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Comprehensiveness—consideration of the whoie--poses no theoretical
difficulties from the viewpoint of the plain-man. All that is needed is to think
with sufficient abstractness. Perhaps abstract thought is itself problematic,
however. The West has not held so, traditionally. We say that thought is
power and we value power. But the human situation resulting from such thought
is one of increasing polarization among men.
Human thought divides one into self and abstract concept of self- -into
subject and object. While some say that a person can reflect and yet not be
self-alienated, the human situation suggests otherwise. I assume that alien-
ation is inevitable, but I also assume that no individual could tolerate its full
impact within himself. He must take sides and project alienation onto society,
thus increasing its dangers. But to remain whole he then must try to recognize
that his opponent's position is equally true and necessary. The whole is a
vi
dilemma.
Neither operationalism nor ordinary language analysis seems an approp-
riate approach to this concept of wholeness. I examine it as a conflict-
-a
conflict within the thought of two writers. Charles Lindblom tends to side with
the objective in human nature and Karl Mannheim with the subjective.
To emphasize the objective is to see oneself and others merely as physi-
cal bodies with different behavioral tendencies. An immediate problem for
Lindblom is to explain how there can be social agreement among a multiplicity
of different values. A more basic problem is to explain the very existence of
such values (which are abstractions) if all one encounters is particular
behavior. According to Lindblom it is just through the clash of opposing values
in a process of bargaining, that social agreement arises and values appear.
To emphasize. the subjective is to see different people as aspects of one
mind, or at least as operating within one conceptual framework. Mannheim
leans this way. His problem is one of explaining how to achieve autonomy
within a conceptual framework or, more immediately, how to escape the
rigidities of bureaucratic -technological society. Mannheim suggests that it is
precisely in recognizing one's necessary conceptual and social boundaries that
one escapes from them.
If the whole is a dilemma, then the clearer and simpler one's position--
the more it can be summarized- -the more immediately one-sided it must be.
To embrace wholeness, such a one-sided position must be tacitly identified
with its opposition. In the spirit of Hegel, I interpret the thought of Lindblom
Vll
and Mannheim as beginning in a narrow, clear position which, because it is
fully though tacitly identified with its opposite, has little meaning. I see the
development of their thought as attempts to loosen this identity, hence increasing
meaning, while yet retaining it, and hence preserving the whole. The attempt
moves the debate partly out of society and into the person's own thought-
-it
becomes broader, more complex, and safer.
I argue by analogy that planned society can itself be interpreted as a
dialectical struggle among conceptual frameworks in which the smaller provide
purpose to the larger and the larger provide means to the smaller. I thus
reject the view that there is only one correct scale of social understanding.
Social reality is neither a large technocratic bureaucracy nor a small community.
It is both, in necessary conflict with each other.
Every human has both right and duty to take personal responsibility for
the whole at his own best level of understanding. One result will be an increase
in personal stress, especially among those most facile with abstractions, but
hopefully another result will be social survival.
viii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This is an essay about comprehensiveness or wholeness in decision-
making, about what we mean when we talk about "seeing the big picture" or
"taking an overview. " If you ask the one who has to do it- -the governor, the
mayor, the chief planner--he is apt to answer that it means personal agony.
It means struggling with mutually exclusive, yet equally and highly worthy,
demands. In short, it means to confront dilemma. In this essay I want to
speculate about that answer.
Maybe this confrontation with dilemma is not a temporary aberration.
Maybe for someone to be a whole human being or something to be a whole
human society is necessarily to be a center of opposing forces --to be self-
alienated. In that case, to the extent that we cannot tolerate this struggle
within our individual selves, we must choose a side. And in joining with others
of like choice, we will externalize and magnify the struggle --and increase its
dangers. On this view, the hot wars between nations, the cold wars between
cities and their neighborhoods, and all those other societal wars will be the
price we must pay for our own inner peace.
Of course this is mere speculation. But the times almost demand that
we speculate in daring ways. As the result of growing limits both on physical
1
2and social resources we face the real possibility, internationally, of havmg
to adopt a "lifeboat ethics" in which the death of whole peoples may be the cost
of survival for others. And it is little consolation to know that at the national
and urban scales the required cost may be only increasing poverty, crime,
and mental disease among those sacrificed.
My essay is an elaboration and defense of this supposition that the whole
is a dilemma and that the price of social peace is our willingness to internalize
that dilemma. The essay means to be an instance of the action it recommends.
It is not a promise of solution to the human condition. It is an offer, on behalf
of urban planners, to share that condition.
Planners in a Quandary
My research began as a response to a concrete difficulty which profes-
sional urban planners of the United States have recently encountered. They are
no longer sure what they are supposed to do.
Until the 1960's, urban planning in the United States largely meant
physical planning. Physical planning was a response to the congestion, pollu-
tion, deterioration, and, in general, the physical chaos, of the early industrial
city. It was not a deeply thought out response because it apparently didn't need
to be. The obvious solution, so it seemed, was to make a "comprehensive
plan" for a city's growth. This comprehensive plan would focus in a map,
which would separate polluting factories from residences, would establish
limits on the height and coverage of buildings so as to reduce traffic and light
3problems, and would otherwise organize the city iri the same way that an
architect would organize a well designed house for a docile client.
But the city was not a house and the client was not docile. In the United
States, until the 1930's, the city was little more than an arena for the play of
market forces. And even afterwards market forces continued to play the main
initiating role in physical development. At their best the planning maps did
not say what would happen but only what was allowed, and even then exceptions
were easily gotten by those with sufficient economic power.
Following World War II, a wide range of federal grant programs were
established or expanded to fund certain aspects of urban growth. The most
substantial funding was for suburban single family housing, an intercity express
highway system, and some very limited redevelopment of the urban cores.
Some funds were also provided, mostly to the smaller cities and towns, for
the plan -making upon which other grants were often conditioned. Given these
many opportunities, urban planning became a high growth profession through-
out the 1950's and for most of the 1960's.
People seldom question their basic assumptions when things are going
well. Not until the later 1960's were there any general doubts within the
profession that planners really could take a comprehensive view, as they
understood it, and could apply it. By that time, however, two opposing tenden-
cies had become evident.
Firstly, planners discovered that their comprehensive approach was
more difficult than expected and that they really had not been using it. On the
4one hand, the market system was still making the most important decisions
~
the location of industry and business and the general suburban movement. On
the other, when planners did intervene they were most effective when they
intervened on the side of the middle class or the rich. A redevelopment project
to assemble land for business, or an exclusionary zoning ordinance to protect
a suburb from low tax generators, would succeed. But a plan for public housing,
or to improve the parks and schools of a ghetto area, was very likely to fail.
Thus the planners were not helping everyone to the same extent.
Some planners saw nothing upsetting in this first discovery. For them it
was a sign of the planner's maturity when he at last recognized that planning,
like all else in government, was essentially a process of bargaining among
interest groups. Granting that the rich had more power, these planners assumed
that even the poorest would gain enough, since the economy was constantly
growing and there was a basic consensus about matters in liberal societies.
Other planners were equally sanguine about the discovery but for virtually
opposite reasons. They attacked the depersonalizing inequitable features of
large scale industrial society and saw the ideal of comprehensiveness as one
more example of such features. They were glad enough, therefore, to see its
limited success. They were confident that an agglomeration of small, relative-
ly self-sufficient, communities would provide enough social order. *
'For a more extended discussion of liberal and radical planning, see
text, chap. V, pp. 310-17, 318-22.
5The second thing many planners discovered was the desperate need for
some kind of comprehensive approach. Previously bemused by the easy money
of federal grants, they had often taken their own profession less seriously
than it deserved. They had been content to argue its need on grounds of
esthetics or efficiency. But these grounds were not greatly persuasive in a
growing economy, one which apparently could afford waste and disorder more
than it could afford restrictions on private enterprise. It is not when there is
plenty for everyone (or everyone who is noticed) that we most need planning.
It is when we face scarcity. Outsiders, and especially those in the environ-
mental movement, made the strongest call for a more truly comprehensive
approach and they based it on a stronger argument, survival.
According to the environmentalists, we must try to halt suburban sprawl
in favor of revitalizing central cities and older small towns. They favor
decentralization if it is achieved by concentrated settlements. They also favor
mass transportation over the expressway system. The more thoughtful of
them argue, as well, for a greater sharing of wealth and more attention to the
basic needs of disadvantaged groups. All these aims require a more inclusive
viewpoint, and probably a broader control, than has previously been available
to public planning. And they are far more controversial.
Buffeted by these opposing viewpoints, the present day planner is often
understandably perplexed. The proponents of interest group planning, I shall
call them "liberal planners, " assure him that things are going pretty well just
as they are. The critics of industrial society, I shall call them "radical
6planners, " are equally sure that things need drastic improvement, but they
agree with the liberals that the traditional comprehensive plan is no way to get
it. Some of the environmentalists overlap the two previous groups, but others
call for a tougher more inclusive planning, especially on physical matters.
They want states to take back from the cities and counties much of their
planning powers and they prefer more action at the national level also. While
the liberals and radicals envision an explicitly political planning, environ-
mentalists tend to favor the traditional view that planning is above politics.
They suggest that the environmental planner, in particular, is sensitive to a
long range public interest which should override the immediate concerns of
2
elected officials.
The concept of comprehensiveness is at the center of this dispute. Does
society need to plan itself as a whole? If it does, can this occur indirectly, as
the liberal and radical planners suppose, or must it mean an explicit large
scale control? Or, again, is the need for explicit large scale control met,
itself, through something like liberal and radical modes of planning? Is com-
prehensiveness perhaps a composite of all three approaches?
9
^"Because of the breadth of the preceding discussion about the planner's
situation, and because the points are generally well accepted within the
profession, the writer has not attempted to provide documentation. If there is
a quarrel with what has been written, it would be that the categories of planners
overlap more than has been suggested and that the writer has said little about
the systems -analytic approach which many planners consider to be dominant.
On the latter point, systems analysis is the present day variant of the same
rationality model which underlay the earlier mapped plan approach. This
rationality model is discussed in text, chap. V, pp. 311-13, see also text
footnotes 25, 26, chap. V.
7My essay is a response, at the level of theory, to this very immediate
problem of American urban planners. Because the response is theoretical I
must now leave the most concrete aspects of that problem. But they will
reappear later on.
At the theoretical level, the planner's quandary is to know just what we
do mean by comprehensiveness. The need is for a concept examination. And
this, specifically, is what my essay provides. The effort divides into three
parts. In the first part (Chapter II) I propose a method of concept examination
because I have misgivings about the appropriateness, to the concept of com-
prehensiveness, of the methods now extant. In the second part (Chapters III
and IV) 1 apply this method to the writings of two important planning theorists.
In the third part (Chapter V) I consider, in a rather wide ranging discussion,
the practical implications of my method and its applications.
As was said earlier, my total effort can best be called speculative. It
is speculative not in having no connection with the current literature, but in
making unconventional interpretations of that literature. These interpretations
can be summarized as a series of suppositions and such a series is presented
below as the most appropriate precis of the essay. Note, incidentally, that 1
treat the terms comprehensiveness, wholeness, and completeness as synonyms
throughout all that follows.
Suppositions about Wholeness
1. Western Civilization traditionally has believed that the capacity for
8abstract thought was perhaps the distinguishing feature of the whole human
being. But suppose that this capacity, which allows us to imagine something
different and better both m ourselves and in society, is also that which alien-
ates us from ourselves and each other. Such a result would occur because in
self consciousness we became divided into subject and object and, then,
because we projected that division onto the social world. Suppose that our
humanness will not allow us completely to reject the objective side of our nature
and thus to become spontaneous and unthinking in our responses. And suppose
that neither will it allow us completely to reject the subjective side and thus to
become mere centers of mechanical behavior or model points of external soc-
ial relations. Then we are saying that to be a whole human is necessarily to
be self alienated.
In that case, the work of the thinker cannot be to show a way out of the
problem --as there is no way that would not destroy a person's humanity. The
thinker's work, instead, is to display the structure of the problem so that we
have an understanding of what must be endured and can devise a plan to share
the burden equally.
2. If the subject and object sides of a human are both present within that
human, then knowledge about him, the kind of knowledge provided by the social
sciences, is not obtained from some outside world of neutral facts. If we want
to know about a person's overt behavior, his objective side, we must know
about the meanings he himself puts into that behavior; we must know, that is,
his subjective side. Thus if we want to know the meanings of human concepts,
9we will find them to be internal meanings; there is nothing "out there" to
point to. But, furthermore, these internal human concepts are each a unity
of opposites. For each is a unity of the objective and subjective sides of the
human.
3. What does it mean, though, to say that concepts are internal? Does
it mean that they are internal to each human or internal to the whole society
of humans? If a human could absorb the full burden of his self alienation with-
in himself, then the concepts would have to be internal to himself, as he would
have taken into himself the alienation previously projected onto society. But
what could it mean to say that the concepts were internal to himself? It could
mean something like the following (the example is not fully developed). If I
define, say, a "traffic problem" as a problem when that "so and so ahead of
me at the stop light doesn't start up fast enough, " that is not a concept internal
to me. But if I leave this nearest cause of my aggravation and trace through
all the intermediate connections until I return to myself as tacit supporter and
beneficiary of, say, a competitive inegalitarian system which results in differ-
ent frustration tolerances, then my concept of a traffic problem more properly
may be called internal. A more complete example of such an internal meaning
is given in Chapter II on pages 94-96.
4. Suppose that no human could fully absorb his subject-object tension
within himself but had to choose sides and thus project his tension onto the
larger society in the form of public issues. Then human concepts would be, in
part, internal to the society as a whole. This means that these concepts,
10
which by conjecture are always a unity of opposing forces, would now be
defined not wholly by a conflict within the person but also, in part, by a con-
flict within the society. No concept could be understood except in contrast to
its opposite.
The preceding suppositions are very abstract but it was necessary that
they be set forth to provide the foundation for what follows. Insofar as they
can be defended, the defense appears in Chapter II, and particularly in the
discussion of a degree of reality logic. The more specific suppositions which
appear below are the bases for the last section of Chapter II and for the later
chapters.
5. The last section of Chapter II is based on, and gives some defense of,
the following suppositions. Consider the life thought of a person who has
written extensively on some social topics. Suppose that this person's thought,
or a major part of it, takes one side of a certain public issue. If asked to
guess the point of his thought process, we normally would say that it was an
attempt to reach consistency and at the same time to reach a subtlety adequate
to the objective facts of human experience.
Suppose, now, that neither consistency nor a correspondence to external
facts is possible but that the thinker is on one side of a hard social dilemma,
generated by human alienation. Suppose that his earliest thought begins with a
primitive intuitive concept which includes both sides of the dilemma. Suppose
that the development of his thought is not truly a reaching for consistency but
is instead an attempt to hold onto his primitive faith in the identity of both sides
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of the dilemma, while at the same time he increasingly distinguishes the two
so that he can accept one side and ever more fully reject the other. And
suppose finally that his "success" in doing this requires him explicitly to
assume the side of his opponents while he must explicitly contrast that position
with his own.
These are the suppositions, or main features, of what 1 call a dialectical
method of concept examination. I suppose, so far as the concept of wholeness
is concerned, that the appropriate method of concept examination is neither to
'
ope rationalize wholeness nor to explore how we all ordinarily use that term.
Instead I see the method as a tracing of some person's response to a dilemma
he faces.
6. Charles Lindblom has argued that the process of pluralist bargaining
is not an obstruction to coordination but is a way to coordinate. In Chapter III
I examine his arguments through the perspective of my dialectical method. I
suppose that he begins his thought widi a kind of primitive faith in the compat-
ibility, even identity, of bargaining and coordination. I suppose that the devel-
opment of his thought is an attempt to maintain this identity, while more sharply
distinguishing out the concept of bargaining so his claim that bargaining can
coordinate will not be merely tautologous.
I suppose, finally, that he explicitly accepts the basic assumption of
those liberals who believe in central planning. He assumes, in other words,
that there is a consensus on important public matters. Because there is, it
is possible for bargaining to coordinate probably about as well as central
12
coordination. But this is not the whole of his position, 1 suggest, since if it
were the result would be trivial. The significant position is that people with
widely different desires can coordinate by bargaining. In order to say the
latter, he needs to contrast explicitly his own model of decision-making with
those of central-planning liberals so as to suggest that his model does allow
more conflict despite his consensus assumptions which imply the opposite.
7. Karl Mannheim has argued that the knowledge people have, as well
as their beliefs, is affected by their social conditions. They see social reality
from a "perspective, " a conceptual framework. But Mannheim adds that it is
possible for some people, at least to loose themselves from their perspectives.
His arguments are considered in Chapter IV. I am supposing there that he, too,
begins his thought with a faith in the compatibility of apparent opposites. In
this case the belief is that "systematization, " by which he means a sort of
evolving conceptual structure, has intrinsic to it the notion of truth independent
of that structure. I suppose that the development of his thought is an attempt
to maintain this suggested identity of conceptual structure with conceptual
freedom while at the same time distinguishing out the idea of freedom so that
it is not simply a label for whatever the conceptual structure permits.
I suppose, finally, that Mannheim assumes, in the thought I am describing,
a position often associated with totalitarian political regimes. This is the
position that there is one best conceptual structure at a certain time, although
that one is always in process of evolution. The view suggests an embracing
historical destiny. Because there is this embracing history, it is possible to
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achieve conceptual freedom; such achievement- is automatic. That it is auto-
matic, however, is just another expression of that trivial result one gets by
identifying destiny and freedom. The significant position would be that a
person can become free of his conceptual structure and not within it. To be
able to say the latter, Mannheim needs to contrast his model of social reality
with that of the totalitarians to show that his allows a true freedom, despite
the assumption he shares with them which suggests the opposite.
The key to my examination of the thought of Lindblom and Mannheim is
the supposition that they both face problems which are logically impossible,
by the criterion of formal logic. Hence they must be understood to be elab-
orating their respective dilemmas instead of resolving them.
The results of the concept examinations in Chapters III and IV are not,
except negatively, conclusions to be applied in Chapter V. Rather, they are
insights into the structure of our response to dilemmas. Hence the results
can be brought to the last chapter only as analogies. They suggest a structure
which may also be found in the practice of urban planning.
8. Having assumed that every human being must to some extent extern-
alize and thus put off upon society his own inner dilemmas, I suppose, in
Chapter V, that the burden of these social dilemmas is not spread uniformly.
I suggest that it is most easily avoided by those who are most able to generate
it- -the meritocracy or administrative class. Within this class are the planners.
I suppose further that the principal expression of this inequity is belief that
there is only one correct scale of human understanding- -one true whole. And
com-
ic
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I suggest that the presently accepted scale may have passed beyond the
petence of many members of society. I suppose finally that there may be a
sense in which simpler, narrower, conceptual frameworks may be as wholisti
as broader ones. I argue that this supposition implies a different relationship
between the high level professional or administrator and other people than
that to which we are accustomed-
-a relationship more stressful to the former
precisely because it is more meaningful to the latter.
These then are my principal suppositions. They are not undefended, but
I call them suppositions because they are unconventional interpretations of our
social experience and because they are in some cases too wide-ranging to
permit in-depth defense.
It is time now to take a deeper look at the concept of comprehensiveness,
as preparation for the concept examinations in Chapters III and IV.
Two Problems of Comprehensiveness
I have alluded to two problems encountered respectively by Lindblom and
Mannheim, problems which I call dilemmas. I consider them to be problems
both of comprehensiveness as a concept and of comprehensiveness as that to
which the concept refers. (Comprehensiveness is a human concept and, for
reasons already presented in supposition 2. above, we cannot draw a sharp
distinction, in such cases, between concept and referent. )
Before the 1960's, most professional planners in the United States would
have recognized only one of these problems of comprehensiveness. The
15
problem for them was how to achieve it. How could the society achieve an
overview of urban physical problems and a control of those problems, within
the bounds of a free enterprise, pluralist politics? Apparently it happened in
some countries of Western Europe, toward which the American planner looked
enviously. But it was seldom thought to happen here.
Recently, some American planners have identified an opposite problem.
They examine the society more broadly and conclude that we are all captives
of large scale bureaucracy, whatever may be the failures of urban planning
per se. This condition of bureaucratic suffocation is true of industrialized
societies generally, and the resulting problem is not how to achieve compre-
hensiveness but how to avoid it. How is it possible to achieve relatively small
and self-sufficient communities within the larger social order? Planners
identifying this other problem look to the Republic of China or to other third
world countries for their models.
The first problem of comprehensiveness is what I call the social control
problem. It is the problem which concerns Charles Lindblom and also concerns
those designated as liberal planners.
The second problem is what I call the social change problem. In a more
abstract form it is the problem addressed by Karl Mannheim in those of his
writings which especially concern me. In its immediate form it is the problem
of radical planners.
I want to consider, briefly, the philosophical roots of these two problems.
The Social Control Problem. To see comprehensiveness as raising a
16
control problem is to adopt a viewpoint with roots in the positivist aspect of
Thomas Hobbes' thought. 3 For Hobbes, human beings are merely matter in
motion and, like the elements of which they are composed, they themselves
have only mechanical relations to each other. In the later language of David
Hume, each human could be described as loose and separate from all others.
Humans are not separate in having distinctly different understandings.
Indeed they do not have understandings at all if by this is meant something
involving an intimate mixture of facts, values, and reasoning. Humans do
experience sensations but these sensations will be the same for all who ex-
perience them. Also, humans can give arbitrary general "names" to similar
sensations. From these names it is possible to deduce consequences. But,
because the names are arbitrary many alternatives are possible and the
system of knowledge deducible from one set will differ from that deducible
from another. Thus, human understandings differ from each other not in
themselves but because different humans make different choices in the naming
of similar sensations.
All humans are governed by passions (i. e. , forms of the motions which
they make), and these are in all cases directed to the same general goals --self
preservation and self aggrandisement. Apparently the ultimate reason that
humans are attracted to different specific goals, and may acquire different
^Hobbes is not a wholly consistent thinker. This brief and somewhat
over-simplified presentation of his thought emphasizes the mechanistic side of
it. The discussion is based primarily on W. T. Jones, A History of Western
Philosophy, Vol. II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co. , 1952), chap. 22.
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knowledge, is because they are different physical bodies.
Perhaps the dominant of the general human passions is self preservation-
expressed as an intense quest for security. Unfortunately the effect of that
passion is to produce a "war of all against all" such that even the strongest
lose what little security they might gain through their strength. But if we
assume that men are what Hobbes says they are--simply matter in motion-
then this war of all against all should raise no problem of social control.
Humans will have no way to reflect on their situation and imagine the desira-
bility of social order.
The Hobbesian view of human nature is not preposterous. It is a variant
of the view held by anyone who maintains that all significant knowledge of
human beings must be reducible to sense experience. And it has the great
virtue of explaining human differences and separateness. Both are due to the
existence of different physical bodies.
Given this view of human nature, however, a social control problem only
appears when the view becomes inconsistent. According to Hobbes the response
to the war of all against all is an agreement among men, ceding power to an
absolute sovereign who maintains order. But this response assumes that men
can, in fact, reflect.
In any case, the social control problem itself can now be concisely
stated. If there is a plurality of individuals with competing preferences, how
can these preferences be ordered into a collective preference to which all
18
will agree? 4 For if all do not agree and hence do not accept the collective
preference then it does not function as a truly collective preference.
So stated, the social control problem is almost the same as what is
otherwise called the collective choice problem. Because I assume no existing
or enduring consensus on procedures or policies, but assume instead a sharp
conflict, I emphasize the necessity for any collective preference to be unan-
imous.
The difference between my approach to the collective choice problem
and that of most others consists in my assumptions, first, that the problem is
logically impossible to solve and, second, that this logical impossibility does
not mean an end to intellectual effort on the topic. It simply means a redirec-
tion of that effort. The first assumption I perhaps share with Kenneth Arrow
and some writings of Robert Paul Wolff. The second, which may seem absurd
to the reader, is defended in Chapter II at pages 74-81.
The Social Change Problem
. Some thinkers take a position virtually
the opposite of Hobbes'. Hegel, in his philosophy of history, is thought to
4This statement of the problem, with the exception of the reference to
unanimity, is similar to that of Kenneth Arrow. See text, chap. II, p. 76.
^This version therefore differs from that of writers such as J. M.
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock who, in the Calculus of Consent , also emphasize
at least near unanimity, but who assume that such near unanimity is possible.
For a discussion and critique of their view, see Brian Barry, Political Argu-
ment (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), chaps. XIV and XV.
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do so. ^ His views provide one of the philosophically most extreme founda-
tions of the social change problem. Where for Hobbes there was only matter,
for Hegel there is only mind. And if there is only mind then there can
ultimately be but one mind. No mind would be able to know another except as
an aspect of itself, there being no neutral standard by which both could com-
pare themselves.
non-
Mind, or Absolute Spirit as Hegel otherwise calls it, is a largely
temporal process of infinite self-realization. But there is a phase of this
process
--the phase of "Objective Spirit"
--which occurs in time. That phase
is discussed in some of the most "applied" of Hegel's writings. Yet even in the
unfolding of Objective Spirit it is only the whole, the process of world history,
which is wholly real. Individual persons are contingent differentiations of the
whole. "Mind, " says Hegel, "has actuality, and individuals are accidents of
this actuality. " 7
In the phase of Objective Spirit even single states are only passing
This discussion draws from the following sources: Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," trans, by T. M. Knox and "The
Philosophy of History," trans, by J. Sibree, Vol. XLVI of Great Books of the
Western World
,
ed. by Robert M. Hutchins (54 vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc., 1952); Herbert Marcuse, "Reason and Revolution, " and
George H. Sabine, "Hegel's Political Philosophy, " in Essays in the History of
Political Thought
,
ed. by Isaac Kramnick (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1969); and G. R. G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel
(London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
7Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," ["Addition 100" of "Hegel's Additions
to the Philosophy of Right"], p. 133. Also see ["Addition 94"], p. 132; and
["Addition 152"], p. 141.
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phases, although they do seem to have a higher reality than individuals.
A state is higher not because it is, as for Hobbes, a contract among
people whose individuality is rooted in their physically distinct bodies. It is
higher because it is an organic moral community and creates individuals. It
creates individuals not of course as bodies but as conscious thinking and
willing beings. They exist as such only because they are members of this
community.
Hegel is not primarily concerned to argue this view but to assert it as
part of his description of dialectical development. He does give, however,
what constitute a number of arguments. All are aspects of the claim that the
community is a meaning framework. He argues that human wants as opposed
to merely physical ones are socially conditioned; that a person is nobody
definite except by limitation to some social group; and that the individual is
only truly free when his choices are not merely arbitrary but arc influenced
by their content- -a content already present as the customs and laws of a
g
society.
Each stage in the historical development of this higher reality, the
state, is called by Hegel the spirit of a people. This spirit is something like
a world view and a national character existing as a single entity. It is less
^This summary of his arguments on the general point is largely para-
phrased from a summary in Sabine, "Hegel's Political Philosophy," p. 318.
On the particular point that a person becomes definite by limitation to a social
group, see Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right," ["Addition 130" of "Hegel's
Additions to the Philosophy of Right"], p. 139.
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exclusively a way of seeing than a way of being and it comprises all aspects
of social life.
The succession of dominant states is achieved through the agency of
particular "world historical individuals. " Spirit is not a discrete being who
can act apart from individuals; Hegel does not argue that the self-conscious
-
ness of Spirit could occur in the absence of any individual self-consciousness.
But world historical individuals further the goals of Spirit by intensely pur-
suing their own self-interest. They are not aware of these goals. Sometimes
Hegel speaks as if the self-interest of world historical individuals was inevitably
unethical. But he acknowledges at other times that the interests of such
individuals, like those of other wise individuals within the state, may naturally
serve ethical purposes, though in this case a higher ethics. ^
y
".
. .
the history of the world occupies a higher ground than that on
which morality has properly its position; which is personal character, the
conscience of individuals, their particular will and mode of action,.
. .
They who on moral grounds, and consequently with noble intention, have
resisted that which the advance of the spiritual idea makes necessary,
stand higher in moral worth than those whose crimes have been turned into
the means --under the direction of a superior principle --of realizing the
purposes of that principle. "
Then Hegel adds:
"But in such revolutions both parties generally stand within the limits of
the same circle of transient and corruptible existence. Consequently it is
only a formal rectitude, . . . which those who stand upon ancient right and
order maintain. The deeds of great men, who are the individuals of the
world's history, thus appear not only justified in view of that intrinsic
result of which they were not conscious, but also from the point of view
occupied by the secular moralist. "
But then Hegel concludes again that history has really nothing to do with
morality. Hegel, "The Philosophy of History, " p. 184.
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From Hegel's viewpoint, at least as it is expressed in his history, there
is no social change problem. The world historical individuals are as much
subject to historical destiny as are any others.
A social change problem can be identified in Hegel's thought only when
that thought is treated in a way which others (probably not Hegel) would call
inconsistent. It appears only if we suppose that some people could become
independent not only of their present social milieu but of any evolving social
milieu.
The social change problem may then be stated as follows. If society,
together with its concepts, is the source of human individuality and under-
standing, how can anyone independently alter his nature or his understanding?
This problem is what others may call the problem of cultural or social
relativism. The term relativism implies that the problem is logically im-
possible to solve since individuality and understanding are relative to the
society. I accept that implication. Again, as with the social control problem,
I want to argue, however, that something's being a logical impossibility does
not necessarily mean that it is no longer worth thinking about.
These problems of comprehensiveness are problems to which Lindblom
and Mannheim respectively address themselves. Starting at Chapter III, I
shall examine their efforts. First, though, I must explain my methodology
and give its rationale. This is the purpose of Chapter II.
CHAPTER II
A DIALECTICAL METHOD OF CONCEPT EXAMINATION
"There are two kinds of truth,
small truth and great truth.
You can recognize a small truth
because its opposite is a falsehood.
The opposite of a great truth is
another truth. nl
Niels Bohr
This is a dissertation in political science. Knowing that fact, the reader
who holds a conventional view of science is likely to be perplexed by the two
problems I have identified: the social control problem and the social change
problem. He may agree that they exist, if not perhaps in the form given, but
will wonder if they are really problems of scientific knowledge rather than of
applied knowledge. How a group of different free -thinking people can agree on
forms of social order- -is not that, for example, a matter more of technique
than of science?
^Quoted in I<eo Rauch, The Philosophy of Hegel, Monarch Notes and
Study Guides (New York: Monarch Press, Inc., 1965), p. 27.
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My response to the reader's perplexities is a conditional one. Whether
the problems are problems of science depends on what kinds of scientific
problems there might be. It depends on whether, indeed, there might be
problems which were truly problems of theoretical knowledge and yet which
were better described some other way than as science.
In this chapter I describe three sorts of problems of theoretical knowl-
edge. The first two are widely acknowledged and discussed. One is the prob-
lem of empirical associations
--what phenomena are truly associated with each
other? The other is the problem of concepts
--what are the meanings of scien-
tific terms? The third problem is a speculative one on my part but it has
foundations in a movement of thought which has previously been influential.
This third problem is also a conceptual one, but of a different kind. I call it a
dialectical problem.
Following the review of these problems, I shall present my reasons of
theory and expediency for thinking it necessary to consider the problems of
comprehensiveness as dialectical ones. The chapter concludes with discussion
of a suggested method for dealing with such problems.
Conceptual Problems Distinguished From Empirical Problems
Empirical Problems --The Positivist Viewpoint
.
According to one view,
which I shall call the positivist, research problems are empirical. They are
primarily problems of data reliability- -the statistical problems of assuring
that if we repeated an observation or experiment, all conditions being the same,
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we would be likely to get the same results. This view of research problems
is part of the more general positivist position according to which the empirical
world in some sense directly confronts us, and hence allows us to formulate
general hypotheses about this world with assurance that there is a way to test
2them. (Many scientists would now agree, though, that we do not test a
hypothesis to prove it true. We do so to show that the hypothesis resists
attempts to disprove it. )^
It is not possible to identify something, unambiguously, as a positivist
approach to research, since any piece of scientific work could be said to in-
volve both positivist and non-positivist elements. But the following example
at least emphasizes the former view. It builds on Skinner's approach to
4human behavior. In this example our first step is to advance a hypothesis --
say that the rewarding of "cooperative" human behavior is likely to increase
^In the philosophy of science, there may be few present-day writers who
could be described unequivocally as positivists. But some writers approach
that position more closely than others, among them being Ernest Nagel and
perhaps Carl Hempel. In the application of scientific method, the emphasis
on data reliability is still very influential. See, for example, Fred Kerlinger,
Foundations of Behavioral Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1965). Here, the scientific method is described without hesitation as a study
of relationships. Most of the book concerns data collection and measurement,
and statistical tests of relationships.
JThis is the falsifiability criterion advanced by Karl Popper. For a
discussion of it, see Bryan Magee, Karl Popper
, Modern Masters (New York:
The Viking Press, 1973), pp. 15-18.
^See B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Toronto: Bantam
Books, 1971), chaps. 1, 7, 8.
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the amount of that behavior. Then we devise a test of this hypothesis. Let us
suppose we select a group of children and provide them with craft materials
which they can use either for making objects to keep (self -activity) or to con-
struct a large but simple doll house which is to be sent to a children's hospital
(cooperative activity). After the craft session is over, those who spent any
time on cooperative activity are called back, unbeknown to the others, and are
given special praise. At a later date the session is repeated, under the same
conditions, to see if the "cooperators" have increased the percentage of time
spent in that way.
From a positivist viewpoint, the most important problem in this research
is to assure that the associations we discover about the particular sample of
children would be true of the entire universe of children. The problem is to
assure that the findings are not due simply to chance.
There is another problem for positivists but it is one not taken so ser-
iously. It is often called the validity problem or the problem of operational-
izing concepts. (It is also a problem of going from a sample to the whole but
a different one). In the example given, we need to decide what is meant by
concepts like "cooperative behavior, " "increases in cooperative behavior, "
and "rewards. " Following Hume, positivists tend to hold that concepts have
meanings because the more basic ones, at least, are reflections of sense ex-
perience. And because they have this kind of meaning we can test, by sense
experience, the propositions in which they occur. ^
^Logical positivists express this in a verification theory of meaning,
while practicing scientists more commonly speak of operationalism.
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Having this faith that experience comes labelled, so to speak, positivists
would assume that we could fairly easily agree on the meanings of "cooper-
ative behavior" etc. Cooperative behavior means, among other things, making
a doll house rather than making things to keep. Rewards means words of
praise, among other things. And an increase in the amount of a certain be-
havior can mean an increase in the time spent on it relative to time spent
otherwise.
The importance of giving very specific instances of these concepts can-
not be overestimated. The positivist is anxious to assure that he has elimin-
ated the effects of any variables, other than those whose association he is
studying. Thus, he must be able to take some very narrow and highly con-
trollable situation and generalize to something much broader. He sees no
great difficulty in doing so, however.
I conclude that if research problems are empirical problems, they are
mainly problems of predictability. They are also problems of meaning but the
latter problems, though important, are not severe, since we know what our
concepts mean in experience. They mean their overt instances --nothing more. 6
Conceptual Problems --The Contexualist Viewpoint
. There is another,
less common, way of seeing research problems which places emphasis pre-
cisely on the question of meanings. According to this view, the primary
^This is admittedly the most extreme version of operationalism, but
modified versions tend to weaken the positivist faith that experience comes
ready labelled and, hence, to depart from positivism.
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research problem is to get clear about the concepts we are using--it is a
conceptual problem. From this perspective, the cooperative behavior re-
search described above raises a question more serious than that of statistical
reliability. The question is whether we are really studying cooperation at all.
The children in our supposed research were not asked to report on their
motives, and we can assume that this was for reasons of objectivity. The
positivist would argue that there is no way to be sure of someone's real
motives, even for the person himself. He would note that motives are not
objects of sense experience. But in the absence of reports about motives, how
do we know that the behavior was indeed cooperative? A child might choose to
work on the doll house because he liked the excitement or bigness of the project
and not to help in a common effort.
There is a positivist argument which explains away this difficulty. It is
that we have been misled by the peculiarities of the social sciences into thinking
that we can do something there that we could not do in science generally. Un-
like other objects of science, people can appear to exemplify a concept of
interest by a self report as well as by other verbal, and by non-verbal, be-
havior. But, as stated above, we can never be sure that someone is manifest-
ing cooperation, or fear, or intelligence, or anything else just because he says
so. According to the positivist view, we conceptually identify human utterances
as we do any other phenomenon- -a concept is simply all of its overt instances.
This view of concepts, however, raises a second apparently intractable
difficulty. How can the concept be general? How can a study of the
cooperation which means making a doll house for others rather than toys for
oneself tell us anything about the cooperation which means being willing to
accept peacefully the ascension of a political leader with whom one disagrees,
if he has been elected by a majority of the citizens? If it cannot do this, then
science, as the development of general laws, is impossible. Science, after
all, can never study the whole of anything but must always look at instances.
This positivist difficulty, which I shall examine more closely at a later
point, has prompted some people to adopt a different, "contextualist" view of
research. Their claim is that general concepts are not defined by pointing to
instances. Such concepts are defined by the context of other concepts within
which they are used. If we want to study a cooperation which is more than a
narrow overt behavior, then we will have to look at a cooperation in which
general meanings are already an integral part. We could look again at our
study of the children since there are surely meanings in their actions, but
these meanings would be relatively simple and inarticulate. That may be an
advantage from the positivist viewpoint but it is not an advantage otherwise.
Suppose, instead, that we study the adult reaction, in two countries, to
the election of a chief executive. In country A (an industrialized, free enter-
prise system) the election appears to be peacefully accepted. In country B
(an underdeveloped but also free enterprise system) it is soon followed by a
coup d'etat during which the elected chief executive is replaced with a leftist
^Sorne philosophers of science who are particularly associated with this
view are Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn, and Norwood Hanson.
30
military junta.
From a positivist viewpoint, it is obvious which country manifests a
more cooperative attitude among its citizens and the major research problem
is simply that of determining what factors might be associated with this atti-
tude.
From the contextualist viewpoint, however, what counts as cooperation
depends on one's conceptual or theoretical framework. And one's conceptual
framework is a matter of the distinctions which are considered most important.
The problem for the contextualist is to determine what distinctions are most
basic.
We might view the two countries through quasi
-Marxist spectacles and
if we did we would be making certain characteristic distinctions. We would
distinguish between exploited and exploiting peoples and also between a pre-
capitalist, a purported free -enterprise capitalist, and a socialist stage of
economic development.
From this view, the competitive system of country A would necessarily
favor the strong and ruthless. And because it was a capital intensive system
the effect of the system would be to further widen the gap between the power of
these strong and ruthless, who controlled the capital, and those people who did
not.
Though the system generated surplus capital, through industrialization,
this capital could not be applied to the needs of the locally exploited except just
so much as to keep them pacified. Otherwise there would be interference with
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the market system. Given this unacceptable capital outlet and given the re-
sulting inadequate income of the locally exploited, country A would need to
find outside market opportunities and outside opportunities for capital use.
Some of these opportunities would be in such underdeveloped countries as B.
As the stronger country, A could dictate the terms of its economic relation-
ships with B and the result could be to inhibit the development and maintain the
poverty of B.
Given this view of countries A and B, we would conclude that the election
'
behavior of country A reflected apathy rather than cooperation
-since the same
power group would hold office after any election and would always provide enough
welfare to keep the public pacified. On the other hand, the behavior of the coup
supporters in country B reflects the only true cooperation discernable in cither
country. It is deliberate and is directed at a goal beyond self
-interest
--the
goal of eliminating the country's status as a pawn. Of course, once country B
had embraced a socialist system then, on our view, cooperation would not need
to appear as anti -system.
We see that if the concept of "cooperation in a capitalist country" occurs
in a quasi -Marxist context, then it must be the cooperation of a revolutionary
cell, as this is implied in the concepts of exploitation and historical determinism.
From within an opposing, capitalist, context one would deny that the
controllers of capital were an elite and privileged group or that the relations
of developed to underdeveloped countries were more exploitive than they were
economically stimulating. Instead the claim would be that economic power is
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widely distributed and that such power differences as exist represent, to a
significant degree, the hard work of those whom they favor. From the per-
spective of the free enterprise capitalist, a more appropriate way to carve up
reality would be by a distinction between politically free and politically unfree
regimes. Given economic freedom, then, so long as a people were free to
vote, to join political parties, and to participate similarly, one could assume
that the peaceful ascension of an elected leader did indeed reflect cooperation
and conversely that a coup-ridden polity reflected its absence. Furthermore,
one could also assume that these meanings of cooperation were enduring ones,
since one would not acknowledge any inexorable tendencies in history and
certainly not any tendencies that would greatly alter the democratic rules of
o
the game.
Ostension--A Problem for Positivism
. Faced with the difficulties in both
positivist and contextualist approaches to theoretical knowledge, it is not easy
for one to choose between them. A positivist may have difficulty in persuading
us that his findings mean what he says they mean but these findings at least
seem to have some basis other than his own expectations --he has an obvious
concern for "stubborn fact. " While the contextualist is deficient in this
respect, while he seems dangerously close to defining the facts to suit himself,
^This illustration of the contextualist approach draws its principles, but
not the specific illustration, from Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in Political
Science," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series, ed. by Peter Las
-
lettandW. G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwcll, 1969), pp. 25-57.
33
yet for this very reason he, too, has his own virtues. At least his findings
must mean what he says they mean, and this is not a trivial result since the
findings we are mostly concerned with are those about human actions. In such
research, the researcher always has himself as object.
It is because human beings seem to be the immediate source of meanings,
in any event, that one may prefer the contextualist approach. If it is difficult
to explain the movement from meaning to fact, at least one does not deny the
presence of meaning if one is a contextualist. By contrast, the positivist
seems to do so. Consequently he faces a severe problem, the problem of
ostension.
The problem of ostension (I shall treat ostension as synonomous with
denotation), is the problem of teaching a meaning by pointing to a sensed
instance of that meaning. The possibility of ostension seems to be the funda-
mental tenet of faith for positivists
. It is expressed in the claim of the British
empiricists that the mind is a mirror reflecting reality. While he denied that
we gained the concepts of objects in this way, the grandfather of positivism,
David Hume, seemed quite ready to admit that smaller elements, bits of sense
Q
experience, were so learned.
9David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
,
ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 15-16. [Bk. I, Pt. I, sec. VI,
first par. ] Hume was not wholly consistent, however. At some points he
suggested that one could have impressions of objects. See David Hume, "An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, " ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Vol.
XXXV of Great Books of the Western World
,
ed. by Robert M. Hutchins (54
vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), pp. 455-56. [sec. II,
no. 13.]
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The tendency of positivist thinking, since- Hume, has been toward an
exasperating increase in subtlety on this point. Faith in ostension still seems
to be present but it is more illusive and inconsistent. Bertrand Russell has
argued that a denoting phrase never has a meaning in itself but that the propo-
sition in which it occurs has a meaning. 10 This view would look like a con-
textualist position, were it not known that Russell also had faith in the existence
of "hard data" as the only ultimate source of knowledge, hard data consisting
principally in personal sense data and logical laws. 11
A. J. Ayer, the best known spokesman for that variant of positivism
described as logical positivism, has persuasively and explicitly argued against
12
ostension. * Then, at other points in the same work, he tacitly has accepted
it. He has developed a verification theory of meaning according to which any
significant non -tautological proposition is meaningful only if it is, or somehow
1 o
entails, an observation statement.
10Bertrand Russell, "On Denoting," Mind
, XIV (1905), 479-93.
1] See W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy
,
(New York: Har-
court, Brace & Co.
, 1952), p. 986. The original source is Bertrand Russell,
Our Knowledge of the External World (Chicago: Open Court, 1929), pp. 75-77.
12See text p. 36.
1 o
-^Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (2d ed. ; New York:
Dover Publications, Inc.
,
n. d. ). In this dissertation, the writer shall not dis-
cuss the intricacies of the verification theory or the subtle modifications which
Ayer made in his first formulation of it. Suffice it to say that he asserts the
meaning of a statement can be tested by a range of sense -contents occurrences
and not by a single one. And, if this is possible, it apparently is so either,
because we have some a priori theoretical framework which tells one which
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The reason why recent positivist philosophers continue to maintain, and
yet are ambivalent about, their faith in ostension is because ostension seems
an impossible way to learn and has seemed so at least since Plato. It seems
impossible, that is, to learn about anything by referring to an instance of it
or a sign of it. 14
Plato, indeed, made the still broader claim that no reference to some-
thing outside oneself could teach one.
You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows,
or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to
'
enquire; and if not, he cannot;^ for he does not know the very subject
about which he is to enquire. 10
Augustine believed that ostension was possible but that it was due to a
sense -contents are relevant and which are not or. because the sense
-contents
themselves will tell that. Ayer does not want to say the former and thus
seems committed to the latter, which is the faith in ostension. See pp. 5-16
and 35-41. To the writer, the statement which most reveals Ayer's faith in
ostension is the following:
".
. .
what is required to verify a statement about a material thing is
never the occurrence of precisely this or precisely that sense -content,
but only the occurrence of one or other of the sense -contents that fall
within a fairly indefinite range" [p. 12].
l^The writer's use of the term ostension is deliberately broad. It
encompasses all methods of defining which refer to an instance of the thing
defined, which is why the term is made synonymous with denotation. It also
encompasses, additionally, all methods which define by reference to a sign
in its physical existence.
1DPlato, "The Dialogues of Plato, " ed. by Benjamin Jowett, Vol. VII
of Great Books of the Western World
,
ed. by Robert M. Hutchins (54 vols;
Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), p. 179. ["The Meno, " 80.]
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divine illumination. It was not possible in the way that empiricists suppose.
"For if I am asked what walking is when I am still, or doing something else,
and if I, by walking immediately, try to teach without a sign what has been
asked.
. .
then how shall I avoid having the asker think that walking consists
in walking only so far as I walked?.
. . And what I have said about this one
word will be true of all the others which we thought could be shown without a
sign.
.
."
16
As the thing itself could not teach one, neither, said Augustine, could
the sign of the thing. "For when a sign is given me, if it finds me not knowing
of what thing it is a sign, it can teach me nothing, but if it finds me knowing
the thing of which it is the sign, what do I learn from the sign?" 17
The positivists acknowledge the difficulty. Ayer remarks that ".
. . One
cannot in language point to an object without describing it. If a sentence is to
express a proposition, it cannot merely name a situation; it must say some-
thing about it. And in describing a situation, one is not merely "registering"
a sense -content; one is classifying it in some way or odier, and this means
I o
going beyond what is immediately given.
The ambivalence toward ostension, at the level of general philosophy,
has its parallel in the philosophy of science, as we shall see. In the 1920's
16St . Augustine, "Concerning the Teacher, " excerpts in The Age of Be-
lief: The Medieval Philosophers
,
ed. by Anne Fremantle, The Mentor Philoso-
phers (New York: The New American Library, 1954), p. 38.
17Ibid.
, p. 41.
l^Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 91.
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there was a simple faith as expressed in Percy Bridgman's classic notion of
operationalism. Bridgman held that every scientifically meaningful concept
must be defined by a set of performable physical operations and meant nothing
more than those operations. 19 Yet he apparently supposed that such concepts
were, at the same time, the highly general concepts with which science was
concerned. He was claiming to be a nominalist, but the physicists' concepts
of the 1920's were not, in fact, simply descriptions of the operations performed.
The problem of ostension soon became evident, therefore. If every set
of operations represented a different concept, as Bridgman claimed (or going
beyond Bridgman, if every even temporally or spatially different set of oper-
ations represented a different concept, as it logically should have) then gener-
alization from, and even repeatability of, operations would be impossible. We
have already encountered this difficulty in trying to generalize from supposed
research on cooperative behavior among children.
Recognizing this difficulty in classic operationalism, positivist philoso-
phers of science proceeded to modify the notion. Some changes were minor-
-
the suggestion, for instance, that operations might be only hypothetical. 20
But gradually there was a major change --the shift toward the view that scientific
19For a brief discussion of Bridgman's position, see Carl G. Hempel,
Philosophy of Natural Science (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice -Hall,
Inc.
,
1966), pp. 91-93.
20Bridgman, himself, allowed for this in his later writings. See G.
Schlesinger, "Operationalism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed.
,
V, 544.
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concepts do not stand alone but are part of a theoretical framework. 21 There
remain, today, differences of opinion as to the relative weight of theory and
observation in the grounding of concepts, even among the positivistically
inclined, with Hcmpcl giving an increasing emphasis to theory by comparison
with others. In general, though, the criticisms of ostension have been
decisive-
-at least at the philosophical level, and at least to the extent thai the
positivi.st approach is now usually combined with the contexualist one.
Two Kinds of Conceptual Problems?
If we are to conclude that scientific problems are, in the first instance,
conceptual problems, can we also conclude that there is but one principal type
of conceptual problem? I believe that this conclusion is often drawn but I dis-
agree that it is correct. In this section I shall try to say why.
The positions of positivism and contextualism are expressions, in the
realm of science, of a more general philosophic distinction between empiricism
and idealism. And the problems of those two approaches to science have their
analogues in philosophy generally. The empiricist, as I describe him, believes
2*Ibid. Also on this point, Ernest Nagel argues that the evidence for a
purported scientific law is more satisfactory if, instead of supporting the law
by itself, it supports it as part of a system. See Ernest Nagel, The Structure
of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (New York: Har-
court, Brace & World, Inc.
, 1961), pp. 04-67, 68-70. For a particularly in-
fluential and concise statement of the view that knowledge confronts experience
as a whole, and from a man who sometimes calls himself a nominalist, see
W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review
,
LX (January, 1951), 20-43.
39
that there is a world wholly independent of consciousness and, hence, that the
entities of this world are completely loose and separate from each other inso-
far as any influences of consciousness upon them are concerned. Indeed there
are no entities
--only transitory sense impressions. Accordingly, the problem
for the empiricist is that there are only associations but no categorized objects
to be associated. The associations have swallowed the categories.
The idealist believes that, since consciousness is essential for knowing,
the world which is known must be a product of consciousness. Every entity in
the world is thus integrally related to every other. The problem for the ideal-
ist is that there can be only one ultimate conceptual category-
-the knowing self.
All associations are part of the definition of that concept. Thus this category
has swallowed the associations.
When philosophers of science argue that inquiry occurs within the bounds
of a conceptual framework but is nonetheless open to observational tests, they
are adopting a middle way between idealism and empiricism. But the concept
of a middle way tends to carry with it the suggestion that there is only one such
position, whereas what is at least as likely is that the middle way simply in-
corporates, in microcosm, that larger debate of which it is the middle way.
For example, the "middle way" in American politics is a code phrase used to
characterize one's own position, leaving the implication that one's opponent is
an extremist.
I shall argue that there is a kind of contextualism, a kind of emphasis on
conceptual problems, in the philosophy of science which seems dominant at the
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time of writing and has tended to acquire the title of middle way. I shall then
argue that there are important difficulties with this particular middle way and
shall then sketch out features of a possible alternative.
In distinguishing two kinds of conceptual problems, I shall use the term
"logic. " Hence, I use the term not in the present sense, where it refers to
the principles of prepositional connections (syntax alone), but in an earlier and
broader sense which also includes questions of meaning. 22
Within logic there are three traditional laws of thought which are sup-
posed to be necessary and sufficient for correct thinking. Present day logic
has been developed as a formal syntactical system in which these laws are no
longer fundamental. But they seem to remain fundamental in that pre
-formal
meta-logic without which the formal system could not have been designed. 23
The three laws of thought are: the Law of Identity, the Law of Non-
Contradiction, and the Law of Excluded Middle. There arc different ways to
formulate these laws. Since I am concerned with logic as implicated in the
attribution of meaning, as having a semantical dimension, I believe the trad-
itional formulations are probably best. These are as follows.
The Law of Identity asserts that A is A.
22A presumed value in removing questions of meaning from formal logic
was the hope that one might, thereby, avoid the paradoxes which had been dis-
covered within all attempts to render logic systematically complete.
23On this point, see Irving M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (2d ed.
;
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 273.
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The Law of Non-Contradiction asserts that the propositions A is B and
A is not B cannot both be true.
The Law of Excluded Middle asserts that either A is B or A is not B.
For both emf ir. cists and idealists, logic and its laws are taken as
absolutes. For empiricists like Hume or the logical positivists, the laws of
thought are absolute because they are tautologous. For idealists like Spinoza,
the laws are absolute because they are constitutive of reality itself. But in
any middle way between empiricism and idealism, logic cannot be wholly
absolute in either sense. The empiricists must be wrong to suppose a sharp
distinction between contingent consequential facts and certain but tautologous
and inconsequential logic. And the idealists must be wrong in their sharp
distinction between an ephemeral deceptive world of fact and a certain and
unchanging world of logically related ideas.
Consequently, if there is more than one middle way between empiricism
and idealism, the differences between them may well have to do with which of
the laws of logic is most qualified, which most becomes a matter of degree.
A Degree of Truth Logic . The apparently dominant form of contextual-
ism, at present, seems associated with doubt about the Law of Excluded
Middle. The claim is made that our most important concepts are incapable
of precise definition. We cannot definitely say of them either, that they force
us to see reality, permanently, in a certain restricted way or, that they pro-
vide us with accurate but highly fragmented glimpses of that reality. This
claim is obviously advantageous since it avoids the criticisms of both con-
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textualism and positivism. But the disadvantage, if such, is, as William
Alston says, that ".
. .
the fact of vagueness forces us to make some sort of
qualification in the supposedly self-evident 'Law of Excluded Middle.
.
.
" ,24
We are no longer certain that A must either be B or not be B.
Now if our concepts were wholly vague so that there could be no progress
toward deciding whether or not A was B, then we would be retreating to empiri-
cist scepticism. To hold to a middle way, we must claim that our important
concepts are capable of an increasing precision as we willfully alter them, as
outside reality forces us to alter them, or as both events happen more or less
together. Bertrand Russell has aptly described this general process, in
discussing John Dewey's approach to inquiry. He speaks of object and subject
rather than of outside reality and concept but the thrust of the position is
similar.
Inquiry, it is evident, is some kind of interaction between two things,
one of which is called the object and the other the subject. There seems
to be an assumption that this process is more or less in the nature of an
oscillation of which the amplitude gradually grows less, leaving it possible
to guess at an ultimate position of equilibrium, in which, when reached,
the subject would be said to 'know' the object, or to have arrived at
'truth' concerning it. ^
It is because this version of contextualism, this approach to conceptual
problems, must assume that concept and "reality" gradually approach each
24\villiam P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice -Hall, Inc. , 1964), p. 96.
25Bertrand Russell, "Dewey's New Logic," in Pragmatic Philosophy, ed.
by Amelie Rorty, Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Com-
pany, Inc.
,
1966), p. 316.
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other, while never completely merging, that I describe it as a degree of truth
logic. For we customarily use the term truth to characterize a correspondence
between inner concepts and outer experiences.
I distinguish five interrelated features of any degree of truth logic. At
least some, and often all, of these are evident in those works which set forth
such a conceptual logic.
L There is an "external reality " consistently independent of one's
concepts (although the difference between reality and concepts is not abso-
lute). Thus, although a degree of truth logic is a contextualist position it is
one which tends toward empiricism more than toward idealism
. This is the
most important feature, though sometimes the least explicit.
2. There is a certain openness of concepts and conceptual frameworks.
This is the second most basic feature and is necessarily associated with a
qualification of the Law of Excluded Middle. It is this openness which allows
for conceptual change to occur sometimes from the side of the concepts per se,
sometimes from the side of that which is conceptualized.
3. Concepts undergo evolution toward improved forms. Consequently,
it does not follow, because concepts influence what we see as facts, that all
concepts are merely relativistic.
4. The evolutionary process occurs through the actions of a community
of investigators or the broader community of language users
. A conceptual
framework is a shared phenomenon, and changes in it represent a collective
effort.
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5. The collective actions of these investigators are not arbitrary, but
occur in response to evident problems
. Although concepts are not absolutes
but are ever open to change, the problems which generate this change do have
a certain absoluteness about them, at least at any given point in time.
There are a number of directions in thought which may be called degree
of truth logics. These are represented by: some advocates of multivalued
logics; ordinary language philosophy, at least as represented by Wittgen-
stein; some recent philosophy of science; and some of pragmatism. In what
next follows I shall briefly review certain of the writings involved.
William Alston has argued that many concepts are necessarily vague
because we do not know what conditions are necessary and sufficient for
26
applying them. These are concepts for which we cannot readily distinguish
between those (analytic) features which help define the term and those (syn-
thetic) ones which are factually true of that to which the term refers.
27Consider the concept of want --it has many expansions. If 1 want some-
thing then, among other things:
(a) Belief that a certain act might help me achieve it increases the
likelihood that I will try to perform that act.
(b) I may act aggressively if frustrated in my attempts to achieve it.
26Alston, Philosophy of Language
,
chap. 5. Also see his essay on
"Motives and Motivation, " Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 1st ed. , V, see
especially pp. 404-06.
27Alston, "Motives and Motivation, " pp. 404-06. The illustrations
given on p. 45 of text are the writer's.
(c) I may be reminded of it when I think of other things associated with
It is not obvious that one or another of these expansions is purely analytic
while the rest are purely synthetic.
Alston agrees that empirical evidence is, in a way, a conceptual con-
struction but he would deny that it is a neat, tightly integrated, construction.
A concept does influence the perceived facts. Presently we tend to identify as
wants those to which expansions (a) and (c) are applicable. But we don't
always do so, and thus the expansions are not purely analytic. Concerning
(c) it is questionable, for example, whether the thought of cancer will remind
the smoker of a cigarette, even if he associates one with the other. As
regards (a) it is not certain that a businessman is more likely to withhold
evidence about product safety if he believes this to be an effective act to
achieve higher sales. Expansion (b), on the other hand, is not purely synthetic.
If concepts influence facts, it is also true that empirical considerations in-
fluence concepts. If expansion (b) became securely established knowledge,
then it might well acquire a degree of the analyticity of the other expansion.
Alston intimates that there is a way in which we all customarily do use
the concept want- -we accept most of a set of concept expansions but do not
unequivocally commit ourselves to any one. We want to leave open the
possibility, mentioned just above, that concept expansions previously thought
synthetic will acquire a degree of analyticity.
Hilary Putnam makes similar points about the analytic -synthetic
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2 8distinction. He argues that there are many concepts which cannot be purely
stipulative and thus purely analytic. There is no one common attribute in-
volved in the concept of man, for example. There are a cluster of attributes
and if most are present we label that entity a man. In science we deal with
analogous concepts which may be called "law -cluster concepts. " These are
concepts like "energy" which figure in many laws but play diverse roles within
them. Any one law, even one thought definitional, can be changed and we feel
that the identity of the cluster concept has stayed the same.
When we see Einstein's change in the concept of kinetic energy or see a
change in the concept of a straight line, resulting in part from experimental
optics, these are not mere changes in stipulation of isolated concepts, says
Putnam. The concepts exist within conceptual frameworks which reflect., in
varying degrees, both convention and the import of experience.
For Putnam, as for Alston, many concepts are permanently open. It is
not surprising then to find him, also, suggesting qualifications to the Law of
Excluded Middle, although the earlier essay in which he suggests this does
not itself argue for conceptual openness.
^Hilary Putnam, "The Analytic and the Synthetic, " in Scientific Explana-
tion, Space, and Time
,
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. Ill
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), pp. 358-97.
Putnam's argument draws in part on Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism. "
2 9Hilary Putnam, "Three-Valued Logic," Philosophical Studies , VIII
(October, 1957), 73-80.
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What is m ost noteworthy in the cited writings of Putnam and Alston, as
of others to follow, is that they maintain the distinction between concepts and
outer reality. Both writers acknowledge the existence of purely analytic and
purely synthetic statements. 30 Consequently, their particular conceptual
problem has an empiricist tinge. It is the problem of the gap between con-
cept and reality. In other words it is once again the problem of ostension. To
talk of the difficulty in connecting the concepts of want and energy with partic-
ular experiences, or with other signs, is to make essentially the same point
as did Augustine for the concept of walking. Among a myriad of possible
variations, how do we know where to draw the line?
But there is a difference between these writers and the positives. The
latter, insisting on the durability of the two epistemic poles, put their faith in
30Alston, "Motives and Motivation. "
"There are some statements involving 'want' or 'desire' which if they
are true, do not enjoy that status through embodying some features of the
meanings of the words involved. ... At the other end there are purely
analytic statements. ..." [p. 405].
*
Putnam, "The Analytic and the Synthetic. » Putnam intimates that change in
meaning does not mean a change in basic reality and, hence, that there is a
realm one usually refers to as the synthetic.
"In the case of the terms 'energy' and 'kinetic energy, ' we want to say,
or at any rate I want to say, that the meaning has not changed enough to
affect 'what we are talking about'. ..." [p. 380].
He also states that there can be purely analytic statements, in the sense of
statements without exception, in cases where the subject term is presumed
not to figure in any exceptionless natural laws.
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bridging the gap, through operationalism. 31 Contextualists of the sort I am
now describing propose instead a gradual closing of the gap. According to
them, concepts face experience collectively as a conceptual framework, and
the experience we see therefore depends on that framework. We could not
bridge the epistemic gap because we are only immediately in contact with the
one side which is our concepts. But we can know we are closing it if the
perplexities which appear in our concept usage should gradually lessen.
In the essays mentioned, neither Alston nor Putnam elaborates the notion'
that our concepts function within conceptual frameworks. I have already
argued the case for that notion in my earlier discussion of contextualism. Let
us look now at two philosophers of science who are particularly associated
with it.
According to Thomas Kuhn, much scientific work consists in elaborating
32
a set of already accepted theories. He argues that until the scientists have
such a set together with methods of application, until there is a shared
3lSome might say that positivists collapse mind to matter as idealists
do the reverse. But the relationship is not symmetrical here. Since one's
thoughts are closest to oneself, the rejection of these thoughts is a less con-
vincing epistemological extreme than is the idealist rejection of matter,
granted that neither view is very convincing. As a demonstration of how foolish
someone can sound who tries to reject thought, see Skinner, Beyond Freedom
and Dignity
,
p. 21.
32The discussion of Kuhn's thought is based on the following two works:
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1st ed. ; Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962) and Thomas S. Kuhn, "Reflections on
My Critics, " in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , ed. by Imre Lakatos
and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University
Press, 1970).
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paradigm, they do not even know what to look for.
The concept of oxygen, for example, does not stand alone but is an
integral part of the oxygen theory of combustion. According to the earlier
phlogiston theory, combustion occurred in the presence of air combined with
phlogiston. In the process of combustion phlogiston escaped. Hence, when
"oxygen" was isolated by the phlogiston chemist Priestly, his concept was that
of "dephlogisticated air" and this is not what we today understand as oxygen. 33
The example illustrates how our conceptual frameworks structure the very
reality we see. And it suggests that change in those frameworks will be diffi-
cult to accomplish, even though it obviously occurs.
Stephen Toulmin takes an approach to science which is similar to Kuhn's.
These two men would agree with Alston and Putnam both that there is an ex-
ternal reality apart from our concepts and that, because many of our concepts
are open, there is promise of shortening the gap. But they describe at greater
length than the others how this process occurs, the community of investigators
through which it occurs, and the problems to which the latter respond.
33Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
, pp. 53-56, 69-72.
3
^Toulmin's philosophy of science is expressed most directly and con-
cisely in Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding: An Inquiry into the
Aims of Science
,
Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers,
1961). The "growth" of scientific knowledge, especially as regards conceptual
change, is discussed in Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding, Vol. I: The
Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1972). The writer's discussion of Toulmin draws from both
sources, but principally from the latter.
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Both men agree mat those within a scientific discipline can move pro-
gressively from one conceptual framework to an improved one, although
Toulmin emphasizes less the system and cohesion of the framework. Both
describe this movement as basically evolutionary, although for Kuhn its
internal dynamics involve periods of framework stability alternating with
periods of framework change whereas for Toulmin the process is continuous.
But more significant than these points of agreement on process is the discussion
each man gives of the role played by the community of investigators.
Kuhn's views have undergone change on this point. Consider first what
he says about periods of framework stability, those which he calls "normal
science. " According to his earlier views, the scientific community serves a
proselytizing function. Students are expected to accept the prevailing paradigm
of a discipline on the basis of authority rather than that of independent invcsti-
35gation. v They have little competence to do otherwise and the texts do not
present fundamental alternatives.
More recently, Kuhn has suggested that much learning of scientific
generalization occurs by a process of ostension in which the student is con-
fronted with a series of problem -solutions and told what generalizations they
36illustrate. If Kuhn is here proposing a pure correspondence theory of know-
ing, he would seem to have abandoned his basic theme that paradigms structure
dJKuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
, pp. 80-81.
36Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics," pp. 270-73.
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our knowing. This would be a surprising shift. But he seems to be making
the claim, already noted in the writings of Alston and Putnam, that external
reality and concepts somehow work together in knowing. Kuhn sees no diffi-
culty with such a view
--he observes that we all learn to identify many things
byostension: father, mother, sister, dogs, cats. And he gives some detail
about how reality and concepts work together. Reality appears as stimuli
which are the same for all. The clustering of stimuli into similarity sets,
which allow us to identify, say, a dog or cat, occur in our neural processing
apparatus and this, also, is the same for all. That we see one thing rather
than another is due to the educational programming of the apparatus, and this
must be the same as well since the persons in a discipline share the same
history, an everyday language, an everyday world, and most of a scientific
37
one.
Regarding periods of framework change, Kuhn acknowledges that
individual dissent plays an important initiating role, but he holds that consol-
idation of the change occurs because it is accepted by the discipline as a whole.
^7Ibid.
, p. 276. Kuhn's position here seems similar to Wittgenstein's
claim that ostensive definition is possible within a context but not completely
outside one. And, the context can change for both thinkers.
"One of the things upon which the practice of normal science depends is
a learned ability to group objects and situations into similarity classes
which are primitive in the sense that the grouping is done without an answer
to the question, 'similar with respect to what?' One aspect of every
revolution is, then, that some of the similarity relations change" [p. 275].
38Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 143.
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Such wide agreement is possible, according to his later writing, for the same
reasons that one can learn an existing conceptual framework. It comes about
via stimuli, neural patterns, and programming which are shared by both the
advocates of the new paradigm and the followers of the old. One evidence that
framework shifts do indeed occur, he says, is that historians regularly learn
to make them. ^
Kuhn warns against calling these changes in conceptual framework the
result of decision or choice however. They are not ultimately matters of
applying a priori standards but are more experimental. "Exploring an alterna-
tive theory by techniques like those outlined above, one is likely to find that
one is already using it ... At no point was one aware of having reached a
decision, made a choice.
Toulmin, like Kuhn, believes that the process in which the scientific
community accomplishes framework change is not ultimately one of applying
a priori standards. But for Toulmin it is not immediately of that sort either. 41
Whereas Kuhn seems to ground the possibility of framework shifts on what we
all share in language and external stimuli, Toulmin emphasizes our shared
39Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics," p. 277.
40Ibid.
4 Toulmin, Human Understanding
,
p. 486. Toulmin argues that the ideas
of a milieu do not form static propositional systems but, rather, constitute
historically-developing conceptual populations. The test of a man's rationality
is not his application of the tests derivable from a static system, but is his
ability to make conceptual adaptations to new situations.
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problems.
• •
;
to th
^ extent that men living in different milieus have faced similar
collective problems, and developed comparable collective activities
--or
rational enterprises '-for tackling them in an organized manner, we can
'42
Se Pamllel ^"Prises as defining corresponding forums of
For Toulmin, conceptual change is literally evolutionary-
-a matter of
conceptual innovation and selection so as to adapt to new situations. The
selections involved are primarily the collective judgments of the relevant
scientific community, based on experience in all cultures and historical per-
iods. And, as in biological evolution, the rationality of the judgments is
ultimately determined not by men but by history. 43
Having examined the Kuhn and Toulmin positions on the functioning of
the scientific community, we must conclude that in a fundamental sense they
are the same. Whether the community is better described as sharing in sensa-
tions and meanings or as sharing in problems, what it finally accomplishes, it
accomplishes by force of outside circumstance. For Kuhn, the community does
42Ibid.
, p. 492.
43lbid.
, p. 501.
"
. . .
.we shall find ourselves coming close to a view of 'historical
destiny' shared with
.
. . . Vico and Kant, Epicurus and Hegel . ... To
some --but only some --extent men could bring their rational grasp of the
current situation to bear on their future expectations and patterns of life,
in such a way that they anticipated, and so were 'rationally pre -adapted'
to, the novel problem -situations that would face them in the future ....
the verdict of experience rewarded even-handedly those men whose rational
procedures and innovations proved, in the event, to meet the actual demands
of history most adequately
. . .
.
"
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not deliberately choose a new framework. And while Toulmin wants to em-
phasize the reasoning involved in conceptual change, the success of a change
depends on historical destiny. So in neither case can we properly criticize
what the community does, for it ultimately has no choice.
The last of the five features I identify in a degree of truth logic is the
belief in evident problems. Toulmin is quite explicit on this point, as we have
seen, but the view has also been continuously present in Kuhn's work. The
scientist never finds a perfect fit between the prevailing paradigm and external
reality, says Kuhn. The scientist knows this is so not because he can go com-
pletely outside the paradigm and look but because there are anomolies. 44 One
of the anomolies in the phlogiston theory, for example, was that an object was
supposed to lose phlogiston when heated in air and yet the material remaining
after metal was so heated weighed more than before. Kuhn sometimes asserts,
and most emphatically in later work, that the anomolous experience is an
evident problem.
Most of the puzzles of normal science are directly presented by nature,
and all involve nature indirectly. Though different solutions have been
received as valid at different times j. nature cannot be forced into an
arbitrary set of conceptual boxes.
All of the writers mentioned above have probably been influenced by the
"ordinary language" philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is thus appropriate
^^Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
,
chap. IV.
45Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics, " p. 263. This position is ad-
mittedly at odds with some passages in the earlier work.
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to close the literature review with a brief look at this position. ^ Wittgen-
stein explicitly denies that ostension by itself can convey meaning, (lie
attributes the view that it can to Augustine but Augustine's ostension is an
unusual kind, as we have seen. ) Wittgenstein holds that ostension can work
within a context
-what Kuhn above calls an educational programming.
Contexts are for Wittgenstein like rules of a game, and words have uses
according to the rules. To understand a piece in chess, for example, we
must understand the whole game. Language is not one game, however. It is
a series of games which overlap each other. And these are public games such
that a person can engage in them all. For Wittgenstein this does not mean
they are part of some super game--in fact there is no one thing which all
language games have in common. What language games do have is family
resemblances to each other. Consequently it is family resemblances, also,
which tie together the various uses of a particular word.
What for us is most notable about this ordinary language position is
Wittgenstein's belief that we can understand all the various language games.
It is like the belief of Kuhn and Toulmin that we can pass from one conceptual
framework to another. Wittgenstein's argument here seems to be that we could
46The writer's discussion of Wittgenstein's thought is based primarily
on K. T. Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1969); the editor's introduction to Harold
Morick, ed.
,
Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1967); and Max Black, "Wittgenstein's Views about Language,"
Margins of Prec ision (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970,
pp. 246-67.
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not even understand our own situation if we could not understand that of
others. For a word to have a meaning there must be a rule governing its use.
But to have a rule is to be able to check whether it is being followed, says
Wittgenstein, and a single person cannot do so. It would be the same as trying
to verify information in a newspaper by another copy of the same paper. 47
There is no sense in a person's talk about experiences as being purely inward.
We can refer to our selves as objects but not as subjects. 48
It might be granted that Wittgenstein's argument is persuasive as to why
any group of people must share some language games (though I do not grant
this without qualifications) but why must they share all of them? I don't be-
lieve he gives a reason for the latter position. The stated purpose of his later
philosophizing was to dissolve philosophical puzzles by examining our ordinary
47Introduction to Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds
, pp. xvi-
xviii.
48
Ibid.
, p. xix.
"In his second argument, Wittgenstein attempts to show that the 'I' in
the skeptical argument does not refer to an owner of experiences; and he
presents two reasons
. . . First, no criteria of personal identity are
applied in my avowing my thoughts and feelings
.
. . Thus Wittgenstein
says that I am not talking about any particular entity I_ but just about the
experience of feeling pain itself. He does not maintain that all uses of 'I '
or 'my' are nonreferentiaL but only what he calls die use of 'I' as subject
.
In T's other use as object, it clearly refers ... In all of these cases,
there is the possibility that I am wrong.
. . And here we come to his second
reason for holding that 'I' does not refer to an owner of experiences: he
says that where there is no chance of referring to the wrong person, it does
not make sense to speak of referring to a person at all . " [Underlining of
the long passages is this writer's. J
language use, and an assumption behind this purpose was that we simply did,
in fact, have such an ordinary language. 49
In concluding this exposition of a degree of truth logic, I want to point
out what it is about Wittgenstein's notion of a rule that makes me say of it,
and of any similar contextualist position, that it is empiricist tinged. Empiri-
cist philosophy tends to absorb categories within relationships. A purely
empiricist social science will treat persons as publicly observable behavior
patterns, and if it is wholly consistent it will reduce those behavior patterns
to chemical interactions. The self, even the body, disappears into an associ-
ational flux. When we say that there are truly such things as mental concepts,
not just sounds in response to sense impressions, then we depart from
empiricism toward a middle, contextualist, view. But if we then argue that
the existence of conscious meanings or purposes is only possible insofar as
they are publicly shared, our position is analogous to that of the empiricist.
There is now a mental life but it is still not an individual life, it is an associ-
ationism. The bleakness, the emptiness, of the empiricist notion of people
49
Black, "Wittgenstein's Views about Language," p. 259.
"... the general agreement among human beings that in fact makes it
possible for them to play the same language games --to speak the same
language on the whole --is a remarkable fact, by no means to be 'taken as
a matter of course. ' That men constantly misunderstand, and not always
willfully, is obvious enough; what is easily overlooked- -in moments of
pessimism, at least--is the extent of de facto agreement that makes the
very existence of a shared language possible. Human beings do, on the
whole 'agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions
but in form of life. '
"
On the purpose of philosophy as the dissolving of philosophical puzzles, see
Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, pp. 86-88.
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remains. For Wittgenstein there apparently was no center of individual
conscious subjectivity. By this I mean more than that an individual was in
large part a product of his social setting. I mean that personal autonomy was
completely impossible. There was meaningful reference but no true self
reference. ^
Critique of a Degree of Truth Logic
. We could speak of a conceptual
framework which was complete in the sense that it was shared by all (or more
accurately was the determinant of all thought), although the framework was
incomplete in the sense that it could evolve. Or we could speak of a conceptual
framework like the above but which was also incomplete in that external
reality could pierce through the framework at points. These are both what I
would call degrees of truth logics. Wittgenstein and possible Toulmin may
better illustrate the first view, and the others mentioned may better illustrate
the second.
Whichever of these two views one takes, it faces a serious criticism.
How can one judge, without being arbitrary, what is an improved concept or an
improved conceptual framework? According to a degree of truth logic, this
judgment is made by a community of investigators or language users and in
response to evident problems. But this answer is not convincing in itself.
Kuhn, for example, has been accused of advocating mob rule for his earlier
view of normal science in which a paradigm is presented to students as dogma.^
50see footnote 48.
51Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics," p. 234.
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Consider firs-, this notion of evident problems. All the writers cited
would probably agree that human values and purposes are not clearly distinct
from facts of nature. 52 Values are an integral part of that conceptual frame-
work without which we could see no facts. Why then are problems any less
framework-dependent, since problems appear to be values expressed in
reverse form? Can it be that values are more lacking in the full concreteness
of the here and nov than are problems? I don't see why.
If I can articulate a problem, I can rephrase it as a value having the
the same degree of specificity or generality. If in some city a certain amount
of the housing stock is substandard, the corresponding value is simply to
eliminate that substandard housing. If I see this particular housing problem
as part of a broader problem arising from the operation of the economic sys-
tem then just to the extent that I can describe how this connection works I can
describe what I want to be different in the economic system, as regards housing.
Articulated problems seem no more capable than are articulated values
of providing an outside position from which to judge the worth of different
conceptual frameworks. Broader felt problems might be able to do so, but
who is to judge when these felt problems exist? Apparently it must be the
community of investigators or of language users. We seem to be thrown back
on this notion of a meaning, purposive community as the one ultimate response
52The writer is not advancing a fully instrumentalist view of knowledge,
on behalf of these authors. He is making the weaker claim that purposes are
not independent of facts but help structure them.
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to the criticism of a degree of truth logic.
Now why assume that the community is correct? Why assume that we
share as much in sense data and interpretation as Kuhn, for one, says we do?
Wittgenstein's answer, and he gives the most definite answer, is that we have
no choice. To be conscious of something, to be able to conceptualize it,
requires that we already be following a rule- -that we already share a con-
's 3
ceptual framework. For Wittgenstein, though, we cannot present meanings
to our subjective selves since the rule, being public, tells us nothing of sub-
jective selves. But we can communicate with each other, of course, and in
such a way as to correct mistakes in meaning. I am going to call the kind of
argument Wittgenstein has made the "communication argument, ' and because
his version of it is analogous to a pure empiricism, in that it concedes no
sense to reports of thoughts or sensations attributed to a subject, I shall call
it the "empiricist version. "
The reader will now ask whether this empiricist version of the communi-
cation argument is correct. And to that question 1 have no unambivalent answer.
I personally believe that the argument is just as correct as what I shall call an
idealist version--but no more so. It explains why we can have meanings, con-
cepts, and that is something which empiricism does not do well. It also
explains why we can be mistaken about meanings, and that is something idealism
does not do well. Bat the problem with this version of the communication argu-
S^Fann, Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, pp. 75-76.
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ment is its rejection of subjectivity.
By itself, the position in ordinary language philosophy that we just do
share our concepts could lead to a dogmatic sort of concept analysis. I shall
close this discussion of a degree of truth logic by very briefly considering one
example of the ordinary language approach.
From an examination of "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian
Analysis" Isaac Balbus concludes ".
. . that the Marxian treatment of the
concept 'interest' is far more consistent with the variety of meanings that our
ordinary language acknowledges are entailed by the concept, and that, as a
consequence, Marxian analysis has both explanatory and normative advantages
over Pluralist analysis. "
54
Our ordinary language recognizes, says Balbus, two very different yet
equally important meanings of interest. 55 One, the subjective meaning,
defines interest as what a person likes. The other, or objective meaning,
defines it as what a person has a stake in or is affected by. According to
Balbus, Pluralism recognizes the first meaning only believing that no one can
be mistaken about his interests. 00 But Marxian analysis recognizes both and,
above all, is concerned with their interrelationship. This is why Marxian
analysis is superior.
54Isaac D. Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian
Analysis, " Politics and Society
, I (February, 1971), 151.
55ibid.
, p. 152.
56lbid.
, p. 155.
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Without probing the details of the Balta essay I want to ask two questions.
First, is it likely that any theory as widely accepted as the Pluralist theory of
pontics would ignore an obvious use of language? Secondly, is it possible for
two very different meanings of a term to be "equally important" in the sense
of "equally dominant?"
To the first question my own answer would be "no. " Recent Pluralists
such as Robert Dahl affirm the existence of a consensus on the most important
procedures or methods. And they assert that the consensus is not something
which most people reason about. It is something they have been socialized
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into. People thus have an "objective" interest in this consensus in the
Balbus sense. Now of course the effect of society upon them is considered a
benign effect rather than the malign one which Marxism sees. But that is not
the point. The point is that Pluralists, too, accept the "... variety of mean-
ings that our ordinary language acknowledges
. .
.
" 58
57Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The Universi-
ty of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 132.
"... politicians subject to elections must operate within the limits set
by their own values, as indoctrinated members of the society, and by their
expectations about what policies they can adopt and still be reelected.
In a sense, what we ordinarily describe as democratic 'polities' is
merely the chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial
conflicts. Prior to politics, beneath it, is the underlying consensus on
policy that usually exists in the society among a predominant proportion of
the politically active members. "
58Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis, "
p. 151. That pluralists may not label this consensus an objective interest, in
the Marxian sense, is of minor significance. The fact is that they do allow
for it and that it does have a specified relationship to subjective interests.
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To the second question, also, my answer is "no. " If we assume that
the effect of a social system on its members is largely benign, (perhaps be-
cause affluence washes away system bias) then the dominant concept of interest
is the subjective. The objective, we take for granted. But if the effect of the
system is malign then the objective concept of interest should become dom-
inant. Whichever view we take, the two meanings of interest cannot both be
dominant on that view. If 1 take the Marxist view I cannot say that the real
interest of the American people is in a higher material standard of living,
since that is what they say they want, and also that the real interest is in a
change in the socio-economic system to provide more meaningful lives. I will
probably say, as Marx does, that objective interests are the source of subject-
ive interests.
The Balbus essay illustrates a troubling feature of ordinary language
philosophy. If we really do consider the full variety of ways in which we use
an important concept we may well find that the uses are virtual contraries.
Hence our analysis does not much help us unless we assume that certain uses
are dominant. In that case, a person who disputes the uses so assumed is apt
to find himself confronted with appeals to look more carefully and with the
argument that "we are communicating, after all, so we must really agree on
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our basic concepts. " Wittgenstein suggested that his purpose in language
^This writer does not say that Balbus, himself, takes such an over-
bearing posture, but that such a posture is given a rationale in the ordinary
language approach. Furthermore, there are those who do seem to
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examination was not to argue but to give reminders.
It is this very practical difficulty in a degree of truth logic-its down-
grading of explicit debate over concepts
-which prompts me to look for another
approach to conceptual problems.
A Degree of Reality Logic. I want to speculate that there may be a
second form of contextualism, a second middle way between idealism and
realism. I believe that this speculation can lead to a method of concept exam -
ination which does give more weight to debate.
This second form is associated with doubt about the Law of Non-
Contradiction. Whereas a degree of truth logic asserts that our most import-
ant concepts cannot be precisely defined, the conceptual logic I now describe
asserts that these concepts are precisely defined but by their contradictories
and contraries. Because this logic is as much a form of contextualism as is
a degree of truth logic it too avoids the criticism of positivism that we have
only a flux of sensations and don't really see a whole picture of reality. And
because it envisions contradictory concepts it too avoids the usual criticism
take it. Consider the following statements by Copi.
"Since we do communicate with each other and understand the terms we
use, the intensional or connotative meanings involved are neither subjective
[constituting the features of objects believed to be denoted by a term] nor
objective [all the features which are in fact common to all the objects
denoted by a term] . . . . "
Now, it is agreed to use certain terms to denote certain objects, says Copi.
"The conventional connotation of a term is its most important aspect
for purposes of definition and communication, since it is both public and
can be known by people who are not omniscient" [Copi, Introduction to
Logic, p. 109].
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of contextualism that we are forced to see reality from restricted viewpoints.
In this case it does so because if we simultaneously see a thing in contra-
dictory ways, then our vision must be inclusive, whetever one may think of
that kind of inclusiveness.
In striking contrast both to empiricism and to a degree of truth logic,
this second conceptual logic denies, in the most sweeping way, that there is
any gap between concepts and reality. By this I mean, firstly, that it denies
there is any possibility of defining a concept by pointing. It denies the sug-
gestion of Alston, Putnam, or Kuhn that external reality intrudes sometimes
and can help produce a conceptual change. But I also mean, secondly, that
this logic denies the essential objectivity of concepts. It denies a position like
Wittgenstein's according to which all meaningful concepts must be capable of
being checked by something outside the person using them.
I have now indicated the two main features of a second contextualism.
The two are closely interrelated. If there is nothing outside concepts then
concepts must be defined by themselves. But a self-definition is not at all
informative unless it involves the negation of the concept. I do begin to learn
something about white if I know that it is not not -white. That I do so necessarily
implies, though, that a concept contains its contradictory within itself.
Now given a situation in which thought and reality are identical but in
which thought becomes more informative as it becomes more aware of all its
contradictions, we cannot say that thought can be mistaken. For thought
always corresponds exactly to reality, since it is identical to it. Therefore we
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cannot speak now of a degree of truth logic. But this thought which is also
reality can be incomplete. That is why I call this second conceptual logic a
degree of reality logic.
At this point the reader may well ask if my speculation is not idle spec-
ulation. One might grant that a degree of reality logic would be interesting,
if it were not implausible, but might then insist that it is implausible. Why do
I say that reality and thought are identical? We can think of many things which
don't exist--world peace for example. And why do I say that concepts are
internally contradictory? If I claim that a certain person is politically con-
servative does that mean the same as saying that he is not politically conserva-
tive? The claim seems absurd. Of course I may argue that people have
questioned the Law of Excluded Middle and ask why, therefore, it is not
equally plausible to question the Law of Non-Contradiction. But the reader
may respond that, in fact, it just is not equally plausible.
In the following discussion I respond to these questions. I first consider
at some length the two main features of a degree of reality logic, and I try to
show that each is more plausible than it may seem, initially. Then I make a
brief point by point comparison of this logic with the main features of a degree
of truth logic. The discussion is followed, as earlier, by a literature review,
but in the present case I shall consider the work of a single writer, Hegel. It
is Hegel whose work most represents what I call a degree of reality logic.
The discussion concludes by referring the reader to material in the last chap-
ter where I attempt to illustrate the practical difference between the two
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conceptual logics.
The Verstehen Method -- As long as we focus on the natural sciences,
the distinction between thought and reality may seem obvious. But in the social
sciences there is a method of inquiry which tends to deny the distinction and
yet has appeal to common sense. This is the Verstehen method. According
to this method we learn about other human actions because the actions are the
concepts and because we are somehow involved in the conceptual framework of
these other people. ^
What underlies Verstehen is an observation I indirectly mentioned earlier
in distinguishing between positivism and contextualism. While our concepts
may structure the way we see physical nature we do not normally suppose that
they constitute nature. We suppose that there is something external upon which
they operate. But a human action is different. While such an action may
possibly have a meaning imposed upon it, it also has a meaning within it, and
in the absence of the latter meaning we are apt to say that there is no action.
This action may involve a bodily movement but it may take place only as a
~oT>rilis description of Verstehen is not as applicable to some authors,
associated with that approach --Max Weber, for example--as to others. This
writer's discussion of the approach is based primarily on the following sources:
Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (Lon-
don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958; Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action
,
Viking Compass Book (New York: Viking Press, 1959); Essays by Ernest Nagel,
"The Subjective Nature of Social Subject Matter," Donald Davidson, "Actions,
Reasons, and Causes, " and May Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action, " in Readings
in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences , ed. by May Brodbeck (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1968); and Don Martindale, "Verstehen, " International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1st. ed. , XVI, 308-13.
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process in the mind. Stuart Hampshire points out that a conclusion reached
in thought is as much an action as any other. 61 Hampshire also suggests that
by an action we mean something conscious and I follow this interpretation. 62
Given the above features of a human action, I shall illustrate the point
that meanings are internal by an example. A man waving could be greeting a
friend, sending a message across a distance, directing traffic or doing any one
of innumerable other acts. The societal context within which he is acting may
narrow the possibilities. If he is standing in the center of an intersection then
there is a fair probability that he is directing traffic. But if we want to know
for sure what he is doing then we ask. And we normally take his answer as
conclusive.
Furthermore, our hand waver's answer is conclusive not because he is
the best predictor of his own actions (as if he noticed that he often greeted
friends and so predicted that this was what he was doing now) but because his
intention determined the nature of the action in the first place. Without that
intention there would be only an arm movement, and if anyone interpreted that
movement as an action it is his interpretation, not the other person's, that
would be mistaken.
We see that there is a domain of human experience, some would say the
6lHampshire, Thought and Action
, pp. 90-91.
What Hampshire says, most explicitly, is that an intentional action
must be conscious, but he also seems to say the same of action itself. See
Hampshire, Thought and Action
,
chap. 2, especially pp. 93-95, 119-21.
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most important one, where the common sense view is that thought and reality
are identical.
There is, however, a serious problem with this Verstehen approach to
human action in the extreme form which I have given it. 63 If a man is con-
scious then he is thinking. But if his thoughts are his actions then it seems to
me that he is incapable of moral deliberation, because he can never be mis-
taken. Now it is a common criticism of the Verstehen approach that it supposes
a man cannot be mistaken about his actions. 64 But it is less common to say
that he cannot be moral. I shall explain my reasoning.
The problem that is described here and in the following footnote is not,
perhaps, the only major problem of Verstehen, but it is the one that shall be
discussed.
64Despite their varying treatments of it, this problem of identifying
mistakes is a central point for Nagel, Davidson, and Brodbeck. Nagel views
the Verstehen approach as one of introspective analysis of psychic states and
argues that:
"... the controlled study of overt behavior is nevertheless the only
sound procedure for achieving reliable knowledge concerning individual and
social actions" [Nagel, "The Subjective Nature of Social Subject Matter, "
p. 40]. [This writer's emphasis. J
Davidson disputes the claim that reasons and actions are logically in-
separable. He argues, among other points, that one can be mistaken about
one's reasons, and that one can know one is mistaken because he can know the
connection between reason and action. Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and
Causes, " pp. 54-57.
On this same general problem of identifying mistakes, Brodbeck criticizes
the Wittgensteinian version of Verstehen on the ground that
"... our understanding and knowledge of man is therefore a priori and
necessary rather than, as with the natural sciences, a posteriori and
contingent. " [Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action, " p. 60J.
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If we conceive of human action as always involving bodily movement then
the fact that a man could never be mistaken about his actions would not imply
that he could not be morally responsible. Although some of his thought would
be identical to his actions, other parts of his thought would consist in spreading
before himself a series of alternatives and making choices among them,
choices which would issue in action. But if all of his thoughts are actions about
which he cannot be mistaken then his conclusions of thought are inevitable, by
definition. We are not apt to call someone morally responsible if his moral
conclusions are inevitable.
One possible way around this problem would be to adopt the position of
Wittgenstein on language and social relationships. At least two recent Verste-
hen thinkers, Peter Winch and Stuart Hampshire, find it appropriate to do so. 65
The rules which according to Wittgenstein provide meaning to our concepts are
also simultaneously our social institutions and customs, and these in a sense
are our actions. 66 Winch gives this example, among others:
65Winch, The Idea of a Socia l Science and Its Relation to Philosophy; and
Hampshire, Thought and Action. Winch grounds his work, explicitly, on
Wittgenstein's approach. Hampshire does not do so, but his discussion of how
one can communicate with another appears to draw from Wittgenstein. See
pp. 55-61, Thought and Actio n. It is evident that the only Verstehen thinkers
whose work is discussed in this section are those who draw from Wittgenstein.
This is done because the writer's purpose is to criticize this sort of Verstehen
approach.
ot,See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy
,
pp. 121-28, 131-36.
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exJafn wM^H ' ' '/^ SlmPly mVented by who w*nt^ toplai hat happens when societies come into armed conflict. It is anidea which provides the criteria of what is appropriate in the behavior ofmembers of the conflicting societies. Because my country is at war thereare certain things which 1 must and certain things which I must not do. 67
Wittgenstein's position appears to be a solution to the problem of Versce-
hen because, while it holds that concepts and human action are simply different
ways of describing how we follow the same rule (and is thus a Verstehen
position), 68 the fact that there is a rule means that one can check for mistakes.
Hence one can distinguish, in a sense, between moral and immoral acts.
But when the Verstehen method is associated with a position like Witt-
genstein's, the method ceases to be part of what I call a degree of reality logic
because it ceases to emphasize the subjectivity of a human action. 69 I shall
elaborate again.
If I share the same rule with everyone else, if I am involved in the same
form of life, then just so far as the rule affects my actions i am not a subject.
67Ibid.
, p. 127.
68in any case, it seems to be a kind of Verstehen position, as it appar-
ently does to those Verstehen thinkers who build upon it. Of course, Wittgen-
stein is not talking about introspection as a method of inquiry—and it is this
latter method which is often, and this writer thinks more properly, associated
with the approach.
69The philosophic distance between apparent behaviorists like Nagel and
Brodbeck and Verstehen analysts like Winch or Hampshire does not seem so
great as the former suppose. Both sides tend to reject introspection- -at least
as something possible apart from society. Both emphasize a public domain,
though for the former this tends to be a domain of sense experience while for
the latter it is a domain of shared concepts. The empiricist tinge in Wittgen-
stein's approach is discussed in this writer's text at pp. 57-58.
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I don't decide what to choose. The rule establishes my choices. If, for
example, an instance of killing is involved, then the shared rule will determine
whether this killing is murder and should not be done, or whether, as in war,
it is national defense and should. Now, of course, I must decide, in the end,
whether to do the act or not, but if the rule completely defines the morality
of it then my action as a ^ubject is intellectually empty and, hence, is not
really action according to Verstehen analysis. The action may be "mine" in
the sense that a Sartre existentialism would give to that term, but otherwise
it is better described as the action of the society in which, as an object, I am
immersed.
Perhaps no Verstehen thinker would claim, though, that the rule com-
pletely specified action. Certainly Peter Winch would not do so. He dis-
tinguishes between the beliefs which exist within a "mode of discourse" and
modes of discourse as wholes. 70 This suggests what he elsewhere says
explicitly
--that a rule is not a rigid formula but must be interpreted anew by
the agent in changing circumstances. 71 Now when I talk about the Verstehen
method, I am talking not about the narrowing of human choices which the rule
involves but about those choices to which Winch alludes
--choices which still
remain for the person as a subject to make. And about these choices I do not
see how the actor can be mistaken; these he cannot check against a rule. So
7 0winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy,
p. 110.
71 Ibid.
, pp. 62-65, 91-94.
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the problem of Verstehen-that we cannot morally deliberate
-seems to
persist.
There is another response to the problem, however-one which is no
more satisfactory but is perhaps as much so. Suppose we take seriously the
Niels Bohr quotation at the beginning of this chapter that the opposite of a great
truth is another truth, and suppose we further assume that there is no sharp
distinction between the true and the moral. Then it is possible for a person to
act in a way which is autonomous, yet substantive, while at the same time the
person can check the meaning and hence the morality of his actions. This is
why.
The person acts, wc are supposing, independently of social influences
and furthermore he cannot be mistaken in his acts. He can be incomplete,
however. If he does not recognize the inherently tragic nature of human action
and thus sees only one side of a moral issue it is precisely then that he is
immoral. He can identify his incompleteness without wholly sharing the views
of his moral opponents, though. The conflict itself will accomplish that.
Now is it so odd to say that human action cannot be mistaken in meaning
nor be morally wrong but that it can be one-sided? Consider the issue of fair
trial vs. free press. Certainly there are strong arguments for a free press,
particularly in the coverage of courtroom proceedings and particularly in the
case of political offenders. But there can be equally strong arguments for the
claim that press coverage makes a fair trial impossible and especially in just
those cases mentioned.
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There are many moral dilemmas such as the above. Are they pervasive?
Do they define the human situation? In this discussion of Verstehen, I have
assumed that they do. I have suggested that for the most important part of
reality, human action, thought and reality are wholly identical, but that this
is a tragic identity. It is necessarily filled with contradictions.
Contradiction -- The affirmation of contradiction is the second major
feature of a degree of reality logic. I want to suggest both that there can be
contradictory concepts and that there can be contradictions, or dilemmas, in
social phenomena. While the first point is the more fundamental it must wait
upon my exposition of Hegel for its defense. In what follows I speak mainly
to the second.
This affirmation of contradiction may be more plausible than it seems.
To understand why we must first look back to the argument that can be made
for any contextualist position- -for any position according to which the facts we
see depend in part on our conceptual framework. Charles Taylor gives a
cogent version of that argument as he develops the thesis that political science
cannot be value neutral. I have drawn on his argument in my earlier discussion
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of contextualism. I now look at it directly.
Taylor observes that for any range of phenomena there are an indefinite
number of features that could figure in correlations. Thus we cannot develop
explanatory theories of any breadth except as we identify the crucial dimensions
72See pp. 29-32 of text and footnote 8. The work referred to is Taylor,
"Neutrality in Political Science. "
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within which our phenomena can vary. Otherwise, we do not know what facts
to gather. But in identifying the dimensions of variation (henceforth I shall
simply call them distinctions) we are taking value positions. For example, to
see the difference in political systems as primarily a difference in whether or
not the systems allow political freedom is to have made, already, a value
judgment in favor of those which do allow such freedom.
Now a person might say that in some cases political freedom had to be
"overridden" in a political system
--for example in wartime. But if he went
further and argued that political freedom was not the primary basis for dis-
tinguishing between polities, then he would have "undermined" the theory
involved. And it is Taylor's point that he would not be unscientific if he did
this since any way of looking at phenomena involves some value position. 73
With the Taylor argument in mind, can we imagine any major distinction
which would be an "outcast distinction"
--a distinction never to be used as a
principal basis for differentiating phenomena? Certainly one must be very
careful before answering this question with a "yes. " It is the nature of con-
ceptual frameworks that those operating within them are not readily tolerant
of other perspectives. An American liberal would probably find unconvincing
the illustrations I use in discussing contextualism. He would label
73In a later work, however, Taylor is very explicit to the point that
some conceptual frameworks are superior to others, and that only those who
operate within the more adequate positions can know this. Charles Taylor,
"Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics
, XXV (Fall,
1971), 3-51. See especially pp. 46-47.
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"exploitation,
* "imperials" and similar concepts as leftist jargon unconnected
with political realities. But the Marxist would find such concepts fundamental.
There is one distinction, however, which is very widely treated as an
outcast in Western thought. It is the distinction between contradiction or its
practical expression in dilemma, on the one hand, and the absence of contra-
diction, on the other. To use this distinction as a primary basis for dividing
phenomena is to imply that dilemma is often the human condition. Otherwise
there would be no point in so much emphasizing the distinction.
Thus the distinction makes a great difference. If there are many social
problems which represent logical impossibilities then our intellectual response
is to learn how to live with the consequent dilemmas. But if we suppose that
the problems only appear to be dilemmas then we are saying that the distinction
between contradiction and non
-contradiction is trivial. We are saying that the
appearance of something as a dilemma is obvious and is a point not deserving
much elaboration. Our effort should be directed instead at attempts to resolve
these supposed dilemmas.
Let us consider, now, the collective choice problem and some associated
problems in democratic theory generally. According to a precise formulation,
the collective choice problem is one of aggregating a multiplicity of individual
preference orderings around alternate social actions. 74 The collective
74This is basically the formulation of Kenneth J. Arrow, "Values and
Collective Decision-Making, " in Philosophy, Politics and Society
,
Third Series,
ed. by Peter Las left and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969)
pp. 215-32.
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choice-democratic theory literature is particularly worth examining in
connection with our tendency to treat the distinction between contradiction and
non-contradiction as an outcast distinction. The reason it is so is because there
are some writings which come perilously close to admitting the distinction and
the treatment of those writings is illuminating.
I shall look very briefly at three works with the intent not to examine any
details (except in one instance) but simply to point out what the writers claim to
have done and how they and others react to it.
Kenneth Arrow, in a rigorous formal proof, claims to have shown that
democracy, in a widely accepted sense of that term, is impossible. 75 He
argues, specifically, that there is no rule by which individual preference
orderings can be aggregated into a social choice which is itself an ordering and
is not dictated by a minority (provided there are at least three alternatives).
The reaction to Arrow's work appears to be largely an attempt to find a way out
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of the dilemma. And I believe that Arrow himself shares this desire. He
75a brief presentation of this proof is made in the previously-cited work.
The proof is developed in more detail in Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and
Individual Values (2d ed. ; New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
1963). In trying to understand the Arrow proof, this writer has benefited from
Thomas Conrad, "The Collective Choice Problem in Political Theory" (unpub-
lished Pli. D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1968).
a chapter added to the second edition of Arrow, Social Choice and
Individual Values
,
he responds to some of his critics. The thrust of their
criticism seems to be a claim that there is no true dilemma or, alternatively,
that there is a way out of it.
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has described his conclusion as "quite embarrassing. " 77
Richard Wollheim has argued that there seems to be a paradox in the
theory of democracy.
"
. . .
if a man expresses a choice for A and the mach-
ine [i. e. democratic system] expresses a choice for B, then the man, if he is
to be a sound democrat, seems to be committed to the belief that A ought to be
the case and to the belief that B ought to be the case. " 7 * Whereas Arrow argue,
that there is no reasonable democratic system which does not lead to a minor-
ity choice, Wollheim is wondering how a person can adopt as his own the
choice of a democratic system if it does not agree with his personal choice.
Wollheim sees no real paradox, however. "I doubt that any of us are
prepared to regard Democracy as inconsistent. " 79 He proposes a distinction
which, for him, shows that the two claims of his hypothetical democrat are
compatible. Other authors, while displaying the same faith in the consistency
of Democracy, propose other distinctions. 80
Robert Paul Wolff has claimed that there is no way to make the autonomy
77Kenneth J. Arrow, "Values and Collective Decision
-Making, " p. 228.
78Richard Wollheim, "A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy, " in
Philosophy, Politics and Society
, Second Series, ed. by Peter Laslett and W. G.
Runciman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 78-79.
79Ibid.
, p. 84.
SOsee, for example, D. Goldstick, "An Alleged Paradox in the Theory
of Democracy, " Philosophy and Public Affairs
, II (Winter, 1973), 181-89.
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of the individual compatible with the legitimate authority of the state. 81 If an
individual is morally autonomous he cannot be under a moral obligation to obey
the laws of any state. But if a state is legitimate it has a moral right to rule
and, hence, its citizens have a moral obligation to obey its laws. Here Wolff
has stated explicitly that the concept of a legitimate state is inconsistent. On
his view, it cannot be possible, as Wollheim thinks, for a person's own choice
to be compatible with the collective choice if the two differ.
Because Wolff, more than Arrow or Wollheim, seems to accept the dis-
tinction between contradiction and non
-contradiction, it is worthwhile to con-
sider the work of one of his critics to see whether that critic grants the dis-
tinction and operates within it, or whether he denies it and thus, in Taylor's
terms, undermines the theory. I want to examine just one point made by
Jeffrey Reiman. Reiman argues that "Moral authority is not a meaningful
SlThis claim is a change in emphasis from an earlier one which involved
essentially the same point, but made it subordinate to another. According to
the earlier point, the individual's highest obligation is to be autonomous and
anarchism is the only political theory consistent with autonomy. Because this
earlier point is the one for which a defense is explicitly made, while, in fact,
an ttempt is being made to defend both points, Wolff's argument is confusing
and highly vulnerable to criticism. This writer believes it is possible, never-
theless, to isolate the later claim and focus on that.
Wolff's original claim, and his argument, appear in Robert Paul Wolff,
In Defense of Anarchism
,
Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1970). The altered claim was made in personal correspondence
reported in Tom L. Beauchamp and Ken Witkowski, "A Critique of Pure
Anarchism, " Canadian Journal of Philosophy
,
II (June, 1973), 535.
82jeffrey H. Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy: A Reply to
Robert Paul Wolff's In Defense of Anarchism, Harper Torchbooks (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972). [Hereinafter referred to as In Defense of
Political Philosophy. J
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moral concept because it contradicts the notion of moral obligation itself , " 83
Something is moral because of what it is and not because of where it comes
84from. Consequently there is not a meaningful conflict between moral
authority and moral autonomy since die former does not exist. If it existed
there would be contradiction.
Notice that what Reiman has done is to undermine Wolff's position by
denying that there might be contradiction. If we, instead, accept the possibil-
ity of contradiction then Reiman's statement converts to the claim that "because
moral authority is a meaningful moral concept it contradicts the notion of
moral obligation. " While I grant that in its revised form this is not exactly
Wolff's position, does it not come close? Wolff claims, at one point, that to be
autonomous is to be oneself the judge of moral constraints 85 and this seems
related to Reiman's claim that moral obligation issues from the inner char-
acter of something- -what it is --and not from an outside source. Each person
must judge the moral "what" if he does not depend on another for his moral
standards. Thus, Reiman in his notion of moral obligation comes close to
83Ibid
.
, p. 2. From the view of this writer, what Reiman must mean
to say is that "moral authority is not a meaningful moral concept because"
if it were
,
it would "contradict the notion of moral obligation itself. "
84Ibid.
, pp. 2-4.
85Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, p. 13.
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Wolff's notion of autonomy. 86
From this very brief look at some literature that skirts the edge of the
distinction between contradiction and non-contradiction it is apparent that the
distinction is treated as an outcast. And yet the fact that this literature exists
at all might well suggest that there is something plausible in that distinction,
especially in the light of Taylor's argument.
Features of a Degree of Reality Logic -- Having examined, in a little
detail, the plausibility of the two main features which characterize a degree of
reality logic, it is time to consider these and other features as they compare
with what I call a degree of truth logic. Before doing so, however, 1 want to
emphasize the tentative nature of my claims. I do not insist that thought and
reality are wholly identical, even in the domain of human action, nor do I
insist that contradiction is the nature of our concepts or of the human condition.
What I shall argue is that the possibility of these claims being true is too
86Reiman acknowledges that, in rejecting the concept of moral authority,
he appears to be agreeing with Wolff's defense of anarchism. But, according
to Reiman, there is for him at least a "theoretical possibility" of establishing
the existence of "legitimate" political authority, though not of moral author-
ity. Reiman's final position seems to invoke what this writer calls a degree
of truth logic. Reiman argues that Wolff's concepts of moral autonomy and
moral authority are too purely definitional. In the terms of Alston or Putnam,
one might say that Wolff's concepts assume too sharp a distinction between
the analytic and the synthetic. Real moral autonomy involves an existent
social order, says Reiman, and cannot be completely opposed to legitimate
political authority. See Reiman, In Defense of Political Philosophy, pp. 4-5,
75-79.
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serious to be ignored. 87
The features of a degree of reality logic may be listed as follows:
1. There is no "external reality" consistently independent of one's
concepts. Hence if this logic is a contextualist position it must be one which
tends toward idealism more than toward empiricism
. Now one might argue
that this second conceptual logic simply is idealism and not another middle
way, since to identify thought and reality suggests a complete and closed
reality. I disagree. The reality I speak of seems internally contradictory,
to me. Its "completeness" is the completeness of contradiction, not the
logical order of an idealist philosophy such as that of Spinoza.
2. There is, as with the degree of truth logic, an openness of concepts.
But here they are not open because they are indefinite but because their
87 Furthermore, the claims are so broad that their proof tends to be
internal. There seems no way to test the validity of the Law of Non -Contra-
diction without assuming, in advance, either that the law exists or that it
does not. Consequently, proofs against the existence of contradiction will
usually be found to be assuming that law. Logicians imbed all the laws of
thought within the metalanguage by which they talk about logic, and they can
become quite testy if anyone questions the metalanguage. Mure makes the
following important criticism of the logician's insistence on his laws of
thought and, specifically, his insistence on the law of non -contradiction.
"It has been objected to Hegel's Logic that he bases it on a flat denial
of the law of contradiction. The objection suggests that this law is for
logic an unexaminable universal axiom to be accepted as an a priori datum.
Eut if it is, there is exempted from the logician's critical scrutiny what
is implied by this very objection to be an extremely important character
of thought. " [G. R. G. Mure, An Introduction to Hegel (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 139. j
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definiteness is a product of conflict and tension. (In other words there is
determination by negation. ) Hence definition is not a stable state, either of
rest or movement.
3. Again, as with the degree of truth logic, concepts undergo evolution.
But evolution does not here refer to a merging of reality and concept but to
awareness of the connection of the concept with every other concept
. No con-
cept is completely understood until the conceptual whole is completely under-
stood.
4. The evolutionary process does not occur through the actions of any
pervasive community of investigators or language users but as a conflict be-
tween such communities. The conceptual structure within which individual
concepts have their meaning is that conflict.
5. The problems to which these communities respond are contrasting
problems and yet they ara interdependent ones.
All these features of a degree of reality logic --identity of thought
(concept) and reality, definition by negation, completeness of definition de-
pended on completeness of understanding of the whole, development of
definitional completeness as social conflict, and social conflict as conflict of
different but interdependent problems (and thus perspectives)-
-all these are
found in the philosophy of Hegel. I shall attempt to reveal these features as
I give an exposition of his thought.
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Hegel> Thought. 88 Hegel's views contrast sharply, in many respects,
with those of common sense. If one places the burden of proof on he who
opposes common sense then it falls heavily on Hegel, yet he accepts this
burden only in the context of his own method and this method diverges as
sharply from common sense as do his substantive positions. He does not
ultimately defend his views either by appeal to sense experience or by the use
of formal logic --that logic based on the Law of Non-Contradiction. Both
methods are for him relatively early, partial, and by themselves mistaken,
phases of thinking. Reality is "Absolute Spirit" becoming conscious of itself.
The only adequate proof for any position is that it is part of the description of
this development process, a process Hegel calls "dialectical. "
88The discussion of Hegel's thought is based primarily on the following
secondary sources: Mure, An Introduction to Hegel
. See previous full citation.
G. R. G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel (London: Oxford University Press,
1965). Michael Kosok, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," in
Hegel: A Collection of Critical Es says, ed. by Alasdair Maclntyre, Anchor
Books (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
,
1972).
The following works, representing primary sources, were consulted:
Carl J. Friedrich, ed. , The Philosophy of Hegel , The Modern Library (New
York: Random House, 1954). Georg Wilheim Friedrich Hegel, "The Philos-
ophy of Right, " trans, by T. M. Knox, Vol. XLVI of Great Books of the Western
World, ed. by Robert M. Hutchins (54 vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
In.
,
1952).
Other secondary sources consulted were as follows: The discussions of
Hegel in Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis a nd Action: Contemporary Philos ophies
of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).
Herbert Marcuse, "Reason and Revolution, " in Essays in the History of
Political Thought, ed. by Isaac Kramnick (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice -Hall, Inc.
,
1969). George H. Sabine, A History of Politica l Thought
(3ded. ; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), chap. XXX.
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A Defense of Hegel by Formal Logic For those who find his typical
form of argument unconvincing, there are passages in Hegel's works and in
those of his sympathetic interpreters which revert to other forms of argument,
particularly to formal logic. I shall employ some of these formal logical
arguments.
While it may seem inconsistent to try to defend Hegel by methods he
himself rejected as inadequate, this is not quite the situation. Firstly, Hegel
does acknowledge formal logic as what may be called a lower phase method.
For him, the worth of this method is not to find, by a process of elimination,
some position free of contradiction. There is no such position. The worth of
such logic is to reveal its own defect, the defect of assuming absolute dis-
89Unctions. I am not proposing, however, to emphasize this particular use
of such logic. For it could not support Hegel's position any more satisfactorily
than it could support other views. Without, for example, absolute distinctions
between what he will call "philosophical science" and what he will call the
thinking of the "understanding" it is not possible to say as emphatically as he
does that one posidon derives from the former and some other merely from
the latter.
But Hegel's sometime use of formal logic can be construed in another way,
and that is my second point. It can be construed as a neutral method capable of
discriminating between the better and worse of other methods. Understood thus,
S^Mure, Thg Philosophy of Hegel, pp. 12-13.
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formal logic is something wholly other than Hegel's dialectical logic. Yet it
is perhaps only by means of something wholly other that his own logic can be
defended. Indeed, this conclusion seems, in the end, to be a reaffirmation of
the dialectic itself.
Having acknowledged the legitimacy of a defense of Hegel by formal logic,
I would summarize the claim he wishes to defend by saying that: all knowledge
is self knowledge. And I would summarize the basic argument for that claim
as follows: To know anything presupposes a relationship between the known
object and the knowing subject. If the object was completely foreign to the
knower then he could have no knowledge of it. Specifically, if the mental
image is apart from the real, one would need an image of the relation between
object and image to know that the two corresponded. But this image is in turn
only an image of a relation one term of which is foreign. To know that this
second order image really corresponds to that relation, one would therefore
need a third order image, and so on to infinity. 90 To know anything at all
therefore requires either that we reach the end of infinity (which we cannot do)
or that we incorporate the object of knowledge within the knowing subject him-
self. One must conclude that all knowledge is a form of self knowledge or, put
another way, is a form of self consciousness.
A corollary of the above point is that human self-consciousness is the
prototype of all knowledge. Here is a sort of knowledge in which subject and
90por one expression of the problem, see Mure, An Introduction to
Hegel, p. 150.
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object are clearly distinct and yet a unity. The self as object is other than
the self as subject and yet it is the same self.
Though they seem to follow by formal logic, the above conclusion and
its corollary, when stated so abstractly, probably do not carry conviction.
I shall begin again. As I do so I must give one prefatory remark. In what
follows, I equate consciousness and self-consciousness. Hegel separates them
both logically and, in a sense, historically. But in both cases consciousness
is always self consciousness in potential. The two are not really separated.
Now whether or not knowledge is a form of self consciousness it certainly
requires self-consciousness in that it requires a self. It makes little sense to
speak of knowledge without a knower. Yet there seems to be no knower on the
reasoning of empiricists such as Hobbes or Hume. If Hobbes is correct in
claiming that knowledge is merely a resultant of motions experienced some-
how as qualities, 91 where is the subject to have these experiences? The
image of billiard balls rebounding on each other suggests, at most, a flux of
sensation, not a point at which they are integrated.
The same difficulty arises for Hume. All non-mathematical knowledge,
he claims, has its basis in given "impressions" (which include such entities as
sensations, emotions and the will). Ideas are merely less lively impressions,
being copies of the more lively ones. And they happen to be associated in
regular ways. Knowledge, states Hume, is just an awareness of these associ-
9*See text chap. I, p. 16.
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ations. Even that much knowledge seems impossible, however, since the
subject of awareness is itself nothing but a non-necessary association of ideas.
. . .
from what impression cou'd this idea [of a self] be deriv'd?.
. . It
must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self
or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impres-
sions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference.
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold,
light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself
at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing buTthe"
perception. y2
Hume did have an explanation for the apparent existence of the self. It
was a mere fiction of the mind. But how there could be a continuing mind to
engage in such fictions was not indicated. Indeed, Hume suggested by his
explanation that no such mind existed.
Neither Hobbes nor Hume, then, can convincingly account for subjectivity.
Yet the existence of subjectivity is as certain to plain-man thinking as are real
objects and the correspondence theory of truth . Common sense is not all on
the side of the empiricists. Furthermore, the existence of the subject im-
plies that the subject is conscious of itself. That is at least part of what sub-
jectivity normally means.
I conclude that if the subjectivity essential to knowing cannot be reached,
starting from an external given, (whether of objects or sensations) then one
must apparently start from the subject itself. This conclusion gains further
support from two other directions. First, consider again the infinite regress
92Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
, pp. 251-52. [Bk. I, Pt. IV,
sec. VI. ]
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to which a correspondence theory of truth seems to lead. To acknowledge the
priority of the subject in knowing completes this infinite regress, in a sense
(while of course denying the correspondence theory in its usual empiricist
form). It completes the regress by assimilating infinity within the subject
itself as its essential attribute --the capacity for self reflection and thus self
transcendence. Common sense recognizes the self as something that can
reflect on itself, can reflect on its reflection and so on.
Consider, secondly, the method of ostension, that method upon which
most empiricists ultimately ground their views. The classic difficulty of this
method, as we have seen, is that of producing unambiguous information.
Pointing, it seems, suggests an infinite number of applicable concepts. Sub-
jectival knowing avoids this difficulty. If knowing truly begins with the subject,
the problem which arises is not how information could be correct but how it
could be incorrect.
These, then, are some of the principal arguments of formal logic for the
claim that all knowledge is self-knowledge. In the following pages I shall
further elaborate that claim, first by briefly considering Kantian thought,
second by examining the Hegelian dialectic, third by discussing the Hegelian
notion of Spirit, and last by some comments on Hegel's philosophy of history.
Contrast Between Hegel and Kant -- Immanuel Kant holds, in a way, both
that the subject is epistemologically prior and that knowledge is ultimately
initiated by an objective reality. To use a simple metaphor, concepts are like
cookie cutters which cut "phenomena" out of the differentiated but otherwise
90
unknowable thing-in-itself. 93 The difficulty with this view is that if the sub-
ject is a cookie cutter which cuts out phenomena then, to continue metaphor-
ically, it is not, presumably, a mirror which pictures the phenomena thus
produced. But how then can the phenomena be known? Kant's response is an
appeal to something like unmediated sense experience. 94 The subject provides
only the forms of knowledge
--certain very abstract categories such as sub-
stance or cause and effect. Jf one has an experience it will be prestructured
by these forms. But whether one has the experience is determined somehow by
things in themselves. It is those which provide the matter of knowledge, telling
what particular substances there are or what particular instances of cause and
effect. Thus for Kant, even as for empiricism, the subject does not seem to be
truly prior in knowing.
It was particularly in response to Kant that Hegel developed his views of
truly subjectival knowing. For Hegel, such knowledge implies a different
status for concepts. They are not like cookie cutters which operate on some-
thing basically different. They are like seeds which contain the potential of
developed reality within themselves. Such knowing thus implies also a funda-
mentally different source of differentiation for reality. For empiricists the
division of reality into different determinate entities is assumed a given.
93]viore precisely, there are acts of judgment which must occur prior to
experience because they are presupposed by experience. They make experience
cohere in certain general ways.
the discussion in Mure, An Introduction to Hegel
, pp. 89-91.
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But if reality unfolds from the concept, differentiation appears in this very
process, a process which Hegel calls the dialectic. Let us now consider that
process.
The Hegelian Dialectic -- Michael Kosok has developed a very helpful
formalization of Hegel's dialectic. My discussion of its principles is largely
drawn from early pages of that essay95 but does not follow them exactly.
If all knowledge is self knowledge then it is reflection. Hegel's dialect-
ical logic is the formal process of reflection. It is a process which is the
structural opposite of empiricism oriented thought. In empiricist oriented
thought we suppose there is a vast array of concrete sense phenomena and that
from these ascends a pyramid of increasingly high abstractions. But dialect-
ical knowledge is an inverted pyramid. A small set of elements on an early
highly abstract level are capable, by reflection, of being analyzed from a
meta -level which brings out properties about that level which could not have
been formulated within it. As reflection continues on ever higher levels there
is increasing complexity and concreteness. Of course this process is not
simply one of moving from the abstract to the concrete instead of the reverse.
The Hegelian "abstractions" already contain the concrete in potential much as
the details of a mathematical system are already contained within its principles.
The dialectical process occurs in what are analogous to temporal stages
but do not in fact exist in time; they are better described as logical moments.
95Kosok, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," pp. 237-49.
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Let us examine this dialectical process rather closely. There is an element,
something immediately present in the field of consciousness, which element
is both concept and reality. This element is reflected upon. The first logical
moment of the reflection affirms that this element is present. But the very act
of affirmation implies that something other than the affirmed element must
exist from which it is distinguished-
-namely the negation of the element.
This second moment, the moment of negation
.
. .is regarded as the
essence of reflection and mediation.
. . since to mediate or reflect is to
remove (negate) oneself from a situation of immediacy. 1,96 It is thereby also
the essential moment of determination or, to put it another way, definition.
"Reflection is a questioning process producing determination by setting an
element in opposition with itself.
.
.
*' 97
As the assertion of the element implies its negation, however, so the
negation again refers to the assertion. I cannot understand not -something
except as I can imagine the something. This third logical moment is labelled
by Hegel "double negation. " Only with this third moment can I be said to have
a complete reflection since I cannot think of an element without thinking of its
negation and I cannot think of its negation without thinking of its affirmation.
While the triad of affirmation, negation, and double negation is essential
for any reflection at all, and thus any determination of the element (or defin-
96Ibid.
, p. 240.
97Ibid.
, p. 241.
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ition of the concept), a single triadic process does not yield a complete
reflection. The element has only been defined as one of mutually implied
possibilities
--the possibility that it is implies the possibility that it is not and
vice versa.
Because the element with which reflection begins is made only potentially
determinate, through that reflection, it is now necessary to reflect upon the
reflection. This second level reflection will involve nine terms instead of the
original three, since each moment in the initial act of reflection is itself the
object of a triadic process. Similarly, the third level will involve twenty seven
terms. Now this process goes on to infinity but by infinity is not meant here
the endlessness of things which are themselves finite. Recall that Hegel is
describing the process of self-knowledge. What is meant is the infinitude of the
individual who because he can reflect upon himself
,
(or in other words has his
own determining negation within himself) is internally infinite. 98
Clearly, then, the dialectical process never comes to an end except in
the sense that it always is_ at an end as the continuing self-struggle of the self
conscious individual. Kosci; expresses this point by saying that "Reflection is
an infinite movement of self-realization that can never resolve itself in the
form of a completed product : the whole as a process is incomplete; only the
99process as a whole or an infinite totality and not a product is complete.
98See Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel
,
p. 22, footnote 2.
"Kosok, "The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic, " p. 249.
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In summary, the dialectical process is the development of self
-con-
sciousness. There is, in the first step, subject present as a state of non-
conscious harmony slightly disrupted by a vague awareness of unease. In the
second step this awareness of unease is objectified—is made into an object
confronting the subject. But in the third step the subject becomes more fully
realized in becoming aware that this object is really an aspect of itself. This
total process has at least three descriptions, with their associated terminology.
It may be called the "development of self consciousness, " as above, or it may
be called the "dialectic, " or it may be called the "realization of the concept. "
It is difficult to illustrate briefly the principles of the dialectical process,
since such brief illustration calls for concrete examples, and in Hegelian
thought what is highly concrete only occurs at a late and complex logical moment.
I shall attempt two illustrations while recognizing that the simple examples I
give employ concepts richer than they ought to be. The first illustration em-
braces several levels of the dialectical process.
Consider a person emerging into physical consciousness with a headache.
There is first that vague sense of unease. Next the person senses the headache
as a definite something apart from himself, say a vise within which his head is
being squeezed. Finally he becomes aware that this supposed foreign pressure
is really part of himself.
If we use another expression for the process, if we think in terms of the
"realization of the concept, " we can describe that process a little differently.
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The first step is the concept of a headache in its immediacy, the second is the
concept actualized, and the third is the concept in its actualization. Only with
the three steps together is there really the thought of a headache, the concept.
Of course the process can also be described by using the most well
known terminology of the dialectic. The first step is then said to be relatively
pure thought and to be relatively indeterminate. It is called the thesis. The
second step, or antithesis, is the thought negated-
-confronted with its other --
and by this step it begins to become something definite. In the third step, or
synthesis, the thought is realized as one with its other. The headache as
objective and the headache as subjective is the same one.
It is not odd to consider a headache as an aspect of a self, but Hegel
argues that everything, even the supposedly external world of nature, is ulti-
mately such an aspect. I shall carry the above metaphor a little further to
suggest how this might be.
On a second level of consciousness the person is at first explicitly aware
of his headache but only dimly aware of the immediate social context within
which it arose. Subsequently he comes to objectify this context in the form of
stress situations which confront him. Let us suppose, though, that through
psychological counseling he comes to recognize these situations as attitudes,
and thus aspects, of himself. This third step completes a second triad and
already assimilates to the self that which prior to Freud might have been
considered external.
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At still a third level the person begins with explicit awareness of his
neurosis but little awareness of its broader social context. With further
counseling he objectifies the context as, say, overdemanding parents whose
cumulative actions still confront him. But with the insights of a social philos-
opher he may finally recognize that the competitive society which helped
produce insecure overdemanding parents is the same society in terms of
which he finds his own self identity. Thus like the stress situations, the
parental influence becomes, in a sense, an aspect of himself.
In this metaphor I have not reached the natural world but it is clear that
at least much of social reality is conceivable as an aspect of the subject.
Nevertheless, a word of caution is needed. This metaphor, like any other,
can be misleading. We normally think that it is a person who becomes aware
of a headache and that it is the same person who subsequently recognizes the
contexts of the headache. But if the metaphor is to be exact, one must think
of the headache as itself a subject, though not a fully developed one. Thus it
is the headache which becomes aware of itself, then emerges from this narrow
awareness to become aware that it is more than a headache, and then in turn
emerges from the new awareness, and so on.
My second illustration is of a single level of the dialectic and shows how
plausible it is to say that our social concepts, at least, are defined by their
opposites.
Let us consider the ideological dichotomy of political conservatives and
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political liberals. Do we know what a conservative is by sense experience?
Clearly not. Until we already have a conception of conservatism we don't
know what features of sense experience are important. But then do we all
share the same conception? It seems so, because a conservative will probably
use some of the same words in describing himself that his opponent would use.
But there may be a difference. For the conservative these words may be
concepts, while for his opponent they are empty categories. Both may agree
that the conservative believes society to be an organic whole but the difference
is that the conservative apparently sees it this way and his belief is not the
cause but the outcome of that way of seeing. And the liberal does not see it
that way.
Now if one accepts Wittgenstein's position about language
--the position
that we do seem to share our basic concepts
--one may not find the preceding
argument very convincing. But it is the best I will attempt. There probably
is no conclusive argument either way. And assuming that we do not share the
same conceptions, a conservative and a liberal must be defined by each other.
A conservative, as such, would have little determinate character on
Hegelian reasoning. He does not acknowledge himself as a conservative nor
does he acknowledge other ideologies. And this is because he tacitly assumes
society to be a kind of living organizm which can change only imperceptibly
and not by the independent agency of any of its members. Still, there is a
certain unease about conservatism, a vague sense of discord. But the conserv-
ative only begins to be determinate, his sense of discord only begins to be
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objectified--and then only as defensiveness-when he is confronted with his
antithesis. And it is his antithesis, the liberal, who especially manifests
determinate character.
The liberal does not achieve determination directly, however. That is
to say, he does not achieve it by arguing, at first, for a certain state of society.
He achieves determination in becoming conscious of the conservative position,
let us here call it the organicist status quo, as something distinct from him-
self. In this process he will necessarily see this status quo as in some ways
opposed to his individual concerns and that of any other single experient. Thus
when the liberal then proceeds to defend greater social equality and individual
freedom the specific content of that concept will derive from its contrast to the
status quo. He will begin by arguing against tyranny and privilege.
Hence the organicism of the conservative only becomes conscious when
it is negated by the atomistic views of the liberal, but the latter views only
become clear in contrast to what they negate.
The Hegelian "Spirit" -- The preceding illustrations of the Hegelian
dialectic indicate just how far from plain-man thought subject oriented knowing
goes, if it is developed with formal logical consistency. Of course, the reality
which Hegel saw as a development of thought is, preeminently, social reality.
The natural world was treated somewhat differently. But in any case, whether
or not the notion of dialectical reality seems odd that of the subject surely does.
The Hegelian subject, as potential, is many sorts of things "lower" than
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an individual person. That it is has been already noted in connection with the
headache metaphor. Concepts like quantity and thing, supposedly actual
things like rocks or plants, and the human himself in his primitive or child
state are all the subject in potential and at various stages of its development.
The Hegelian subject, in its full development, is not an individual person,
however, but is something "higher. " It is "Absolute Spirit," "Universal
Mind, " "God. " Individual persons, as well as all the non-logical entities
which are lower than them, are merely contingent differentiations of this
being. There is a formal logical rationale for such a view. If knowing begins
with numerous different subjects, by which I mean different as subjects, then
knowledge will differ for each. But even if knowing begins with numerous
identical subjects, no single subject has awareness of a "common" reality.
In other words, there is no common knowledge. He is aware of his reality
which happens to repeat exactly that of every other. On the assumption that
there is a common knowledge, it clearly seems to follow that the subject must
be singular. Hegel so claims, although his subject is singular as a unity
of numerous personal subjects.
Spirit is, of course, the subject of that dialectical process which has
lC%his argument is drawn from Mure, An Introduction to Hegel
,
p. 91.
It is interesting that, for both Wittgenstein and Hegel, there is a common
world of concepts. But, for Wittgenstein this commonality means that there
are no subjects --the usual conclusion for one with empiricist leanings. And
for Hegel the commonality means that there is only one subject- -which is
again the usual conclusion for one with tendencies toward idealism.
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already been illustrated. It is through the dialectic that Spirit grows in self
consciousness. The process is primarily logical, not historical, and when
that is understood it does not seem so odd to find that abstract ideas as well
as persons are considered subjects. Nevertheless, the general theory still
seems odd since rocks and plants are also subjects, and since persons are
not the ultimate ones. In addition, reality as the self realization of a single
subject is only describable by language which on positivist assumptions sounds
like outrageous hypostatization and anthropomorphism. From those assump-
tions, which are close to plain-man thought, it is easy to criticize and even
caricature Hegel. It is easy but not responsible. If his views are plausible
then so must be the language they require.
Social Implications of Hegel's Philosophy-
-Two Views -- Hegel's
philosophy as I have presented it clearly reveals the first three features of a
degree of reality logic. Thought and reality are indeed identical. Together
they make up the unity of the knowing subject since all knowledge is self-
knowledge. And concepts are indeed open in the sense of being in conflict with
each other rather than being indefinite. For it is in the process of self-negation
that a concept becomes definite. Furthermore, the concept is definite only as
the continuation of the process in higher levels of reflection.
That Hegel's thought also reveals the last two features of a degree of
reality logic --conflict among meaning communities and dispute over the rel-
evant problems --is evident from the discussion of his history which I offered in
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Chapter I. 101 History is a process of struggle among different forms of
social life, different states. And that it is implies that the different states see
different social problems.
Nevertheless, Hegel's social thought, unlike his logic, departs from the
kind of contextualism I am trying to promote. The reasons are, firstly, that
the historical process seems to come to an end (the struggle does not persist)
and, secondly, that whether it does or not later stages in the process seem to
supplant earlier ones. By contrast, I want to talk about a contextualism in
which the conceptual struggle is eternal and, as will be clearer in Chapter V,
where earlier stages continue to be as real in their own way as are later ones.1
Is it possible that Hegel might reasonably have constructed a different
philosophy of ethics and of history upon the same dialectical logic? I suggest
that it is. Hegel's logic is a timeless process in which all the moments of the
dialectic must be thought of as simultaneously present. Being a process of
self realization, it can be thought of as a linear progression. But since every
step in the process occurs by negating, and thus referring back to, that which
preceded, the process also seems completely circular. Hegel's history, how-
ever, (though not his ethics) is a process which occurs in time and is usually
interpreted only as a linear progression.
In his ethics and his history Hegel claims that the individual will only
101 See, text chap. I, pp. 18-22.
102 See, text chap. V, pp. 356-67.
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become free as he recognizes himself to be part of society and ultimately a
part of the State-part of a form of ethical life. Thus Hegel usually seems to
be saying that an individual is free just insofar as he obeys the laws and con-
forms to social customs. But if the state is simply a late phase in a single
dialectical process, as it is, then one might also say that society generally,
and the state in particular, are real only by contrast with individual persons
and that the subjective wills of individuals are as real and moral as are the
laws and customs of society.
A similar argument can be made about Hegel's claim, in his history, that
forms of ethical life --let us say world views since they are at least roughly
that—both succeed and improve upon each other. The argument is that if the
later world views become real only by contrast with what precedes them, their
reality is dependent on the reality of those earlier world views. Thus the
later views are no more an improvement on the earlier than the earlier are on
the later. 1 tried to illustrate this possibility before by showing that if political
liberalism is in one sense an advance on political conservatism in another
sense it depends on conservatism for its own meaning. (We have a common
sense awareness of this converse relationship- -revealed in the perplexities of
social contract theories of society. Unless the supposedly atomistic individuals
of liberalism already share certain deep-rooted customs and beliefs, including
a theory of legitimate social rankings, they could scarcely agree on what sort
of social contract to adopt. )
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I want to suggest, in closing this section, that Hegel's logic, and the
social implications he could have drawn from it but apparently did not, con-
stitute another way to explain human concepts without retreating to empiricism.
The empiricist says we can know, learn, and teach by pointing. But
there are grave arguments against his view. If we reject it, however, we
must assume that if we can still know, learn and teach, then it must be because
we see the world through conceptual frameworks which structure our knowledge,
and that we can communicate our concepts to each othe r.
According to Wittgenstein and similar thinkers it seems that we under-
stand each other's concepts because we share them
--we somehow share the
same conceptual framework. But according to Hegel we understand any con-
cept by contrast with its opposite. This Hegelian insight, carried further into
the social realm, would suggest that a community of investigators or of
language users could have meaningful concepts only in contrast to those of
opposing communities. Hence the reason communication would be possible
across conceptual frameworks was because each side had to assume the oppos -
ing view in order to articulate its own and thus each side was, in effect, on
both sides of the relevant issue
.
The above theory of concepts would explain why convincing ad hominem
arguments are so widely available in political debate. An American liberal
(i. e. a reform liberal) finds that his ability to criticize system bias with
relative immunity rests on his own favored position in the system. One recent
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and striking example consists of those who favor busing for racial integration
but themselves avoid its impact by the safe geographic location which their
status makes possible. An American conservative (i.e. a classic liberal)
finds that his own interest in the current system rests on his ability to under-
mine it. For example, he may argue the classic virtues of capitalism because
he is simultaneously destroying them by monopolistic practices.
Because the Hegel-based argument I have just set forth is another way
to explain human concepts without pointing, and because it must therefore
assume the communicability of those concepts, I call it a second version of
the "communication argument. " Because this version explains communication
as the product of self-consciousness, in which the object and subject are
necessarily in contact since they are two aspects of the same self, I call this
version of the argument an "idealist version. "
The idealist version of the communication argument represents, to me,
a legitimate second way between idealism and empiricism. If the reader would
like to see a more detailed yet concise application of this approach than has
yet been given, he should turn to pages 386-89 in Chapter VI. In the chapters
which next follow I shall be applying the approach at some length.
Comprehensiveness as a Dialectical Problem
We have now reviewed three possible approaches to the examination of
the concept of comprehensiveness. We could see the concept from an empiri-
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cist viewpoint. In that case, the primary research problem would not be a
conceptual problem at all but would be the statistical-survey problem of
correlating comprehensiveness in decision-making with the conditions under
which it was most likely to be achieved. But there would be a subsidiary prob-
lem which was conceptual. We would need to operationalize the concept.
Secondly, we could see the concept from the viewpoint of a degree of
truth logic. Our problem then would be to examine carefully our ordinary
usage and to do so with recognition of the perplexities which empirical exper-
ience would sometimes reveal to us about that usage.
Or, thirdly, we might want to see the concept from the viewpoint of a
degree of reality logic. How we would proceed in this last case is not yet very
clear but apparently the process would involve the idea of an inner conflict—
a
conflict between two aspects of the same subject.
We are now in a position to answer more fully the question posed at the
beginning of this chapter- -the question whether the problems of comprehen-
siveness identified in Chapter I are truly scientific problems or at least
theoretical problems. I said then that whether or not they were theoretical
problems depended on what kinds of theoretical problems there might be. But
I want to point out now that the substantive research problem we identify already
implies a certain research approach and hence a certain theoretical problem.
If the problem of comprehensiveness is basically the problem how a
multiplicity of physically discrete individuals, with different values rooted in
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their physical differences, can be organized into a social whole, then such a
problem raises an empiricist research problem. For it presupposes, with
naive empiricism, that there is an external reality of physical objects and
that connections among these objects are mental abstractions discovered of
experience (in the case of theory) or imposed upon it (in the case of practice).
While on this view the problem of comprehensiveness is a problem of practice
it poses a theoretical problem. That problem is, of course, to discover the
conditions which correlate with effective achievement of social order.
If the problem of comprehensiveness is basically the problem how an
individual is able to become free of the conceptual and social whole which
already exists, and which provides his identity as an individual, then it both
raises and simultaneously is a conceptual research problem. In order to
loose oneself from the conceptual framework within which one is, it is neces-
sary to become aware of that framework- -it is necessary to push it away, so
to speak, and examine it from outside. This is the kind of conceptual problem
implied in a degree of truth logic. For it supposes that an individual could,
in fact, become at least partly free of his concepts and reach a "beyond,
"
whereas for the degree of reality logic there is no beyond.
The two problems thus lead to different virtually opposite approaches.
Yet common sense tells us that both problems do exist. We could ignore
common sense, and this is something I am always willing to do when common
sense tells me to reject something. (Unless we always accept common sense,
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in which case there is no room for theoretical knowledge, we cannot justifiably
use it to reject certain things and not others. For more careful thought might
tell us that what we first rejected really had merit. ) But I always respect
common sense when it tells me to accept something even if the result is that
I must accept opposites; for there may very well be truth in both of those
opposites.
Since common sense suggests to me that both problems of comprehen-
siveness are real I cannot accept the diverse methodological implications they
provide if the dissertation is to employ a single method, and I desire that it
should. My choice of method comes, instead, from an initial direct examin-
ation of the concept of wholeness itself. That examination proceeds as follows.
Is wholeness something to which we can point? No. The very act of
pointing implies that it is a pointing at something. If there is any concept
which it is singularly inappropriate to define by ostension then this concept of
wholeness is the one.
Is wholeness then a combination of concept and social reality which is in
a state of evolution toward a more definite form? According to a degree of
truth logic this is the condition of important concepts. But wholeness, i.e.
completeness, is not incomplete.
I conclude that it is best to examine the concept of comprehensiveness
from the standpoint of a degree of reality logic since any other method of
concept examination seems to deny the very existence of this particular concept
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It must be admitted, however, that my own choice of method already pre-
supposes the kind of concept which comprehensiveness must be. It pre-
supposes that wholeness is a unity of opposites. But this supposition, while
perhaps curious, does have an important source of support in mathematical
logic.
A satisfactory wholeness apparently must embrace infinity and contra-
diction. This is what Hegel's concept of spirit does. But it is also an alternate
interpretation of Kurt Godel's incompleteness theorem. Godel attempted to
develop a complete formal systematization of the arithmatic of whole numbers
-
an arithmatic which contains an infinite numer of elements. His attempt con-
sisted in mapping the assumptions of the system into the system itself. The
resulting product was found to be self-referential, however, and to result in
1 03
contradiction. The more usual way of describing Godel's conclusion is
that any logically consistent system with an infinite number of elements is
essentially incomplete. The alternate conclusion, however, is that a system
with an infinite number of elements is complete as an inconsistent system. 104
There is a further argument to be made for treating wholeness as a
dialectical problem. The two problems of comprehensiveness previously
±UJFor a brief discussion of Godel's proof, see Ernest Nagel and James
R. Newman, "Godel's Proof, " in Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory,
ed. by Irving M. Copi and James A. Gould (New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1967).
* ^Something n^e this conclusion is suggested by Kosok, "The Formal-
ization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic," pp. 263-64.
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identified are not themselves wholly consistent but incorporate opposing views.
I oversimplified them, in this section, so as to show the tendency of their
methodological implications, but in each case there is only a tendency. If it
is possible for the atomism and behaviorism of a Hobbes to yield social order
(even if only in one act) then people cannot be merely sources of impulse.
There must be some mind, some concept usage, present. And if it is possible
for certain individuals to somehow rise out of the social meanings of their
time, as Hegel asserts, then most of us would conclude that there must be
neutral ground-sense experience
--which provides the foundation on which to
do this.
The approach of the degree of reality logic is particularly sympathetic to
the inconsistent mixtures which both problems of comprehensiveness seem to
represent.
A final argument for the method draws from considerations of expediency
rather than of theory. The human condition, at the time of writing, increas-
ingly appears as one of dilemma. We seem to be caught in impossible choices
such as that between a livable environment and the satisfaction of basic mater-
ial needs or, more fundamentally, between the maintenance of what is good in
industrial civilization and the reversal of the trend toward increasing poverty
in many non-industrial societies. Perhaps a method which sees dilemma as
inevitable, and proposes to analyze it, is a method worth investigating. Indeed,
if conditions are as bad as some commentators maintain, the method is one we
cannot afford to ignore.
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A Dialectical Method of Concept Examination
In this last section of Chapter II is presented the method of concept
examination which I shall use in the following two chapters. I believe this
method is something of a departure from that commonly employed in ordinary
language analysis but I don't insist on the point. If it happens that some or
many ordinary language analysts are using a method like that which is proposed,
then it is their sort of ordinary language analysis which I, also, want to use.
A few comments might be made about nomenclature. The method is an
"examination,
"
not an analysis. It does not seek to draw out abstract elements
and reduce them to a few even more abstract ones. Its purpose, on the con-
trary, is to display the gradual efflorescence of the concept through increas-
ingly richer specification. The examination is "dialectical" in several senses.
It is so first in the loose sense of making argument the focus of its concern.
Within this focus is included argument over first principles, over the axioms
which for conventional logic are unarguable, and consequently the method is
dialectical in a second sense --that which Plato uses in the Republic. 105 Finally
the method is dialectical in the third sense that argument is understood to be a
series of completed arguments each of which is successively more refined than
the last and each of which grows from, and yet in a way rejects, earlier ones.
This third sense is roughly the Hegelian sense.
105The Republic of Plato, trans, by Francis MacDonald Cornford (Lon-
don: Oxford University Press, 1941), chap. XXIV. [Bk. VI, 509-11.]
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My proposed method is, in brief, an analogue to the Hegelian position
according to which reality is a single subject or a single concept becoming
ever more fully realized. Could we not see the life work of many an important
theorist as the attempt to develop the full meaning of one concept? Plato's
work could be plausibly understood as a continuing attempt to define the Good.
Many medieval thinkers were perhaps attempting to define God, and many
thinkers during the Renaissance were certainly attempting to define Man. The
writings of a country's judiciary are an attempt to define Justice. Some novel-
ists may be trying to define Fate, others Love, and so on.
If we do see a thinker's work in this way, could we not imagine the
possibility both that his concept has no universal reference in experience and
that it is not shared by all other minds
--and would we not then conclude that
his concept must be defined by its own negative? If we do imagine this then
the definition of any concept requires the existence of its opposite within itself.
If we further suppose that these concepts in question are still social concepts,
not concepts which belong to the thinker alone, then the conflict of opposites in
any concept implies a social conflict.
Now given the previous assumptions, we may say that the thinker's
participation in a social conflict, though it appears to be a debate over propo-
sitions, is really a definition of a concept . And thus if we examine the debate
we are effectually examining the definition. Such an examination, based on
such assumptions, is the dialectical approach to concepts which I am proposing.
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The Dialectica l
_Method m Relation to the Ordinary Language Approach .
The ordinary language approach shares with other contextual^ approaches the
observation that there is no sharp distinction between facts and values, between
description and normative evaluations. Human society, the source of all
immediate values, is also the source of the conceptual scheme through which
we identify facts.
Many contextualists, whether more or less inclined to ordinary language
methods, appear to supplement this first observation with a second one, how-
ever, to the effect that when we know the description we know the norm. Julius
Kovesi expresses the point, with respect to concepts, by observing that we
cannot say that two objects are similar in every respect except that one is good
while the other is not. Once we know, for example, that something is a murder
we know that it is bad. 106 Others such as Kurt Baier 107 have taken like posi-
tions, positions which would seem very close to naturalism were they based on
more positivist assumptions.
The question I have for this second observation is whether it could not as
well be reversed. If we already know the moral worth of something when we
106Julius Kovesi, Moral Notions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967),
pp. 26-28.
Baier argues that, in value judgments, the identification of that which
is being judged about can only be made if one knows something about its purpose.
To know a car is to know the purpose of cars and to know the latter is already
to know something about the criteria for a good car. See Kurt Baier, The Moral
Point of View: A Rational Basis of Ethics (abridged ed. ; New York: Random
House, 1965).
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know what it is, why could we not equally well say that we already learn what
something is as we argue out its moral worth?
The apparent response to such a question by much of ordinary language
analysis, and by similar approaches, is that our most important concepts are
concepts that we all share. Consequently we could indeed reverse the sequence
but not to the point of producing a really intense debate. Gallie, for one,
argues that there exist "essentially contested concepts" but he adds that these
concepts have reference to "exemplars" which are acknowledged by all (al-
though they are open and provide no one best set of defining features).108
Kovesi asserts that a fundamental duality is not possible, at least for moral
notions. Conceptualization is a public process. ".
. . only those features of
our lives can be incorporated into these notions that are shared by any of us,
and in turn the formation of the notion must itself be done from the point of
1 09
view of anyone. "
By contrast with the view above, the method I propose is one in which we
do learn what something is primarily as we argue its moral worth. And this
debate is expected to be so fundamental that in a sense we do not even share
the same terms of reference. The reason we can nevertheless have a debate
is because our opponent's views are the necessary background condition for
108W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts, " in The Importance
of Language
,
ed. by Max Black (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice -Hall,
Inc.
,
1962), pp. 121-46.
1 09
Kovesi, Moral Notions, p. 55.
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our own, and vice versa.
I suggest now that this dialectical development of concepts is as amenable
to common sense as is the position of ordinary language philosophy. From the
latter position everyone is seen to be engaged in ordinary language analysis
just in the process of social interaction and language use. Those for whom it
is a profession differ only in that they do it more carefully and hopefully with
a little more insight. Their method is not ultimately an adversary proceeding
but is one of clarifying what things are.
The ordinary language approach makes sense since we do gain conceptual
clarity through relatively nonconflictual processes of day to day social life and
discourse. But it also makes sense to view concept development as a process
of intense moral debate. This second approach, which is also pervasive, is in
the first instance an argument over the worth of something whose nature is
only very vaguely grasped. It is only through an adversary process that that
nature becomes specified.
Consider the jury deliberations in a murder trial. Given my contextual-
ist assumptions we know that these deliberations are not just a matter of seeing
here a certain human act and finding there the best label for it. To know some-
thing as a human act is already to know, in large part, the kind of act it is. But
the question remains whether the jury is better understood as engaged primari-
ly in clarifying the nature of murder in the light of their experience with this
particular event or in arguing about the intrinsic goodness or badness of that
event. I grant that judicial decisions are often interpreted in the former way
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by legal theory. But I would still maintain that what goes on in the jury room,
and for that matter in the privacy of the judges* chambers, is more aptly
understood as an argument over moral worth. As the argument reaches a
tentative conclusion the jury has "found" at once both the act and the concept.
Arguments on such basic matters are never more than tentative, of
course. We might better say not that the argument reaches a conclusion but
that the argument is the conclusion, that the argument is the --internally con-
flictual- -concept. The plausibility of this, as regards the present example, is
evident. Consider the hung jury or the split decision in appeals court. Split
decisions are commonplace and hung juries would be more so if the juries were
not so often pressured into decisions.
There are numerous other examples of social life which could be con-
strued as examples of dialectical concept examination. Those which develop
military or diplomatic concepts such as "aggression" and "war criminal"
unfortunately tend to involve violence, so intense is the moral argument. But
there are many examples which do not and these include not only the usual
activities of legislatures, political parties, voters, etc. but also the writing
of books.
Written arguments certainly can be seen as instances of dialectical con-
cept examination. I do not refer to the obvious point that the sides of, say, a
legislative debate can include written arguments as well as oral ones or that a
writer may make the case for his opponents as well as for himself. I mean
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that the written argument on one side of the debate can be seen as a debate in
itself. In what now follows I try to show why.
From the view of a degree of truth logic, a book length argument rests
on a great number of distinctions and hence of subsidiary concepts which can
be safely taken for granted because they are part of a common culture. The
argument then focuses on a few remaining concepts, and these of course can
vary only within the relatively narrow limits set by the mass of concepts that
are already assumed.
It does not follow, however, that because the subsidiary concepts are
assumed by the author that they are therefore really free of inconsistency.
According to a degree of reality logic, an author's meanings may vary not
merely around a central tendency but to the point of being contraries and
possibly even contradictories. And they are the more able to do so precisely
because they are not the matter of prime concern. Thus within his argument
the author may be found to be arguing with himself, if these contradictions are
present.
There is nothing greatly odd about this thesis. That someone's argu-
ments can be plausibly interpreted in quite different ways is commonly
acknowledged and gives rise to one of the major needs for scholarship. But
scholarly interpretation is usually motivated by a goal of the one best interpre-
tation. And we may ask if this is a reasonable goal, granting that it is a
necessary one for the purpose of writing textbooks. Perhaps the author really
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is saying quite different tilings.
From the standpoint of a degree of reality logic the differing concepts
and propositions in some extended argument are not a target for scholarly
reduction. One's purpose is to interpret these as an internal debate consti-
tuting part of the larger debate over a certain concept or concepts. And this
phenomenon of debates within debates itself constitutes a specification of the
concept or concepts, the best specification possible. 110
Main Features of the Method
. The purpose of a dialectical method of
concept examination is to reveal, with increasing specification, a concept by
and as the pattern of defense of the worth of the concept. By worth I mean
Even if one rejects the broader implications of the method, it still has
certain practical advantages. Firstly, it takes very seriously the obvious
question to be asked of anyone arguing a position-
-"Why should I believe that?"
Despite its obviousness, this question is not emphasized by present-day
empiricists since for them argument is not primarily instructive. Ordinary
language philosophers, although they criticize the empiricist position, do not
seem to emphasize the question either. They employ argument to clarify
ordinary language as it contributes to the evolution of language and of the norms
embedded therein. For them, argument seems to be a recognition device.
Thus, the proposed method seems to this writer to fill a practical need.
And it does this without taking a skeptical position. It is concerned less with
evaluating the defense of a position than with simply displaying that defense in
its full complexity. In doing the latter, it has a second practical advantage.
It treats an author's writings as worthy of an extended examination. In an era
which emphasizes speed reading and rapid summary, this may be a useful
counter force.
The practical advantages of the method are accompanied by some clear
practical dangers. An emphasis on the great complexity, and even inconsis-
tency, in an author's work can easily degenerate into nit-picking. Even worse,
it may lead one to overlook general principles which are there. Points which
appear to be inconsistent, at first, may actually be tied together by these
principles. This writer recognizes these dangers.
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centrally the "normative" value of the concept but without supposing that this
value is wholly distinct from the "description" of the concept. By normative
value is meant ultimate goodness or badness, not instrumental goodness or
badness (as, for example, in "fruitfulness for research"). 111
There are a number of features named or implied in the above statement
of method and I shall elaborate on several of them.
Focus on the Writings of Others -- Although I propose to examine a con-
cept by examining the defense of its worth, I will not, in an important sense,
be focusing on a defense which I myself produce. If I did so I could not estab-
lish enough psychic distance to even approximate an adequate examination.
This is because a dialectical examination must be self referential. Because it
departs from the assumption of a generally shared and only vaguely conscious
conceptual framework, it must seek defense of a concept's worth in terms of
that very defense, or of an opposition defense, or of a combination of both.
Hence it must look for argument within the argument. I shall therefore focus
on other peoples' writings and on those which do more or less explicitly defend
a position about the worth of a concept.
Hold Back from Summarization -- The argument within a writer's argu-
ment is the object of a dialectical concept examination. To see this argument
one must hold back from summarization. In saying this, I don't suggest that
m-Note that, in this description of purpose, the writer speaks of the
worth of the concept and not the worth of that referred to by the concept. It is
obvious, from previous argument, that any permanently sharp distinction
between thing and concept is not acknowledged.
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one can avoid that which summarization implies, namely the presence of a
conceptual framework. I have of course been insisting on the ubiquity of con-
ceptual spectacles. Neither do I suggest that one could make any examination
of an author's work, other than verbatim repetition, without one's own analysis
and in that sense summary. What I mean is just what I said. One should hold
back from summarization as much as possible. 112
To hold back from summarization is the obverse of the affirmative in-
junction to seek out and identify the different distinctions and thus subsidiary
concepts, the different expansions of these concepts, and the different argu-
ments and other points of defense which employ the concepts. This is the
initial step.
Seek Patterns of Defense Following the initial step, is the second and
major step. It is the attempt to learn how an author uses all the elements to
defend his position for or against the worth of the concept in question. One
112One might object that there often is not much complexity in an author's
work which could be overlooked. This writer is not so sure. Consider this
analogy. Traditional studies of legislative activity focused on recorded votes,
public debates, committee hearings open to the public, and similar overt acts.
It is recognized, now, that even a single legislator's activity on a single bill
comprises a very large number of different and even inconsistent actions, and
that those which have been traditionally the most obvious ones may be the
least interesting. As one moves from traditional models of politics, first to
pluralist models and subsequently to what, for lack of a more general term,
might be called new -left models, ever more of these other actions come into
clear view. Why should one not suppose, therefore, that a shift in viewpoint
might do the same for authors whose works would otherwise be considered
thin?
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common approach would be to cleanse the elements of any definite contra-
dictions and ambiguities and then to reconstruct what remained in a loosely
structured chain of logical syllogisms. But it was precisely my point in giving
a rationale for a dialectical method of concept examination that this approach
would not do. In destroying the contradiction, it destroys the inner debate
and it is just that which one seeks.
By a pattern of defense I mean, then, something broader and looser than
the common approach requires. A point of defense need not. be a conventional
logical argument and this is why I prefer to use the word "defense" rather than
the word "argument. " It may instead take a form that would be considered fal-
lacious by conventional logic and which is yet accepted as convincing by many
people. The simplest way, for example, to prove that A can do B is to identify
them. Thus democracy can obviously coordinate if it is coordination.
As for the pattern, I mean any relationship among all the various elements
if that relationship makes some sense as a whole. It is often suggested that
there can be no structure among concepts which are ambiguous by conventional
standards or among arguments which, by the same standards, are fallacious.
This is too strong a saying. We cannot be that sure of the claim, in the ab-
sence of any attempt to find such a pattern.
An Anticipated Pattern of Defense --The Dialectical Pattern --No pattern
can be found where none is anticipated. The assumptions of a degree of reality
logic suggest a pattern as well as a procedure. Historians of science such as
Kuhn argue that science is less an inductive aggregating process than it is a
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succession of increasingly broader conceptual wholes incorporating in altered
forms those which went before. 113 We might plausibly say the same of a
single person's thought. It makes sense to see personal knowledge as an
efflorescence of distinctions which successively destroy and reconstruct con-
ceptual frameworks. For most people this process goes unrecorded. But for
some sorts of writers it may well be captured in the chronology of their works.
For Kuhn those wholes within wholes can be deductively organized after
the fact, so to speak, although that organization does not accurately describe
their historical development. In the realm of social phenomenon, however,
I am suggesting that the confrontation with conceptual structures of higher
levels is a perpetual one and does not appear only in their initial development.
The liberal-conservative conflict in politics seems to be this sort of conflict.
So does the relationship between various geographic levels of political com-
munity from the local community to the nation state. It is precisely the view
of a degree of reality logic that such conflicts must be perpetual, as they
define the concepts through a succession of conceptual wholes. The pattern
to anticipate is, then, one of wholes within and against wholes.
I shall proceed on this assumption by examining, in chronological order,
certain principal works of a single author. And I shall assume that these
ll3Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . In his later writings,
however, Kuhn has deemphasized the impression, conveyed in this early work,
that scientific paradigms are complete conceptual frameworks which can
change only by revolutions.
122
works do form some sort of ultimate whole, however incompatible they may
initially appear.
The Dialectical Pattern. The dialectical pattern, or in other words the
pattern of the inner debate within a thinker's works, is revealed by identifying
the different levels of completed argument, of conceptual whole, and then by
displaying the relationships between each completed argument and the next
above it. I shall first discuss certain basic features of the arguments and
shall then outline the major steps taken to reveal the whole dialectical pattern
or any one level of it.
Features of the Arguments --
1. The argument is a conceptual structure.
Each argument is an argument for or against the worth of the concept
under examination, in this case the concept of comprehensiveness. Now these
arguments are themselves understood to be conceptual structures and are the
closest things to what on another view would be called conceptual frameworks.
If concepts become specified in competition with each other and not by reference
to a common evolving culture then one cannot draw much of a distinction be-
tween a concept and the conceptual framework within which it makes sense.
Both are equally independent. Conceptual structures are struggles, both intern-
ally and externally. They are not settings. This is Hegel's viewpoint.
2. A completed argument is circular.
By a completed argument is meant a circular argument. That the argu-
ments should be circular is not so odd. If concepts are internally related then
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circularity is the only form available other than contrast.
3. A higher level completed argument is richer in distinctions than is
a lower level one.
By a higher level argument, or a more expansive conceptual structure
(two terms for the same thing) I mean an argument that is richer in sharp dis-
tinctions. This is a common meaning. The purpose of the distinctions, as I
perceive it, is less common, however.
4. The purpose of richer distinctions is to better defend one's case.
Why does someone who has written a short essay on a certain subject
then proceed to write longer essays or books on the same subject? It is often
said that he does so in order to make richer points of connection with the con-
crete reality to which his discussion refers. He makes more distinctions to
achieve a closer fit with that reality. Another purpose often cited is that he
does so to elaborate the cultural-linguistic setting which we all share. It is
important to recognize that however much these two purposes may differ they
have in common the typically western assumption that differentiation of some
sort, whether these differences are material or cultural, has ontological
priority. They assume that the philosophic problem is to explain how there
can be unity as expressed in such things as universals.
There is an alternate assumption, however, which is common to eastern
and some western thought and which holds that reality is one. The problem,
on this view, is to explain how there can be any differences, not why there is
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unity. This is the problem for Hegel and his explanation is that differentiation is
the self realization of a single subject.
On this latter assumption, a major reason for making more distinctions is
to defend one's case against the attacks directed at one's earlier less differ-
entiated positions. This other purpose was supposedly common to scholastic
thought and it is often attacked as an improper one. People argue that some-
one who will use distinctions in this way has no respect for facts. He simply
wants to defend his theories at all cost and hence a setback to his theory, from
sense experience, will always be countered by more distinctions. But this
argument supposes that there are neutral facts of some sort. If this is not so,
then the development of distinctions, particularly of social distinctions such as
ends/means, politics/society or individual/group constitutes in itself the
development of reality. And if concepts must be defined by their negatives, so
that the definition of a concept is not only social but a social conflict, then it is
the very nature of this conflict, this debate, that one pursues it by making more
distinctions.
Displaying the Pattern -- I now come to the most critical stage in my
discussion of methodology. It is a detailed description of the dialectical
pattern- -the pattern of an author's inner debate. The dialectical pattern is
displayed by showing that the following specific propositions hold with respect
to a reasonably large selection of the person's written works. The works will
most commonly be essays or books but they may include book reviews, symposia
participation, personal correspondence and the like.
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Those propositions designated by letters are background propositions.
Those propositions designated by numbers are treated as definite steps in the
argument process and these numbered steps will appear in the analyses of
Chapters III and IV.
A. With respect to each pair of chronologically proximate works, parts
of works, or groups of works, both of the pair are complete arguments and
the later of the two is a higher level argument than the earlier. In other words,
the later is a larger circle with more internal arguments on it-
-because it
incorporates more distinctions
--than is the earlier argument.
B. The totality of an author's works, considered relevant for this con-
cept examination, can be seen as maintaining one side of a debate. The debate
seems to pose a dilemma. A common sense view of the debate s uggests that
each side has as much merit as the other although each excludes the other.
Perhaps this is because each side is understood in opposition to the other. This
debate is the "outer" or "primary" debate.
Within each side of the outer debate there are two factions. They arise
as alternate attempts to deal with the dilemma posed by that debate. The first
faction leans toward the other side of the debate, while still giving verbal
allegiance to its own side. The second faction defines itself in opposition to the
first faction. It wants to show that one can truly retain the advantages of one's
own side but without its disadvantages. This debate within the outer debate is
the "proximate outer" debate or "secondary" debate.
It is the second faction which seems the most aggressive faction in the
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proximate outer debate. Because its position is logically so tenuous, however,
the strongest position that it can take, and consequently the one usually taken,
is that the other faction's position leads to logical absurdity. In other words,
the argument begins as a reductio ad absurdum. But reductio arguments are
not necessarily convincing unless it can be shown that there is an alternate
position which is not logically absurd. Hence those on this side of the proxi-
mate outer debate must provide a "direct proof as well as the reductio or
"indirect proof. "
The direct proof is a proof that it is in fact possible to gain the advantages
of one's own side in the outer debate without its disadvantages. The statement
of that possibility is called the "central theme" and because the central theme
seems to pose a contradiction, the attempt to defend it is what generates the
"inner" or "tertiary" debate.
The statement of the central theme appears in the earliest of the author's
works and is more or less continuously maintained in subsequent ones. The
initial argument and all the later ones are, in one sense, varying attempts to
defend this theme. In another sense they are expressions of the theme.
C. There is also revealed in the earliest work a concept which is the
subject of the theme and which is also present in all subsequent works. It may
be called the "central concept. " The dilemma of the outer debate comes to a
focus in this concept. It is not the concept at issue in that outer debate, how-
ever, but is the negation of that concept. The central theme appears to be
making an assertion about the central concept—an assertion which is simul-
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taneously definitional and non
-definitional. Stated from the point of view of
the concept, the theme asserts that the concept both contains and does not
contain a certain feature.
The reason for the curious nature of the central concept is because it is
the negative phase in the dialectical definition of the concept at issue. If the
concept at issue is comprehensiveness, then the central concept is the negation
of comprehensiveness. But if the negative concept can only be understood by
reference to the positive, then this opposite of comprehensiveness is somehow
the same as comprehensiveness.
D. The earliest argument in defense of the central theme is in effect
two arguments. There is the argument represented by the theme itself as an
identity statement. And there is a more explicit argument which simultaneously
rejects and yet incorporates this identity statement. Hence the tension present
in the concept and theme reappear, not surprisingly, in the first explicit argu-
ment for that theme, and they subsequently reappear between that argument and
any later argument.
The above propositions set forth the general structure of a dialectical
concept examination. Below are listed the propositions connected with particular
steps of that examination.
1. Central Concept
The central concept is stated. It is the analogue of the Hegelian antithesis.
The central concept is central because negation is the active force of the di-
alectic. The central concept defines, by negation, the concept in debate.
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2. Other First Order Major Concepts
Here are stated both the concept in debate, or thesis, and the concept
which defines the central concept, or synthesis. Because we are talking about
a concept which is internally defined—not by reference to anything outside
itself- -the synthesis concept must appear inconsistent. It defines the central
concept by negation, and thus appears as the opposite of that concept, but it
defines itself as being identical to the concept in debate. And the central con-
cept is the opposite of that concept. In this second step we emphasize the
tendency to identify the thesis and the synthesis concepts with each other. If
these concepts are the same, then both are in negative relation with the central
concept since we know from step 1. that the thesis concept is so.
3. Attempted Identity of Opposites- -Genesis of the Inner Debate.
This step merely states the inconsistency among the concepts which
results from steps 1. and 2.
4. Central Theme as an Argument in Potential.
The central theme asserts that the central concept is identical to the
concept in debate, although it understands the concept in debate as the synthesis
concept, not the thesis concept. (The practical value in this apparent assertion
of contraries is as a way to gain the advantages in both sides of a dilemma
without the corrollary disadvantages. ) The central theme is hence a compact
expression of the identity of opposites described in step 3. It is, in Hegelian
terms, a complete reflection- -a concept both negated and with its negation.
129
Now the problem in defining a concept by its opposite is that neither
concept has been defined except as a possibility. This is why the central theme
is an argument in potential. It wants to connect two concepts in a convincing
manner and the best way to do this is by an identity statement. In that case
the central theme as assertion and the central theme as the object of argument
are the same theme. But it also wants to be saying something meaningful and
in this case there must be a difference. I could define peace, dialectically,
as war but this would convince no one that the way to one is through the other.
5. A New Distinction.
Here it is shown that, in the progress of argument, the author introduces
a new distinction which suggests a potential meaning for the central concept.
6. Cancellation of the Earlier Argument.
It is shown that the effect of this new distinction, is to cancel the central
theme and risk denying the position that the author is trying to make. He would
go over to the opposing faction within the proximate outer debate.
7. Initial Development of the New Argument
Here one claims that the author tries to use the distinction in such a way
as to create a new argument which retains the advantages of the old.
8. Self-Contradiction of the New Argument in its Initial State.
But this attempt instead of strengthening the concept is shown to weaken
it and leave the author in a worse position than he was before.
9. Preservation of the Earlier Argument.
To avoid this problem it seems necessary to reintroduce the earlier
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argument within the new one.
10. Circularity of the Completed Argument.
At this point the new argument is complete and does strengthen the
potential for meaning in the central concept, but it does so because the argu-
ment is circular.
The preceding propositions are completely abstract at this point in the
narrative, but they have not been derived from purely abstract thought. They
are based on the application of certain tentative principles to the Lindblorn and
Mannheim work. In what follows, I show this application.
Any attempt to support the foregoing propositions cannot be a highly
rigorous one, however, any more than can the ordinary language approach. It
is not rigorous primarily because the hierarchy of conceptual levels which I
identify is probably capable of expansion or contraction so that all the levels
of argument might be found in the initial work or, conversely, very few might
be identified even over the range of a large body of work. I shall try to show,
nevertheless, that the work of at least two writers --and specifically their
otherwise perplexing inconsistencies --can be plausibly interpreted in terms of
the above propositions.
Because the method of concept examination is involved and lengthy I shall
apply it primarily to a single one of each writer's works. In each case, I
choose that work which to me seems the beginning of the author's line of thought,
and thus seems to contain in potential all that will follow.
CHAPTER III
A NEGATIVE VIEW OF COMPREHENSIVENESS
THE PATTERN OF ITS DEFENSE
IN THE WRITINGS OF CHARLES LINDBLOM
A Problem for Lindblom
In this chapter, I interpret, in terms of a dialectical concept examin-
ation, those writings in which Charles Lindblom argues that the process of
pluralist bargaining is a way to coordinate. I consider Lindblom' s argument
a response to the social control problem --the problem how the competing
preferences of a plurality of individuals can be ordered into a collective pref-
erence to which all agree. I call it a control problem because if people can
agree on policies and procedures then they can establish a social order--they
can control their society.
The social control problem, or at least a less extreme version of it,
appears to be another way to express the classic difficulty of political plural-
ism --the likelihood of disorder. How can a political system which gives great
freedom to competing groups and individuals nevertheless achieve adequate
social coordination?
I speculate that both problems present logical impossibilities. For the
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latter problem, evidence suggests that neither pluralism nor authoritarianism
can gain even its own distinctive advantage without an effort to gain also the
advantage --and disadvantage
--of the other. Pluralist political systems claim,
in effect, to serve freedom at the expense of authority, 1 but there is much
evidence that these systems are themselves biased against some groups and
2
restrictive of their freedom. To overcome this bias, authoritative social
coordination seems necessary. A more perfect freedom has not been shown
adequate to do the job. Similarly, authoritarian political systems, in their
attempts to impose a total order even over freedom of thought, find they must
1-The writer is, here, using the terms "freedom" and "authority" very
loosely, with the hope that the manner of use is generally clear.
^The attack against pluralist bias comes from many directions. For
some principal examples see the following works: Peter Bachrach and Morton
S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power, " American Political Sc ience Review , LV1
(December, 1962), 947-52. William E. Connolly, ed. The Bias of Pluralism
(New York: Atherton Press, 1969). John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial
State Signet Books (New York: The New American Library, 1967). Theodore
J. Lowi, The End of Libe ralism: Ideology, Policy , and The Crisis of Public
Authority (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. , 1969), C. W. Mills,
The Power Elite (London: Oxford University Press, 1956). E. E. Schatt-
schneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).
^There is an expressed hope among many critics of pluralism that the
development of a less biased system can be achieved through greater individual
autonomy. This increase in autonomy is supposed to result from a more
adequate childhood education, through consciousness raising among adults and
in related ways. But the political systems most often cited as at least partly
exemplifying an improved society have not emphasized human autonomy. For
example, Cuba and the Peoples Republic of China are highly egalitarian societies
in many ways, but they also enforce substantial limitations on individual
freedoms. I am not saying that a system having less of the pluralist bias will
necessarily have more of the bias apparently inherent in central government
control. I say only that the evidence seems to point that way. Strong
evidence for the contrary view is not apparent.
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concede a degree of freedom at least to those who impose the order and, by
extension, to all whose cooperation is necessary for its success. 4 A control
so complete as to embrace even the controller has been proclaimed in theory,
but it has not been achieved in practice. ^
Despite such evidence as the above, Lindblom and other pluralists
believe that it is possible to resolve the classic problem of pluralism and
hence also to resolve a version of the social control problem. I assume,
^Lindblom makes this point in an early essay.
"No dictator is mighty enough to stay in power standing alone. . . He
can only expect his orders to be obeyed by the leaders around him because
they find it in their interests to obey. Hence he cannot rule without offering-
advantages to them; and, knowing it, they indicate at what price their
loyalty can be won. These subsidiary leaders are in turn in the same
relation to their subordinates as is the dictator to them" [Charles E. Lind-
blom, "Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government," Research Memoran-
dum RM-M34-RC. (Santa Monica, California: The Rand Corporation,
1955), pp. 18-19]. [Hereinafter referred to as "Bargaining. "]
For a defense of the general point as regards Soviet politics see Carl
A. Linden, Khruschev and the Soviet Leadership 1957-1964 (Baltimore,
Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).
^A control even over the controllers is clearly supposed in Hegel's
notion of world historical individuals, and is supposed also in Marx's dialecti-
cal materialism, as that is most commonly interpreted. In both cases
historical necessity provides the control.
Although Lenin did not deny this historical necessity, his attempt, in
effect, to distinguish between the mistaken spontaneity of the working class
movement and the correct historical understanding of the socialists made the
notion dubious. See Lenin "What is to be Done?" Milovan Djilas argues in
"The New Class" that the political bureaucracy has become the new exploiting
class in the Soviet Union. At a more philosophical level, Alasdair Maclntyre
points out that while social control may extend even over basic conceptual
frameworks, the controllers themselves cannot logically be confined within
these frameworks. Their own consciousness must be wider or they could not
be aware of what they do. See Alasdair Maclntyre, "A Mistake about Causality
134
by contrast, that this belief is not warranted6 and that what Lindblom actually
does is elaborate the dilemma intrinsic to the problem rather than resolve the
problem. But, to me, this is a more valuable function anyway.
The Lindblom Response as an Internalized Debate
If we suppose that the achievement of something poses a dilemma then
we may suppose that the horns of the dilemma are represented by the opposing
sides in debate over the merits of that particular thing. And if we suppose,
further, that in human actions the concept of a thing is virtually the same as
the thing, then the concept will be made clear by that debate. Given these
assumptions, a dialectical concept examination is not a direct search for the
meaning of a concept but is an argument over its worth. So to learn what
social control means we argue about it. But control, in the loose sense I use
the term, is synonymous with comprehensiveness. What is debated, then, is
the value of comprehensiveness.
in Social Science, " in Philosophy, Politics, and Society Third Series, ed. by
Peter Las lett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969).
^Perhaps the word "assume" should be emphasized here. This writer
is assuming, not arguing, that the social control problem presents a logical
impossibility. The point would be very difficult to argue, on either side, for
reasons given in text, chap. II, pp. 74-81.
^This is the Verstehen position, which is briefly discussed in text,
chap. II, pp. 67-74.
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If Lindblom is thought to be debating the value of comprehensiveness,
how can I say, as I do in the chapter title, that he takes the negative position?
Although we shall find that he criticizes certain kinds of comprehensiveness
still his intent is to show that there is a kind which is attainable through the
pluralist process. Should that not make his position affirmative? The reason
I say "No" is because of the sort of debate involved. I am not talking about a
school debate where the first rule is that we agree on our basic concepts. I
mean the sort that often happens in politics --debate over concepts so funda-
mental that the concepts by means of which we debate are the same as those
in dispute. In such debate the position one is most truly defending is that
already provided by one's conceptual framework. Lindblcm sees the structure
of society as highly pluralistic, I shall argue, and this precludes him from
ever truly reaching the position that comprehensiveness is either possible or
of value.
Despite his conceptual commitment to social fragmentation, however,
Lindblom certainly does want to argue that this fragmentation can produce --
even perhaps be identical to- -social order. It is just through this attempt that
he internalizes within himself debate over comprehensiveness. He is trying to
argue against the very conception of society which provides his terms of
reference.
The purpose of my examining Lindblom's argument with himself, and
also of Mannheim's with himself, is to show how a debate, and thus on my view
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how a dilemma, becomes internalized. My further purpose is to display the
Pattern of that Process. But in these Chapters III and IV I am talking only
about the intellectual internalization of dilemma. I talk about the necessary
tension pattern within the person's thought as distinct from that within his
life. In Chapter V, however, I consider the internalization of dilemma within
the whole man.
A Peculiarity of the Lindblom Position
Before ending these introductory comments, I must make one major
qualification to what has been said. I must partly take back the statement that
Lindblom sees the social structure as fragmented. That statement is true
when he is compared with Mannheim but not when he is compared with positiv-
ists. Lindblom seems to be a contextualist. He sees democratic society as
a sort of embracing conceptual order which is cohesive and consensual. It is
not just a collection of atomistic individuals. On the other hand, it is not a
symbiosis as contextualist views of society are often thought to be. It is an
order which emphasizes the competition rather than the cooperation among
groups and individuals. Though he seems to believe that we all see through
the same cultural spectacles, Lindblom nevertheless manifests, in my view,
o
the tendency toward an atomistic view of society.
8This point needs elaboration. Where Lindblom explicitly acknowledges
the idea of a contextualist epistemology (the idea that our knowledge is at least
partly the product of a conceptual framework), he asserts that there usually is
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I have argued in Chapter II that philosophical tendencies are as im-
portant as philosophical extremes. Given this assumption, I believe that
since Lindblom leans toward an atomist view of society his inner debate is
ultimately an attempt to show how such a fragmented society can achieve
social order. This is how he himself describes his work. But because Lind-
blom is a contextualist, believing that most democrats are part of one con-
ceptual order, his argument appears to be the opposite. He appears to be
trying to show that it is possible to have real conflict in a society that seems
too all consuming to permit this.
no generally shared conceptual framework and that where there is the frame-
work is inadequate. Indeed it is the usual absence of any such shared viewpoint
which he gives as one of the reasons why pluralist decision making is best.
Such decision making assures that all important views will receive a hearing.
"It is well known.
. .
that the mind flees from comprehensiveness, that
an 'object of perception, or judgement, is referred, not to the whole world,
but to a specific background or framework. "... our minds determine what
is relevant and irrelevant, by imposing a structure upon the problem situation.
This structure tends to vary from mind to mind; and though it is true that on
occasion people can be brought to adopt similar structures, it usually occurs
at the expense of comprehensiveness and may mean that the most useful
insights are abandoned together with the structures of assumption and inter-
pretation that furnished them" [David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom,
A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York:
The Free Press, 1970. ), pp. 43-44]. [Hereinafter referredlo as Strategy
of Decision
. ]
Similar points are made in other Lindblom writings. See Lindblom, "Bargaining,"
p. 28. Also see Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through,"
Public Administration Review
,
XIX (Spring, 1959), 88. [Hereinafter referred to
as "Muddling Through.
"J
Where Lindblom is not talking explicitly about conceptual frameworks but
rather about the consensual cultural social base which makes it possible for a
pluralist process to reach agreement, then he talks as if there were a generally
shared conceptual framework which was adequate. See the first part of foot-
note 20. By 1967 and 1972 he seems to be saying explicitly that there is such an
overall conceptual framework although by 1972 he is proposing that it, too,
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This reverse argument is the one I examine in this chapter because its
assumptions are the only ones on which the dialectical method can easily work.
In the dialectical method we assume that society is an organization of concepts
but not primarily one of publicly shared concepts. On the latter point we assume,
instead, that a concept becomes definite in opposition to the shared concepts of
its social-conceptual base. Since Lindblom does assume a dominant social-
conceptual base in pluralist democracies, it is easy to see his thought as the
problem of giving reality to a concept in apparent opposition to that base. The
concept of bargaining, which assumes that people have different understandings
and interests (else they would not need to bargain) is such a concept.
It is time now to examine Lindblom's attempt. A first assumption of my
method is that the physical totality of a thinker's work, or a major part of that
work, can be seen as a meaningful intellectual whole, however conflicting some
of the writings may appear. Despite this assumption, I cannot be that inclusive
in my discussion of Lindblom, but 1 shall consider a fairly large number of his
essays and books.
Lindblom's most explicit writing in defense of his position 9 on compre-
should be questioned. See text p. 149.
Because Lindblom at first tacitly acknowledges a shared democratic cul-
ture and then does so more explicitly in 1972, this writer calls him a contex-
tualist. But because in most of his train of thought Lindblom sees a plurality
of competing conceptual frameworks the writer would also say that he leans
toward positivism and atomism.
9At various points in his writings Lindblom states that he is not arguing
a position about decision making but is only describing the process which
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hensiveness begins with an essay entitled "Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in
Government" (1955). "> The thrust of (his essay has since appeared in at least
nine other short works and in three books. I shall consider all of these efforts.
Most well known of them is his essay on "The Science of Muddling Through"
(1959). 11 The essay was followed by two major books
-A Strategy of Decision
prevails.
"... this paper is one of a growing family of ventures into clarification
of non-quantitative and largely non-theoretical methods. One noteworthy
characteristic of these studies is that they are not argumentative: they do
not urge this or that method upon social scientists; they merely make ex-
plicit and formalize the methods already in use" [Charles E. Lmdblom,
"Policy Analysis," American Economic Review
, XLVIII (June, 1958) p ' 298]
If this were generally true of Lindblom's writings they would not be easily
suited to the writer's method. But this writer would agree with Lewis Froman
that Lmdblom is, in a sense, both describing and arguing. In a footnote to
chapter II of The Active Society
, Amitai Etzioni reviews this question.
"Lindblom does not manifestly advocate a strategy which he calls some-
what disaffectionately 'disjointed incrementalism. ' Three reviews of the
Strategy of Decision point to this ambiguity. Morton A. Kaplan notes: 'It
is not clear throughout the book if the authors are more concerned with
whether disjointed incrementalism is a description of how people do choose
or a prescription as to how reasonably to choose, ' The Annals of the Amer-
can Academy of Political and Social Science
, Vol. 352 (1964), p. 189.
'Whether the strategy is a description of a 'social process' or an alternative
ideal of rationality is not clear, * Victor A. Thompson, American Journal of
Sociology
,
Vol. 70 (1964), p. 132. Lewis A. Froman, Jr. concludes: 'As
Lindblom, the empirical theorist and Braybrooke, the philosopher, try to
suggest, it (the strategy) is really both, 'American Political Science Review
,
Vol. 58 (1964), p. 116" [Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The
Free Press, 1968) chapter II, footnote 65]
^First reference is in footnote 8.
U
Ibid.
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(1963)12 and The Intelligence of Democracy (1965) 13-which together provide
the fullest statement of his views.
Preparatory to the concept examination, I shall present an "illustrative"
summary of Lindblom's position. My purpose in doing so is to suggest that an
adequate summary of his views is impossible since he seems to be taking
opposite positions on numerous points. This impossibility of summarizing,
moreover, is just what we should expect if the cause of Lindblom's inconsist-
encies is his attempt to deal with a social dilemma which he has intellectually
internalized.
Following the illustrative summary I proceed to the concept examination
itself. I first try to describe the overall dialectical process by which Lind-
blom gives increasing reality to the concept of bargaining in a consensual
society. Then I examine in depth the first step of this process. That in-depth
examination focuses on his 1955 essay.
An Illustrative Summary of Lindblom's Position
In Chapter II I argue the dangers in attempted summaries of an author's
work, pointing out that interpretations of any work can be and always are
multiple. For my own approach, the summarizing process is a very cautious
12jbid.
1 3Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making
Through Partisan Mutual Adjustment (New York: Free Press, 1965). [Herein-
after referred to as Intelligence of Democracy. J
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and halting one. In order to emphasize the partiality involved in my attempt,
and to introduce some of the perplexities which later will be examined, I
append numerous provisos and contraindications to everything which I say.
The first and main proviso is the instability of Lindblom's theme. There
is a traditional theme in pluralist thought which I have previously identified as
the theme of pluralist disorder. But pluralists who acknowledge the likeli-
hood of disorder usually do not focus on this problem. Instead they focus on
the problem of safeguarding the opportunity for social conflict. They acknowl-
edge the other problem as being present in the background but they don't deal
with it, assuming that there is at least enough social order.
According to a converse theme, one would focus on the problem of
achieving social order while acknowledging, in the background, the problem
this raises for safeguarding social conflict. And in this case too one would
deemphasize the background problem, tacitly assuming that there was enough
social conflict. For the traditional theme, the immediate problem of social
conflict would be the danger of losing it. For the converse theme, the immed-
iate problem would be its very presence.
Lindblom's theme seems an attempt to have the advantages of the con-
verse theme without losing the advantages of the traditional one. He shifts
from one to the other. Usually his writing accords more with the former, but
some works, and passages in many others, treat of the latter. 14 For now I
14rhe following essays and books represent instances of a tendency
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merely recognize the presence of alternate themes and proceed to a summary
of the converse and, in a sense, central theme. In what follows, the provisos
to my summary have been indented in order to set them off clearly.
Lindblom's Central Theme
I. Lindblom's central theme concerns pluralist democratic societies and
involves the claim that such societies, and particularly the United States, can
toward the traditional theme in Lindblom's writing (although everything he has
written displays that tendency to some extent).
Lindblom, "Policy Analysis, " pp. 298-312. See especially p. 307. In
this essay Lindblom argues that an incremental method of policy analysis is
appropriate for the political fragmentation of a democratic pluralist society.
Since that kind of society is assumed to be best, so is incrementalism. Lind-
blom does not argue that this method will optimize or coordinate, however,
though he intimates that it may. LJnfortunatcly it is not clear whether he is
intimating that the incremental decision method can itself coordinate or whether
the pluralist political process can do so.
Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
. See especially pp. 73,
129-31. In the first part of this book Lindblom much elaborates the incre-
mental method. His primary argument for that method seems to be, as in the
preceding essay, the claim that it fits democratic politics. Comments about
the coordinating power of incrementalism do occur, and it is even claimed that
they represent the mam theme of the book, but what is particularly emphasized
is the ability of disjointed incrementalism to consider a wide variety of values.
Charles E. Lindblom, "Decision-Making in Taxation and Expenditures, "
in Public Finance: Needs, Sources and Utilization
, A Conference of the Univers-
ities-National Bureau Committee for Economic Research (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), pp. 295-336. See especially pp. 314 (footnote) and
316-17. [Hereinafter referred to as "Decision-Making. "] In this essay Lind-
blom explicitly claims more concern with the coordinating or calculating
advantages of pluralism than with its safeguards against excess governmental
power. But his discussion in some places tends to belie the claim. He recog-
nizes, for instance, a need for a system of weighting values if there is to be
coordination, but his weighting system turns out to be whatever minority groups
demand as the price of their consent. Such a system safeguards against govern-
mental power more obviously than it coordinates.
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coordinate as well as can authoritarian societies. 15
Presumably this is intended to be a significant theme or Lindblom would
not have written so much on it. But it is significant to the extent that there
is indeed a wide plurality of different intensely felt interests in democratic
societies. Without those differences coordination does not represent a
severe problem and displaying a solution to that problem is not much of an
accomplishment.
What is coordination? Lindblom sometimes understands it as a character-
istic of any relation whatever among decision-makers while at other times
he suggests that it is a fuller concept. But the nature of this fuller concept
is not clear. ^
15See footnote 9.
16The following passages suggest that any decision-maker interaction is
coordination and sometimes they show Lindblom's uneasiness with this con-
clusion:
"Since it has been shown that coordination is achieved when X defers to
Y, when X ignores Y, and when X dominates Y, it would seem to follow
that any pattern of yielding or dominance is as consistent with coordination
as any other. This being the case, it would seem to follow that any kind of
relation among decision-makers must be pronounced coordinated. Obviously,
for further analysis, we need a fuller concept of coordination than has yet
been introduced" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
, p. 162].
"How often these methods for partisan mutual adjustment [methods of
mutual neglect, deference, or manipulation] achieve a rational coordination
of decisions is not realized. That they interlock decisions made at various
points in the body politic is clear enough. ... But what if the interlocking
of decisions is without any perceivable desirable pattern? It has to be shown
that coordination so achieved is rational in some sense going beyond what we
have already said" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 316].
The tendency to identify coordination and decision-making apparently has
roots in an earlier essay, if we can understand coordination as the achieve-
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What is an authoritarian society? It is not too clearly distinguished from
a democratic one. If the difference is the measure of coercion then the
problem is that for Lindblom there is sometimes no sharp distinction be-
tween consent and coercion. 17
ment of the public interest (and Lindblom seems to understand it so in this
essay, see footnotes 101-103).
"Hence, within a certain range the public interest is represented by an
agreement among partisan interP^ » [t i^Hrm "Pnr
::iii-n"q~>~3u]Other passages in Lindblom's work attempt to describe stronger forms
of coordination but they do not clearly succeed. In "Decision-Making, - the
tests of coordination look more like tests for pluralism. In the Intelligence of
Democracy, Lindblom attempts, only indirectly, any fuller concept. He com -
pares the coordinating ability of partisan adjustment with that of centrality, so
we must look to his definition of centrality for any conceptual elaboration 'But
the latter concept is itself a weak one. Centrality cannot be a form of synopsis,
pp. 165-66; it cannot imply consistency in the strong sense that one policy
flatly contradicts another, p. 193; and it cannot involve the decreed values
even of a majority as this contradicts the pluralist desire for dispersed
power, pp. 271-72.
17 MIn "Bargaining, " Lindblom distinguishes between the two decision
processes of bargaining and hierarchy. He clearly associates bargaining with
pluralist democracy and intimates that hierarchy, in its purest form, is assoc-
iated with dictatorship.
".
. .
pluralism develops the complex distribution of control necessary
to democracy rather than the monolith of control useful to the dictator"
[Lindblom, "Bargaining, " pp. 19-20].
But Lindblom also notes, pp. 18-19, that pure hierarchy is impossible. One
must, therefore, conclude that the difference between democracy and authori-
tarianism is not for him an absolute one.
That the status of the distinction between consent and coercion is also
fuzzy is apparent from the following passages:
"Because every demand one makes, every preference one feels, and
every value one holds already reflects a compromise between individuals
and circumstances ... we cannot draw a nice line between 'This I agree
to' and 'This I am under the circumstances going to accept' " [Lindblom,
The Intelligence of Democracy
, p. 224].
"Even if the distinction between that to which one consents and that which
one is forced to do is obscure and at best only a matter of degree, there
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Features of Pluralist Democracy
II. A. Within pluralist society there must be consensus on fundamental
procedures and values or minorities would not be accepting the decision out-
comes of the society. 18
But what is this consensus--an inarticulated cultural milieu, a deliberate
is a difference between a chief executive who consents to step down when hehears the election returns and one who will not do so unless his life is
threatened.
. .
" [Ibid
.
, p. 259].
In general, Lindblom claims he can simply avoid the question of coercion
since he is not dealing with the traditional theme of pluralism where it is most
important. He makes this claim explicit in the Intelligence of Democracy at
pp. 206-07 footnote. But the claim seems misleading; for clearly the point of
Lindblom's writing is to show that the coordinating virtues of pluralism are
additional to its virtues for avoiding tyranny, not substitutes for them. He
wants to show that one can have both, and to do this he must deal also with the
traditional theme.
l fin
... the alleged precondition of democratic government: that citizens
must agree on certain fundamental values and procedures, despite their
disagreement on others" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 317].
Lindblom sometimes gives particular emphasis to the procedures:
".
. .
we sometimes place a value on certain social processes that
resolve conflicts rather than place values on possible outcomes of the con-
flict. The obvious example is the widespread approval given to the process
called majority rule.
. . .
for a large category of policies we are indiffer-
ent to outcomes provided only that the outcomes are chosen by majority
rule" [Charles E. Lindblom, "The Handling of Norms in Policy Analysis, "
in The Allocation of Economic Resources
,
ed. by Morris Abramovitz and
others (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 171].
[Hereinafter referred to as "Handling of Norms. "]
For other similar comments, see: Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of
Decision
, p. 73; Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
, p. 259; and Lindblom,
"Bargaining, " p. 32.
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majority decision, or something else? 19 Apparently it is neither de-
scriptive or normative theory in the positivist sense. No other single
alternative is consistently adhered to, however. What "Accepting an out-
come" means depends on which of the above alternatives applies.
II. B. In return for the consensus, minorities must be granted a veto
power on any issue they wish. Experience suggests that in the United States,
Evjdence that the consensus is an inarticulate cultural milieu appears
in numerous passages. The essence of Lindblom 's position in many of these
is that the attempt to verbalize our values often produces apparent conflicts
which obscure a deeper but inarticulate agreement. An example of this view
follows:
"... agreement reached through these methods [of fragmented policy
analysis] is quite consistent with much explicit and elaborately articulated
ideological disagreement, which is, however, largely irrelevant to the
actual choices being made.
. . words about values make the most of dis-
agreement while the actual handling of values in analysis quietly achieves
some important degree of agreement.
. .
. much agreement emerges
simply because the practicioners share a common culture.
.
.
" [Lindblom,
"Handling of Norms, " p. 176].
Also see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 133.
This inarticulate consensus embraces the current economic system.
Hence, that system appears as a given, not a deliberately chosen ideology.
See Lindblom, "Policy Analysis, " p. 310.
On the definition of the consensus as a majority decision note that this
writer is here speaking of majority decision as the way to reach agreement.
He is not speaking of the doctrine of majority rule as the outcome of agreement.
On the latter topic, Lindblom sometimes takes an affirmative position (see
footnote 18, second quotation) and sometimes a negative one (see footnote 22,
second quotation). But on the topic now at is sue --whether the agreement is
achieved by majority decision-
-Lindblom is also ambivalent. Sometimes he
implies that agreement cannot be reached this way.
Majority rule
".
. .
is of limited use. Policy-makers do not know what the majority
wishes on any but a very few issues on which the citizens have expressed
themselves.
. . . Moreover, citizens are greatly dependent upon policy-
makers for advice as to what they should prefer.
. .
" [Lindblom, "Tin-
bergen on Policy-Making, " Journal of Political Economy, LXVI (December,
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at least, the price will not be too high. 20
Though if the consensus is an inarticulate shared culture, how can one
set conditions for it?
The Impossibility of Synoptic Decision
-Making
III. A. There is a conventional theory of rational decision-making which
Lindblom calls synoptic decision-making. According to this theory, values
should be clarified in advance, all the alternative implementing policies and
1958), 534].
Lindblom elsewhere implies, of course, that some agreement among the
majority must be possible --at least on certain basic values and procedures
--or
democracy could not survive. See this writer's footnote 20, second quotation.
Sometimes Lindblom seems to "throw everything into the pot" and leaves
the reader to interpret this consensus for himself. He does this, for example
in speaking about the procedural "conventions" of democracy.
"The conventions are explicit or implicit prescriptions that specify to
some degree, though only very roughly, what goal values and side values
can and cannot be sacrificed to the achievement of other values. Some con-
ventions are written into law, others come to be traditionally accepted
without force of law. Others not written into the law are themselves the
product of the kind of interchange [partisan mutual adjustment] we are
describing in this book.
. . . Where these are not law people may accept
them out of the conviction that the stability of the system demands their
acceptance. Or they simply may strategically calculate the advantages of
their accepting them.
. . . Presumably the acceptance of some conventions
is traceable simply to social indoctrination" [Lindblom, Intelligence of
Democracy
, pp. 91-92].
Incidentally, this appeal to social indoctrination is particularly ironic in a work
supportive of minority group freedom. Yet it also appears at the very beginning
of that thought sequence which culminates in Lindblom 's Intelligence of Democ -
racy . See Lindblom's "Bargaining," p. 39.
20
"Societies can be thought of as purchasing this agreement, or consent
to continuation of democratic government, by conceding to each interest
group whatever it requires as a price for its consent" [Lindblom, "Decision-
Making, "p. 317].
".
. .
in the United States and other successful democracies some of the
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all the consequences of each policy should be considered, and that policy
shonld be chosen which best serves the chosen values. 21 This conventional
theory has severe problems, though, which can be avoided by frankly accepting
the kind of society mentioned in I and II.
The Problem of Value Conflict --
III. B. 1. One problem of synopsis is that people disagree on values. 22
common values (including democracy itself) on which citizens unite are
more important to them than the values on which they disagree. Were this
otherwise, a large minority would rather abandon democracy than be
outvoted.
. .
" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 32].
2 ] For a particularly concise statement of this theory, see Charles E.
Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process
, Foundations of Modern Political Science
Series (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 13.
22Some illustrative quotations are the following:
".
. .
decision-makers, to say nothing of the electorate, do not in fact
wholly agree on objectives or values. To be sure, on many they agree
roughly; but the scope of government decision-making is not limited to
their areas of agreement" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making, " p. 302J.
It seems, indeed, that even on some basic procedural matters there
is no agreement.
"Despite conflicting preferences among citizens, might a decision-maker
. .
.not simply follow the principle of equality in the weighting of individual
preferences?"
"This is a defective criterion.
. . differences in social function call for
inequalities in the weighting of preferences.
. . . The case for equality in
weights has never been pushed seriously except for the special case of
equality in a kind of 'last say' decision, as in elections.
. . .But even in
'last say' expressions of opinion we are not agreed on equal weights; many
persons wish to depart from them to take account of intensity" [Lindblom,
Intelligence of Democracy
, pp. 140-41].
".
. .
universal or general criteria such as majority preference are
inadequate for the solution of complex problems" [Ibid . , p. 185].
Also see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 35.
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va.
But usually Liudblom emphasizes that large scale choices, at least, are
agreed in democracies. 23
III. B. 2. This is not to say, however, that all value conflict is signifi-
cant. Disputes over grand ideological alternatives such as Communism
Capitalism are not very much so. 24 A11 real world systemg are
mixed.
Though in his most recent work, Lindblom does intimate that grand
alternatives need discussion and may be disputed. 25
23See point II. A.
24See footnote 19, first quotation.
In the book he wrote with Dahl, Lindblom was particularly explicit in
rejecting the significance of ideological disputes, and this view does not change
in most of those later writings we consider.
"In economic organization and reform, the 'great issues' are no longer
the great issues, if ever they were. It has become increasingly difficult,
to find meaningful alternatives posed in the traditional choices between soc-
'
lahsm and capitalism, planning and the free market, regulation and laissez-
faire.
. . .
[Actual choices are not so grand].
. .because, at least in the
Western world, most people neither can nor wish to experiment with the
whole pattern of socioeconomic organization to attain goals more easily won"
[Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, Economics, and Wei -
fare: Planning and Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social
Processes
,
Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1953),
p. 3].
2
^The economist
".
. .
is correct to take the main structures of society as given. Other-
wise his analysis would be irrelevant to the circumstances in which policies
are actually made.
The consequence, however, is that as a policy analyst he has to prac-
tice a conservative and superficial kind of social science.
. . it does not
ask radical questions about fundamental features of the social structure"
[Charles E. Lindblom, "Integration of Economics and the Other Social
Sciences through Policy Analysis, " Integration of the Social Sciences through
Policy Analysis
,
ed. by James Charlesworth (Philadelphia: The American
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HI. B. 3. Significant conflict is conflict at the margin. By this Lind-
blom often means a conflict over trade-offs
--a conflict in an essentially
zero-sum situation where an increment in one element implies a decrement
in some other. There certainly is substantial conflict here. 26
But maybe there isn't. Elsewhere, Lindblom in effect questions whether
decision situations are zero-sum. 27 He also suggests, elsewhere, that
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1972), p. 1].
"Someone ought to be asking such questions ..." [Ibid.
, p. 4].
26Lindblom's common example is the trade-off between inflation and
unemployment.
"... abstract values command wide agreement. ... But evaluations at
the margins at which policy choices are made are much disputed: one
citizen or policy-maker would rather see another million unemployed than
see prices rise by 3 per cent; another prefers the opposite" [Lindblom,
"Tinbergen on Policy-Making, " p. 534].
"Whenever values are in conflict --that is, whenever one has to give up
some of one value in order to achieve some of another value --a full state-
ment of a goal value requires that its ranking or position in a deductive
system be related to the cost of achieving it" [Braybrooke and Lindblom,
Strategy of Decision
, p. 29].
"In short, both because values sometimes conflict and because they some-
times complement each other, those actually relevant to policy choices are
values of increment and decrement, that is, marginal values --rather than
abstractions such as defense, full employment, liberty, or better highways"
[Ibid
. , p. 31].
The mention of "complementary" values in the last quote does not weaken the
basic emphasis on value conflict. It is just because resources are limited and
values basically conflict that the partial achievement of one value suddenly
makes it worthwhile to pursue another. Without this zero-sum relationship,
values would have no necessary connection with each other, either positive or
negative, but would relate only to the valuing individual.
27
"In the market, trade offers benefits to both parties, hence public good.
But in bargaining in government it often appears that one's victory is another's
defeat. I shall show, however, that bargaining almost always (perhaps with-
out exception) takes place because of the possibility of mutual gain to all the
15.1
marginal values are equivalent to policies and that people often agree on
policies. 28 Furthermore, sometimes all he means by a marginal conflict
is the small difference between two social states, and thus conflict at the
bargainers although sometimes the only mutual gain is in abating a pre-
existing conflict by reaching a settlement" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 3]This half-hearted confidence in the mutuality of values becomes less o furtheron in the essay. See p. 31.
l n
In the Intelligence of Democracy there are numerous intimations that the
social situation is not zero sum. For example:
"A central coordinator.
. .
may easily fall into the habit of believing
that what one party gains another must lose, a fallacy that plagued economic
thinking until Adam Smith made it abundantly clear that for many transactions
all parties can gain" [Lindblom, MeUigence of Democracy p 210]
This confident statement, also, becomes half-hearted as Lindblom adds, on the
same page, that the mutual advantage may be only a Pareto optimum. In a
Pareto optimum some do not gam and not to gain, in a changing world, is to
lose.
2 8Since Lindblom has frequently held that general values in a democracy
are agreed, it follows that if marginal values are also agreed there is no place
left for conflict.
That we can often agree on policies is asserted in numerous places.
".
• .
it is commonplace that individuals can often agree on policies when
they cannot agree on ends" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making, " p. 534]
Also see Lindblom, "Decision-Making, " p. 309.
That policies are identical to marginal values is less commonly asserted
but consider the following passage:
"Instead of choosing among values in the light of which alternative policies
can be rated, we often choose among alternative policies directly. That is to
say_, instead of choosing among a group of abstract values, we compare and
choose among combinations of them in which their proportions differ.
Now because, in our society, change proceeds almost always through
incremental steps, it turns out that we often evaluate only a restricted set
of alternatives which are only incrementally different from each other
.
Hence, our values are not total or average values but are instead values
at the margin" [Lindblom, "Handling of Norms," pp. 170-71]. [First
emphasis is this writer's. ]
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' margin is mild by definition. ^ Finally he says we can often agree on the
specific things we are against though not those we are for. 30
HI. B. 4. Value statements are not really meaningful until stated in
terms of choices at the margin. The evaluator cannot really know what he wants
except in terms of the options and costs apparent at the moment he is con-
fronted with the need for a choice. 31
29Lindblom makes the claim that marginal differences are incremental
differences and that the incremental is small.
"... a 'small' change is a change in a relatively unimportant variable
or relatively unimportant change in an important variable. ... a small
change in an important variable will also be denoted as an 'increment of
change"* [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 64].
".
. .
the notion of 'small' is not so subjective and personal. ... in any
society there develops a strong tendency toward convergence in estimates of
what changes are important or unimportant.
.
.
" [Ibid.
, p. 62].
30"
'Another hypothesis is that in the practice of these [pragmatic] methods
we often find ourselves agreeing on what we are against, even if we cannot
agree on what we are for" [Lindblom, "Handling of Norms, " p. 177J.
"Policy aims at suppressing vice even though virtue cannot be defined.
.
.
"
[Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, pp. 102].
See also Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 147, 149.
The agreement on what one is against has no apparent temporal endurance,
however.
"(It is in their conception of social ills as well defined 'problems' with
'solutions' that
. . .
aspirants to the synoptic ideal go wrong. ) In a nonstatic
society, objectives and other values continue to shift and so do actual possi-
bilities for change" [Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 124].
See also Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
, pp. 146-47.
"For national economic policy
. . . only in the vaguest and least helpful
way do we as citizens or policy-makers know our values except by inference
from our actual choices.
Aims cannot be rationally chosen without regard to costs, but costs are
not always known in advance" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making, "
pp. 534-35].
Elsewhere Lindblom intimates that the costs (i.e.
,
the trade-off values)
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HI. B. 5. Consequently, the synoptic goal of postulating values in ad-
vance of choices is impossible. And this means that the synoptic goal of
deducing choices from values is also impossible, supposing as it does a greater
conceptual division between the two than exists.
But then there are no conflicts of values, there is only interaction among
choices, and Lindblom does not want to say merely that interaction can
achieve coordination. He wants to say that conflict can do so. After all,
one of his major points is the existence of value conflicts, probably among
large scale values, the kind one would deduce from, but certainly among
values at the margin. He often writes as if one could deduce choices from
values were it not that the values conflict. 32
can never be known in advance. If they could, then it would be possible, pre-
sumably, to determine how many people preferred one side of the trade-off
rather than another. And, it is not possible to do that.
"No one can know the facts about that subtle kind of value or preference"
[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 254].
In his very next paragraph, though, Lindblom partly retreats from the afore-
mentioned assertion.
on
The following passage illustrates the view that were it not for value
conflict, one could deduce choices from values.
".
. .
whether a set of decisions are fully coordinated or not, other things
being equal, depends, finally, on the values by which one judges the set. A
set of policies nicely adjusted to achieve a maximum of price stability is not
necessarily nicely adjusted to achieve a high level of employment" [Lindblom,
Intelligence of Democracy, p. 165].
But Lindblom also adopts, on this matter, a similar approach to that taken
elsewhere. That is to say, he sometimes embraces both sides of a question
though in such a way that their mutual exclusivity is obscured (see this writer's
footnote 19). In the present instance, Lindblom suggests that value conflict,
on the one hand, and the knowledge of values only at the decision moment, on
the other, are alternative reasons against a welfare function.
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The Problem of Deficient Knowledge --
in. C. 1. In addition to the problem of value conflict, other major
problems of synopsis are the problems of complexity and of uncertainty. Even
if there were values apart from implementing means it would, in any case, be
impossible to consider all the available means or to foresee all the possible
consequences. Not only is the information limited but so is man's capacity to
33process it. I shall refer to these two problems together as the problem of
deficient knowledge.
Are the problems of complexity and uncertainty really additional to that
of value conflict or alternative to it? Meaningful conflict among large scale
values (such as ideologies) would suggest that something substantial was at
In synoptic analysis the common requirement that values be clarified
and systematized in advance of analysis is impossible to meet in many
circumstances in which, on the one hand, the relevant values are unknown
until the analysis is far advanced or in which, on the other hand, disagree-
ment on values guarantees that no stated principles or welfare function can
command the agreement of those whose values are presumed to be governing"
[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 139-40].
In the aforementioned quote, neither the presentation of the two possibilities as
live alternatives nor the phrase "many circumstances" must be allowed to
obscure the fact that these two possibilities can never occur together. If values
conflict, then they must have been statable in advance of decision. And if they
are not so statable they cannot conflict. Yet Lindblom apparently wants to say
both things. He wants to say that there is a sort of automatic coordination of
values since they only become specified when the battle of interests is resolved
and a choice made. But he also wants to say that this coordination is a product
of conflict.
^These criticisms of synopsis, like those based on the presence of
value conflict, occur throughout Lindblom's work. For a particularly clear
presentation, see Lindblom, "Decision-Making, " pp. 300-02.
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stake, and this in turn would imply that such values could be applied. The
effect of applying values so wide would be to decree a conceptual closure in
support of the values-and with closure, knowledge would not be deficient.
For there would be a designed limitation of means and a designed interpre-
tation of all consequences.
Neither would knowledge be deficient if there was conflict over incre-
mental values. Meaningful conflict among incremental values, as distinct
from incremental choices, would imply that such values could be articulated
in advance of choice. But to articulate and then debate incremental values
presupposes, according to synopsis, the capacity to consider all variables.
Thus it seems that if there is a problem of value conflict for Lindblom,
then there is no problem of deficient knowledge.
III. C. 2. If one had adequate theory, meaning by theory the sort that
positivists call descriptive theory, then knowledge would not be deficient. Un
fortunately there is no such adequate theory. What there is is sufficient to
serve an "orienting function" but not to guide choices at the margin. 3 '
34Although Lindblom expresses belief that theory of a certain sort
structures our facts (e.g.
,
see Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
,
pp. 98-99), such theory, he says, is not what the synoptic decision-maker
wants. For such a decision-maker there must be
"... highly structured bodies of generalizations that systematically
employ concepts offering some approximation of axiomatic treatment.
.
.
"
[Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 117].
On the inadequacy of such theory, see the previous reference, pp. 117-19,
also Lindblom, "Muddling Through, " p. 87.
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What does orient mean? How can a theory aid direction and yet not
aid choice?
If knowledge is deficient from lack of adequate descriptive theory, then
this means that large scale values cannot be successfully fitted to social
reality since we cannot achieve a large-scale description of such reality
on which to fit them. And if knowledge is deficient from lack of decreed
conceptual closure then such values have not been applied. Thus, conflict
between large scale values cannot be very significant in either case.
Furthermore, the lack of adequate descriptive theory prevents an over-
view of all variables and makes impossible the articulation of incremental
values. If they cannot be articulated then they cannot be known to conflict.
Thus one reaches the converse conclusion to that reached in the proviso
to HI. C. 1. If there is a problem of deficient knowledge then there is
apparently no problem of value conflict.
The Possibility of Democratic Decision-Making
IV. A. Given the impossibility of synopsis for social coordination, in
complex cases, it is not necessary to show that democracy can do better. It
is necessary only to show that democracy is a possible coordinating device. 35
^^Lindblom would deny, sometimes, that synopsis and democracy are
even in the same class and would thus deny that they are alternatives. The
alternative to synopsis is incrementalism, according to him, and the alterna-
tive to democracy (understood as "partisan mutual adjustment") is centrality.
These other alternatives rest on the distinction between decision method and
sociopolitical process, however. Synopsis and incrementalism are alternative
decision methods while centrality and democracy are alternative sociopolitical
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IV. B. The processes of democracy which enable it to achieve coordin-
ation include two major components: the decision method and the socio-
political process which employs that method. 36
Though it often seems that these two components collapse into one. 37
processes. And this distinction between method and process is itself »„
... to look upon an overview of mutual repercussions among decisionsas a merit of central coordination is to conceive of central coordination asan exercise m synoptic problem solving. But synopsis
. . . is an impo siblemethod of problem solving for complex problems. We do not prove byThtargument that central coordination is impossible or that, by default of itpartisan mutual adjustment is a desirable alternative. We make the pointonly that one traditional claim [many would say the distinguishing claimthough] for the superiority of central coordination over other forms of
adjustment is invalidated for sufficiently complex problems
This limited move in the argument somewhat changes the perspective
with which one regards partisan mutual adjustment.
.
. . [It] lm poses on no
one the heroic demands for information, intellectual competence time
energy, and money that are required for an overview.
.
.
" [Lindblom
'
Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 170-71].
36Throughout his writings, Lindblom makes an explicit distinction be-
tween these two components. For example, the distinction is a cornerstone of
the essay on "Policy Analysis" in which he first explicitly argues that incre-
mental policy analysis is the method most appropriate for incremental politics
And ln the Strategy of Decision he and Braybrooke again make the point as they
speak of "Matching Practices to Political Contexts. " In The Intelligence of
Democracy, Lindblom tends to identify only the incremental element of
decision-making with decision "strategy. " Though he speaks of the strategy as
both incremental and disjointed, it is primarily the former features which he
discusses. The disjointed element of decision-making appears more fully when
he speaks of "The Need for a Multiplicity of Decision Makers. " See Lindblom,
Intelligence of Democracy
, pp. 148-52.
37One indication that the distinction between decision method and socio-
political process is often conflated is the description of incremental politics
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IV. C. These two components are associated with the two major prob-
lems of synopsis. The decision method is particularly responsive to the
problem of deficient knowledge. The socio-political process is responsive to
the problem of value conflict. Neither component, however, is sufficient by
itself to solve either problem. Each depends upon the other.
in almost the same terms used to define the incremental method.
"We shall call this typical pattern incremental politics for two reasons.
In the first place, we have referred to its preoccupation with small or
incremental changes as one of its defining characteristics" [Braybrooke and
Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 73].
"It becomes clearer now why political policy, in its focus on increments
of change, also shows the other characteristics
--it is remedial, serial,
and exploratory, for example --that we identified as part of incremental
politics" [Ibid.
, p. 74].
Another indication of a conflated distinction is the fact that incremental
method and incremental politics seem to be necessary conditions for each other.
If we understand incremental politics as a competition and adjustment among
many interests then such a politics is necessary if the incremental method is to
achieve any degree of comprehensiveness. In an incremental, serial process
it is only the presence of such competing groups which assures that most
interests will be represented. Hence, a necessary condition for the incre-
mental method is incremental politics. See Lindblom, "Muddling Through, "
p. 85. But conversely, a necessary condition for this incremental politics,
this interest group politics, must be the incremental method. It is the only
method available for solving complex problems, and, therefore, must be the
analytical basis of any politics whatever.
We need not look so far as we have, however, to see suggestions of the
identity of decision method and political process. That suggestion is apparent
in the very titles and subtitles of Lindblom 's major works. He speaks about
The Intelligence of Democracy - -that is, he speaks of the analytical method in-
herent in democracy itself. The subtitle of A Strategy of Decision suggests the
same point. It is called Policy Evaluation As a Social Process implying that the
decision strategy is this process. In "Handling of Norms," Lindblom makes
this point explicit.
"It is customary to think of an analytical process as going on in one mind
or within the minds of a small group. But the analysis of policy problems
can also be seen as a social process. . . " [p. 174].
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IV. D. As it commences to make decisions, a democracy finds itself
in agreement on certain problems-the ills in society-even though different
individuals and groups cannot agree on the solutions to those problems. 38
But since the nature of a problem closely determines the range of possible
solutions, why are the problems agreed when the solutions are not? Lind-
blom elsewhere suggests that the problems are not agreed either. 39
The Method of Incrementalism --
IV. E. 1. Taking those known ills as its departure point is the peculiarly
democratic decision method, "Incrementalism. " In dealing with those ills,
the method considers only policies that differ slightly from the current ones,
and only a limited number of those. 40 Furthermore, in the process of policy
analysis it may conclude that the problem should itself be incrementally altered
and hence so should the objectives. 41 (New technologies, for example, might
suggest new goals. ) Though small, the policy changes are frequent and thus
successively compensate for errors of oversight. 42
Lindblom sometimes describes the decision method not only as incre-
38See footnote 30, first part.
^See footnote 30, last part.
most extended description of the method is given in Braybrooke
and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision . On the present point, see pp. 83-93 in
that work.
41 Ibid.
, pp. 93-99.
42 Ibid.
, pp. 99-102.
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mental but also as disjointed. 43 This practice assimilates decision method
and political process to each other, as previously noted.
IV. E. 2. It is by the reliance upon small increments both in problem
formulation and policy choice that incrementalism resolves problems of com-
plexity and foresight. This method is thus a way of assuring that social inter-
relationships will be under control despite deficient knowledge. It is not,
however, adequate by itself to assure this.
IV. E. 3. The reason it is not adequate is that incremental policy choices
are not small primarily because there is a value in safety and no great need for
large changes. They are small because they are marginal, because they are
zero-sum choices between alternatives both of which are greatly desired. That
they are marginal means that the values on which they are based are determined
at the moment of choice itself. We don't know what choice is small or marginal
except in the choice proce ss. 44
But in many passages Lindblom treats marginality itself as mere small-
ness and not as a zero-sum relationship. ^
43it is so described primarily in the Strategy of Decision . See in their
book the chap. 5 title and pp. 104-06.
44Textual evidence for this statement is basically the same as given in
footnote 31. We don't know what we want until we know the trade-offs. And
trade-off choices are often what Lindblom means by marginal choices. But we
cannot know the trade-offs or margins except at the instant of choice since they
are constantly changing as a result of new technologies and prior choices.
45See footnote 29.
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The Process of Partisan Mutual Adjustment --
IV. F. 1. In a democracy, the customary choice process is "partisan
mutual adjustment. " 46 In a democracy incrementalism can identify its incre-
ments only through this process.
But maybe not. There are apparently social ills known by all democrats.
And there is a convergence of estimates on what are small changes. 47
IV. F. 2. This decision process is one in which the many diverse groups
of a pluralist society struggle with each other over their different problems
and policies. 4 ^
4oThis i s the term used in The Intelligence of Democracy
. Elsewhere
Lindblom refers to the apparently same process simply as mutual adjustment
or as incremental politics.
47See footnotes 30 and 29.
The issue raised in footnote 30-
-whether there are known social prob-
lems which have some temporal endurance
--never is resolved. Following are
some further passages which suggest that social problems are indeed more
enduring, have more the nature of givens, than do social goals.
Incremental decision-making is:
"... better described as moving away from known social ills rather than
as moving toward a known and relatively stable goal" [Braybrooke and
Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 71].
The incremental-decision-maker:
".
. .
deals with specific features of observable situations, which we
suggest can be evaluated regardless of whether there is any way to deal
conclusively with the more abstract conceptions of value" [Ibid.
, p. 132J.
Adjustment of means and ends is:
".
. .
caused by observation of empirical discrepancies between given
means and suggested ends. . . there are well established techniques,
accepted throughout the scientific community and beyond, for making
observations of this kind" [Ibid.
, p. 135].
AO
They struggle in at least the minimal sense that they each make decisions
calculated to serve their own particular goals, not goals presumably shared by
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But perhaps they don't often struggle. 49 Often they cede authority on
different matters to each other. 50 And many other times they simply adjust
to whomever moves first. ^
IV. F. 3. It is only through this struggle that policy costs to each group
become clear (see point III. B. 4. ) and thus it is the struggle that is both the
choice process and the policy evaluation process. Unlike synopsis (or, rather,
unlike the ability claimed for it) evaluation here cannot be made by one person
or one cooperative group. It is a social process. 52
others. These partisans may be openly hostile to each other or they may be
subtly manipulative. See Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
,
p. 29.
49Lindblom's view of partisan mutual adjustment is so broad and the
different forms he identifies are so varied that only a small fraction of them
seem to imply, necessarily, a partisan struggle. Of twelve separately listed
forms, only four clearly do so- -negotiation, bargaining, partisan discussion,
and reciprocity. Ibid
.
, pp. 33-34.
50They do so in the "deferential" form of adjustment and in the "calculated"
which is a variant of it. They also do so in accepting the "authoritative pre-
scription" of others. Similarly a kind of authority is presupposed when one
person "unconditionally manipulates" another or is able to make a "prior de-
cision" which constrains the alternatives of another. And "compensation" too
appears a kind of authority since it is of little effect unless the power of the
purse is unequally distributed. Ibid.
These concessions of authority are multilateral. There is no single highest
prescriptive authority in government which prescribes to all others and concedes
authority to none. Ibid.
, pp. 77, 99.
^They apparently do this in "parametric" adjustment where one decision
maker simply adapts to another's decisions without considering the conse-
quences for that other person. Ibid .
, p. 33.
52
"It is customary to think of an analytical process as going on in one
mind or within the minds of a small group. But the analysis of policy prob-
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But Lindblom must assume that evaluation is not always such a process
or else his own writings will not be very significant. Lindblom 's writings
are addressed to persons or to groups acting as persons and hence cooper-
ative. One cannot, after all, address his writing to a struggle. And Lind-
blom appears to be giving more than mere description of the policy process
to those readers. His description is also a recommendation. 53 This im-
plies that evaluation can be made in other ways since Lindblom himself
apparently intends to do so.
IV. F. 4. The outcome of the struggle is always a simultaneous agree-
ment on policies and values.
That it is always one is a definitional truth if values are determined in
the process of policy choice and if policy choice is a social process which
adjusts conflicting interests to each other. But Lindblom elsewhere says
that policy agreement often rather than always results and that it does so
lems can also be seen as a social process. ..."
"The weighting [of different values] does not take place until actual policy
decisions are made. At that time, the conflicting views of individuals and
groups
. . .
are brought to bear on policy formulation. Policies are set as
a result of such conflict.
. . . The weighting or aggregation is a political
process, not an intellectual process" [Lindblom, 'Handling of Norms, "
p. 174].
53See footnote 9.
54m
. . .
because choice of value and choice of policy are made simul-
taneously, evaluation is achieved automatically in decision-making.
. .
"
[Braybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 132].
See also footnote 52.
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even when people disagree about values. 55 The implication of this latter
claim is that values and policy are distinct and that evaluation is not always
a social process.
The question whether point IV. F. 4. is a definitional or non-definitional
truth is itself unclear depending on what is meant by "agreement. " Since
all individual preferences already represent compromises between individual
and environment there is no sharp distinction between free agreement and
coerced agreement, says Lindblom. 56
The Coordinating Ability of Partisan Mutual Adjustment --
IV. G. 1. If values could be distinguished from policies, then whether a
set of policies was coordinated would depend on whether it was nicely adjusted
to achieve a certain value or values, even at the expense of others, and thus it
would further depend on whether there was agreement on those values. 57
But this implies what elsewhere is called a naive view of consistency.
There it is suggested that numerous different sets of policies can be con-
sidered consistent in service of any single value if one distinguishes between
CO
different relevant considerations --say between short and long range ones.
S^See footnote 28, first part.
5°See footnote 17, last part.
"^See footnote 32, first part.
^"One naive view of inconsistency—hence, by inference, of consistency-
is to be immediately rejected as troublesome. One hears, for example, that
a government is inconsistent (and hence foolish) if, on one hand, it encourages
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IV. G. 2. Now there is value agreement but it is not on values distin-
guishable from policy choices, and the values chosen are not the deliberate
choice of individuals. They are a resultant of many conflicting interests.
But see the proviso to point IV. F. 4.
IV. G. 3. The mutual adjustment process thus does not deliberately
achieve coordination but it automatically does so. For it adjusts policies
to each other in a context of value agreement, and this is as much coordina-
tion as is possible anyway given the deficiencies of knowledge.
IV. G. 4. And this amount of coordination is enough since there
is resource slack59 in the society and a shared
crop restriction and, on the other hand, undertakes expensive projects for
reclaiming productive soil from wasteland.
. . . These are inconsistent
policies only in the trivial sense that in each of these cases one can think of
a value toward which one of any two paired policies advances while the
other of the pair is indifferent or opposed. By such a test, however, any
two policies can always be shown to be inconsistent, for such a value can
always be found. 11
"In the light of a number of relevant values, rather than only one, and
even in the light of most single values, such pairs of policies turn out to
be quite consistent. It: is easy to find a combination of short- and long-
range objectives, and of objectives with respect to growth as well as to
distribution of income, that make crop restriction and acreage increases
consistent.
. .
" [Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
, p. 193].
59See footnote 27.
This writer does not know that Lindblom ever explicitly mentions re-
source slack in connection with his own work. But he and Hirschman do so
favorably in discussing Hirschman's thesis that the unbalanced economic
growth inherent in a market system may be preferable to deliberately bal-
anced growth.
"Admittedly, the process is likely to be more costly in terms of resource
utilization, but the imbalances at the same time call forth more resources
and investment than would otherwise become available. The crucial, but
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culture^ which provides
MffiJfe, basic agreemeM on values> policies
_
procedures.
The non zero-sum notion of resource slack conflicts with the frequently
zero-sum notion of marginal choice.
The assertion of a shared culture conflicts with the often substantial
emphasis placed on value conflict, even conflict over values at the margin.
Furthermore, given system slack and wide cultural agreement, the
claim that pluralist systems can coordinate is not very significant. It would
be surprising, indeed, if the systems could not. See the proviso to point I.
The Lindblom Position as a Dialectical Concept Examinati on
The conclusion of my attempted summary thus reconfirms the problei
which have faced that attempt from its beginning. There is substantial ambig-
uity in the Lindblom concepts and diversity, even to the point of inconsistency,
in his arguments. The result is a very great number of different concepts and
plausible, assumption here is that there is some 'slack' in the economy.
[Alberto. Hirschman and Charles E. Lindblom, "Economic Development,
Research and Development, Policy Making: Some Converging Views, "
Behavioral Science
,
VII (April, 1962), 212J. [Hereinafter referred to as
"Converging Views. "]
In any case, there are numerous tacit references to resource slack besides
those in footnote 27. For examples, decision makers can defer to others and
still have enough options left to achieve their own goals. Lindblom, Intelli-
gence of Democracy
, pp. 47-50. And even in the case of finite resources, as
in a budget, additional funds come in from time to time (and apparently one
can always afford to wait for these). Ibid.
, p. 199.
See footnote 19, first part.
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positions. I interpret this diversity as a response to an inherently conflictual
social reality. And I interpret the response as an "inner debate" which Lind-
blom is having with himself-a debate he undertakes in the course of his partic-
ipation in an "outer debate" with others over the worth of comprehensiveness.
I understand Lindblom to be on one side of the outer debate. His partic-
ipation takes the form of concepts developed and arguments advanced in support
of a position on that side. In the inner debate he argues both for and against
those concepts and arguments. The presence of this inner debate is why, in
my view, it is practically impossible to summarize Lindblom's position. The
remainder of Chapter III is an attempt to partly trace the progress of this inner
debate.
The discussion to follow, and a similar discussion of writing by Karl
Mannheim, represent, in a sense, the core of the dissertation. It is through
these discussions that I utilize what I call a dialectical method of concept
examination. In one sense, of course, the core is represented fully as much
by the problem statements given in Chapter I and the methodology considered in
Chapter II, for both the problem statements and the method delimit the con-
ceptual possibilities. Nevertheless, the early chapters are intended to intro-
duce the later ones rather than to stand by themselves.
The Ceaseless Quest for Proof . In many present day approaches to con-
cept examination the emphasis is placed on meaning
.
Typical questions concern
why we understand universals or essences, how to make our ideas clear, how
we in fact use certain words, and so on. By contrast, the emphasis in the
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approach presented here is always on cogency
, I assume that conviction does
not arise out of understanding but that understanding arises out of conviction.
I further assume that the quest for cogency is a perpetual one and that it is
fruitful as such
.
I expressly reject the assumption, typified by some passages of John
Hospers, that it is not fruitful to ask for ultimate proof. As a specimen of the
view I oppose, these passages are worth quoting at some length. (Hospers
speaks of the foundations of logic. )
. . .
we are so accustomed to being barraged by the request "Prove it" that
we tend to think that this is required also of the very bases of proof them-
selves ... But the principles of proof themselves make proof possible. We
cannot prove them in turn.
.
.
61
Still, the uneasiness may persist. We want every statement to rest on
another one. We are in the position of the lady and the rock: The earth
rests on an elephant; what does the elephant rest on? A rock. What does
the rock rest on? Another rock. What does that rock rest on? Another
rock
. . .
,
and so on ad infinitum. A lady in the audience keeps asking this
question over and over again; finally in exasperation the speaker says to
her, "Lady, it's rock all the way down !" All the way down --to what? The
speaker can stop her endlessly repeated question only by teaching her a
little astronomy and curing her of naive notions of up and down—though
perhaps she will never quite overcome a feeling of dissatisfaction with the
explanation. You too may remain dissatisfied with our conclusions about
logic unless you get over the idea that the ultimate principles of proof must
themselves be proved ...
We have to start somewhere, and this is where we start. 63
^John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (2d ed.
;
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 213.
62
Ibid.
Ibid.
, p. 212.
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This warning away from the quest for ultimate proof assumes that we
all share Hospers' faith in certain bases of proof and/or that a ceaseless
pursuit is not worth undertaking. Now in the sciences, even the "hard"
sciences, it is certainly not clear that we share the same concepts or basic
laws. And, more fundamentally, it is not clear that we agree on the absolute-
ness of the laws of logic. Contextualists do not agree, for example, that
absolute identity statements can be made. Breakthroughs in philosophy as
well as the sciences are supposed to be possible and may well depend on calling
in question what previously went unquestioned.
If shared faith is not obviously adequate to stop our demands for proof,
neither is the ceaseless nature of those demands. Indeed, traditional philoso-
phy itself seems to represent such a ceaseless process and it is not obvious
that such philosophy is therefore useless.
Synopsis of the Discussion . In the following discussion I trace the
pattern of that apparently ceaseless struggle with himself through which Lind-
blom seems to argue the case against comprehensiveness. I think this struggle,
like every other conceptual struggle, occurs within a hierarchy. A group of
nations, let us say, struggles ideologically with another group. Most of the
time the struggle is non -violent, taking the form of a debate. For those who
share the ideology there is an additional inner struggle or debate over ways to
gain the peculiar advantages of that ideology while escaping its disadvantages.
If the first struggle is said to be between friends and enemies then this second
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one may be said to be among friends. In actuality, the distinction between
friends and enemies is only one of degree, however. Now there may be an
indefinably large hierarchy of debates within debates but at whatever level one
looks there will be spokesmen who attempt to summarize and defend a position
at that level. The perpetuity of the debate, and of its hierarchical order, must
ultimately go on within these spokesmen themselves. Thus it is in this form
that there appears that limitless quest for proof of which Hospers (mistakenly
1 think) denies the legitimate existence.
Context of the Lindblom Debates -- The outermost debate (I shall call it
the primary debate) in which Lindblom is involved concerns the traditional
pluralist position. According to that position the politics of central control is
undesirable because it produces overconcentration of power and thus becomes
a threat to individual liberties. One acknowledges that the cost of pervasive
competition among groups and individuals may be a deficiency of governmental
coordination but one then holds that this deficiency is not serious since there
exists a general consensus over procedures and policy in pluralist political
systems. The outermost debate is between liberals and "authoritarians. "
Lindblom is certainly a participant in this debate, though only indirectly as
regards most of those writings examined here. ^
^Lindblom leaves no question about his support for liberal democracy
over dictatorship. He does not believe that coordination is incompatible with
liberalism. That is the main point of his writings. But wherever it may
appear to be incompatible, coordination must be abandoned. For example,
coordination seems to call for at least some equilibrium among different
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Within the outermost debate is another, secondary, debate among the
liberals themselves
--a debate over the extent to which central coordination
may replace political competition, given the consensus which is assumed.
This debate is particularly evident between the central planners of Western
Europe and Americans like Lindblom. Here he is a direct participant, for
the debate concerns precisely what I have called the converse pluralist
65theme. (It is hence apparent that the converse theme is subordinate to the
traditional one. )
As a participant in this secondary debate Lindblom takes the side which
denies that central coordination is appropriate for liberalism. I suggest that
he does so, at least in part, to avoid reducing the primary debate to triviality.
group interests. This condition is not obviously achieved if a minority can
exercise an absolute veto, can effectually blackmail the other groups. But in
that case it is the requirement for consent that must prevail, even at risk of
a veto, rather than the requirement of equilibrium. See Lindblom, "Decision-
Making, " p. 317.
Putting this point another way, one might say that coordination is often
associated with the need for relatively greater social equality. But the need
for minority consent may result in inequality. Where it does so we must
abandon the equality criterion.
"Most of us in the Western tradition would, if faced with a practical
choice, probably sanction any degree of inequality necessary to maintain
a government based on consent rather than a high degree of repression"
[Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, p. 260].
65" it w ill be apparent to many that in exploring these [decision-making]
processes I am following the tradition of the pluralists in political theory.
But my . . . interest [is turned] toward the calculation aspects of these
processes rather than the control aspects. More concretely, where a
political scientist asks whether these processes safeguard us against an
overconcentration of power, I ask whether they can aid us in rational
choices" [Lindblom, "Decision-Making," p. 314, footnote 14].
Central coordinate cannot be compatible with liberalism unless there is
widespread consensus. Otherwise, coordination will involve a rebuff to
substantial minorities. But if there is widespread consensus then no great
harm is done by choosing central coordination over individual liberties, as a
governing approach, and no great benefit is gained either. It simply doesn't
matter much which approach one chooses. What do I care that I am told to do
what I would want to do anyway?66
Now it would be easy to argue that Lindblom does assume the existence
of a widespread consensus in pluralism and that, consequently, all his argu-
ments for it do tend to become trivial-for he makes numerous references to
To what this writer has just said, the likely criticism will probably
be that he fails to distinguish between levels of freedom. Because we may
agree on the most important matters does not mean, it will be argued that
our right to disagree on lesser matters is not worth protecting. The writer
concurs but asks for examples. It is doubtful that examples can be found which
will allow us to distinguish clearly between authoritarian and democratic
regimes. Consider the freedom to speak on matters other than the political-
economic system itself. This is not proscribed, for example, in the Soviet
Union. Indeed, it is encouraged through vigorous letters to the editor columns
and the injunction to report problems to party members. Granted that the
line between sensitive and nonsensitive topics is unclear. But it is that, also,
in the United States.
Furthermore, if one emphasizes effective freedom of speech then the
distinction between two countries becomes particularly obscure. In the United
States it is true that one can speak to acquaintances and to political represent-
atives in more daring ways than would be permissible in some other countries.
But access to wider audiences is under the control of the political-economic
system, in the guise of advertisers and interlocking directorates between
business and the mass media.
sion
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American political consensus. 67 Lindblom appears much more consistent
if we accept tins view. I believe it likely, however, that he means to make
his views significant even at some expense in consistency. And there is evi-
dence for this belief. He is neither consistent nor wholly clear in his discussi
of consensus. 68 Suppose, therefore, that Lindblom does want to make signif-
icant claims for pluralism and consequently that he is assuming the existence
of substantial value conflict. Is he not then forced to conclude that pluralism
will fail to coordinate and that it will instead produce, probably violent,
disorder? His colleague, Robert Dahl, has drawn just this conclusion in those
69circumstances. Clearly Lindblom would not like the conclusions. Thus he
faces a challenge. He must show that significant pluralism—a pluralism of
widely different values --can coordinate these values even if it does not
"centrally" coordinate them.
It is in the light of this need for a claim that is both significant and
favorable to pluralism that we should see the debate between Lindblom and the
central planners of Western Europe. Both sides are liberals and both agree
on the need for some coordination. But the Europeans seem to assume the
67
".
. .
in the United States and the other successful democracies some
of the common values (including democracy itself) on which citizens unite
are more important to them than the values on which they disagree" [Lind-
blom, "Bargaining, " p. 32J.
See also footnote 18.
68See footnote 19
69See Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 98-99.
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existence of social consensus in assuming the possibility of a social welfare
function. 70 Hence they face the danger that their liberalism will be trivial.
What Lindblom needs to show is that his style of liberal coordination is truly
coordination and yet allows for more conflict than does theirs. It is in his
attempt to do this that we can trace the relation between this most proximate
outer debate, where Lindblom stands on one side, and the ultimately inner
debate, which he has with himself.
Relation of the Proximate Outer Debate to the Inner Debate and Theme -
The proximate outer debate in which Lindblom is engaged is, to repeat, a
debate with fellow liberals over the virtues of central coordination. The
position he wants to defend in that debate seems a logically tenuous one. Given
this tenuous position, the safest way to make one's own case is by an indirect
proof- -a proof for the logical impossibility of one's opponents' views. Lind-
blom gives just such a proof.
The concepts of comprehensiveness and central coordination involve the
idea that general goals can be formulated in advance of decision, that the
relevant means to these goals and consequences of these means can be ex-
haustively canvassed from a central position, and that from the central position
70
'^Consider the following statement by Jan Tinbergen in his review of
A Strategy of Decision
.
"It is not quite true
. . .
that no social welfare functions have been con-
structed; Van Eijk, Frisch, Sandee and Theil may be quoted to the contrary"
[Jan Tinbergen, review of A Strategy of Decision
,
by David Braybrooke and
Charles E. Lindblom, in American Economic Review
, LIV (December,
1964), 1094],
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one can choose the most appropriate means. I suggest that Lindblom constantly
argues against this idea to the effect that the formulation of advance goals is
logically impossible. A person cannot know what he wants until he knows what
the options and costs are and he cannot know the applicable ones except at the
moment of decision. 71
The above argument is so cutting, however, just because it is two-edged.
In denying the possibility of advance goals it seems to deny the very possibility
of deliberate individual decision. For one cannot then differentiate between the
spontaneous interaction of an animal with his environment and the thoughtful
action of a human on that environment. By itself, this indirect proof would
simply once again reduce the general concept of pluralist politics to triviality.
Of course there can be both value conflict and coordination if the conflict is no
more, say, than the interaction in a bee hive.
Consequently, Lindblom also needs a direct proof- -a proof that his own
form of coordination through conflict is possible. I think he tries to meet the
need by showing that evaluation and decision are both social processes and
processes of conflict. Such decisions are not the direct reflection of individual
deliberation since, on the one hand, they are not individual decisions and, on
the other, they are not a result of cooperation and advance agreement. Thus
they do not, in these senses, involve advance goals. But such decisions are
still deliberate since they are the result of an initial conflict over values.
71See footnote 31.
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Consequently they do seem to involve advance goals indirectly. In effect,
Lindblom seems to be saying either that social conflict
_is deliberate unified
decision or, at least, that social conflict leads to such decision. These views
are expressed in his own earliest language, as the statement that bargaining
can coordinate. 72 The statement presents the central theme which I believe
he pursues in attempting to complete the indirect proof for his position (the
argument against comprehensiveness) with a direct one.
At this point in my argument it may be asked if Lindblom's theme is as
curious as I suggest. I apparently assume that no distinction can be made
between different sorts of advance goals. But maybe bargaining can have ad-
vance goals, after all, even if they are different from those of central coordin-
ation. In that case perhaps Lindblom does not find himself in quite the dilemma
which I describe and accordingly need not respond with what appears to be a
contradictory thesis.
I don't believe that Lindblom acknowledges such a distinction in advance
goals as can relieve him of his dilemma, however. Certainly there is a dis-
tinction. It pervades his writings. It is the difference between an aggregate
of separate more or less atomistic goals, on the one hand, and a goal integra-
tion embedded in our very culture, on the other. The latter may be otherwise
described as a conceptual framework.
But the existence of this sort of advance goal in bargaining is precisely
72"I am arguing that bargaining is a method of coordination, not a toler-
able obstruction to coordination" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 4].
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the cause of dilemma, not a solution to it. In most of his writings that we ex-
amine Lindblom wants to show that a conflict of interests can result in (if it is
not in fact identical to) social coordination. The interaction involved in a soc-
ial-conceptual framework is not evidently a matter of conflict, however, at
least not for those within it. To be in conflict would logically require one to
stand at least a little distance outside the conceptual framework. Now Lind-
blom does seem to draw this last conclusion at certain points but I think it a
mistake to suppose that it summarizes his writings. It seems to represent,
instead, a basic transformation of that thought sequence which culminates in
the Intelligence of Democracy
.
Within the thought sequence, Lindblom focuses on the concept of bargain-
ing, of partisan adjustment, of group conflict. And he has the problem of
showing how there can be this conflict within a pervasive culture which itself
defines social values. But even in the "Bargaining" essay Lindblom anticipates
another concern. He sees a need to investigate the formation of the culture,
as manifested by social consensus. 73 In his subsequent comments in Nomos
VII_(1967) he explicitly describes the problem of values as one of cultural
formation rather than the aggregation of individual values. And in his remarks
on integration of the social sciences (1972) he urges the need to ask radical
questions about the social structure. 74 These comments of 1967 and 1972
73Ibid.
,
ppT 39-40.
74
".
. . because values are in fact culturally aggregated, the problem of
'aggregation' is in fact a 'formation' problem to which contemporary analysis
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follow the Intelligence
... and imply the question of how to escape from a
dominant conceptual framework.
I say then that Lindblom works over one problem and ends by trans-
forming it into another. He first struggles with the problem how there can be
value conflict within a pervasive culture which defines our values. Just after
he has developed his fullest answer to this problem he apparently transforms
it to the different problem how we can escape from our culture sufficiently to
alter it. It is primarily his first problem that we examine. That problem
does seem to present the dilemma which I describe and hence to justify my
explanation of what he is doing.
Now odd as it might seem, this explanation of the theme and its purpose
seems plausible. For such an explanation can make sense of a central incon-
sistency in Lindblom's thought (mentioned in the provisos to III. B. 5. and
IV. F. 4. of the illustrative summary). That inconsistency is the presence
of the contrary claims, first, that values are derived from choices at the social
decision moment and, second, that people disagree about values, the latter
claim implying that the values must endure over time.
If we assume that the central theme of Lindblom's thought does appear
to affirm contraries, then the support of that theme obviously will constitute
an intellectual struggle. The struggle could be conceived as a primarily linear
is insensitive" [Charles E. Lindblom, "Some Limitations on Rationality.
A Comment, " in Nomos VII: Rational Decision , ed. by Carl j. Friedrich
(New York: Atherton Press, 1964, p. 227].
Also see footnote 25 for reference to the 1972 work.
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process leading to an increasingly more exact and less inconsistent concept of
human decision-a discovery that the struggle was only an apparent one. But
it could also be conceived as a primarily circular process which represented
progressively expansive restatements of the struggle itself. I propose to
conceive the theme and the struggle in this second sense.
Before considering how this inner struggle seems to generate develop-
ment of Lindblom's central theme, I need to make some points of summary and
comment about what has just been said.
1. Liberals must show that as they emphasize individual and group free-
dom in the conduct of a polity they can yet achieve enough social order in that
polity.
2. Some liberals propose to do this by showing that central coordination
is compatible with liberalism
--that liberal democracies can plan as well as
can authoritarian regimes.
3. But to be able to show this, it seems that one must first assume a
wide consensus among a country's populace. And given this consensus it
doesn't greatly matter which political system one chooses. A recommendation
for liberalism is really a recommendation that the country be lucky enough to
be consensual. (And since consensus comes easier to the rich, one may also
be recommending, in effect, that the country be rich. )
4. To avoid making his position trivial a liberal might want to show both
that a society can be consensual enough for coordination and that it can be con-
flictual enough so that a pluralist competition is the better politics. Such a
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liberal, and Lindblom is one, would then be engaged in debate with those
fellow liberals who espouse central planning. Unfortunately, his position
would seem as logically shaky as theirs was trivial.
5. Because Lindblom *s position in this "outer" debate does indeed appear
shaky, his safest approach apparently would consist in logically discrediting
the liberal planners. If he could do so, his own position, tenuous though it was,
would be all that remained.
6. The importance of this approach cannot be too much emphasized. In
conventional formal logic, to show a contradiction in some position is equivalent
to proving its contradictory. This procedure is called a "reductio ad absurdem"
argument or an "indirect proof. " The debate between pluralist liberals and
planning liberals is not so sharply drawn as to logically demand the applica-
tion of this principle, but it is enough so as to suggest it.
7. I cannot accept this principle, however. According to a most critical
assumption of my dissertation, reality may not be such that the principle holds.
8. Lindblom shows, by an apparently conclusive argument, that central
planning is illogical. He does so by showing that advance goals seem impossi-
ble. But he must then indicate that some human decision-making is still possi-
ble or he has reduced pluralist politics to non-conscious animal interaction.
An indirect proof alone would not let us take notice of this problem but we do.
9. It is just in moving from indirect proof to a direct proof that the outer
debate over liberal planning is evidently converted to an inner struggle. For
Lindblom it seems to be a struggle to maintain the view both that human values
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are consensual, in deriving from the social decision moment, and that they
are conflictual, and hence must endure in time.
The Impetus for Theme Development If Lindblom's thought is an
effort to affirm contraries, this is not necessarily a surprising circumstance.
The need to do so may well be the human condition. And if it is, then we might
find a certain characteristic beginning to the development of any person's
thought. We might find that in his intellectual youth he had a faith in the
identity of contraries
--a faith which in later years he tried to maintain while
yet differentiating ever more finely between them. I suggest that Lindblom's
thought does develop in this way.
Lindblom's central theme
--the position he holds in the outer debate and
the position which in its seeming contradictariness capsulizes his inner debate-
is that bargaining can coordinate. I want to make the bold claim that this theme
does begin as an identity statement. I think Lindblom takes the tacit position
that conflict is coordination! In his early essay on "Bargaining" (1955) he
associates coordination with value agreement and with the public interest. So
far as one can tell from a very few and vague comments this is what coordina-
tion is. But then Lindblom explicitly states that the public interest is often
nothing other than bargained agreement among partisans --i. e, a managed
75
conflict. 10 Now Lindblom might mean that conflict results in agreement rather
than that it is agreement --and this seems, indeed, to be the simplest most
^Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 26.
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obvious interpretation of his views. I don't believe, however, that he can
mean this in the light of later works which he apparently treats as compatible
with this early one. And there seem no other meanings which would avoid this
identity of opposites. More will be said later in defense of this identity state-
ment. 76
Assuming for now that there is this attempted identity of opposites then
there is a constant compulsion to move on in one's thought. To rest in the
identity of value conflict and value agreement would be to reduce the one to the
other. In a pluralist model of politics
--one which makes conflict its fore-
ground concept and relegates agreement to the status of a background assump-
tion- -conflict would appear to be reduced to agreement. If the concept of con-
flict is to be made meaningful and not left as a mere label for what looks like
its opposite then increasing efforts must be made to differentiate it. 77 But
these efforts can never be decisive since they will be constrained by a constant
need to reassert the original identity of the two concepts. Otherwise pluralism
freed from consensus assumptions becomes a hopeless attempt to negotiate the
76See text pp. 210-13.
77Consistent with his method of dialectical concept examination, the
writer is treating the development of Lindblom's thought as if it comprised the
elaboration of a concept. He does so even though Lindblom's writings may
appear, on the surface, to be defending a proposition rather than defining a
term. In fact, Lindblom, himself, sometimes speaks as if his thought were a
process of definition.
"Because this is an exploratory and imprecise paper, I cannot define
bargaining very sharply. If we understand it as poorly as I argue to be the
case in this paper, it can only be defined with satisfactory precision as we
come to know it better" [Lindblom, "Bargaining," p. 2].
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non
-negotiable.
The Stages of Theme Development (The Progress of the Inner De-
bate) -- I identify three main stages in the development of this ambivalent
theme. The first is represented by an early and little mentioned essay which
Lindblom wrote under the auspices of the Rand Corporation m 1955. Entitled
"Bargaining, the Hidden Hand in Government" 78 it represents some departure
from the book written with Robert Dahl two years before79 where bargaining
and coordination were treated as alternate processes. In the 1955 essay the
"
central theme that conflict is coordination seems starkly evident. Perhaps
Lindblom would now reject some of these early statements but I don't believe
he can do so without rejecting major works which follow. For the ambivalences
reappear in those works.
In the essay the concept of coordination is vaguely but effectually identi-
fied with value agreement. Now since conflict appears to be identified with
coordination, then if coordination is equivalent to agreement conflict must be
a wholly undetermined concept. There is conflict in name only. This result
makes the whole theme meaningless, however, and the urge to have a meaning-
ful statement consequently forces an immediate rejection of the theme as an
identity statement. Lindblom instead acknowledges the possibility of deadlock
7 8
"First reference is in footnote 4.
79Dahl and Lindblom, Politics Economics and Welfare: Planning and
Politico-Economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes. First
reference is in footnote 24.
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and the consequent need to distinguish levels of power. There is now conflict
in potential and not merely in name. 80
After the essay on bargaining, Lindblom wrote nothing closely relevant
to his central theme until 1958. 81 There then appeared in rapid succession
four important essays, highlighted by the famous "The Science of Muddling
82Through" in the spring of 1959. "Policy Analysis" 83 appeared in June of
1958 followed in December of 1958 by "Tinbergen on Policy
-Making" 84 and in
1959 by "The Handling of Norms in Policy Analysis. " 85 These four essays
^Elaboration and defense of the points made in this paragraph begin on
text p. 188.
O 10iHe contributed to a brief published discussion of the monopoly problem,
see American Economics Review for May 1957, and in January of 1957 his
essay "In Praise of Political Science" was published in World Polit ics. The
comments on the monopoly problem are confusing but Lindblom seems to be
arguing for a broader view of the corporation than that to which economists are
accustomed. Seen in the context of his other writings he is probably removing
the concept of the corporation from a strict market model only to place it in the
not-so-different pluralist model. In the essay published in World Polit ics,
Lindblom argues that political scientists possess a degree of systematic theory
beyond what they recognize, namely the pluralist theory. He does not empha-
size the advantages of pluralism as a normative theory, however; he empha-
sized, instead, its value as a description of society.
82pirst reference is in footnote 8.
8
^First reference is in footnote 14.
S^First reference is in footnote 19.
oc
First reference is in footnote 18.
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constitute, to me, a second stage in the development of the Lindblom theme.
The concept of conflict no longer exists only in potential. It is actual but only
as conflict over minor individual values. This conflict occurs within a larger
setting of other individual but widely shared values. 86 It is marginal conflict
in the sense of being mild.
86What noticeably separates the essay on "Bargaining" from the four
works just mentioned is an emphasis in the latter works on the means /ends
distinction. In "Bargaining, " Lindblom 's main emphasis is on the point, that
coordination of values occurs automatically in the process of political-social
conflict and that, consequently, there is no need to distinguish between means
and ends because one needs no deliberate ends. There is little evidence that
Lindblom does make the distinction in this earliest essay.
Lindblom needs to introduce the means /ends distinction, however, if he
is to make the concept of value conflict meaningful. Otherwise, a value and
its implementing action will be identical, and in that case value interaction
apparently can take only two forms neither of which will constitute real value
conflict. If the interaction involves no shared conceptual framework it will
necessarily reduce to an unresolvable debate over opposing actions --a debate
like those which emotivists envision. (One actor will insist that he, himself,
should perform Act A. Another will insist that he should perform B instead. )
But if there is a shared conceptual framework its existence will imply that
similar values -actions are undertaken by all.
Where the means/ends distinction is introduced (i.e.
,
where actions are
considered somehow different from the values they implement), then there is,
for positivists, logical space to argue about values. The debate is not neces-
sarily reduced to a shouting match. And for contextua lists the presence of
some shared values does not, then, necessarily predetermine, as it otherwise
would, agreement on those lesser values called means.
Having acknowledged the concept of a means /ends distinction, one must
simultaneously admit that it cannot be an absolute; it is a concept about the
relationships between entities and not about any particular entities themselves.
Hence, means are simply lesser values. These lesser values are the marginal
values which represent differing trade-off relationships possible in implement-
ing the more general ones. There can truly be conflict over such marginal
values. See Lindblom "Muddling Through, " pp. 84-85; and Lindblom, "Hand-
ling of Norms, " p. 167. This conflict seems to take place within a larger
setting of shared individual values, however. See Lindblom, "Policy Analysis,
"
pp. 309, 300-01; Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making, " p. 534; and
Lindblom, "Handling of Norms, " p. 171.
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Beyond the second stage I think it possible to identify a third one, though
the differences between second and third are not as dramatic as those between
the first and second. The third stage involves more lengthy, more subtle works,
the major ones being A Strategy of Decision 87 (with David Braybrooke) and
The Intelligence of Democracy. 88 It is in the last of these that Lindblom
particularly recognizes conflict over "collective" values as distinct from con-
flict over individual ones.
Collective values are those which cannot benefit one person without bene-
fiting many others and similarly cannot be withheld from that person without
being withheld from others. 89 Presumably the costs, too, must be shared
though Lindblom does not explicitly mention this. He admits that collective
values often evaporate from pluralist theories of politics as they seem to do in
his own earlier works. But even in The Intelligence of Democracy there arc,
for him, only discrete collective values. There is no "overriding aggregate of
collective value," nothing that might be called "the" public interest. 90
There also appears, with this explicit recognition of conflict over col-
lective values a greater emphasis on conflict as a zero-sum situation. 91 That
S^First reference is in footnote 8.
^^First reference is in footnote 13.
89Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy
,
p. 279.
90lbid.
, p. 283.
9*In "Bargaining, " Lindblom consistently maintains that most political
situations are non zero-sum. (See first quote in footnote 27. ) In later writings
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is to be expected. Where values are individual what is a need to one may be
a benefit to another so that nobody has to pay costs. A classic example is the
nursing mother who is supposed to receive as much gratification in feeding the
child as the child obtains in being fed. Capitalist theory supposes that many
relationships are like this.
If values are collective, though, there may sometimes be costs equivalent
to the benefits. And if collective values are generalized into the public inter-
est then there almost must be such costs. For if people have a great variety
of needs and wants which must be satisfied as an aggregate, and for all
persons, then unless none of this great variety conflict- -a highly implausible
he continues to say this at points while at other points he suggests the opposite.
Those four works which this writer identifies as a second-stage argument re-
veal only rather brief acknowledgment of zero-sum relations. To be sure,
they speak much of value conflict but they do not emphasize the possibly mutual
exclusivity of these values. There are allusions to the danger of minority rule,
but only in the essay on "Handling of Norms, " p. 167, is there explicit dis-
cussion of whether social relations are zero-sum. Here, Lindblom does
suggest that except in the price system they usually are.
The balance of emphasis throughout the four works still leans strongly
to a notion of mutual gain, however. For an example of the prevailing Eone
consider this passage:
"Both in bargaining and in other kinds of strategic interplay, there are
strong motives for adversaries to find what has been called an 'integrated'
solution.
. . some settlement which, by reconstructing the conflict, gives
all parties much or all of what they want and does not simply 'split the
difference'" [Lindblom, "Tinbergen on Policy-Making, " p. 536],
In the Strategy of Decision, p. 29, Lindblom states a position which he
has implied clearly many times before but then has blurred. Value conflicts
are zero-sum situations.
"Whenever values are in conflict --that is, whenever one has to give up
some of one value in order to achieve some of another value ..." [Bray-
brooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision
, p. 29].
The best evidence, in Intelligence of Democracy, for a greater concern
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assumption-conflict over the public interest must be zero-sum.
Although there is no explicit connection drawn by Lindblom between the
above admissions of collective values and of zero-sum conflict, on the one-
hand, and the greater length of the works in which they occur, on the other,
I suggest that there may be such a connection. It is perhaps just because
Lindblom attempts to maintain the identity of conflict and value agreement
while at the same time he is claiming that conflict can be rather severe that
his works at this third stage are so lengthy and so subtle.
These then are the three main stages which I identify in Lindblom's
development of the converse pluralist theme. Within the limits of this disser-
tation it will not be possible to consider all of them at length. I shall examine
only the first but that one is to me the most critical stage in any case.
First Level of Argument
. In elaborating on the first level of argument
with potentially zero-sum relationships comes not from specific passages but
from the greatly extended discussion of how value conflicts can be reconciled
through partisan mutual adjustment. It comes, that is, from the obvious
implication that the demonstration of this reconciliation is not easy. Almost
all the material in the last one hundred pages of the book is devoted in one way
or another to this problem. And as significant as length is the progress of the
discussion. It seems basically circular. For example, Lindblom suggests
that we interpret value consistency as a Pareto optimum but acknowledges that
pursuit of such an optimum does not resolve all value conflicts. Then he sug-
gests that partisan mutual adjustment will achieve much value agreement any-
way at least in the basic sense that some decision is finally reached. But he
acknowledges that this decision may appear coercive and he can only soften
that fact by de -emphasizing the distinction between coercion and consent in the
first place. See Lindblom, Intelligence of Dem ocracy
,
chaps. XIII and XIV.
Similar advances and retreats occur in later chapters.
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as it is presented in the essay on "Bargaining, \ . " , shall first attempt a
somewhat extended summary of that work. Of course there must be, on my
view, many provisos to any such summary but I shall not give them here in
the explicit form which they took in the earlier illustrative summary. They
will now appear as interwoven into the very fabric of my interpretation and
analysis.
The Essay -- The thrust of the essay is apparent from the title. Lind-
blom suggests that in the same way as the selfishness of men in the market
can lead to public good so can partisan bargaining in government. (Reference
in this essay is only to bargaining among public officials. ) In his own words,
I am arguing that bargaining is a method of coordination, not a tolerable
obstruction to coordination. 9^
. .
.bargaining or negotiation in government is a closer kin to Smith's
"higgling of the market" than third-cousin-by-analogy. 93
The alternative to bargaining is hierarchy. The author advances the
hypothesis that bargaining is preferable for various reasons, in particular
because the bargaining process tends to insure that all vital interests
obtain a hearing, and because the results of bargaining tend to be in the
public interest.
Lindblom is confident that market trade offers benefits to all since,
according to him, there are curbs on the power of any one individual. He
acknowledges that bargaining, in contrast, often appears to favor some persons
^Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 4.
93
Ibid.
,
p. 5.
94lbid.
,
p. ii.
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at the expense of others. But he promises to show that bargaining, too,
almost always occurs because of the possibility of mutual gain to all, though
he concedes that the gain sometimes consists merely in abatement of
flict.
con-
95
The major concepts in the essay are bargaining, hierarchy and coordin-
ation but only the first one is explicitly defined. Hierarchy is associated with
the idea that if one wants to achieve a social goal then one must make it some
official's responsibility to pursue it. 96 It is also associated with the concept
of unilateral power and, 97 obliquely, with that of dictatorship. But Lindblom
also acknowledges that democracy can take a hierarchical form and, apparently,
not just in the sense that the bureaucratic part of any government is usually a
Q o
formal hierarchy. yo He seems instead to be acknowledging a planning or
"socialist" democracy of the European sort. Hierarchy in any case seems to
mean the deliberate pursuit of the public good. 99 This public good is not
95lbid.
, p. 3.
96Ibid.
, p. 6.
97Ibid.
op
In any democracy the subordination of hierarchy is always more
marked than dictatorship even if it is less marked than in American
government" [Ibid . , p. 19].
99
Aside from the price system, we are still wedded to the idea that. . .
the way to reach social goals is to set them up as organizational object-
ives. . . the way to serve the public is to motivate individuals to serve the
public—in short, the way to get results is to organize power hierarchically'
[Ibid.
, p. 7J.
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necessarily a generally agreed public good, but it would be so in a socialist
democracy.
Coordination, or social coordination as it is sometimes called, is even
less explicitly defined than is hierarchy. One often thinks of this concept as
referring to a process by which many different elements are brought into a
whole-brought so through the purposive application of some common prin-
ciples or values. This makes the concept look much like hierarchy, and we
shall see later that it does seem to look that way to Lindblom-but for a differ-
ent reason.
The elements which are brought together may be different values, how-
ever. In other words, coordination in a more basic sense may be needed to
provide the common values which coordination in a more applied sense can
then use to integrate elements other than values. Lindblom apparently under-
stands coordination in this more basic sense. It is associated with "achieving
a social goal, " 10° serving the "public interest, " "finding common goals, " 101
10°".
. .
we are still wedded to the idea that the way to reach social
goals is to set them up as organizational objectives, which means then that
the way to coordinate is to make it someone's job to coordinate.
.
.
"
[Ibid. J.
1
^spite his use of the term "coordination" at the beginning of his
essay, what Lindblom mainly tries to do from then on is show that bargaining
serves the public interest, the latter being defined as widely shared goals.
"An official's bargaining power depends in large part upon the coincidence
of the goals he pursues in bargaining and the public interest, here defined
as the achievement of widely shared goals" [Ibid.
,
p. 2 1 j.
"improving everyone's position. 1,1 02 In this imprecise and intuitive form
coordination thus seems to mean either the achievement of value agreement
or value agreement itself.
Bargaining, which is the one explicitly defined concept, is defined by
negation. It is said to comprise those methods of control over officials which
are multilateral instead of unilateral. 103 It is a residual category of control
not accounted for in the hierarchical models of government. 104
Of the many other distinctions which appear in later works several are
here conflated to the distinction between bargaining and hierarchy. There is
little distinction between the general political process of democracy, the
specific political process of bargaining, and the decision method of incre-
mentalism. And there is similarly little distinction between dictatorship,
hierarchy, and the decision method of synopsis. Neither is there much em-
phasis on the means -ends distinction and its deficiencies.
After distinguishing between bargaining and hierarchy, the essay elab-
orates the point that bargaining is common in American government. It then
proceeds to the main topic which is a discussion of the virtues of bargaining
for coordination.
102".
. , bargaining almost always (perhaps without exception) takes
place because of the possibility of mutual gain to all the bargainers. . .
"
[Ibid.
, p. 3].
103Ibid.
,
p. 2.
104 Ibid .
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Lindblom begins, as so often in his later works, with a kind of reductio
argument. He observes that bargaining is ubiquitous and concludes that if
hierarchy can be shown to be impossible or clearly inferior in important cir-
cumstances then facts like ubiquity will have to be persuasive. 105 He then
completes the argument with sub-arguments showing that hierarchy actually
is impossible in democracy, because of social and institutional pluralism,
and that it is also impossible, in certain circumstances, in any government. 106
(Lindblom is speaking mainly of democracies, though. )
Now Lindblom could end the argument here but he evidently senses that
a reductio argument is not enough. He doesn't want to say merely that bar-
gaining is the best there is. In what immediately follows comes the most
interesting and curious part of his total argument.
Earlier in the essay Lindblom claimed to see the presence of curbs on
power inequality in the market system and to see the possibility of similar if
1 07less effective curbs in pluralism. This was to be expected since pluralist
theory usually holds that there either is or can be rough equality of bargaining
power. But now as he proceeds to the most critical steps of his argument,
105Ibid.
, pp. 15-17.
106Ibid.
, pp. 17-20.
Lindblom did not put the matter exactly this way. He spoke of curbs
on "private vices" rather than on "power inequality. " But the import would
seem to be much the same. In a bargaining polity one need not curb the vices
of the weak. And to curb the vices of the strong, one must curb their power.
Ibid.
, pp. 3-4.
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Lindblom denies this latter position. Equality is a ridiculous idea, he says.
Bi-partisan equality would lead to deadlock. And equality defined as a situation
in which no party to the bargain feels anyone else did better is also undesirable.
Coincidence with the public interest, not satisfaction of the partisans, ought to
be the test of a settlement. 108
The public official with more power is probably one with a higher position
in the formal government hierarchy. And he should have gained this through
various alliances.
»..
. .
the only way to win is to find common cause with a
majority of the bargainers. " 109 The official thus will have more bargaining
power if he pursues more widely shared values. Such values constitute the
public interest, the only sort of public interest there can ever really be. 110
And the public interest as such, or at least its achievement, is apparently
what is meant by coordination.
At this point in the argument Lindblom fears he will be thought to have
begged the question by assuming that the bargaining objective is something
more than private gain. 111 But he assures the reader that he has not. There
are many different interpretations of the public interest; failure to recognize
that fact is a basic defect of hierarchy. And often these interpretations cannot
108Ibid.
, p. 21.
1Q9Ibid.
, p. 22.
110Ibid.
, pp. 23-24.
m Ibid.
, pp. 24-25.
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be reduced to a smaller number by appeal to the voice of the majority. The
majority is silent. Often the only way to know that values are widely shared
is to know that they are the outcome of bargaining. "Hence within a certain
ranSe the public interest is represented by an agreement among partisan inter-
ests, which is the way bargainers see it, not a goal or state of affairs having
some validity other than as a practical bargained compromise. 1,1 12
Thus does Lindblom argue that bargaining is not merely the best one can
get in the direction of coordination. It is a definite coordinating device. It is
so because those sympathetic to the public interest will have the greater
bargaining power. This public interest is not something above the bargaining
process, however, but is often the outcome of that very process.
The crux of Lindblom's argument seems to be captured in the above
points, but it is elaborated in subsequent points and some of those need to be
mentioned. For one thing, there are other related advantages to bargaining
besides its ability to see the public interest for what it is. The bargaining
process better assures that the values of every significant group will be con-
sidered in any final reconciliation of interests involved in a policy decision.
The hierarchical decision maker sees such reconciliation as a matter of his
own judgment in weighing values, and he is likely to miss the values that don't
fit his biases. The bargainer believes that reconciliation will come just in
letting every group speak for itself. On his view, it cannot occur in one person's
li2 lbid.
,
p. 26.
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mind. H3
Bargaining also produces better feedback since big decisions are not
necessarily made at the top of a hierarchy. And it is less intellectually
demanding. 114 But its greatest value is that it motivates men to seek common
goals rather than to be satisfied with a compromise of conflicting interests.
This is a value because there are countless common goals, at least in the
United States. 11 The reason that there are is partly the good fortune of our
history but it is also partly because bargaining makes it the business of our
government leaders to uncover every possible area of agreement. 116 (Is
Lindblom perhaps alluding to his earlier point that the areas of agreement are
often whatever emerge from bargaining?)
After discussing the virtues of bargaining, Lindblom very briefly con-
siders its deficiencies, suggesting that these deficiencies stem from an excess
of institutional pluralism or from attempts to gain power other than through
alliances. In any case, he does not think the objections are very serious.
The paper concludes with some suggestions for further study, the most
significant to us being the first. That suggestion is to study the social frame-
work of agreement, on fundamental ends and on political means, within which
H3lbid.
, pp. 27-29.
114lbid.
, pp. 29-30.
115Ibid.
, pp. 30-31.
116Jbid.
, p. 32.
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bargaining occurs. Lindblom claims that this framework of agreement is
achieved through social indoctrination, "strategic calculations, " and, for
certain groups, through special role restraints. 117 It is not clear, though,
that the ends and means in question are less fundamental than those which
earlier were considered to be our historical inheritance or the product of
bargaining itself. (Perhaps bargaining implies the making of strategic calcu-
lations and perhaps our historical inheritance is the result of indoctrination. )
The Dialectical Pattern -- 1 want to suggest now that the inconsistencies
or, at least, ambivalences which must have been apparent in the essay on
Bargaining have a point, assume a pattern, when interpreted as a dialectical
concept examination.
1. Central Concept
The central concept in this essay, and in the Lindblom thought sequence
as a whole, is the concept of bargaining. It appears to be a broad concept. It
already comprises, in embryo, the concept of patterns of adjustment among
dominants and subordinates as well as that of bargaining among equals. 118
117
Ibid.
, pp. 39-40.
1 1 s0As has been previously said, Lindblom does not explicitly argue for a
bargaining among equals in this essay. Indeed, his explicit statements go in
the opposite direction. But he takes for granted the presence of a rough equal-
ity in his very use of the concept of pluralism and in his claim that groups
retain some degree of autonomy.
".
. .
if groups working through a common government retain some
degree of autonomy with respect to one another—and this is what social
pluralism means --they can arrive at governmental decisions only through
bargaining" [Ibid.
, p. 20J.
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2. Other First Order Major Concepts
The other major concepts are hierarchy and coordination. These are
never clearly defined but what definition there is is critically significant. For
it makes the two concepts seem very close to each other. This isn't necessar-
ily surprising. If we forget Lindblom's discussion and consider a plain man
view of the two concepts, it would clearly seem that to coordinate implies the
exercise of hierarchy and that what hierarchy does is to coordinate. We might
easily say, then, that the two concepts are really just different aspects of a
single one. Now this docs seem to be the conclusion to which Lindblom is
headed but he is arriving there from a different direction.
I suggest that in his view it is value agreement of which the two concepts
display different aspects. Both allude to value agreement and for both there
are limits to purposive action as regards that agreement.
From the previous exposition it appears that coordination means either
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social agreement or the purposive achievement of social agreement. If it
means the latter then it shares with hierarchy an assumption claimed for that
concept by Lindblom --the assumption that goals can be achieved by deliber-
ately pursuing them. But more likely it means the former. Lindblom clearly
doesn't intend to emphasize the idea that value agreements have temporal
endurance and could serve, once achieved, as promises for a hierarchical
process. To do so would weaken considerably his central theme. It thus
H9see text pp. 191-92.
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seems more accurate to say that coordination and value agreement occur
simultaneously rather than to say that coordination achieves agreement.
Hierarchy might be supposed a very different concept given the strong
association Lindblom seems to make between that concept and purposive action.
But let us give some extended thought to the implications of the concept as he
uses it and see if the supposition holds. We note firstly, and despite Lind-
blom's sometimes claims to the contrary, that hierarchy must be possible. 120
Since bargaining is all those governmental processes which are not hierarchy,
then if hierarchy did not exist the term bargaining would refer to any govern-
mental process whatever. In that case some of bargaining would surely co-
ordinate. Lindblom clearly means to say more than this in his essay.
Furthermore, the hierarchy from which Lindblom wants to distinguish
bargaining is primarily that of Western social democracies, not that repre-
sented by command economies such as in the Soviet Union. 121 Now the
* 2
^Lindblom 's contrary claims are explicit.
".
. .
hierarchy is impossible in American government except as one of
several bargaining controls" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 17J.
In other words, hierarchy is a subordinate element in the bargaining process.
On the most critical matters, hierarchy is impossible in any government.
"To take an extreme, dictators can exercise power only through employ-
ing large elements of bargaining in their hierarchies" [Ibid.
, p. 18].
121±z,1 In emphasizing the coordinating ability of a bargaining polity, rather
than its ability to protect against power concentration, Lindblom is obviously
speaking to the West. If he was speaking primarily to the Communist East, it
is the latter ability that he would most need to emphasize. For it is just that
ability that they would most violently dispute.
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hierarchical forms of democracy must presuppose value agreement since
values cannot simply be imposed under a democratic system. Some of that
agreement might be the result of historical inheritance, but according to
Lindblom that is not the whole explanation for the presence of agreement in the
122United States and there is consequently no reason for us to think that it
would be a sufficient one elsewhere. Presumably then the agreement on basics,
even for socialist democracies, is associated with something like bargaining.
Thus coordination and hierarchy seem to be the same at least in the sense that
both are associated with agreement over basic values and that this agreement
arises in bargaining.
If there is still a distinction between coordination and hierarchy it must
be that coordination shares with bargaining the bargaining approach over lesser
values whereas hierarchy resolves disputes among those lesser values by
deduction from greater ones. But in the context of this distinction, Lindblom's
major arguments no longer support bargaining over hierarchy as a coordinating
device. Hence, if Lindblom is to be persuasive then he must abandon even this
minor distinction between hierarchy and coordination. In the following lengthy
analysis I shall try to defend these last two sentences.
122"That we have common values to unite us is in part the good fortune
of our history. But it is also explained by the fact that bargaining makes it
the business of our governmental leaders ... to uncover every possible
area of agreement" [Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 32].
12
^This writer believes that Lindblom has only two principal arguments
for the superiority of bargaining over hierarchy. There are other lesser
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The first major Lindblom argument is that the more powerful officials
better reflect agreed values (the public interest). 124 By itself, however, this
is an argument for hierarchy, not bargaining. If our officials will always do
what is best for us then why not opt for hierarchical government? In those
circumstances it should be both the most efficient kind and the most just.
It is really the second argument that supports bargaining. According to
this one, value agreement arises from bargaining. 125 Now since coordination
in its broader sense seems equivalent to value agreement it follows from the
second argument that bargaining can coordinate as well as can hierarchy. We
must closely examine this second argument.
If the agreement which arises from bargaining is agreement over what I
have called the "greater" values then this accomplishment of bargaining does
not serve to distinguish coordination from democratic forms of hierarchy.
Both coordination and democratic hierarchy derive their greater values from
bargaining, as I have just finished saying.
But suppose that there is the further claim that bargaining results in
agreement on "lesser" values as well. There are two interpretations of this
ones, but they do not seem very cogent in themselves. He argues, for ex-
ample, that a bargaining model can accommodate more diverse views, but this
advantage is not relevant unless the many views can be brought together. He
also argues that the model requires less intellectual capacity from decision
makers, but that advantage is scarcely relevant, either, if the cost is chaos.
124Lindblom, "Bargaining, " pp. 23-25.
12SIbid.
, pp. 27-29.
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further claim. According to one interpretation, agreement on these lesser
values will follow from bargaining rather than occurring simultaneously with
it. But if this is what happens then the values selected have temporal endur-
ance. They do not necessarily alter with every move in the bargaining process.
Now if the lesser values endure then greater values can be expected to do the
same. For example, if a nation sets specific policies both for increases in
social benefits and for across-the-board decreases in taxes, and if the nation
continues to do this despite any contraindications economically, then these
enduring policies may be generalized into an equally enduring greater value --
that of unlimited economic growth. And given this greater value it is now
possible to deduce other policies from it. Hierarchy is thus justified. From
this example I conclude that if agreement only follows from bargaining then
bargaining does not seem superior as a method for determining lesser values.
It is true that bargaining may produce policy agreement. But the agreement,
once achieved, may be generalized into principles which may then be applied
by hierarchy.
I think Lindblom's more common claim is that bargaining and agreement
occur simultaneously
.
Certainly in later works he argues that we cannot even
know our values except in the process of bargaining over trade-offs. * In
other words, the process of coming to know values occurs simultaneously with
the reaching of agreement over them. If this is so, however, then there can be
126See footnote 31.
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no distinct decision process called hierarchy since there are no enduring
values available to be applied. Values change with every step in bargaining.
Thus bargaining must be the superior process as it is the only process. But
by the same token there is no distinction left between coordination and demo-
cratic hierarchy. For it is senseless to try to distinguish between lesser and
greater values if none of them endure long enough to be objectively examined.
And without that distinction the distinction between coordination and democratic
hierarchy must collapse.
3. Attempted Identity of Opposites-
-Genesis of the Inner Debate
If Lindblom begins his argument as I suggest then he faces a dilemma.
a. He explicitly defines bargaining as the negation of hierarchy. ".
bargaining refers to a residual category of controls in government that are not
accounted for in the sometimes explicit but commonly implicit hierarchical
1 97
models.
.
." (my emphasis. )
Bargaining is the negation of hierarchy.
b. He then seems to identify bargaining with coordination in identifying
it with the public interest as value agreement. "Hence within a certain r .ge
the public interest is represented by an agreement among partisan interests,
which is the way bargainers see it, not a goal or state of affairs having some
128
validity other than as a practical bargained compromise . "
127 Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 2.
128
Ibid.
, p. 26.
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Bargaining is identical to coordination.
*
c But he also seems to equate coordination and hierarchy as I have tried
to show in the immediately preceding discussion. If he did not do so he appar-
ently could not sustain his claim that bargaining is superior to hierarchy.
Hierarchy and coordination are identical to each other.
Let us stop abruptly at this point and look back over the first three steps
of this "dialectical concept examination" of Lindblom's essay. These three
steps are highly significant. They represent my first application of that method
described in the last part of Chapter II. And in any application they would be
the most critical steps.
The basic assumption behind these three steps, and behind the method as
a whole, is one simple idea. THERE ARE NO CONCEPTS WHICH JUST ARE.
There are no concepts which we can gain by pointing, despite the ubiquitous
common sense belief that there are. There are no concepts which we all just
find ourselves sharing, despite the belief among many Anglo-American philos-
ophers that there are.
From this simple idea there come two critical inferences. Because
there are no concepts which come from pointing, every concept must be under-
stood in terms of other concepts. But because there are no concepts which we
all just share, every concept is questionable.
From these two inferences come, in my view, two possible visions of
our human situation.
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We may think ourselves like the person who seeks the meaning of some
term, say "democracy, " in a dictionary and finds the defining terms to be as
questionable as that whose meaning he sought. This is the skeptics* vision.
But alternatively we may think ourselves like the person who finds him-
self in actual struggle against a concept, say totalitarianism, which he scarcely
grasps but nevertheless in contrast to which he comes to understand such a
concept as democracy. I believe that this vision is a meaningful alternative
and I would call it the vision of dialectical struggle. It is in terms of this
latter vision that I have been examining Lindblom's thought.
If there are no concepts that just are, then even the simplest subject-
predicate proposition becomes conceptually involved. There must be the con-
cept about which we principally speak. Then there must also be the negative of
this concept since without that we could not understand it. Thirdly, there must
be the concept (or concepts) which we predicate of the first. And this concept,
also, must be defined by negation if we are to grasp it. But, curiously, on the
great social themes we may often find (1 shall later suggest always) that the
concept of predication is said to constitute the negative of the conceived re-
lationship between the first two concepts. In other words, the negating of the
first concept is in turn negated suggesting a somehow positive relationship
between what seemed at first to be contradictories. Hence it is often argued
that we can have the best features of both our own position and the apparently
opposing one.
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1 see Lindblom involved in just such conceptual complexities as I have
just described. He finds himself in an intellectual struggle with European
democratic planners and in that struggle he assumes that he and his opponents
know what is meant by one concept-
-that of hierarchy. The concept is not
known in any positive sense, however. It is, instead, a penumbra which sur-
rounds the beginnings of speculation. This does not mean it is nothing. We
might call it the seed from which a fuller concept could develop. But for the
present it is only a seed.
Lindblom places himself in opposition to this vague concept of hierarchy
and expresses this opposition as the concept of bargaining. Bargaining is what
hierarchy is not. If hierarchy were understood as something inherently inegal-
itarian, having a chain-of-command structure, and pursuing an external purpose
then bargaining would be different in these features. But Lindblom never clearly
says that it is different in all these ways, and sometimes he says the opposite.
That is to be expected. After all, the concept of hierarchy is largely undeter-
mined.
At this point then Lindblom has two major concepts --hierarchy and
bargaining- -but since the second is defined by the first and the first is only
very vaguely defined we may say that the definiteness of the concept of bargain-
ing is only potential. So Lindblom is in a predicament. It is like the predica-
ment we would encounter by defining black as not -white, when we don't know
very clearly what white is. And the solution is the same. One needs a further
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concept which simultaneously separates and integrates the first two concepts.
This further concept must integrate the others in the sense of showing
what they have in common. For we don't know what it means to say that one
concept is the negation of another unless we know their common ground. (If
they have none, the statement is meaningless. ) At the same time the two con-
cepts must retain their negative relations or they lose any distinct meaning
because they are absorbed within that "common ground" which is no longer
common to anything.
In the case of white and black we have such a concept as I suggest. It is
color. This concept maintains the separation of concepts because it is itself
associated with one of the two sides. Color implies white. Black is the ab-
sence of color. But the concept also integrates. Color embraces both black
and white.
I suggest that for Lindblom the synthesizing concept is coordination.
Coordination is associated with hierarchy as we normally suppose, and as even
Lindblom seems to believe. And it is hence the opposite of bargaining. Yet
coordination embraces both hierarchy and bargaining as different ways of inter-
relating individual actions. (Lindblom is not wrong when he suggests that all
decision making coordinates. That is a definitional truth. But there is as well
129
the opposing definitional truth that only hierarchy is coordination. )
129The thought that the same concept can both immediately negate another
concept and also transcendently affirm that concept is denied by many people.
With regard to the present example they would claim that the coordination which
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Given the dialectic of concepts which I describe as necessary if any con-
cept is to have meaning, it is to be expected that Lindblom's argument, and
any argument for that matter, will take the form described. While an argu-
ment may appear to be an argument over propositions, it will actually be a
debate over concepts. For Lindblom it is an attempt to define bargaining by
contrasting it with hierarchy and then to define the contrast in terms of what
both terms share in the third concept of coordination. But coordination can
only be understood by contrast with bargaining. Hence if the concept of bar-
gaining is to have meaning it is necessary to affirm what appear to be contra-
dictories. This affirmation of contradictories takes here the form of the three
assertions that bargaining is coordination, that bargaining is not hierarchy,
and yet that hierarchy and coordination seem to be the same.
In popular expression we could say that Lindblom is trying to eat his cake
and have it too. This is not to suggest, however, that his attempt is merely a
is opposed to bargaining is of a "lower level" than that which embraces both
bargaining and hierarchy and consequently that there is no contradiction. This
writer agrees that there is a difference of levels but does not see how this ends
the contradiction. If bargaining and hierarchy are understood in terms of the
higher level concept of coordination, how is this concept understood? Recall
that we always assume no outside source of concepts. Concepts determine each
other . Eventually, then, even the most sophisticated concept returns to the
starting point. It is, therefore, useful and correct to think of every conceptual
level as circling back immediately on the next beneath it. In the present ex-
ample, this means that while coordination involves what is common to both
bargaining and hierarchy the only way we can know what coordination means is
by contrasting it with bargaining (which, in turn, is in the process of being con-
trasted with hierarchy). In Hegelian terminology, coordination is a negation of
the negation which bargaining is.
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mSliS^S^. Given the problem of achieving adequate social coordina-
tion while retaining a bargaining society the attempt might seem to be so. It
might seem a way to affirm both features, however practicably incompatible
they seemed. I am suggesting, however, that Lindblom's position may con-
stitute something more-that it may constitute a conceptual nece ssity. When he
argues that a bargaining society can coordinate he is, on my view, providing a
definition of bargaining.
If contradictory assertions are inherent in the use of concepts then Lind-
blom's apparent attempt to eat his cake and have it too is no criticism. But
does concept usage necessarily involve contradiction? I have just given some
reasons why I think it does, and these recapitulate earlier arguments. Those
arguments are initially abstract however. How convincing is my case when
it proceeds from the other direction
-from the concrete? In other words, how
convincing is the claim as it appears in those three propositions which I derive
from Lindblom's thought?
The first proposition- -that bargaining is the negation of hierarchy-
-can
hardly be disputed. Lindblom is quite explicit on the point. He says that bar-
gaining comprises all those government controls not accounted for by hierarchy.
And he gives no other more purely positive definition.
The third proposition- -that hierarchy and coordination are identical—may
be disputable but I cannot see how, other than by exploiting a certain vagueness
in Lindblom's discussion of these concepts. And if the concepts are left vague,
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Lindblom's use of them will be equally vague and hence questionably significant.
The second proposition-
-that bargaining and coordination are identical-
may seem more dubious than the others. Before responding to that point, how-
ever, I must recall Lindblom's understanding of coordination. For him it
seems to mean the bringing together of diverse values rather than the bringing
together of other things once these values have been agreed upon. (The thesis
of the essay is that bargaining can coordinate--yet the main thrust of the dis-
cussion is that bargaining leads to agreement, 130 and very little subsequent use
is made of the word "coordinate. ") Hence coordination means cither the
achievement of value agreement or the value agreement in its achieved state.
Of these two meanings the former would emphasize the idea that we reach goals
by pursuing them and this is just what Lindblom does not want to do. 1 have
suggested, accordingly, that coordination, for Lindblom, means value agree-
ment itself. And there is one further consideration. Lindblom explicitly
identifies the public interest with agreed values. Hence coordination seems to
mean the public interest.
We are now ready to consider objections to my second proposition. One
objection is this. Perhaps Lindblom is saying that coordination (hence value
agreement, hence the public interest) follows from bargaining rather than that
it is bargaining. Now it happens that I have already responded once to this ob-
jection in discussing the concept of hierarchy. I here shall do so again with
130See text pp. 201-03 and footnote 115.
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specific reference to coordination.
The quotation which for me most explicitly identifies bargaining with the
public interest is the one given when 1 first presented proposition b. In that
proposition it is true that Lindblom refers to the public interest both as a
"goal" and as a "state of affairs. *' And the former term suggests that the
public interest is something to be achieved by bargaining while only the latter
term suggests that it is perhaps imminent in the bargaining process. But the
latter term makes more sense when the quotation is placed in context. The
question is how to determine what values are widely shared and the quoted
answer is, in effect, "whatever arises in bargaining. " But this answer clearly
implies that with every iteration of the bargaining process there will be a new
public interest. If this early Lindblom position were not repeated and even
strengthened in later works, or if one could find some reason in this early
essay to largely isolate it from later ones, then one might perhaps reject the
interpretation I am giving. But I find nothing in the "Bargaining.
.
.
" essay
which so far separates it from what follows. And what follows does support the
interpretation. In "Handling of Norms" Lindblom argues that the weighting of
values, and hence the occurrence of some kind of agreement, is not an intel-
lectual process accomplished in the minds of individuals.
The weighting does not take place until actual policy decisions are made.
At that time, the conflicting views of individuals and groups. . .are brought
to bear on policy formulation. Policies are set as a resultant of such con-
flict, not because some one policy-making individual or group achieves an
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integration but because the pulling and hauling of various views accomplishes
finally some kind of a decision.
.
131
One must not be misled by such terms as "accomplish" and "finally" in this
quotation. It would be more accurate to speak of the agreement as imminent
in the process. For, elsewhere, Lindblom emphasizes that the process never
ceases but is a constant succession of small steps. "It is a characteristic of
political processes in most governments that any single office, organization,
or agency pursues a never-ending series of attacks on more or less permanent,
though perhaps slowly changing, problems.
.
.
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One should not be misled, either, by the new item of permanency- -the
problem --which is mentioned in the last quotation. Specific problems are not
truly permanent either. "Decision makers do not fix on a nicely defined prob-
lem. Ends are adjusted to means as well as the other way around.
. . Hence
'the problem' is continually redefined. " 133
In "The Science of Muddling Through" Lindblom again intimates that
agreement is imminent in bargaining. Sometimes administrators can agree
neither on abstract values nor on trade-off values. Yet agreement occurs and
the objectives are established by the agreement. ".
. .
it ought to be remember
that objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than are agreed upon.
131 Lindblom, "Handling of Norms," p. 174.
l32r3raybrooke and Lindblom, Strategy of Decision , p. 100.
133Lindblom, Intelligence of Democracy, pp. 146-47.
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Hence agreement is the test of 'best' policy.
.
.
" 134 [whether the decision
method requires advance objectives or does not].
In all of the foregoing quotations Lindblom is not describing a sequential
relationship between a bargaining process and value agreement. Instead, the
situation he describes is one in which agreement arises as this process goes
on. Hence it seems to me that the first objection is not sustained.
There is, however, a second objection that might be made to my propo-
sition b. According to this objection one would grant that bargaining and agree-
ment were identical but would then insist that Lindblom avoids dilemma be-
cause he assumes consensus. On this view it is true enough that Lindblom's
concept of bargaining involves a sort of imminent, simultaneous agreement.
But there is no comparable disagreement.
I have responded before to this second objection by noting that Lindblom
is neither wholly clear nor wholly consistent in his discussion of consensus.
But a simpler and to me as persuasive a response is simply to note the mag-
nitude of Lindblom's work. What point is there in writing at such length about
the coordinating abilities of pluralism if those are just the result of happy
circumstance? Why write so much only to reassure us that our muddled de-
cision methods are just fine? If this is all Lindblom means to do then we are
almost forced to draw negative conclusions about both his scholarly ambitions
134Lindblom, "Muddling Through, " p. 84.
135See footnote 19.
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and his common sense.
Faced with the above prospect I believe it is better, as a general rule,
to reject negative conclusions about scholarly work, especially when the work
has a reasonable reputation. Having done so I must believe that Lindblom's
concept of bargaining is substantive. He wants to say that struggle among
partisans can constitute agreement. He is not saying merely that their inter-
action does so.
4. Central Theme as an Argument in Potential
I have argued at some length, both on an abstract level and in view of
his essay, that Lindblom faces a conceptual problem. One aspect of this prob-
lem (which seems to me a universal problem) is that none of Lindblom's prin-
cipal concepts have independent meaning, or the promise of it. They ultim-
ately depend on each other for their meaning. But: the other converse aspect of
the problem is that nothing meaningful can be said about concepts unless they
are distinct from each other. Placing the two aspects together we see that
concepts must define each other by their differences, and yet unless the con-
cepts are somehow the same we cannot even recognize these differences.
I believe that Lindblom's central theme reflects, in its strongest form,
the first aspect of the above problem. The strongest expression of that theme
asserts that bargaining is coordination; hence it dramatically asserts the inter-
dependence of the two concepts. Such a theme appears definitional, however,
and hence the argument for the theme appears to be that very theme itself. If
we say that all unmarried men are bachelors, and if we assume that the con-
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cepts involved here could not change enough to alter this truth merely by
social evolution, then the sentence is its own proof. I am saying that Lind-
blom's strongest statement of his theme is like that.
But if bargaining just is coordination then the concept of bargaining is
emptied of any distinct content. In order to keep the theme it seems one must
lose the concept. This cannot be allowed to happen, however, or the theme
becomes meaningless. Hence one wants to deny the view above that the theme
as argument and the theme as assertion are the same theme. In doing so one
emphasizes the second aspect of Lindblom's basic conceptual problem.
We see that there is a tension developed between the theme as assertion
and the theme as argument. Lindblom needs to both affirm and deny that these
two themes are the same. This is why I describe the central theme not as an
argument but as an argument in potential.
5. A New Distinction
In the initially strongest statement of his central theme (the quotation in
my proposition b) Lindblom does not understand bargaining as a reflection of
power inequality. Bargaining seems instead to imply a conflict among equals.
For at the point where that statement occurs Lindblom is saying that the public
interest automatically arises with bargaining and that this justifies defenders
of the public interest in gaining more power. The bargaining-public interest
identity is hence the source of power inequality rather than its reflection . My
interpretation here seems, at least, the most reasonable interpretation of the
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rather muddy passages in Lindblom. 136 By his initial contrast of bargaining
with hierarchy we have to assume that he mainly envisions a relationship
among equals.
However, given the emptiness of the concept of bargaining or conflict in
his initial theme statement, Lindblom needs to make changes. Now 1 suggest
that the development of an argument in potential will always occur by intro-
duction of a new distinction. And I suggest that at this point in Lindblom'
s
argument the distinction advanced is one between levels of power.
The distinction between levels of power seems necessary to strengthen
the concept of conflict. It suggests that there might actually be an enduring,
nor merely an instantaneous, conflict of values and hence that there might be
need for a way to avoid deadlock by making some people more powerful than
others. Whereas for the theme itself there is conflict only in name, the intro-
duction of this new distinction now means that there is something more. There
is conflict in potential.
6. Cancellation of the Earlier Argument
But the distinction also has another consequence. It means cancellation
136Lindblom, "Bargaining, " p. 26.
The passages are muddy because one does not know whether the more
powerful bargainers --the public officials --created the public interest in the
process of bargaining or whether they only reflect a public interest previously
arising from bargaining among equals. If they did the former, then their
relationship to the public interest is circular (a conclusion to which this writer
eventually arrives). But if they only reflect a previously -achieved agreement
among equals, then it must be possible to agree on goals before implementing
them. Lindblom wants to deny that possibility, however.
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of the previous argument-that is to say, cancellation of the central theme
itself. It denies that the bargaining from which value agreement comes is a
bargaining among at least rough equals.
7. Initial Development of the New Argument
Now Lindblom does not want to say that this inequality is arbitrary or
coercive. He is expressly opposing such forms of government, wanting to
contrast his position with those of the Soviets, etc. He argues, instead, that
the inequality results because certain public officials represent an alliance of
a majority of the bargainers.
8. Self-Contradiction of the New Argument in its Initial State
But note the disastrous situation in which this new argument places him if
it is now taken as complete. Far from having strengthened the concept of con-
flict, Lindblom has weakened it- -for he has weakened the contrast it needs to
make with the consensus assumptions of European economic planners. If
value agreement is built on majority alliances then what matter if the values
are applied through bargaining or hierarchy? In any case the minority has been
shut out. In its present form the argument contradicts its own intent: the
intent to allow for that political conflict of which the conflict between minority
and majority is the prime example.
9. Preservation of the Earlier Argument
One way to remove this danger would be to reintroduce the initial central
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theme which holds that bargaining is agreement. W Lindblom seemfi tQ do
this. He now says that the source of power inequality is not an alliance with a
majority, at least not a vocal majority. Instead the alliance is with a general
agreement which is itself a reflection of bargaining.
10. Circularity of the Completed Argument
The argument is now complete in that it does not weaken the contrast
between the concept of conflict and the majorita rianism, party discipline, and
similar emphases of Europe. And it does allow for a conflict which may be
real enough to require levels of power.
But the argument achieves this completeness through circularity. Those
have more bargaining power whose own views reflect bargained agreement and
bargained agreement obviously results from the influence of those with more
bargaining power.
I have now completed the first level of argument which I identify in Lind-
blom's thought. There are two sorts of criticisms which are likely to be raised
against what has been presented. One will be a criticism of the dialectical
137The passage that most vividly expresses this position is the one quoted
so many times before, and especially in connection with proposition "b" (see
text p. 203). That this should be so may confuse the reader. For while this
writer quotes the passage as evidence of what he calls Lindblom 's central theme
and makes it the genesis of a dialectic, the passage does not, in fact, appear
until after the discussion of power inequality. That is to say, it does not appear
until a late stage in the dialectical concept examination. The writer does not
believe that this situation presents a problem, however. The identification of
bargaining and value agreement is not presented as the conclusion of a syllo-
gism. It is presented as something one just knows; hence, the point at which
the observation is first most explicitly made is not critical.
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examination I have just given. The other may at least partly accept the valid-
ity of that examination but will then conclude from it a severe criticism of
what Lindblom himself has done, at least in the essay examined.
The first critics will probably say that I have read too much into the
essay examined. If concepts are not clear the clarity should not he forced as
I seem to have done, for example, in the process of suggesting that hierarchy
and coordination are indistinguishable. If clarity had not been forced then what
I identify as inconsistencies might not obviously be so, and, likewise, the
pattern of argument might then be different.
I have no conclusive answer to this first criticism. An attempt has been
made to document the assertions made, insofar as possible, but I am afraid
that it could never be sufficient to remove all doubts. Suppose I hypothesize
that a concept or proposition which is clearly present in an author's work gen-
erates a certain intellectual inconsistency. A criticism of that hypothesis
should be reasonably straightforward. But suppose it is an absence in the work
which is said to generate the inconsistency. Suppose, as 1 do, that it is pre-
cisely the lack of clarity in certain concepts that explains Lindblom 's thinking.
Clearly no pointing to the text will either conclusively verify or conclusively
refute the claim.
Nevertheless, I think my assumption is a useful one. I have tried to say
why I think so in Chapter II. Chapters III and IV are attempts to illustrate the
claim. And in Chapter V I shall state it anew and from another perspective.
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But there is no final proof.
To the second criticism, also, there is no final proof. According to
that criticism my work constitutes a devastating attack on Lindblom, because
it captures him in serious inconsistencies. If inconsistency is our inevitable
lot as concept users, however, then it is not appropriate to attack Lindblom
on that basis. Whether this situation is thought to prevail depends, finally,
on whether one accepts the assumptions I have been using.
CHAPTER IV
AN AFFIRMATIVE VIEW OF COMPREHENSIVENESS
THE PATTERN OF ITS DEFENSE
IN THE WRITINGS OF KARL MANNHEIM
To examine someone's thought as, and by, a dialectical concept exam-
ination is to take a different approach to the expository function than is custom-
ary. In this case we don't judge the thought by standards of consistency and
clarity since we do not expect to find only one set of main points within it. We
expect to find opposing sets. Hence exposition is not an attempted reduction of
thought to single main points. It is a tracing of the pattern of inner debate
among opposing ones.
I have attempted to make a dialectical concept examination of Lindblom's
early essay on bargaining. I hope the attempt may persuade the reader thai
this is a plausible approach to thought, even if an unconventional one. In this
chapter I shall make a second attempt, by interpreting the thought of Karl
Mannheim in the same way.
A Problem for Mannheim
In perhaps most of what he wrote prior to his emigration from Germany
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to England in mid-career, Karl Mannheim argued, in one way or another, that
participation within a socio-conceptual structure was the way to become at
least somewhat free from the interpretations imposed by one's society. Mann-
heim's position is a response to what I call the social change problem-the
problem how anyone can independently alter his human nature or his under-
standing if society with its concepts is the source of individuality and under-
standing.
The social change problem could be presented in terms of that illustration
of the contextualist approach to inquiry which I gave in Chapter II. If a certain
society is operated according to a liberal model and hence structures its social
phenomena by distinctions like political freedom, how is it possible for mem-
bers of that society to so free themselves from its perspective as to determine
whether or not it is a distortion?
The Mannheim Response as an Internalized Debate
I speculate that the social change problem, like the social control prob-
lem, may present a dilemma. And if it does, then for Mannheim, as for
Lindblom, we can expect a distinctive response. We can expect, firstly, a
public choosing of sides and, secondly, an internalization of dilemma within
the debaters as they discover that they each need both sides.
Although Mannheim wants to argue the possibility of some freedom from
one's conceptual framework, he starts with the assumption that knowledge and
society are indeed part of such a framework. And on my suppositions where
223
he starts is where he must end. Hence I consider him to be taking an affirm-
ative position on the question of the priority of concepts. Now the priority of
concepts implies the priority of comprehensiveness since there is nothing more
comprehensive than a conceptual framework. Consequently I describe Mann-
heim as on the affirmative side of the debate over that concept.
But despite his own conceptual commitment to a view that society is the
wholeness of a conceptual framework, Mannheim wants to argue that it is
nevertheless possible for a person to achieve some intellectual and social
autonomy. This is how he internalizes the debate over comprehensiveness
within himself. Like Lindblom he wants to argue against the very conception
of society which provides his terms of reference. Lindblom's conception of
society is of something fragmented into competing interest groups and yet he
expects this society to allow for the development of social harmony. Mannheim'
conception of society is of a conceptual integration which he yet expects to
allow for something at least partly unintegrated.
My examination of Mannheim's thought will be relatively brief. Instead
of first presenting an extended exposition, as was done in the "Illustrative
Summary" of Lindblom's position, I shall move almost immediately to the
dialectical concept examination as such. However, I do need to make, first,
a few comments on the totality of Mannheim's work.
Karl Mannheim was a highly prolific but rather unsystematic writer.
Whereas it is initially plausible to speak of summarizing Lindblom's work,
because so much of it seems repetitive, it would not even be initially plausible
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to say so of Mannheim's. Mannheim's thought is generally considered to have
passed through a series of phases, the most dramatic of which occurred with
his move to England. 1 If I were to attempt for him something comparable to
my summary of Lindblom's work it would have to be titled the "apparent diver-
sity" of Mannheim's position. Nevertheless, my purpose in attempting to
summarize Lindblom could equally well be achieved in an attempt to show the
differences in Mannheim. If a thinker is on both sides of an issue, and makes
opposing points to himself, then works which appear the "same" will not be as
repetitious as they seem provided that this inner debate shows some develop-
ment. Conversely, works which appear different will in fact be less so than
they appear since they will contain points contrary to what are considered the
main ones. Such differences as still persist may here, too, reflect the develop-
ment of the inner debate.
Of Mannheim's works I shall focus mainly on his doctoral dissertation
written in 1922 and entitled "Structural Analysis of Epistemology. " 2 This
work is commonly interpreted to be claiming that scientific knowledge has an
*Two useful and brief interpretations of these phases are the following:
George W. Remmling, "Philosophical Parameters of Karl Mannheim's Sociology
of Knowledge, " The Sociological Quarterly
,
XII (Autumn, 1971), 531-47; and
Helmut R. Wagner, "The Scope of Mannheim's Thinking," review of Essays on
the Sociology of Knowledge and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning
,
by
Karl Mannheim, in Social Research, XX (April, 1953), 100-09.
2 Karl Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology, " reprinted as
chap. I in Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology , ed.
by Paul Kecskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).
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absolute base, that it is not merely relative to a historical period. Other
writings which were studied, and will be briefly referred to, represent later
and supposedly different phases in his thought. Ideology and Utopia (1929)3 is
the fullest expression of his concept of the sociology of knowledge. Here he
argues, in apparent contrast to his dissertation, that knowledge is a function
of the social situation of the knower. But he also maintains that some situ-
ational^ determined views are less distortions than are others and, following
Marx in this respect, he sees a need to identify false consciousness and elim-
inate it. With the move to England his emphasis shifted more definitely from
questions of cpistemology and methods of inquiry toward practical aspects of
social change. The first major effort was Man and Society in an Age of Re-
construction (1935). 4 Disturbed by the rise of totalitarian regimes and be-
lieving that it was a response to imbalance between the increasing rationality
of private industry and the lack of rationality in politics, he provided one of
the first and strongest arguments for public planning in liberal political sys-
tems.
In 1950 came the posthumous publication of Freedom, Power and Demo-
°Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology
of Knowledge, trans, by Louis Wirth and Edward Shills, Harvest Books (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1936). [Hereinafter referred to as
Ideology and Utopia
. ]
4Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies
in Modern Social Structure
,
Harvest Books (New York: Harcourt, Brace IT"
World, Inc.
,
1940). [Hereinafter referred to as Man a nd Society in an Age of
Reconstruction. ]
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cratic Planning5 in which Mannheim developed themes similar to those of the
1935 work and in which he also suggested the importance of religion as a means
to achieving the new liberal but planned society. An earlier work, Diagnosis
of Our Time (1943), 6 further developed the importance of religion to the
planned society and suggested that there should be planning for religion itself.
These are the principal Mannheim works which I have examined in proc-
ess of writing this chapter, and the chapter focuses, as was said, on the first.
The reader may well be perplexed that I make so little use of the works ex-
plicitly on planning, and especially since Mannheim is recognized as an im-
portant writer on that topic. The reason for this neglect is threefold.
Firstly, Mannheim's planning writings are, to a large extent, arguing
the need for planning in liberal regimes, but that is not my concern. I assume
7the need. I want to know how to meet it.
Secondly, when Mannheim does talk about how to plan in a liberal polity
he suggests that the success of the process depends heavily on the existence
of a "democratic personality" --one which is cooperative and open to change.
5Karl Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, ed. by Hans
Gerth and Ernest K. Bramstedt (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.
,
1950).
^Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociolo -
gist (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.
,
1943).
^Dahl takes note of Mannheim's preference not to elaborate answers to
these "how to" questions. Robert Dahl, review of Freedom, Power, and Demo -
cratic Planning
,
by Karl Mannheim, in American Sociological Review , XV
(December, 1950), 807-10.
8See Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction ,, pp. 1 99-236;
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But it is another of my assumptions that tensions, inevitable to thinking man,
produce limits to cooperation and to openness. Cooperation is limited be-
cause the inner tensions are partly projected onto the social world as conflict.
Openness is limited because one side of man's nature seeks security and long
range commitments. Certainly Mannheim's image of the democratic person-
ality is a reasonable one. It is the image connected with what I call a degree
of truth logic. Rut my own image of an inevitably self -alienated personality is
at least: plausible. And thus it too seems wortli pursuing when the gravity of
the current human prospect suggests that we consider all plausible explanations
of that prospect.
My third reason for the limited treatment of Mannheim's later works is
simply one of time and methodology. My method requires that I start with the
earliest statement of a certain train of thought, and because of the length even
of this first step the introduction of later ones was not possible. Time con-
siderations also prevented the development of the kind of involved summary
which was prepared for Lindblom and that is the only kind of summary con-
sidered appropriate for a method which emphasizes the presence of incon-
sistencies. Having once demonstrated my reasons for believing in the im-
possibility of concise summary I felt it unnecessary to repeat the process here.
The dialectical concept examination now follows. Its organization is the
same as encountered previously. 1 first try to describe the overall process by
and Mannheim, Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, pp. 199-245.
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which Mannheim gives increasing reality to the concept of conceptual freedom.
Then I examine, in depth, the first step.
The Mannheim Position as a Dialectical Concept Examination
Synopsis of the Process
. Again we want to trace the steps by which an
outer debate between social groups is internalized within the work of an indi-
vidual thinker and then again we want to see how the debate proceeds within
that person's own thought.
Context of the Mannheim Debates -- The outermost or primary debate in
which Mannheim is involved might be thought less a debate between political
positions than one between epistemological positions. Whether it is so under-
stood, however, depends on one's vision of society and politics, as we shall
shortly see. At least until his move to England, Mannheim was involved in a
primary debate with the positivists over the methods of knowing. 9 We have
already encountered the issue of the debate in Chapter II. The contextualist is
able to explain how we can identify objects and construct theories. It is be-
cause we have a prior conceptual framework. But he finds it difficult to show
us how we can verify the "truth" of what the framework lets us see. The
positivist has difficulty explaining how we get our concepts but he does have an
answer for the verification problem.
^For an overview of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, see Paul
Kecskemeti, "Introduction," in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of
Knowledge ed. by Paul Kecskemeti; (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. ,
1952).
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Mannheim takes the side of the contextualist and so he has a verification
problem. But he has another one too. Our conceptual framework is the
product of, and also provides the perspective of, our social situation, accord-
ing to Mannheim. 10 Hence a person can only perform those acts and see those
problems which the conceptual framework permits. Thus Mannheim faces the
problem of conceptual freedom not only epistemologically but socially.
Now the contextualist position and the contextualist problem have affini-
ties to certain kinds of political systems, notably to totalitarian ones where a
single ideology is pervasive. Conversely, the positivist position and the
positivist problem have affinities to liberalism with its assumption of the
existence of discrete relatively autonomous groups. The contextualist, and
especially one who applies his views in the social realm, will therefore find
himself, in one important respect, on the side of the totalitarians and in oppo-
sition to the liberals. This happens to Mannheim. Consequently, I shall focus
henceforth on this political debate rather than on the epistomological one,
although the latter will continue to be mentioned occasionally.
Within the primary debate between liberals and totalitarians (given that
Mannheim is in one sense an unwitting totalitarian) there is a secondary debate
among the totalitarians themselves. This is a debate over the extent to which
it is possible to have freedom from the conceptual framework or ideology while
lOpor a discussion of the way in which a conceptual framework affects
practice, see the discussion of the theory-practice distinction, in Mannheim,
Ideology and Utopia
,
pp. 117-46.
230
that framework or ideology nevertheless persists. On one side of this debate
are the idealogues who insist that a conceptual framework or ideology must be
absolute and complete or else it is not effective. In epistemological termin-
ology these people would be called idealists. Mannheim is on the other side.
His position is particularly evident in Ideology and Utopia
. There he attrib-
utes to the intellectuals an ability to see beyond the situation in which they
first find themselves. The combination of their diverse class and status back-
grounds, overlayed by their common educational background, brings them in
contact with the opposing perspectives. Some of these individuals will use
their heightened awareness to attempt a synthesis of the perspectives. And
since Mannheim, like Marx and Hegel, supposes a direction to historical
change, he supposes that these syntheses will have resemblances to each other.
They will constitute an evolving conceptual framework.
Mannheim's position seems logically tenuous, however. He insists that
1
the intellectuals do not themselves form a class, that the perspective which
the forward looking among them are capable of elaborating is not just one
among others but is a synthesis, and that the intellectual syntheses of current
13
perspectives are not as diverse as those perspectives themselves. But why
should one accept any of these claims? They seem incompatible with Mann-
11 Ibid.
, pp. 154-61.
12Ibid.
,
p. 155.
13ibid.
,
pp. 160-61.
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heim's insistence that there is such a thing as a "total" conception of ideology
and that this conception is only adequate or "general" when a thinker has the
courage to critically examine his own ideology as well as that of others. 14
Mannheim cites Marxism as the example of an ideology which has not
become general because it is not self critical. But if Marxism is wrong in
supposing that its own viewpoint is free of that partiality which it attributes to
all other viewpoints, then why should Mannheim be any less wrong in supposing
such ability among the intellectuals? Many Marxists are themselves intel-
lectuals and precisely the sort who attempt a synthesis of previous views. It
seems to me that the ability which Mannheim ascribes to such people does not
really explain how they can escape from their perspectives but is merely
another way of saying that they somehow can.
Relation of the Proximate Outer Debate to the Inner Debate -- When one
is on logically shaky grounds the safest proof to give is an indirect proof. One
attempts not to prove his own position but to prove the logical impossibility of
his opponent's. In this case Mannheim needs to prove that ideological abso-
luteness is impossible. I think he gives such a proof and that it takes at least
two different forms. One is a proof that there is an absolute truth beyond any
given conceptual framework. The other is a proof that no specific conceptual
framework need be called "relative" since there is no absolute standard by
which to measure relativity. At first glance these proofs may seem to lead to
14ibid.
, p. 77.
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opposite conclusions but their impact on the status of conceptual frameworks
seems basically the same. In neither case can any one ideology or conceptual
framework be called absolute. The first proof is discussed later, at pages
249-51. it is the proof I there describe as being based on self-reference.
Suffice it to say here that this first proof apparently shares the same fatal
defect as the second.
The second proof appears in Ideology and Utopia and has already been
sketched. In more detail it goes like this. If we assume that knowledge is
situationally determined, this assumption might be called a relativist position.
But to call it so reveals that our belief in perspectival knowledge is not thor-
ough going, but is inconsistent, since it combines that approach with the older
belief in absolute static knowledge. It assumes that there is an absolute
standpoint from which we can discern what is relative and what is not. In a
consistent epistemology of Mannheim's sort we must instead speak, he says,
of "relational" rather than relative knowledge. ^
I grant the cogency of Mannheim's proof that conceptual frameworks
cannot be accused of relativism. But the proof is so cogent probably just be-
cause it is also so dangerous to Mannheim's own views. By rejecting rela-
tivism in one sense he embraces it more completely in another. Given his
proof, we now have no standard for identifying distortion of reality other than
the historical process itself. Only the dynamic of this process can provide
15lbid.
,
pp. 78-79.
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such identification. It is dynamic relationism which ".
. . offers the only
possible way out of a world-situation in which we are presented with a multi-
plicity of conflicting viewpoints.
. .
" 16 Those can transcend the current
perspectives who acknowledge the "flux of life, 1,17 who recognize that there is
the possibility of an "open system" 18 at least for some epochs and some social
positions, who maintain a "conceptual elasticity. "
Given the self-subverting nature of his indirect proof, Mannheim needs
to attempt a direct proof- -a proof that there is a conceptual freedom which is
more than just another name for the historical process itself. I cannot say,
however, as I thought it possible to say for Lindblom, that there is any single
systematic direct proof in Mannheim's thought. His concept of dynamic
relationism perhaps comes as close to such a proof as does anything else but
it is not developed. There arc other individual items of direct proof in Mann-
heim's different works. I will look at a few of them in examining his disserta-
tion.
The Impetus for Theme Development -- If we say that dynamic relation-
ism does somehow constitute a direct proof for the claim that participation in
a socio-conceptual structure is a way to conceptual freedom then we have a
curious proof. On the one hand it sometimes looks like a proof by definition.
16lbid.
,
p. 98.
17Ibid.
,
p. 87.
18lbid.
,
p. 99.
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To think relationally means to be able to have ".
. . assimilated all the crucial
motivations and viewpoints, whose internal contradictions account for our
present social-political tension.
. . If the investigator, instead of at once
taking a definite position, will incorporate into his vision each contradictory
and conflicting current, his thought will be flexible and dialectical, rather than
rigid and dogmatic.
On the other hand even such proofs are likely to be offered with hesi-
tation and to suggest that the problem is not solved.
This unavoidable implicit ideology which is at the basis of our actions. . .
marks the horizon within which lies our world of reality and. . . cannot be
disposed of by simply labelling it ideology. At this point we see a glimmer
of a 'solution' to our problem even though nowhere else in this book do we
attempt to offer one. The exposure of ideological and Utopian elements in
thought is effective in destroying only those ideas with which we ourselves
are not too intimately identified. Thus it may be asked whether under
certain circumstances, while we are destroying the validity of certain
ideas by means of the ideological analysis, we are not, at the same time,
erecting a new construction- -whether in the very way we call old beliefs
into question is not unconsciously implied the new decision. . .
From passages such as these we are left to conclude that the argument
for Mannheim's claim--so far as he tries to give one--is at least sometimes
an attempt to affirm identity of contraries. He cannot remain satisfied with
that claim, however. Since between the poles of situationally determined
knowledge and conceptual freedom he seems to lean toward the former, at
least in his German period, the result of identifying the two would be to make
9Ibid.
°Ibid.
,
p. 88.
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conceptual freedom a meaningless concept. This is what happens in totali-
tarian thought where conformity to the prevailing ideology is simply labelled
freedom. To avoid this result Mannheim must try to increasingly differentiate
the two concepts of freedom and situational determination from each other.
Still, the efforts can never be decisive as they will be constrained by the con-
stant need to reassert the identity of the two concepts. For if Mannheim gives
real meaning to conceptual freedom and yet does not identify it with the pre-
vailing conceptual framework then he is saying, with the positivists, that there
is a neutral ground of something, such as sense experience, which gives us
knowledge. He is saying that we can know at least some things without the aid
of a conceptual framework.
The Stages of Theme Development -- It is possible to identify several
stages in the theme that a socio-conceptual structure is is a way to conceptual
freedom. I shall identify just three sucli stages. They represent attempts to
give increasing meaning to the concept of conceptual freedom.
The first stage, or level of argument, is represented by Mannheim's
doctoral dissertation- -"Structural Analysis of Epistemology. " In this work the
theme does seem to begin as an identity statement. Mannheim argues that the
notion of a truth independent of any given conceptual framework is intrinsic to
"systematization. " And one meaning of systematization seems to be that it is
a system --a closed conceptual framework. Hence a closed conceptual frame-
work is said to be identical to a truth independent of that framework. Now the
existence of an independent truth means there is a neutral ground to which
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knowers can refer and hence it means that they can be free of their conceptual
framework. So in suggesting that a conceptual framework is identical to an
independent truth Mannheim is suggesting that it is identical to conceptual
freedom. This initial position would make the notion of independent truth a
wholly undetermined concept, however. The concept would become, as for the
totalitarians, merely a label.
Mannheim thus goes on to say that there can be a "typology" of system
-
atization—there can be certain timeless elements which are true of any one.
If Mannheim is correct, these timeless elements would provide an epistemolog-
ical base of reference
--a sort of neutral ground. Individual knowledge would
not be captive of a changeable conceptual framework. But he concludes that
the probable nature of these timeless elements is their openness to conceptual
change. In other words the determinateness of the elements present in any
conceptual framework whatever is their indeterminacy! Consequently in his
first level of argument Mannheim is able to show only that there is conceptual
O 1
freedom in potential .
I consider Mannheim's position in Ideology and Utopia to be a second
level of argument. Here he asserts, as we know, that there exist intellectuals
who are in a position to see beyond their own conceptual spectacles though in
doing so these people do not reach any absolute position; they participate in
2lThis writer's elaboration of this first level of argument will be de-
veloped shortly.
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the "flux of life. "
22
The emphasis in Ideology and Utopia is more on knowledge than action,
however, especially when compared with works which follow. The central
problem for the forward looking of the intellectuals is to identify those con-
ceptual frameworks which are distortions of present social reality and which
serve the dominant classes and the status quo. These are what Mannheim
calls "ideologies" in a more restricted sense of that term. In identifying
these distortions the intellectuals, in concert with subordinate classes, will
help reveal the conceptual framework or "utopia" which is most adequate to
the present stage of thinking, and hence to the present social needs. This too
is a distortion, though not in this case because it is undesirable but because it
is not yet realized.
In Ideology and Utopia there is now freedom in reality, and not merely
in potential, but it is freedom to know more than to act. This more real free-
dom is not a freedom in opposition to conceptual structure, however; it is
23
still integral to it. This continued melding of conceptual structure and
freedom thus suggests a more expanded contradiction than before.
A third level of argument may possibly be identified in Man and Society
22Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia
, pp. 194-95, 198-99.
2
^This is because the Utopia to be born is apparently fated to be so.
"... every age allows to arise (in differently located social groups)
those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed form the un-
realized and the unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each
age" [Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 109].
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in an Age of Reconstruction
. But here the emphasis is on methods of broad
scale social control rather than on the visions which guide it. And because of
this emphasis I am not certain that Mannheim is involved any longer with a
problem of conceptual freedom (rather than with the kind of atomistic freedom
recognized by positivists). One suggestion that he is is his description of the
planning approach as a stage of thought. 24 The description indicates that he
still thinks in terms of conceptually determined thought and action. Evidence
to the contrary, however, is present in his notion of middle principles ("prin-
cipia media"). These are particular groups of general factors operating in a
certain historical setting. 25 For example, there is the general law that hopes
of social advancement may obscure for individuals their real social position. 2(^
In the late capitalist period the classes typical of earlier economic forms,
such as the class of small shopkeepers do, in fact, remain anti -proletarian
until their hopes of advancement are completely destroyed. Hence this histor-
27
ical period does concretely express a general law in a certain setting. To
postulate general factors which persist through historical periods is for Mann-
heim to retreat significantly from his sociology of knowledge, however.
24Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, pp. 147-55.
His point here seems a pragmatic one. Thought is an instrument for dealing
with the human situation, and at a point in time one sort of thought may be
more adequate than another. Thought is not apart from, but is intimately
bound to, action, p. 149.
25Ibid.
,
p. 178.
26Ibid.
, p. 182.
27 Ibid.
, pp. 181-82.
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I suspect, on balance, that Mannheim is still inclined to try to identify
the contrary concepts of conceptual structure and conceptual freedom. Though
principia media are reducible to general principles they are to be dealt with in
their concrete setting and within that setting they do prepare us to perceive
certain things and not others. 28 They are conceptual frameworks to that
extent.
Furthermore, the discovery of principia media, by reduction of con-
crete phenomena to their abstract components, is difficult, despite the fact
that these abstract components are present. To understand new principia
media, we must observe them in process of being born. This involves an
experimental approach which synthesizes a willingness to intervene in the
interplay of fundamental social forces with the realization that one can only act
as a strategist to reinforce possibilities but not to create them. 29 It seems
to be through such a process of experimentation and openness that Mannheim
thinks it possible to reconcile social determinism with large scale planned
change of society. In Men and Society there is an apparent attempt to make
conceptual freedom real not only as the freedom in knowing but as freedom in
acting.
By the time Mannheim writes Diagnosis of Our Time he seems to have
clearly ended, though, the train of thought which began with his doctoral
28Ibid.
,
p. 179.
29ibid.
, p. 190.
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dissertation. Now he emphasizes not the situational determination of thought
but the almost reverse problem of planning for religious experience, such
experience being understood as a device for social integration. 30
It is not, however, the ending of this great train of thought with which
my discussion essay is primarily concerned. I am concerned with its all-
crucial beginning. The discussion of that beginning now follows.
First Level of Argument
. 1 have identified Mannheim's doctoral disserta-
tion as a first level of argument in what seems to be a dialectical development
of his thought. A review of the dissertation is, once more, the first step in
developing my position.
The Dissertation -- The "Structural Analysis of Epistemology" 31 is a
complex and subtle work. Although its purpose is explicitly stated, some of
the key concepts in terms of which this is done appear to be ambivalent ones.
I shall attempt a summary, but the summary will itself reveal these ambiva-
lences. It will not, in a sense, be a single summary.
Mannheim begins with the idea of a conceptual "systematization. " He
claims to reject, at least for the cultural sciences, the abstracting analytical
posture which holds that general principles and concepts (in his term, "com-
plex structures") can be understood by breaking them down into simpler com-
^^Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist ,
see especially pp. 122-25, 1.30-31.
31
"Structural Analysis of Epistemology, " reprinted as chap. I in Mann-
heim, Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology .
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ponents. Explanation is, for him, the contrary process of understanding-
simpler forms in terms of the more complex. And "systematization" refers
to this more complex structure. 32
There are three basic types of systematization, among winch is the
philosophical. And one part of philosophical systematization is cpistemology.
It is of course the latter with which Mannheim is concerned.
Now the reader needs no more background than what I have just given to
acquire, already, a sense of unease. For against that background the very
title of Mannheim's work suggests at least a near contradiction. He claims to
analyze the structure of epistemological systematization. In other words, he
identifies epistemology as a conceptual structure which is philosophically
prior to its components but at the same time he proposes to isolate some com-
ponents which are particularly fundamental to that structure.
Disquieting as it may be, this near contradiction in the dissertation title
and purpose should not come as a surprise. The danger of contradiction seems
inherent in the project Mannheim sets himself. I have suggested that Mann-
heim's thought was always directed toward a social change problem—the prob-
lem how someone enclosed in an evolving socio -conceptual structure could yet
exert some independence from that structure. It is just Mannheim's purpose
in his earliest published work to assert confidently that this can be done. But
he does so at a more abstract level and more indirectly than will be the case
32jbid.
, pp. 16-17.
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later. Here the claim is for existence of truth which is at once independent of
systematization and yet intrinsic to it. 33 The accessibility of such independent
truth does imply, however, the possibility of that conceptual freedom which
Mannheim later argues for directly.
Put another way, the argument for an independent truth connected with
systematization is, in my view, one expression of that inner debate which
Mannheim is having with himself. It is of course related to that outer position
with which he is more immediately identified-
-the position which asserts the
primacy of conceptual structure, vis
-a -vis a more positivist approach, what-
ever the problems such a position may raise for social change.
1. Three Sets of Distinctions Relative to Systematization
In proceeding with his dissertation argument Mannheim devotes most of
its first section to several sets of distinctions. For purposes of emphasizing
the importance of conceptual structure, these distinctions may perhaps be
usefully separated. But, at least in the context of his inner debate, I suggest
that the distinctions tend to reduce to each other. And I also suggest that they
represent just in themselves a succession of promised solutions to the social
change problem --even though, ostensibly, they are merely preliminaries to
such solutions.
One major distinction is between adequate theoretical systematization
33ft will be clear that truth is somehow independent of the systematization.
See text pp. 249-53. That this independent truth is also intrinsic to the sys-
tematization, it is this writer's particular purpose to show.
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and minimal theoretical systematization. 34 Mannheim introduces the latter
concept very early in his essay at the time he is making his strongest argu-
ment for a contextualist epistemology. That argument asserts that even a
reality consisting of nothing but isolated individuals, which are identifiable
only by proper names, cannot be identified without a systematizing presup-
position. One must assume, of such a reality, that the names themselves
constitute a kind of conceptual framework. In the absence of these names
there could be nothing stable to identify- -and hence there could be nothing but
3S
an indefinite variety.
This minimal theoretical systematization, which produces cognition of
discrete givens, seems virtually opposite, however, to Mannheim's initial
concept of systematization according to which it constitutes the epistemological
priority of the complex over the simple. For if one is to explain the simple
from the complex, one must know the complex. But minimal theoretical sys-
tematization is not knowable as such. If systematization generates the con-
sciousness of external givens, such systematization cannot be brought to con-
sciousness by those external givens. To argue that it could would be to argue
in a circle. Of course positivist theory could be brought to consciousness
from those givens but that is not the sort of theory Mannheim wants to expound.
I have already noted, however, that Mannheim identifies another sort of
34Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology, " pp. 19-20.
35lbid.
,
p. 19.
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theoretical systematization. This latter is a pattern of interrelated concepts,
not merely a collection of proper names. 36 It is more truly a conceptual
structure. But of this pattern, as of the first, one may ask how it is possible
to know the pattern when that pattern is a prior condition for the existence of
those very concepts by which it would be known.
Mannheim may be reaching for an answer to these problems of theoret-
ical systematization in his implied position that the difference between minimal
and adequate theoretical systematization is only one of degree. 37 Perhaps he
is tacitly suggesting that because the minimum systematization could generate
solid givens which lead to knowable positivist laws, and because the adequate
systematization is truly a conceptual structure, and then because minimal
systematization and adequate systematization only differ in degree, therefore
one can to some extent articulate his or her conceptual structure. If this were
so, then the social change problem would be at least partially solved.
A related set of distinctions, and a second promise of solution, are
36
Ibid.
,
p. 20.
37
Ibid. Mannheim is not wholly consistent on this point. He states that
the principle which underlies minimal theoretical systematization is in sharp
contrast to that which underlies the adequate form. But he persists in using the
degree term "minimum" as he says so. He also makes the following observa-
tion.
"That the concepts with which we actually have to do in the sphere of
theoretical thought are not 'minimal concepts' in this sense, i.e. that they
are more than such 'proper names, ' hardly needs detailed proof.
"
Here, again, he speaks of interrelated concepts as being
"
more than"
proper names when it might be more logically consistent to say that they are
wholly other than proper names.
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constituted, I think, by Mannheim's distinctions among aesthetic, scientific
and philosophical systematization. Aesthetic systematization refers to the
existence of numerous conceptual structures each of which exists on its own.
Acceptance of one aesthetic period does not mean rejection of another. 38
Aesthetic systematization is neither an open process nor a closed step in some
progressive movement. By contrast, in scientific systematization a new truth
will force rejection either of itself or of the old truth which it replaces. Sci-
entific systematization is an open process in which conceptual structures do
39
change. Philosophical systematization represents a midway process. As
with science, the solutions to problems change, but, in contrast to science, the
same problems endure. Thus, earlier solutions are not wholly rejected. 40
This second set of distinctions has close ties to the first in that the con-
cept of adequate theoretical systematization is often treated as synonymous
with scientific systematization or with philosophical systematization. 41 More
38Ibki.
, pp. 20-21.
39Ibid.
40
Ibid.
, p. 21.
4
*Ibid. For examples see pp. 20-21, 34.
"This fundamental dissimilarity in the guiding principles of these two
'systematizations' (of the theoretical as against the artistic sphere) is also
responsible for the difference in the structure of their respective histories.
The historical pattern of science can only be adequately represented as a
unilinear series of approximations towards the one and only possible form of
truth. . . whereas the history of art shows the most varied works of art
existing side by side without contradiction" [pp. 20-21]. [This writer's
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important, the impact of the concept of philosophical systematization has
affinities with the combined impact of the concepts of adequate and minimum
theoretical systematization. In both cases a major distinction is first ad-
vanced only to be then weakened and made a matter of degree. For philosoph-
ical systematization the result occurs in the following way.
In philosophical systematization solutions may change while problems
remain. But Mannheim would probably agree (and certainly would do so in
later works), both that statement of a problem strongly limits the range of
possible solutions and conversely that problems themselves may at least change
appearance. 42 Now the concept of philosophical systematization suggests, at
emphases. ]
"Philosophy has in common with science, first of all, the character of
being a theoretical pursuit.
. .
" [p. 34J.
42ibid.
, pp. 35, 36. There is a clear suggestion that problems may
limit solutions where Mannheim says that:
"It is quite striking what stock we always take in the correct formulation
of a problem.
. .
" [p. 35].
He is talking about the need to seek various possible solutions given a correct
formulation of the epistemological problem.
And, despite his statements that philosophy and epistemology deal with
enduring problems, it seems that there might well be alteration in such prob-
lems as they appear to us at different points in time. Though the problem s per
se may endure, the questions may perhaps change. Mannheim refuses to go
far into this issue, however.
"one of the most fascinating logical inquiries would be the examination of
the logical structure of problems, and of the difference between problems
and questions" [p. 35].
"Because there is no denying that there can be but a single truth, that
accordingly for any question in any field only one solution can be correct and
that the history of thought is only the road, through error and confusion, to
truth, from this indisputable postulate it does not follow that the shape of
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first glance, the contradiction that we are constrained by the conceptual
structures implicit in changing solutions, and yet that we have a bench mark
of truth in persisting problems. But since the absoluteness of the problems
and relativity of the solutions apparently only differ from each other in degree,
therefore we can at least partly break out of prevailing conceptualizations and
there is no contradiction.
A third and possibly the most fundamental set of distinctions in the first
part of Mannheim's dissertation is that among systematization, system, and
architectonic
--in particular among the first two. Both of these first two refer
to conceptual structure. Systematization is an "entire set of serially con-
nected mutually defining elements. " It is a "constitutive form" which is
created by the (in Kantian terms) "transcendental logical subject. " 43 Mann-
heim describes system as a "reflected methodological form" created by the
"empirical subject. " 44 Apparently there is a continuity between these two
subjects, however, since the individual who orders his thought into a system
"is really doing no more than push to its logical conclusion a tendency already
the path must always be the same" [pp. 35-36].
"ultimately the structure of a problem can only be understood from the
structure of the entire systematization—and it may well be that the present
discussion will incidentally provide a few clues to this topic as well"
[p. 35]. [This writer's emphasis. ]
Also see p. 37.
43Ibid.
,
p. 24.
44Ibid.
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prescribed in the very systematization. "45
Besides a difference in the subject, these last two concepts differ in that
systematization is always open-a still to be completed chain of interdependent
concepts
--while a system is always closed.
Here again, we see that a distinction is made only to be then bridged.
An individual as a logical subject can identify facts of experience because he
finds himself already operating within a systematization. The conceptual
structure is prior to thought. But this individual can also push tendencies in
this systematization to their logical conclusion, thus creating a system. And
this suggests that the conceptual structure is an object of thought.
I suggest now that the distinction between, and connection between, sys-
tematization and system does not add more helpful information, relative to the
social change problem, than what we have already acquired through the prior
distinctions. Instead it parallels the information contained in the distinction
between minimum and adequate theoretical systematization or the distinction
among aesthetic, scientific, and philosophical systematization. My reasons
for this assertion are fourfold.
Firstly, it seems that there cannot be aesthetic systematization despite
Mannheim's use of that phrase. The aesthetic sphere is neither an open
process nor a series of closed steps in such a process. The principle of con-
tinuity does not hold, he says for aesthetics. "In primary experience a work
45lbid.
,
p. 25.
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of art is taken to be an isolated monad. "46
Secondly, there cannot be a system so far as true science is concerned.
Scientific activity may well produce systems but their persistence, as such, is
antithetical to science.
Thirdly, it is in philosophical systematization that the other two forms
of systematization are synthesized. And in that synthesis one finds a similar
mix of conceptual closure (in problems) and conceptual openness (in solutions)
to that found in the relationship between system and systematization.
Finally, it is just such a mix of closure and openness which is also found
in the connection of minimal and adequate theoretical systematization. From
now on I therefore shall treat the other two sets of distinctions as reducible to
that between system and systematization. And since systematization always
seems to mean theoretical systematization for Mannheim, despite his contrary
48
claims, I shall initially use that phrase in referring to systematization, and
shall always intend it.
2. Independent Truth Inherent in Theoretical Systematization
At any given time there is not just one theoretical systematization but
49
several, these being associated with the various sciences. Some of these
46Ibid.
,
p. 20.
47See text p. 245.
4
^A contrary claim is that there exists aesthetic systematization. See
text p. 245.
49Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology, " pp. 21-22.
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systematizations are "primary" in that they can comprise all elements.
Whatever the status of any systematization, however, the fact that it is
one implies that it has a final form according to Mannheim. By saying this, he
introduces the critical notion of an independent truth. Mannheim supports his
claim of an independent truth with two different lines of defense.
One line of defense is based on self-reference and appears to go like this.
Concepts have meaning because they are members of a chain sequence of inter-
related concepts. Statements made within the context of such a chain sequence,
such a systematization, are either true or false. The statement that there is
no truth per se is such a statement. If assertion of this statement is not simply
meaningless (because of the contradiction involved) then there must at least be
meaningful falsity, and there cannot be the latter without the contrasting possi-
bility of an independent truth. Now since the validity of one proposition implies
that of others, then if there must be the possibility of independent truth for one
statement we may say that there must be a possible truth, a possible final form,
to the systematization as a whole.
^
5QIbid.
,
p. 27.
"Any single statement --even the proposition that there is no truth, no
validity in se--can by virtue of the structure of theoretical systematization
only be either true or false. It follows that the content of this proposition
contradicts those presuppositions that are inescapably implied by its form ;
after all, this, like any other statement, only has theoretical meaning if its
content can be said to be either true or false. If the content expressed—that
there is no truth valid in se- -is true, then this at least must be thought valid
or it would be meaningless to assert it; if it, too, is false, then it still must
251
An argument by self reference is dangerous for Mannheim, however. It
could as well be used to attack as to argue for his views. The proposition
that our concepts have meaning by their location in a systematization is itself
presumably contained within a systematization and seems therefore to have
no independent validity at all.
It is not surprising, then, that Mannheim concedes the insufficiency of
his first line of defense. But he concedes only that it does not prove the valid-
ity of truth as such. 51 And that was not really the point at issue anyway. On
the question whether such final truth is implied in systematization he remains
firm. He bluntly asserts that the notion of a truth valid in itself is an inevitable
postulate involved in the existence of a theoretical sphere as such. 52 This
sort of statement is not new. Similar ones appeared in connection with the
first defense. "It is thus implied in the very structure of the theoretical
sphere that it must itself be assumed as atemporally valid. . . "53
be recognized that falsity is meaningful only if we assume the possibility of
truth, or self-sustaining validity. And the validity of a single proposition
at the same time implies the entire context, from which alone.
. . the
sentence derives its full meaning. ... It is thus implied in the very struc-
ture of the theoretical sphere that it must itself be assumed as a temporally
valid, and this in the form of one or more continuous, chain -like sequences. "
This writer's first interpretation of this passage is not the only one he makes.
See text pp. 252-53 for the second interpretation.
5I
Ibid.
,
p. 28.
52 Ibid.
53
Ibid., p. 27. [This writer's emphasis.
J
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In his first line of defense Mannheim seems to be saying that statements
must be true or false and that since statements only exist in a theoretical con-
text, the context, also, must lead to final truths. All those of his remarks
which assert the reality of error--e. g. ". . . it is a fact that actual thinking is
open to error.
.
." 54
--seem, tome, to tacitly assume the absoluteness of the
true -false distinction and thus to belong in this first line of defense. Perhaps
common sense may tell us that the possibility of error does not necessarily
imply the necessity of a final truth. Perhaps it is possible to knowingly re-
cede from error without, at the same time, knowingly approaching truth. But
I am unconvinced by common sense arguments for reasons given elsewhere. ^
And on logical grounds the two situations do seem tightly connected. I con-
clude, then, that the first line of defense takes the form of a standard syllo-
gism. One simply assumes , as a first premise, a clear division of truth and
falsity regarding statements. One then infers that the possibility of truth must
be inherent in the theoretical content of these statements, in their systemati-
zation. In other words, if truth is possible in a part then it must be possible
in that whole without which the part would not exist.
In his second line of defense Mannheim is asserting that it is just in that
theoretical statements are mutually defining that they must be true or false.
Since they exist in a context, unless that context has a -temporal validity the
54ibid.
,
p. 27.
55See text, chap. II, pp. 106-07.
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statements can have no meaning. Thus this second line of defense appears to
be less an argument than a definition. According to Mannheim it is the very
nature of a conceptual structure b_oth that it constitutes one's experience and
that the structure has a final form which can be knowingly approached56 and
consequently leaves one free to move from one conceptual structure to another.
If my interpretation of Mannheim's second line of defense seems far-
fetched it is nevertheless similar to an interpretation which has elsewhere
been made of Mannheim's later works. After reviewing a number of those
works, Paul Kecskemeti observed that ".
. . the survey of this process of the
working out of the categories of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge leads us to
a strange conclusion: the demonstration of the dependence of thought on social
57
reality serves to open a road to freedom. "
3. The Existence of Typologies
Mannheim was an advocate of rather fundamental social change. For
such a person to maintain that the conceptual structure is intrinsically an
opportunity for freedom is, I suggest, no more surprising than it is for a
56This is also the writer's second interpretation of that key passage
which he quoted in footnote 50. Even that passage might as plausibly be under-
stood to be part of the second line of defense as to be part of the first. The
assertion that any single statement must be true or false "by virtue of the
structure of theoretical systematization" seems readily interpretable as ident-
ifying independent truth and conceptual structure.
On text pp. 275-77 , this writer suggests that Mannheim must adopt his
second line of defense rather than his first, given the purpose of his general
argument.
57Kecskemeti, "Introduction," in Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of
Knowledge, p. 27.
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liberal to suggest that the process of bargaining, of negotiated social conflict,
is itself social order. In any case, the virtual identification of conceptual
structure and conceptual freedom does not remain in the forefront of Mann-
heim's dissertation. In his concern to analyze a systematization, that of
epistemology, he retreats to the more positivist view that there are some
specific timeless elements involved. We can be confident that this is so, he
says, since all epistemologies are called by the same name. 58 For the same
reason we can be confident that it is a single problem which they all address. 59
These timeless elements must be interdependent if they are parts of an
epistemological systematization. But we don't know in what specific way this
interdependence occurs and so we must consider all the logically possible sys-
tematizations as equally possible ways of solving the one epistemological
problem. 60 Some ways, however, may be more historically advanced than
58nHowever much the various epistemologies may differ in their histor-
ical development, they all belong to the same continuity of one idea (which
is the reason why all are called 'epistemologies, ' 'theories of knowledge').
There must accordingly be some concepts at any rate, some perennial prob-
lems, some constellations which always recur and thereby make this con-
tinuity possible" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology," p. 31].
59"The sole remaining assumption, then, would be that the successive
words forming the historical body of 'epistemology' are commensurable up
to a point and may be taken to be attempts to solve one and the same theor-
etical problem. ... As long as it is not mere chance that the individual
theories of knowledge have a common name it ought to be possible. . . to
consider their divergencies as the ramifications of a common path they all
take at the start" [Ibid.
, pp. 32-33].
60Ibid.
,
p. 32.
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are others.
Structural analysis is the exploration of these various solutions. It is the
analysis of typologies of epistemology. It is not the exploration of the one
problem however. 61 The structure of the problem could only be understood
from the structure of the entire systematization and that would apparently
include the whole succession of solutions
--something that is never completed
in finite time.
The epistemological solutions are a priori possibilities and must be
identified through a pure logic. But not every solution is possible at a given
period. History, which is not random but a directed flow, will "materialize"
ft ^
different solutions at different times says Mannheim. This statement is
perplexing, however. Docs it mean that Mannheim is now making a retreat
back to the sort of conceptual relativism which a history bound systematization
would imply? Is he abandoning the concept of timeless elements in a systemat-
Ibid. See also text p. 246 in regards to Mannheim's approach to the
epistemological problem as distinct from his approach to its solutions.
62Ibid.
,
p. 29. There is for Mannheim a pure logic which is not in-
fluenced by historical origins --a logic by which one can examine, apparently
with neutrality, the enduring concepts of epistemology. But this logic cannot
say which epistemology is more correct.
63".
. . it is perfectly possible to view cultural manifestations histori-
cally without plunging into historical relativism. . . . Historical factors
determine only the materialization of the mental content in question. . . .
The process can still be conceived as a quest, as a necessary, roundabout
way to the only correct solution. . . history is not just a flux, but a directed
flow towards some ultimate goal" [Ibid. , p. 39].
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ization? I doubt it. He first leaves the question open. The task for philosophy
".
. .
is to work out the solution of the problem of historicity and timeless
validity. " And then he apparently concedes to the critics of historicism.
He emphatically denies that the ultimate categories by which we grasp things
65
could change (though in the same footnote he acknowledges that the cate-
gories we now use and by which we think we grasp things could change). This
concession ends the first part of his dissertation.
4. The Question of Ultimate Presuppositions
In the second part of his dissertation Mannheim identifies three distinctive
and timeless features of epistemology. There is a problem (the question of the
ultimate presuppositions of knowledge), 66 a unique value (truth), 67 and a
fr4ibid.
,
~p~39.
6^"This latter conception would finally lead to the postulation of a 'dy-
namic' logic according to which not only the matter of history but also the
categories by which it is grasped are subject to change and evolution. . . .
Yet, we believe that such a doctrine is bound to become entangled in diffi-
culties. . . owing to the relativism to which it necessarily leads. The in-
dubitable fact that everything in history is subject to change must not be
carried over into the realm of meaning and validity; by doing so, we should
unwittingly controvert our own assertions" [Ibid.
, p. 40, footnote lj.
66".
, , epistemology achieves the status of a theory entirely sui generis
only because it answers a primitive question in a peculiar way not met with
in any other science. . . . What is common to all theories of knowledge. .
.
is that they transform the question about the nature of knowledge into a
question about the presuppositions of knowledge. . . " [ Ibid . , p. 44].
67
"The value of being-known, the fact of being-true, is specific to the
epistemological approach, and has come into being together with it"
[Ibid.
, p. 69].
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specific correlation (the subject-object correlation). 68 But though timeless
the features are also indeterminate in themselves, for epistemology cannot
provide its own content. 69 The exact problem of presuppositions varies with
the epistemological approach. And what the presuppositions are depends on
the standard of truth and the exact nature of the subject-object correlation.
The content of the above features of epistemology comes from one of the
three primary systematizations-
-those systematizations which can comprise
all elements. They are psychology, logic, and ontology. It can be said that
there is a "priority contest" among them. 70 Where it is psychology which
provides the content to the timeless features of epistemology, Mannheim seems
to see an empiricist epistemology emphasizing the experiential given. The
argument for the priority of psychology is that all knowledge arises from ex-
71perience.
Where the content comes from logic, emphasis is placed on the presup-
positions of knowing. By these, Mannheim apparently means reality consti-
tuting categories similar to those of the Kantian "transcendental apperception. "
The argument for this second approach consists in the claim that everything we
^"Uniquely specific to the theory of knowledge, as we have come to see,
is alone the correlation of subject and object. . . " [Ibid . , p. 66].
69Ibid.
, pp. 47-48.
7QIbid.
, p. 49.
71 Ibid.
,
p. 50.
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are aware of appears to, us as known. 72
Ontological systematization produces two forms as it provides content
for epistemology. It may take a naive form which fails to recognize that what
is
-being-
-nevertheless only appears as known being. 73 (This form sees
being as consisting in raw givens. ) Or it may take the form of an "ex-post
ontological" epistemology which does not so fail.
This last form of epistemology is not made wholly clear. But it seems to
be a synthesis of the experiential given of psychology with the universal real-
ity-constitutive concepts of logic. Denying priority to either alone, it em-
braces them both with the argument that both experience and validity must be. 74
This ex-post ontological epistemology is highly suggestive of that "sociology of
knowledge" which Mannheim will subsequently develop—that socio-conceptual
structure which at once forms our concepts and is, in a sense, formed by them.
According to Mannheim, ex-post ontological epistemology is associated
with a special way of stating the epistemological problem --one which does not
^Mannheim's exact words seem to be a paraphrase of Kant:
"
Priority for logic is pleaded on the following counterclaim: granted that
everything the sciences can talk about is first encountered at the level of
experience, it still is by no means proved that all we can know about this
original experience is also given in experiential immediacy" [Ibid. ].
73Ibid.
, pp. 50-51.
/4
"Priority for ontology
,
in turn, is urged on the ground that everything
to be met with at all is an instance of 'being* in the most general sense.
From this point of view, both experience and logical validity also appear as
modes of being" [Ibid.
, p. 50J.
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go directly to ultimate presuppositions as that approach associated with logical
systematization appears to do. Instead it explores which of all possible postu-
lates (psychological, logical or ontological) will finally be revealed as an esscn-
tial assumption. And it reaches the conclusion that it is the ex-post onto-
75Ibid.
, pp. 49-52. The argument is cloudy bat seems to go something
like this:
1. There are three approaches to the question which seeks to know
presuppositions of knowledge, p. 49.
2. Which approach to the question is chosen will determine in ad-
vance the nature of the answer --that is, it will determine the underlying sys-
tematization, p. 49.
3. But, it is apparently the systematization that constitutes the
approach in the first place since the ultimate presuppositions determine what
can be asked!
This third step in his reasoning is implicit in Mannheim's dis-
cussion of the different priorities. There he sometimes treats the arguments
for one or another systematization as if they were arguments for an approach
even though previously he spoke of the approach as a way of choosing among
the systematizations. For an example, consider the phrase
" Priority for psychology is assured according to the psychologistic theory
of knowledge.
. .
" [p. 50].
Sometimes the third step seems explicit:
"This dispute [the priority contest] reveals most clearly the hopeless and
yet unremitting aspirations of all epistemology to do without presuppositions.
The problem of priority simply cannot arise within the various sciences
which may serve as fundamental disciplines. . . " [pp. 49-50].
4. Now, it is piecisely one of these approaches --the ex-post onto-
logical systematization or ex-post ontological epistemology- -which incorporates
the initial question as to which of several possible approaches is ultimately
correct.
"So we see there is nothing accidental about the type of epistemology that
starts with logic and ends up with an ontological postulate" [p. 52].
"There can be no doubt but that this type of epistemology. . . would cm-
ploy as its fundamental science just this analytic of structure qua logical
doctrine of systematizations, and that it would recognize, as its ultimate
presupposition, the primary systematization laid bare by such an analysis"
[p. 52, footnote 1].
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logical epistemology itself which will be so revealed! 76
The above proposition is not presented as an argument but it has that
impact. And as an argument it is tightly circular and self-referential. An
epistemology drawing from a sophisticated view of ontological systematization
is led to conclude that just this systematization provides the indispensable
postulates for epistemology. And those postulates call for an analysis of
epistemology in terms of various primary systematizations, which is precisely
what the current discussion, and indeed the entire second part of the disserta-
tion, has been manifesting. According to this view only at the postulated end
of history will one of these primary systematizations be revealed as best, but,
given that view, one already knows what one it must be.
This apparent circularity in the discussion of epistemological content is
interesting. It is suggested that ex-post ontological systematization will win
the priority contest, and that this tells us that knowledge is of just that open
ended constructive nature which would let us reach this conclusion.
Mannheim concludes this discussion with a somewhat related point. He
7°"Ex-post ontological theory of knowledge is unmistakably the outcome
of the. . . indirect approach. . . [the one that] begins by exploring which
one of all the possible postulates will finally stand revealed as an indispens-
able assumption" [Ibid.
, pp. 51-52].
Mannheim, himself, seems to acknowledge the circularity apparent here.
At the end of his footnote on page 52 (see 1 5Xt footnote 75) he remarks:
"Whether such an epistemology- -which would have its own logic as
basis --would in fact amount to a meta-critique of all epistemology in gen-
eral presents an exceedingly knotty problem.
"
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observes that the arguments for all three primary systematizations can be
made at the same time, since he has just done so, and concludes that each can
reveal the basic fact of the other two, though from its own "alien" perspective.77
One must assume, however, in view of what we have just heard, that this mix-
ing has a certain tendency toward one particular systematization.
5. The Subject -Object Correlation and Truth Value
Is the content of the subject-object correlation also circularly determined?
It seems so, but to understand how one must distinguish the ways of mediating
between subject and object, on the one hand, from the correlation as such on
the other. The former is less fundamental to epistemology, according to
7 8Mannheim.
Mannheim claims that there are, at present, only three recognized ways
to mediate between subject and object. These are the copy theory, the theory
that the object world is spontaneously evolved from the subject (possibly the
Kantian position is in mind), and the theory of pre-ordained harmony between
79knower and known (perhaps a Hegelian view).
The ways of crossing the subject -object gap are not, however, really
independent of it. They are also ways of identifying that gap in the first place.
~77"lbid.
, p. 52.
78
".
. .
the various ways of media ang are a less specific and clear-cut
criterion of epistemological thinking than the subject -object correlation is"
[Ibid . , p. 62].
79
Ibid.
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And they apparently derive, in both their aspects, from the three primary sys-
tematizations of psychology, logic, and ontology. 80 Hence the outcome of the
priority contest will simultaneously decide both what is the nature of the sub-
ject-object gap and how to successfully bridge it. As Mannheim puts it, the
essence of epistemological systematization is to resolve the correlations in-
volved in formulating the problem—it is to resolve a self made gap. 81 Accord-
ing to this reasoning I presume that if, for example, one accepts psychology as
ultimate systematization-
-if one accepts the view that knowledge is a matter of
experiential givens--then the subject and object will "by definition" be of that
sort where only the copy theory could apply.
If the content of the subject-object correlation is understood as the matter
of its formulation and of its mediation then we know this matter comes from one
of the primary systematizations. And the priority among those systematizations
appears to be established, for reasons already given, in a circular manner.
^
^Ibid
. That the ways of mediating are also ways of identifying the gap is
a point to be elaborated shortly.
This writer's claim that the ways of mediating derive from the primary
systematizations might be called an oversimplification. Mannheim recognizes
two other variables which influence these ways --the distance between subject
and object and whether one starts from the subjective or objective side. But he
immediately intimates that these other variables are reducible to the first. For
example, a given way of mediating already suggests whether one starts from
subject or object—that characteristic consequently becomes definitional.
81_Ibid.
,
p. 61,
82The reasoning here is analogous to that which Mannheim employs later
in arguing that the standard of truth, also, is determined by the presuppositions.
See p. 67 of his work.
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Hence this content is itself circularly determined, though in an indirect way.
But what of the subject-object correlation itself, as distinct from the
ways of bridging the subject-object gap? Mannheim claims that this correla-
tion is unique to epistemology and he displays a triadic structure of knower,
known, and to-be-known which apparently is supposed to constitute it. Prior
to this claim however, he has argued the point that science cannot find the
subject since the subject is always a vehicle of experience, never an object of
83
it. And the way this point is developed strongly suggests that the subject-
object correlation is itself circularly determined. In what next follows, I shall
try to show how.
For the subject-object correlation, even more clearly than for the ways
of mediating it, content comes, says Mannheim, from one of the primary
sciences. But this condition creates a problem if it is true that science never
reaches the subject. In that case science can provide only an objectified sub-
84ject appearing in the form, say, of consciousness, truth, or objectivity.
There is a solution to this problem in the fact that we can "construct" a
subject which is a complement to the objectified subjects. But this solution
only raises the further problem that since all these reconstructions are based
on objectifications they would appear to be the same, regardless of the funda-
mental science, the primary systematization, involved.
83Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology, " p. 56.
84lbid.
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According to Mannheim, the solution to this further problem comes from
awareness that some primary sciences can objectify more than can others. The
meanings of, say, psychology refer to something less objectifiable than those
of logic, and the constructed subject can therefore vary accordingly. 85
Let us consider now the implications of what has been said about con-
structing the subject. It is held that the subject-object correlation is unique to
epistemology but that the substance of its uniqueness comes from another,
alien, systematization. It is also held that there is more than one alien sys-
tematixation which is a primary systematization and from which the correla-
tion in question might come. The latter claim seems an essential one. If there
were only one primary systematization from which content could come, we
could not meaningfully speak of the systematization as "alien" either to episte-
mology as a whole or to such a feature as the subject-object correlation.
Regarding this subject-object correlation, we cannot distinguish different
alien systematizations, however, unless it is through their different degrees
of objectifying- -unless some are less successful in objectification than are
others. But then it is only as we invoke the most successful of these system -
86
atizations that we can identify a subject-object correlation in the first place.
85Ibid.
,
p. 57.
86We are not told which systematization would be capable of the greatest
degree of de-subjectification. This writer presumes that it would be the one
which is involved in ex-post ontological epistemology. Only for that one does
a person objectify not only the subject but the various systematizations through
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In that case, the only determinate content which the primary systematization
provides is that built into the identity test. This test tells us nothing further
however; it only affirms that the subject-object correlation is whatever it is. 87
The other apparent possibility for establishing die content of the corre-
lation is to find it in the entire range of primary systematizations. That this
is a possibility for Mannheim is indicated by his claim that we can always
identify by inspection the degree of objectivity present in any meaning. 88 If
we can do that then all the primary systematizations must be simultaneously
evident to us. To find content under these circumstances, however, is to
which the subject is conceived and, thus, objectified.
In any case, the writer anticipates an objection to his claim that only by
the most de -subjectifying of systematizations could we identify the subject-
object correlation. The objection may be that since every systematization
loses the subject, we gain nothing by depending upon the one that does so
"most. " This objection, however, either supposes that we cannot identify a
subject-object correlation at all (because there is no subject) or that we can
do so but that the differential to do so is not significantly large as between
systematizations. Now the first alternative apparently is not accepted by Mann-
heim since he, himself, recognizes a subject-object correlation. If the sec-
ond applies, then we have what the writer calls the second apparent possibility
for establishing the subject -object correlation. See the next paragraph in the
text.
870/We can never learn anything about something merely by applying the
criterion which identifies that something. Wittgenstein illustrates an analogous
point as the situation of someone trying to verify a newspaper article by
another copy of the same paper. See text, chap. II, p. 56.
88"Meanings always clearly show a greater or lesser degree of object-
ivity. . . and it is always possible to ascertain this degree of objectivity
by inspecting them" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology, "
p. 57].
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determine the correlation precisely by its indeterminacy. If the subject-
object correlation incorporates different degrees of objectification in its very
identity then clearly it has been internally, circularly determined. Further-
more, the subject-object correlation then becomes, in itself, one more osten-
sible solution to the social change problem. Though the primary systematica
-
tion structures our concept of the subject-object relation, we apparently can
escape from any particular conceptual structure. We can do this because the
differences in extent of objectification are only matters of degree, and further-
more, can always be identified as such.
For all the preceding reasons I conclude that both the unique question of
epistemology and its unique correlation do not seem to gain substantive content
from alien systematizations. What they gain, surprisingly, is a reiteration of
the very indeterminateness which those systematizations were supposed to end.
To complete my exposition I shall now argue that the same situation also char-
acterizes epistemology's unique value--that of truth.
As the subject -object correlation involves two distinct aspects --the cor-
relation itself and the ways of mediating, so does the value of truth- -there is
89both a value of truth as such and there are standards of truth. Now standards
of truth are immediately implied in the different ways of connecting subject and
object. The standard of truth is different in a copy theory, for example, than
in a Kantian one. And furthermore the same systematization which provides
89ibid.
,
p. 66.
267
both the standard of truth and the way of connecting subject and object will
also answer the unique question of epistemology—the question about presup-
positions. The result is the paradox that once we employ certain presupposi-
tions we already know the standard of truth. 90
It is the value of truth, however, which is unique to epistemology and
this must always involve, says Mannheim, an alien systematization. 91 Prop-
ositions do not really have the value of truth if they are wholly within a single
systematization. Epistemology is thus a mixed systematization, and, despite
yu".
. .
the truth criteria occurring within an epistemology are closely
related to the particular science that supplied the analytic means for the
quest after ultimate presuppositions. The locus of the ultimate cognitive
presuppositions is also taken to be that of the cognitive value standards.
If knowledge is claimed to be experience at bottom, then experience will
be the bearer of value and its guarantee; if it is asserted to be ultimately
logical, then it is logic that will provide the criterion of truth. . . "
[Ibid.
, p. 67].
Ibid., pp. 69, 71. The writer may appear to be misrepresenting
Mannheim, but he is not. One must be clear as to how alien systematizations
are involved. To acquire its standard of truth, epistemology borrows from an
alien systematization. But the value of truth is unique to epistemology. Alien
systematizations are involved in the latter because truth value and episte-
mology are alien to themselves --they are mixed systematizations. To speak
of the value of truth is to absorb the borrowing process, described previously,
into a concept. It is only as we recognize the borrowing, the alienation, that
there is value.
"Nothing can appear as valuable or normative as long as we remain
within the context of psychological, ontological, or logical systematizations.
A state of things which merely 'obtains' may become. . . normative only if
we look at it from another, alien systematization. . . there is a 'related-
ness' involved in every valuation" [p. 71 J.
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Mannheim's elsewhere suggestion that there might be other such mixtures, 92
it appears to be the only one there is. "Epistemology.
. . alone enables us to
place ourselves outside of the various universal systematizations.
.
.
" 93
Here again we have encountered something unique to epistemology- -the
value of truth- -but here again the determinate content of that something turns
out to be its very indeterminacy! To know the content of this value of truth is
not to know merely how epistemology lets us be outside the pure systematiza-
tions. That epistemology can do so is what we mean by this value. An alien
systematization gives us the value of truth and the value of truth consists in
94
the confrontation with an alien systematization.
My argument that the three unique features of epistemology are all
circularly determined may appear a bold one, but it has some justification in
Mannheim's own words.
92 Ibid.
, pp. 22-23.
93Ibid.
,
p. 71.
y4In other words the borrowing process yields truth value and truth
value consists in the borrowing process.
Mannheim associates what he sees as the intersystematic nature of
epistemology with another concept also. He calls it "free choice of reference.
Both the concept of truth value and of free choice of reference appear to
solve the social change problem by definition. That epistemology can get out-
side any one conceptual framework is precisely the point at issue. The free
choice of reference also seems a concept which simply begs the question.
According to Mannheim, ours is the sort of mind which can get away from the
"natural" approach directed entirely at objects. We can think about thinking.
".
.
.the presu ppositions of knowledge a re always capable of becoming
objects of knowledge in their turn" [Ibid. , p. 45].
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Any theory of knowledge is hard put to it when it comes to the point ofproving the ultimate presuppositions to be true values. That is the explan-
ation for the well-known paradox in the Kantian system, whereby Kant
grounds the necessity of synthetic a priori judgments in the concept of
spontaneity, justifying the latter in turn by means of the a priori The
circularity is anything but accidental.
. . it is the necessary consequence
of the paradox involved in any epistemology. 95
With that parting thought I now turn from the more expository aspect of
discussion to the more analytical one.
Tile Dialectical Pattern -- Mannheim's dissertation is a far more lengthy
and complex work than is Lindblom's early essay on Bargaining. Yet I believe
that the former, as much as the latter, can be fruitfully examined as the first
step in a dialectical thought process. It is true that there seem to be numerous
logical twists within the inmost structures of the Mannheim work. For ex-
ample, the various sets of initial distinctions seem to be both affirmed and
denied. Yet, on a larger canvas, the Mannheim essay, like that of Lindblom,
seems to embody the same general pattern. It is my purpose now to display
that pattern.
My identification of a certain inner debate within Lindblom's thought may
be disputable. But there is little dispute about the existence of a correlative
debate within the thought of Mannheim. Critics widely agree that throughout
his life he struggled with the question how a sociology of knowledge could
escape the danger of relativism. And they further agree that this inner debate
occurred within the context of an outward position expounding and defending
95lbid.
,
p. 69.
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such a sociology of knowledge. 96
1. Central Concept
The central concept within Mannheim's inner debate is unquestionably
that of conceptual freedom. It is the concept of being free not from the ab-
stract laws of a deterministic science but from the constraints of a total
conceptual framework. It is a freedom from the concepts which structure
one's very reality. ^
In Mannheim's dissertation the concept of conceptual freedom appears
indirectly. It appears as independent truth or final conceptual system. But if
6What this writer calls Mannheim's outer position--his defense of a
sociology of knowledge --is too well known to need documentation. That he
engaged in a life -long, or at least almost life -long, struggle with relativism
is acknowledged by numerous scholars.
"The objections to Mannheim's theory.
. .the ancient argument against
scepticism, that of self-contradiction.
. . . Mannheim was aware of these
difficulties and much of his intellectual effort went into attempts to deal
with them, either by denying that his own theory was relativistic.
. . or by
arguing that the 'perspectivistic' character of his own theory did not
diminish its value" [T. B. Bottomore, "Some Reflections on the Sociology
of Knowledge, " British Journal of Sociology
, VII (March, 1956), 55].
"One of Mannheim's fundamental questions --perhaps the fundamental
question- -might be formulated thus: how, in the face of the demonstration
that the spirit is socially conditioned, can I still do right by its inexhausti-
bility and unforseeability? Or perhaps: how can I, nevertheless, save it?"
[Kurt H. Wolff, "Introduction: A Reading of Karl Mannheim," in From Karl
Mannheim
,
ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971,
p. xiv. ]
^Mannheim makes clear that a systematization is, indeed, a conceptual
framework which structures one's very reality.
"Systematization is constitutive to such an extent that anything 'given'
. . . any 'fact of experience'. . . must already belong within one of the
existing systematizations, in so far as it is theoretically grasped at all.
The simplest, most primitive way of 'objectifying' an element is to range
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there is independent truth then obviously there is a way to be free of any
particular conceptual framework. We become so by reaching out to that truth.
And if we can know of a final system which does not simply incorporate the
imminent system then we must be somehow free from them both. Otherwise
we could not notice the difference between them.
Both these two variants of the concept of a conceptual freedom are de-
fined, effectually, by negation. Independent truth is truth independent of, i.e.
truth which is not, any of the series, orders, etc. which currently appear to
underlie our theoretical propositions and concepts. 98 The final form of any
systematization is that which we do not possess and never will. 99 That the
form exists we can affirm, but what the form is we can know only as the nega-
tion of any system which we now have.
2. Other First Order Major Concepts
The two other major concepts seem to be those of theoretical systematiza
tion and of system. Although numerous other major concepts are presented
it.
. .
with one of these inevitably presupposed orders.
. . . 'Ranging' an
element with a series.
. .
is apt to sound as if this element already had its
true identity. . . . Nothing could be further from the truth. ... An 'ele-
ment, ' in fact, only gets its proper identity by adopting the structure of the
series to which it belongs. . . " [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Episte-
mology, " pp. 24-25].
Mannheim also insists, of course, that there is an ultimate form of any
systematization which is distinct from the current one. By contrast with the
possibility of this ultimate form, the current one may perhaps be recognized
as partly erroneous.
98Ibid.
,
p. 26.
"ibid.
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they seem reducible to these two. 100 Aesthetic systematization is an im-
possibility, as defined, and philosophical systematization is largely equated
to theoretical systematization when the latter concept is used in its broadest
sense. Minimum theoretical systematization is different only in degree from
the adequate variety; it is not qualitatively different. Once again 1 therefore
find, as 1 did with Lindblom, that there are two major concepts other than the
central concept.
I also conclude, once again, that these two major concepts are very
close to each other. (From now on I shall refer to systematization without the
qualifying adjective, "theoretical"). Systematization is an open, evolving,
reality-constituting chain of interdependent concepts. Although there is a final
form to this evolutionary process it will never be reached. Any systematiza-
tion always contains erroneous and tentative elements. System, by contrast,
is a closed chain and is how the final form of systematization would appear if
it was reached. There may also be intermediate systems when an individual,
at a certain time, pushes to its logical conclusion the tendency already present
in the systematization. It first appears, then, that system and systematization
are distinctly different, even contrary, concepts. But they do not seem so once
the status of historically intermediate systems is taken into account.
At the very beginning of his dissertation Mannheim makes a fundamental
distinction between the discrete, on the one hand, and the all-embracing or
i00See text pp. 242-49.
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continuous, on the other. 101 He asserts that the discrete concept or propo-
sition can only be understood in terms of a continuum of concepts and propo-
1 02
sitions. Now we don't have to consciously understand, say, a concept in
order to use it, and usually we are not aware of this continuum from which
comes our understanding. But we do become aware, says Mannheim, when
doubt about the concept arises. And he implies that such doubt must arise
since the continuum of concepts changes and evolves. 103 Therefore we must
become aware of our intermediate partially erroneous conceptual frameworks.
Just this necessity creates a problem, however, if system is distinguished
from systematization. The problem is that that of which we can be conscious,
an individual conceptual system, does not display error in itself while that
which does display such error, the continuum of systems (or systematization),
is not something of which we can be conscious. I shall explain.
A system is a conceptual continuum because it is circular but the contin-
uity of systematization results from its infinitude. The latter is continuous
as an open process, not as a closed stage in time. A concept cannot be brought
lOlMannheirn, "Structural Analysis of Epistemology, " pp. 19-20.
102lbid.
, pp. 16, 20.
".
. .
primacy among logical forms belongs to systematization. The
simpler forms can be understood. . . only in terms of this 'highest
1
.
.
form" [p. 16].
Adequate theoretical systematization comprises:
".
.
.a continuum of closely interrelated elements" [p. 20].
103
Ibid.
, pp. 18, 39.
104See text p. 248
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to conscious understanding, however, if understanding depends on a grasp of
the continuum and the continuum is never complete in time.
On the other hand, if there are intermediate conceptual systems which
are complete in time then it would be possible to consciously understand our
concepts. But we could not move from one system to another with any recog-
nition that we had done so. For the move from system to system would take
place within the infinite continuum, not a closed one. Thus to claim that there
was more than one closed system and that one was superior to another would
be a metaphysical claim in the Kantian sense. ^ It would be a claim for
which an equally convincing case could be made on either side.
It seems then that the distinction between a circular continuum and an
infinite continuum removes any opportunity for a meaningfully critical stance
toward concepts.
Given the situation I have described, it is not surprising that Mannheim
often seems to conflate the aforementioned distinction. At one point he speaks
of closed circles in connection with systematization although these are supposed
to be distinctive of systems instead.
l°5Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason, " trans, by J. D. Meikle-
john, Vol. XLII of Great Books of the Western World , ed. by Robert M. Hutchins
(54 vols; Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), pp. 135-45.
106
"In the theoretical sphere, one has to presuppose a closed chain of
continuously connected propositions" [Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of
Epistemology, " p. 20J.
The context of this quote is an early discussion of systematization before this
concept has been explicitly distinguished from that of system.
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At another point hs speaks of system as a matter of identifying a
"tendency" prescribed in a systematization and developing that tendency. 107
But this seems to make system simply an integral part of systematization, not
a discrete monad which happens to be located within it.
The very proposition that consciousness of conceptual structure arises
with doubt is still further evidence that the distinction is conflated since with
systematization there could be no consciousness and with system no construc-
tive doubt.
Finally, one might consider Mannheim's assertion that history is a
directed flow toward an unreachable end. 108 He is saying that history is a
system because it is directed toward an end, and is thus a closed circle. But
history is also systematization because the end is unreachable and the contin-
uum is thus "closed" only by infinity.
3. Attempted Identity of Opposites- -Genesis of the Inner Debate.
If it be assumed that Mannheim begins with the conceptual situation I
have described, then a case can be made that he attempts an identity of
opposites:
a. He explicitly defines final system (in other words, independent truth)
107".
.
.an individual reflecting subject, who orders his thoughts into a
complete system in strict accordance with a principle, is really doing no
more than push to its logical conclusion a tendency already prescribed in
the very systematization" [Ibid . , p. 25].
108
Ibid.
, pp. 39, 26.
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as the negation of any conceptual system which men have yet developed.
Independent truth is the opposite of system.
b. He then virtually identifies this final system with systematization.
Independent truth is identical to systematization.
. . .
we have to take it for granted that an ultimate, true and complete
form of any systematization exists objectively, independently of our own
contributions. This is.
. .
to be interpreted.
. .as a stringent logical postu -
late implied.
. .
in every theoretical construct . 109
"It is thus implied in the very structure of the theoretical sphere that it
must itself be assumed as a -temporally valid.
.
,"
110
»,
, .that truth is
valid in itself.
. .
[is] an inevitable postulate involved in the existence of a
theoretical sphere as such.
c. But he has also virtually identified system and systematization, as I
have tried to show in the preceding subsection. If he had not done so he appar-
ently could not explain the existence of conceptual criticism.
System and systematization are identical to each other.
If this is a correct reading of Mannheim then he is indeed trying to say
that conceptual freedom is conceptual structure. He is making a claim much
like that which Kecskemeti finds so strange in later works, though I suggest
109ibid
.
, pp. 26-27. [This writer's emphasis. ]
H Qlbid.
,
p. 27. [This writer's emphasis. ]
m-Ibid
.
,
p. 28. [This writer's emphasis. ]
112See footnote 57.
277
that this early expression of it is even more flatly contradictory than that of
which Kecskemeti takes note.
4. Central Theme as Argument in Potential
Mannheim's central theme is at least the claim that the dominance of a
conceptual framework over one's thought and action can lead to conceptual
freedom. I have suggested that in its original form this theme makes the even
stronger claim that conceptual structure is identical to conceptual freedom. If
that is true then the theme would include an inner tension, and it does indeed
seem to do so.
The final truth which is implied in the very structure, the very existence,
of the theoretical sphere is never attained. Therefore it cannot be understood
as the goal at the end of a chronological sequence, despite Mannheim's claim
to the contrary. ° For we cannot know that the sequence is progressive.
And therefore, also, this final truth cannot be understood as neutral ground
outside one's conceptual situation. It must instead be seen as something which,
by definition, is imminent in systematization as a process. But to understand
final truth (and hence conceptual freedom) in this latter sense is to empty it of
distinct content.
Thus, in order to assert the theme that conceptual freedom is systemati-
zation one must lose the concept of such freedom. Here again a tension seems
H3por the contrary claim see Mannheim, "Structural Analysis of Episte-
mology, " p. 39. See also this writer's footnote 41.
It is true that Mannheim does not argue, on page 39, that the final truth
can be such a goal. He simply asserts it.
as
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to develop between the theme as assertion and the theme as argument. One
would like to say that the relationship between conceptual freedom and system
-
atization is as close as identity and that the theme as assertion and the theme
argument are consequently die same theme. But one also wants to give some
distinct meaning to the concept of conceptual freedom and to do so the two
themes must be different. So again one must describe the central theme not
as an argument but as an argument in potential
5. A New Distinction
I suggest that it is in the attempt to add substance to the concept of con-
ceptual freedom, that Mannheim introduces what otherwise seems such a
curious purpose. I refer to his attempt to give a structural analysis of e piste -
mological systematization--to give an analysis of something beyond analysis.
This curious purpose is capsulized in the distinction between historical
and typological aspects of epistemological systematization. 114 According to
Mannheim one can find some single elements in any epistemology which are the
same for all periods. There are, furthermore, logical patterns, typologies,
composed of these elements, although which pattern is correct could be known
114"gvery individual work in its actual historical form, e. g. any partic-
ular epistemology, contains elements which can be explained only with
reference to the individual personality of the philosopher concerned, and
others which can be interpreted only in terms of the structure of the mental-
ity of the age in question. Now the more completely we succeed in identi-
fying those features of the epistemological systems which stem from the
nature of the problem, from the persistent, timeless task itself, the easier
it will be to distinguish those features which, if present, have to be explained
differently" [Ibid
, pp. 36-37].
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only at the end of history.
The notion of typologies of systematization appears to strengthen the
concept of conceptual freedom. It suggests that the comprehensive final truth
inherent in systematization, but itself unreachable, must be somehow connected
with the separate elements which persist throughout the systematization, and
thus are reachable. If this is so, conceptual freedom is no longer an empty
concept. It has at least potential substance. One could become free of one's
conceptual structure by reaching the absoluteness of final systematization, and
the persisting truths in any systematization give promise that there is a way to
get there.
6. Cancellation of the Earlier Argument
Without modification, however, this new distinction would cancel the
central theme. Mannheim wants to say that the elements which persist are
nevertheless part of a systematization which by definition is basically open and,
in this sense, all-embracing. But if these persisting elements are fundamental
to the systematization then it is not basically open and all-embracing. If one
persisting element is the presupposition that empirical experience is the source
of all knowledge then systematization is basically "psychological, " in Mann-
heim's terms. And this must be true for all time. Similarly, if one persisting
element is the standard of truth as correspondence with the empirical given
then again systematization is psychological.
If, on the other hand, the persisting elements are not fundamental to sys-
tematization then they can give no promise of a final systematization, an
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independent truth.
7. Initial Development of the New Argument
Mannheim's response to the above problem seems to consist in the tacit
suggestion that while the openness of systematization may be unsettled by the
concept of a typology this is not a serious consequence. It is not serious be-
cause enduring concepts do not exist apart from epistemological systematiza-
tion. Instead they are integral to it. 115 Hence they do not eliminate concept-
ual openness; they structure it.
A typology of epistemology does commit us to a course even though it
does not exactly determine the path. It provides the a priori quasi axiomatic
structure of conceptual correlations.
... how far is it possible to deduce from the structure of epistemological
systematization both the uniformity of epistemological thinking and the prin-
ciple of differentiation which makes for the sundry individual systems?
... On the evidence available so far we can already state: the uniformity
is guaranteed by the correlations that are posited with quasi
-axiomatic
necessity.
.
.The logical structure of epistemological systematization—
which commits us to a certain course but does not exactly determine the
path to be followed-
-must be recognized as the pivot of any typology.
.
116
These points seem consistent with Mannheim's earlier claim that history is a
directed flow. Apparently the logic of epistemological systematization is an
instrument of that flow.
115Ibid
.
, p. 39. The creations of the mind are grounded in timeless
rules but these rules constitute a directed flow. A-temporal elements are
thus an inherent part of evolutionary openness.
116Ibid.
, pp. 64-65.
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8. Self-Contradiction of the New Argument
The foregoing argument has a devastating impact, however, on the con-
cept of conceptual freedom. If the concept before had some substantive
potential or, at most, was empty, it is now worse than empty. Not only is the
claim made for an embracing conceptual framework but it is now said that this
framework is determined, at least in its basic nature. Hence conceptual free-
dom is not merely an empty concept; it is one which is positively absent.
This particular stage which I have identified in Mannheim's thought seems
to me an especially significant one. In its structure I think it explains the
reactive nature of much of Mannheim's work. And looking back to my Chapter
III I think this stage also explains the similarly reactive nature of the thought
of Lindblom. Neither Lindblom nor Mannheim can be satisfied to rest at this
stage of their respective arguments. Lindblom doesn't want his politics of
bargaining to be identified with a politics of majority choice. 117 And Mann-
heim is not satisfied with the "freedom" in historical destiny. Yet, paradox-
ically, they both seem to need these positions in order to identify their own.
Lindblom is engaged in an outer debate with the totalitarians on their own
home ground- -the advantages of planning. And he tries to defend a classic
minority rights liberalism on precisely that ground. But Lindblom also has a
more inward debate with his fellow liberals in the more socialistic planning-
oriented countries. His critical problem is how to distinguish himself from
117Seetext, chap. Ill, p. 217.
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these people so that he need not abandon his outer position. His problem is
how to retain the classic minority rights liberalism in this situation. Hence
the European economic planners, especially Jan Tinbergen, become the goad
to development of his thought, and he begins most of his work as a more or
less direct reaction to theirs.
Lindblom says that he attacks the Tinbergen type model because it is so
common a fallacy. I suggest that the more important reason he does so is to
define his own method of incrementatalism by contrast. He needs this other
model to show how his own is different in the face of his apparent assumptions
of political consensus which would make it the same. In Lindblom's model of
decision-making there must be real conflict, and by juxtaposing his model with
Tinbergen's he hopes to make evident the reality of conflict without abandoning
his theme that bargaining (as conflict) can coordinate.
I think it not too fanciful to say that Mannheim's thought is also funda-
mentally reactive --first to ideology generally, later to its specific expression
in Hitler's totalitarianism.
H£>The most direct evidence of Lindblom's need for the Tinbergen model
is his way of defining bargaining. This most critical concept in his work is
never given a clear positive definition. In the essay on bargaining, it is de-
fined by contrast with hierarchy and thus obviously requires the Tinbergen
model. In the much later book on the Intelligence of Democracy , Lindblom's
argument focuses on the broader concept of "partisan mutual adjustment, " but
this concept is so broad as to include deference at one extreme and uncon-
ditional manipulation at the other. Since a concept this broad would seem to be
amenable to European planners, Lindblom must refer to their thinking if he is
to show that it is not. And, he implicitly does so in Pt. 5 of his book.
See text, chap. Ill, pp. 171-74, 192.
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Mannheim is engaged in an outer debate with the liberals on their home
ground—the virtues of personal freedom. He tries to defend conceptual struc-
ture on that ground but he is also engaged in a more inward debate with totali-
tarian. He is urgently concerned to distinguish himself from the latter so
that he, too, need not abandon his outer position- -that he need not accept the
view that prior conceptual structure determines all thought.
I suggest that as Lindblom needs Tinbergen for a contrast model so
Mannheim needs something like Hitler's totalitarianism. It is not just that
Mannheim is so disapproving of the Hitler phenomenon that he so often reacts
to it. He needs something like it to show how different his own position is in the
light of his claim that conceptual freedom is integral to systematization and,
apparently, to the historical process. In his model there must be real freedom,
and by contrasting his position with that of Hitler he apparently hopes to show
119
this without abandoning his basic theme.
The best evidence that Mannheim actually needs something like Hitler's
totalitarianism, as a contrast model, is Mannheim's way of defining conceptual
freedom. He defines it by negation. In his dissertation, conceptual freedom is
described as that truth which is independent of any present system, and so he
must at least intimate the existence of defecis in any present conceptual system.
In Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia , he identifies certain "intellectuals" who can
take a relatively uncommitted view. Hence, he must contrast these people with
others who only claim to take such a view. He must show that some people can
be the conceptual leaders without at the same time being, say, fascist ideologues
and propagandists.
See text pp. 270-71.
There are two qualifications to these points: Firstly, Mannheim does not
place himself in explicit written opposition to fascism until he moves to England.
But prior to that he was attacking the conceptual constraints of then -current
liberal ideology. Consequently he was, even then, concerned with the constraints
284
For both Lindblom and Mannheim it therefore seems necessary to con-
tinually reintroduce a threatening contrast model. But then because the model
is so threatening it is always necessary to move away from it--showing in
Lindblom's case that bargaining is not just a name for democratic consensus
and in Mannheim's that freedom is not just a name for historical-conceptual
destiny.
9. Preservation of the Earlier Argument
One way to help prevent weakening the concept of conceptual freedom is
to say that while there is a typology of epistemology it is indeterminate. Mann-
heim says just this and he says it both directly and indirectly. The direct
statement is that the enduring elements --the question, the value, the correla-
tion- -do not have content in themselves but derive it from one of the primary
systematizations. The indirect statement consists in frequent use of the word
"typology" with the indefinite article rather than the definite. 120
in conceptual systems. Secondly, it is recognized that Mannheim does eventu-
ally seem to abandon altogether his historicist-conceptualist position. A
growing positivism is apparent in his late English period and, specifically, in
such books as Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning
.
l^Mannheim acknowledges that any historical typology is likely to be
incorrect.
"This essay of mine is an attempt to do justice to the historical process
on the basis of static logic; such an effort must. . . culminate in a typology.
Even though a structural analysis should turn out differently if it were
carried out. . . at another age, it is true for this, as for all theoretical
works, that one solution alone can be the right one" [Mannheim, "Structural
Analysis of Epistemology, " p. 40, footnote 1].
Also see, in the previously cited work, pp. 36, 58.
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To leave the typology indeterminate is not satisfactory, however, since
it is to have timeless concepts which are empty. If this result were accepted,
it would return the argument to steps 3 and 4 and to the initial contradiction
which those steps seem to represent.
The typology is not left indeterminate. It is made determinate, in effect,
by reintroducing the initial central theme that conceptual freedom is system -
atization. The typology
--that which represents timeless concepts
--becomes
determinate through the open-ended evolutionary process which is systematiza-
tion itself. 121
10. Circularity of the Completed Argument
This process of determination clearly involves circular argument, how-
ever. Consider one timeless, a-priori, element--the question unique to
epistemology. This question is that of the ultimate presuppositions of knowl-
edge. But the answer to the question, says Mannheim, will be found to be the
ex-post ontological approach. And that approach repeats the question. J22
Again, consider that timeless element of "truth value" which provides
a benchmark in systematization. This value must come from an alien system
-
atization. It must come, that is, from a mixing of systcmatizations. But this
121See the quotation in footnote 120. Apparently later typologies are
more accurate than earlier ones and for that reason more determinate. At
least we would expect them to be more determinate in those circumstances.
Existing typologies are indeterminate precisely because the priority contest
among basic systematizations has not yet been settled.
122See text pp. 258-60.
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mixing is simply the reaffirmation that one_can put oneself outside a systemati-
zation. We want to know what that value is which comes from an alien system
-
atization but the answer seems to be merely a reiteration that it does come
from outside--that it involves mixture. *
123see text pp. 266-68.
CHAPTER V
WHOLES WITHIN AND AGAINST WHOLES
URBAN PLANNING AS A DIALECTICAL PROCESS
I have laboriously examined the arguments of Lindblom and Mannheim
over comprehensiveness, and have done so on the ground that these arguments .
are in themselves elaborations of that concept. What is the use of this in-
volved intellectual effort?
The use of a concept examination depends on one's viewpoint. The em-
piricist wants to ostensively and unambiguously define objects and events so
he can look for correlations. But one cannot unambiguously define concepts by
pointing.
Many contextualists believe they can reveal the conceptual framework
implied by our present day concepts and can show us how to see the world
differently and better. But people may disagree both on what the world looks
like now and on what would represent a better view.
Other contextualists, a minority at present, believe that the use of a
concept examination is to reveal the deep contradictions inherent in any con-
ceptual framework and to help us endure them. I have adopted this third pur-
pose. In previous chapters I sought to identify the contradictions in the abstract
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concept of comprehensiveness. In this chapter I look for the same contra-
dictions in planning practice.
Abstraction-
-Both the Essence and the Dilemma of Planning
The practical implications for public planning, which I draw from my
concept examination, are radical ones. They are radical in the classic sense
that they go to the roots of a problem. In this case they go to deep roots --the
conventional rationalism of Western thinking.
The Centrality of Abstraction
. In the West we place a high (one might
say the supreme) value on abstractions and on the formal logical relationships
among them. With few exceptions we reserve our highest honor, the esteem of
history, for those through whose mental capacity and/or effort we gain new and
vivid expressions of the most abstract thought. We assume, furthermore, that
the reality around us has a structure analogous to such thought.
These values and assumptions of rationalism have their esoteric forms
as in our normal view of science, the view of it as a relatively straightforward
process of abstraction from certain obvious facts. And toward these esoteric
forms there is much criticism. In its more mundane guise, however, we
almost always take our rationalism for granted. Science may not be a simple
matter of abstraction but we expect the one who says so to say it in an abstract
way, his book being organized by general headings and subheadings. And we
ask the reader of this book to abstract and summarize the "main points. " Our
conventional measure of a good student is his ability to do this and his ability
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to then rethink, by logically recombining, a number of main points drawn from
different books and from personal experience.
In its mundane form our Western rationalism is not opposed to what
philosophy often calls empiricism or realism. It is not opposed, that is, to a
belief in real objects which are independent of our thinking. We assume, for
example, that the sequence of words in that book on science is relatively un-
ambivalent in meaning, at least on an elementary level, and can be summarized.
We make similar assumptions about our personal experiences. How we can get
from shapes on a page to a meaningful sense is perplexing, if we think about it,
but usually we don't think about it.
Wholeness (Planning) as a Product of Abstraction
. As it does for other
things, mundane rationalism provides our most deeply believed, most common
sense interpretation of planning and of the concept of comprehensiveness which
is central to it. Comprehensiveness or wholeness is not a conceptual problem
on that interpretation. We know very well what wholeness is. There are two
sorts: the concrete, or individual, and the abstract. Material objects, in-
cluding human beings, are concrete wholes. They are individuals. All other
wholes represent abstractions, of varying levels, from these objects and from
the relationships among them.
For mundane rationalism there is no intellectual difficulty in taking a
wholistic view, no difficulty in "seeing the big picture. " All higher levels of
government do so and they do so all the time. One simply raises one's level of
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abstraction to an appropriate point. Of coarse higher level abstractions may
give a distorted view of social reality (i. e. of the relationships among human
beings), but that is the price of social order, so it is argued. And, further-
more, constitutional protections and an improving social science are looked to
with confidence for some mitigation of the distortion.
This common sense approach to reason is manifest in most of the theory
and practice of urban physical planning. Speaking for an orthodox and long held
view, T. J. Kent emphasizes that the urban plan is a general plan, and he sees
no serious theoretical difficulty in connecting the abstractions of this plan with
the concrete city. 1 The urban plan is only one level of abstraction however
and there may be numerous others. Some plans would represent subordinate
levels
--the plan of a geographic portion of the city such as a neighborhood, or
of a functional element such as the transportation system. These plans would
deal more closely with concrete wholes. Some plans would represent superior
levels --a metropolitan area, a river basin, or a state--and would be more
distant from the concrete.
The view that one can achieve wholeness through appropriate levels of
abstraction has its advocates not only among planners themselves but among
the sociologists and political scientists from which they often draw their
theoretical insights. Max Weber's classic model of bureaucracy with its
*T. J. Kent, Jr. , The Urban General Plan (San Francisco, California:
Chandler Publishing Co.
,
1964).
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hierarchy of roles is an important source. 2 In recent times, Amitai Etzioni's
strategy of "mixed scanning" has been influential. 3 It is not clear to what
extent Etzioni acknowledges any concrete wholes, but he does articulate the
belief that general overviews of a situation are possible and can be integrated
with more detailed studies of particular aspects.
The common sense view of planning seems to be fundamentally correct.
The wholeness of social entities is clearly an abstraction. Hence abstraction
could be called the essence of planning.
Self-Alienation Inherent in Abstraction
. The fact that planning is essen-
tially a matter of abstractions does not necessarily mean, however, that this
planning is free of conceptual problems. It might be precisely the presence of
abstractions that would produce such problems. In what follows I argue that
the process of abstraction alienates the thinking person from himself.
1. According to contextualist epistemology there is no sharp distinction
between the concrete and the abstract, and I assume such epistemology. A
person is not a Cartesian combination of thinking soul inexplicably aware of
material body, but is something more complex.
Both the critics of rationalism and most of the sophisticated rationalists
agree with this view. They agree that the belief in the immediacy of concrete
2Max Weber, "Bureaucracy: The 'Ideal Type', " in Comparative Politics :
Notes and Readings , ed. by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (3d ed. ;
Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 449-55.
3Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: The Free Press, 1968),
chap. 12.
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objects is a mistaken one. Concepts are not formed by observing a number of
objects and abstracting from their differences so as to retain only what the
objects have in common. For there are no objects except as the products of
abstraction. 4 Ernst Cassirer suggests a description for this simultaneously
abstracting and objectifying process. It is a spark which jumps somehow
across an intensely focused experience such as that of a storm. In that sub-
jective excitement the experience becomes objectified as a personal god. 5 The
appearance of what we call abstract concepts is merely a later and less im-
portant transformation of these personal gods.
2. According to that form of contextualism which I call a degree of truth
logic, this something more complex than Cartesianism involves a concurrent
evolution of "abstract thought" and "concrete reality" toward each other. Thus
personal selfhood appears to be developmental and, in that case, no one would
ever be fully seLf -conscious.
3. But according to a degree of reality logic, abstract thought and con-
crete reality are already identical. Hence every person is a unity of thought
and reality and is fully conscious. I adopt this second view.
^In this writer's sense, Hume, himself, is a rationalist. Even for some-
one as supposedly respectful of the empirical as Hume, there appear to be no
sense objects. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , ed. by L. A.
Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 15-16. [Bk. I, Pt. I,
sec. VI, first par. ]
^Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth , trans, by Susanne K. Langer
(n. p. : Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), p. 33.
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4. If a person is not thought to be divided between body and soul, he
must be thought to be divided within the soul itself, so to speak. For to be
self conscious is to employ abstract thought to divide oneself into subject and
object. Having acknowledged this so fundamental point some philosophers, like
Comte, take the heroic step of denying self consciousness. 6 But others, like
Hegel, affirm the subject-object relationship and accept, at least temporarily,
the self -alienation to which it leads. 7 I shall do so as well. 1 shall postulate
that human alienation is inherent in abstraction and in the objectifica tion which
abstraction expresses
.
For help in making my point clear I suggest that we distinguish between
existential and pathological alienation. Existential alienation is unavoidable
for thinking man, but it should not be confused with such often pathological
alienation as personal maladjustment, the alienation of a worker from his
o
product, or the alienation of citizens from government.
^Comte's position is noted by Charles Landesman, Jr. , "Consciousness,"
Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 1st ed. , II, 192.
7See George Lichtheim, "Alienation," International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, 1st ed.
,
I, 265.
The concept of self -alienation, like that of self-consciousness, is at the
very center of Hegel's thought. On this point, see G. R. G. Mure, The Phil-
osophy of Hegel (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), chap. I, especially
pp. 10-19," 34-37.
8 In identifying a form of existential alienation, this writer is particularly
objecting to the Marxist position on that point. The position is concisely sum-
marized by Bernstein:
"Alienation does not result from the fact that man objectifies himself,
produces objects --this is man's distinctive character. Alienation results
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Reflection on our personal and cultural experience tends to confirm that
there is a form of self
-alienation which is intrinsic to thought and is unavoidable.
As an illustration from personal experience consider such a commonplace
phenomenon as the freshness of travel to new places. The first encounter with
a new environment is wholistic--a total impression of sights, sound, activities.
It is also disorienting, however. One's normal instinct is to search out this
environment in order to achieve orientation and thereby capture and hold the
total experience. But this instinct is self-defeating. Orientation is achieved by
abstraction and by abstraction the full experience is lost. In time it will be
possible to travel through the environment with reference to only a few visual
clues. The travel will now take place over an abstract route in the mind. In
reaction to this result there will thence appear the instinct, once again to find,
and this time successfully to capture, a newer fresher experience. But once
again, and ever after, the instinct will defeat itself.
Our cultural experience, also, suggests that the phenomenon of self-
alienation is a durable one. In support of this view there is, first of all, the
fact that mystic and rational philosophies provide the major division of world
culture and that for the former the self-alienating nature of thought is the
when he produces in such a way (conditioned by the political economy in
which he finds himself) that his products are at once an expression of his
labor -power and at the same time are not a true expression of his
potentialities. . . " [Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action: Contemporary
Philosophies of Human Activity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1971), p. 44. Also see pp. 45-49].
This writer wants to assert, in contrast, that alienation does result from
objectification.
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central point. 9 But, additionally, the great themes of religion and art cross
the cultural divide and seem to reaffirm this point. There is the theme of
return to wholeness after a life of self struggle, whether this be the wholeness
of an "empty" Nirvana, the plenum of a Mohammedan paradise or some mid
position as in the Christian Heaven. And there is the corollary theme of self-
alienation and return within life itself. This is not only a major substantive
theme in the arts. It often seems to be, indeed, the very principle of artistic
construction. The development of great themes in tension with each other and
then the affirmation of such tension as itself a form of resolution --this may be
an apt description of much artistic design and particularly the design of its non-
verbal forms such as music and sculpture.
5. If abstraction is the essence of planning and if self-alienation is in-
herent in abstraction then there is a dilemma. We want to plan our individual
and social lives but we can do so only at the cost of self-alienation. If there is
such a dilemma then it must be the fundamental dilemma of planning as it must
^Mystic philosophies, and those associated with them, seek to deny or
reject objectivity as they affirm its self -alienating character. The writcr
accepts their analysis of objectivity while rejecting their practical conclusions.
He wants to ask how one can live with objectivity, assuming that it is, indeed,
self-alienating.
In any case, there is probably as large and respectable a literature
asserting the alienating character of thought as there is a literature denying it.
For samples of the former, see: the Bhagavad Gita , one of the three canonical
books of Hinduism; writings of Zen Bhuddism, in particular those by D. T.
Suzuki; I and Thou by Martin Buber; Romantic poetry, such as that of William
Wordsworth; Theodore Rcszak's The Making of a Counter Culture; and the
writings of such existentialists as Jean Paul Sartre.
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be, also, the fundamental dilemma of Western culture.
Self
-Alienation Intrinsic to Human Beings. Should we try to avoid human
alienation and hence much of Western culture with it? The answer is not ob-
vious. It depends on how we understand the condition. If alienation is the
total severance of a person from that person's self then perhaps the answer is
"yes
-
" But perhaps a degree of self
-alienation is the condition for achieving
human personality, and perhaps a degree of social alienation is a condition for
human community
. 1 shall give some arguments, both from theory and from
expediency, in support of this view.
Arguments from Theory -- Consider, first, the concept of human physi-
cal health. We call a person physically well not because he is free of disease
but because the disease processes are in a state of subtle controlled tension;
his own physiological defense mechanisms are in a continuous moderated
struggle with the germs always present in his environment. If the struggle
ceased, because the defense processes had decisively overwhelmed the external
threat, this would be as deadly to the organism as it would be if the struggle
greatly intensified.
Moving away from the physiological toward the personality structure
itself, and beyond that to its social base, we may perhaps draw the same con-
clusion. The person is characterized both by an enduring sense of self and by
a series of specific personality traits which may alter while self identity
remains. These two characteristics seem to be in tension, however. To
develop his personality, and hence his characteristic traits, a person must
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assert his traits against what is outside him. Unless he does so he cannot
develop a conscious identity. In other words, without conflict, and in that
sense an atomistic voluntaristic relationship to other people, a person cannot
be conscious of himself as a unique being. The infant apparently begins to
achieve self-hood just when he sees himself in confrontation with his parents,
when he no longer sees them as extensions of his own being.
Is this conflictual element in the production of human personality perhaps
subordinate to a harmonious one? The latter is also important. If the person
cannot be conscious of his self except through social conflict, still it seems
that he cannot have an enduring self of which to be conscious except through a
measure of social harmony and shared meaning. Without that social grounding
every human confrontation would totally jeopardize self identity. 10 One can
10This writer sees a connection between these two aspects of self and
the concepts, in social theory, of "alienation" and "anomie. " But what Marx
calls alienation and what Durkheim calls anomie are for this writer two oppos-
ing tendencies in the self- -tendencies which together produce alienation in this
writer's broader sense of that term
According to Marx, every human being has many possibilities for crea-
tive self-development and what is most important about man in society is that
he have the opportunity to realize these possibilities. The requirement of
capitalist society that man should be confined within fixed and limited roles
removes that opportunity, hence producing alienation. This Marxian view is
similar to what this writer calls the atomistic model of personality formation,
but it is a more mixed position since it supposes that cooperation and the
growth of personal relationships, rather than conflict and impersonality, will
accompany self-realization.
According to Durkheim, a human being becomes fully himself by the
limitation, and hence definition, provided by stable social roles. For Durkheim,
the weakening of such roles destroys human identity in destroying human com-
munity. This position is similar to this writer's organicist model of person-
ality formation, but here, again, the view is more mixed since within Durkheim 's
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illustrate the effects of these two personality forming processes by contrasting
the schizophrenic, but often intellectually vital, character of disintegrating
urban societies (for example, Berlin between the great wars) with the self-
nourishing, but often intellectually unreflective, character of any primitive or
peasant culture.
I don't agree, however, that the social, organicist base of personality
formation is more fundamental than the atomistic, conflictual one and I see no
way to settle the question without appeal to the very points at issue. If we
assume that human conflict is only identifiable through social meaning, then
this social meaning is obviously primary. Individual differences exist but they
are minor and they arise from the social nexus itself (class relationships for
example) rather than through individual initiative. But this position has no
ideal of social order there would be room for an equal opportunity based on
merit.
The preceding summary descriptions of alienation and anomie are de-
rived from Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie, " in Philosophy, Politics and
Society , Third Series, ed. by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1969).
According to Lukes:
"... one can plausibly argue that some degree of alienation and of anomie
is inseparable from life in an industrial society. . . some alienation must
exist wherever there are reified social relations, socially-given roles and
norms; while some anomie must exist wherever hierarchies disintegrate
and social control is weakened" [p. 152J.
This writer is trying to make a similar point, but he wants to emphasize
that both alienation and anomie must occur simultaneously. Industrial society
is always in need of a fixed social structure as a control mechanism. It con-
fronts this need because of social complexities and the necessity for long lead-
time plans. But it is similarly always in need of a weakening of the present
social structure to make it more adaptable to change.
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explanation for the existence of major human differences. If someone persists
in asking about such differences then a changed answer is obvious from the
persistence of the question. It must be the case that individual conflict is
primary and that social meaning is possible precisely in such conflict. (Thus,
for example, we perhaps understand the concept of communication itself by
contrast with opposing concepts of atomism and alienation. )
It seems, then, that neither the organicist nor the atomistic base of
personality formation is obviously superior, as I describe them. This is why
1 suppose that both are necessary and that alienation is the essential human
condition. The person must risk himself in new social environments, yet
nourish himself in persisting social environment. Hence the condition for his
very existence does seem to be a kind of alienation from himself and his society.
It should be noted, however, that in adopting this view I cannot and do not re-
main neutral. I myself adopt the atomistic view and then make it self refer-
ential. If there is a legitimate conflict, between theories of personality form-
ation then clearly the ultimate conflict is between the view that there is such a
conflict and the view that there is not.
Aside from the preceding comments I shall not argue here for the correct-
ness of my view of human alienation. That argument is intrinsic to the argu-
ments made previously for a dialectical relationship among concepts and among
persons. To call a concept dialectical is, after all, just another way of saying
that it is self-alienated. Here I want only to argue the usefulness of my view
as a "working hypothesis," given present social conditions.
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Arguments from Expediency -- From the science of medicine we know
that desperate conditions require desperate remedies. It is widely claimed
that our conditions approach desperation at the time I am writing. The energy-
population squeeze, the world-wide inflationary spiral, and the capacity of
nations for mutually annihilating war are major pieces of evidence. Probably
more important still, and only a little more illusive, is the sense that we are,
indeed, in a state of growing alienation from ourselves and from each other.
At such a time as this no diagnoses of our condition should be rejected out of
hand.
My diagnosis is that we are ill precisely because we are trying to avoid
alienation. Apparent physical illness is sometimes a sign of health. Fever
may show successful struggle with a disease as may high adrenalin levels a
successful struggle with environment. In the same way, moderate alienation
may be an indication of human life and, if so, then the attempt to avoid it may
only increase it to pathological levels for some people, while reducing it to
levels equally pathological, but less apparently so, for others.
The Horns of the Planning Dilemma
Let us suppose, then, that alienation is intrinsic to human beings. How
would we see public planning and the problems which planning seeks to solve?
I propose that we take as our model the alienated personality. As described,
personality represents a dialectic between changing personality traits (the
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process of self-realization which Western culture has largely and strongly
extolled) and an enduring self identity. But planning does not usually deal with
personality directly; it deals with society. Hence, the analogous dialectic
might be this: Planned society represents a process which must simultaneously
allow for personal and social commitment while achieving a conscious ordering
of social change. The element of commitment parallels that of enduring self-
hood in the single individual. And the element of conscious change parallels
that of individual self-consciousness.
The element of commitment cannot be overemphasized. Yet it is often
taken for granted, and sometimes even tacitly rejected, in discussions of
planning. The result is that planning appears an easier, more simply rational,
and consequently a less important function than it is. But things do endure and
in their own ways. The large-scale physical city is an enormous commitment
both physically and socially. Planning would be easy if this commitment could
be abandoned, as some writers (Buckminster Fuller for example) 11 seem to
suppose and as American society has pretended to do in its frontier and more
recently in its suburban escape. But the commitment is still there, and in a
time of tightening resources it will remain so.
A person's life work is also a commitment—a psychic and social one.
Planning would be easy and, again, less necessary, if this commitment, too,
H For a brief but apt description of this attitude, see the discussion on
Fuller in Paul Goodman and Percival Goodman, Communitas: Means of Live -
lihood and Ways of Life ,. Vintage Books (2d ed. , revised; New York: Random
House, 19C>U), pp. 76-82. [Hereinafter referred to as Communitas . ]
302
could simply be abandoned. At the time of writing, the problem of job loss is
a severe one. And the main response of officialdom consists in exhortations
to be very flexible, in other words to abandon the commitment. This response
trivializes a severe problem for which the better response might well be a
serious attempt at manpower planning.
The element of conscious change is perhaps less apt to be under-empha-
sized, but that too may easily happen. For the physical environment, the goals
of growth management and environmental protection are sometimes interpreted
in such a way as virtually to stop all change. For the employment problem,
the seniority principle has often had a similar effect. Clearly, the process of
planning is no more difficult or important in the absence of change than in the
absence of commitment. To plan is to work with dilemma.
Community and Opportunity
. In what follows I shall be talking about this
particular dilemma of commitment and change but I shall use a different term-
inology and an expanded meaning. The terminology comes from Lawrence
Haworth. In The Good City he expressed the problem of planning as follows
(but did not himself see it as an enduring dilemma).
Specialization of activities and of the person is the source of the dis-
tinctive contribution that the urban environment makes to the good life. But
it is also the source of that condition of cities which renders them least like-
ly to sustain a good life. What specialization contributes to the good life is
opportunity. Because urban life is specialized it is diverse; the person con-
fronts an unlimited wealth of opportunities to act, to express himself, to
develop his potentialites. What specialization removes from life is com-
munity. By promoting a plurality of individual worlds, specialization
dissolves the continuity of persons, their sense of living a common life and
their common concerns. The problem is that of restoring community to
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the city in such a way that the distinctive contribution of city life, the
wealth of opportunity it offers, is not lost. 12
I shall use Haworth's terms in a similar though possibly broader way.
By "community" I mean, most basically, conceptual commitment. In assuming
a contextualist epistemology, I maintain that thought and action are intimately
interrelated. We may think that we are committed to a high material standard
of living, for example, but it is our concepts which determine what a high
standard is.
The definition of community is, I think, consistent with other more
common definitions which characterize it as having small scale, simplicity,
face to face relationships, or, in short, a rural-village character. Many
people would agree that the larger society is, in its conceptualizing, more
fluid and open than is the small. Some people would still see in this larger
society a conceptual commitment, although an evolving one. Others, however,
would see in it a lack of commitment—a lacunae within which opposing commit-
ments clashed. Because the latter view assumes there is more room for
fundamental conceptual and action choices in that society I accept it. And on
this latter view it is indeed true that conceptual commitment is associated with
the smaller scale society.
As our commitment is primarily conceptual, so it is our conceptual
framework which is the most important object of conscious change. By
12 Lawrence Haworth, The Good City (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1963), p. 19.
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"opportunity" I mean, therefore, an openness to conceptual change. And for
reasons already given, this definition seems consistent with the more concrete
definition of opportunity as involving a large scale, complex society, in which
face to face relationships are less common. It is in such an urban society, as
Haworth says, that there is the greatest wealth of opportunities to act and to
realize one's potentialities.
What I have called the dilemma of planning, this dialectic of opportunity
and community, is a recurring theme in the seminal literature of physical
planning. The physical environment has always provided one of the greatest
and most easily perceived canvases on which to sketch human ideas. The idea
of self -alienation is vividly expressed by the pulsating movement of people into
the city to find themselves then out to the country to renew themselves; for
people never truly succeed and the movement never ceases. The "country"
to which they return is only a suburb scarcely distinguishable, socially and
economically, from what they left.
Probably the most influential of recent planning theorists is Ebenezer
Howard whose work was the basis of the new town movement in Britain and
elsewhere. Howard spoke of three magnets. The "town magnet" provided
social and economic opportunity but at the cost of unhealthy working and living
conditions, the closing out of nature, and the "isolation of crowds. " The
"country magnet" provided the beauty of nature but lacked the advantages of the
town. And it, too, often provided an impoverished life. Howard saw this
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dilemma as resolvable through a "town-Country magnet," 13 and in fact this
town-country phenomenon has come about, partly in the form of new towns but
more commonly as suburban growth. But if suburbanization may seem to have
resolved those parts of the dilemma connected with material living standards,
it has not obviously resolved that deeper problem hinted at by the phrase
"isolation of crowds. "
Lewis Mumford speaks more directly to the latter problem by distin-
guishing between individuation and socialization. In the past, according to
him, these two were treated as alternative social philosophies. The one em-
phasized the privacy of individuals and the importance of personal freedom.
The other emphasized the importance of the community.
But Mumford too, denies that there is any dilemma, Society is primary.
Except within it human individuation would not arise. For some inexplicable
reason (probably a kind of evolution) society becomes complex, however. Thus
individuals are now highly differentiated and the theory of individuation is as
14
valid as that of socialization, but without negating it. 'Good planning is an
attempt to keep the whole environment in a state of dynamic equilibrium, in
which freedom does not mean empty chaos, and in which discipline does not
13Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-Morrow , ed. by F. J. Osborn
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1965), pp. 45-49.
14Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc. , 1938), pp. 454-56.
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mean an even more vacuous death. " 15 Today it is possible, says Mumford,
to provide a generic, equalized, standardized, communal base and to rest upon
it an individualism which is specific, standardized, even aristocratic. This
possibility comes from an abundance of energy and resources. 16
The Goodmans, also, identify what to me reflect the horns of the planning
dilemma. They distinguish between "green belt plans, " whose purpose is to
quarantine technology from domestic and social life, and "industrial plans, "
which sacrifice the latter for the sake of the former. Like Mumford, though,
and for similar reasons, they see no problem in combining these interests into
integrated plans which serve the whole man. ^
"... for the first time in history we have, spectacularly in the United
States, ... a technology of free choice. . . . And with this technology of choice,
we have an economy of abundance. . . that could underwrite sweeping reforms
1 8
and pilot experiments.
".
. .
if we want to combine town and country values in an agrindustrial
way of life, we can do that. "
The theme of dual values which appear to be opposed but really are not
ISibid.
, p. 458.
16
Ibid.
17Goodman and Goodman, Communitas , Pt. I.
18Ibid.
,
p. 11.
19Ibid.
, pp. 12-13.
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is thus central to classical planning theory. According to that theory, it is
abundance which saves us from dilemma. I disagree with the classic theory,
however. I shall argue that abundance aggravates the dilemma instead of saving
us from it.
In the examination of the thought of Lindblom and Mannheim, I therefore
see myself tracing out the two sides of the planning dilemma and elucidating
the social and personal alienation which that dilemma must express. Each side
represents, on this view, a perennial effort to resolve the dilemma by simul-
taneously cancelling and preserving the opposing position. The effort appears
as an inner debate within the writer's thought.
Lindblom, Liberal Planning
,
and Opportunity.
Lindblom 's Position --If one begins with an emphasis on conscious change,
even at some cost in social commitment, then one takes the approach which I
call "liberal planning. " The writings of Charles Lindblom illustrate it. Lind-
blom seems to accept the reality both of an existing conceptual framework (the
9 f)democratic culture) and of individual interaction, or bargaining, which is
somehow independent of that defined by the framework. It is this apparently
contradictory vision which puts him in debate with himself.
For anyone who agrees that conceptual spectacles help color our thought,
the existence of those spectacles is the first assumption, and so it is for Lind-
blom. Yet for him these spectacles do not have a. comprehensive impact. What
20See text, chap. Ill, p. 136 and footnote 8.
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exists is only a structure of sharing and agreement among more or less freely
competing interest groups. It is Adam Smith's hidden hand. Lindblom does
not seem to imagine, in most of his writing, that the conceptual framework in
which we are implicated might affect not only the matter of social agreement
but the very nature of, and structural relationships among, the groups them-
selves. Perhaps, however, the social division which is really most important
is a class division and perhaps that division limits the autonomy of groups and
the amount of free competition which is open to them.
Despite the fact that Lindblom's concept of democracy does not seem to
be a complete conceptual structure, he treats it as if it were. Democracy is
not merely a set of rules which are referred to by competing groups before
they take action. It is the phenomenon of the competition itself, understood as
something basically harmonious. Good policy is just that which results from
the competition and policy evaluation is the competition process. 21
What specifically generates Lindblom's inner debate is his continually
more elaborated attempt to identify a group competition which exists in actual-
ity- -and not as an empty category- -but which nevertheless is the manifestation
of a cohesive and pervasive culture. It may seem that he never reaches that
state of truly free competition- -that his so-called bargaining is merely the
22bee -like interaction process which he sees as democracy. It may seem,
2*See text, chap. Ill, p. 162 and footnote 52.
22See text, chap. Ill, pp. 153, 162 and footnote 52.
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then, that the need for conscious social change is never met. In fact, however,
it is the other need which is never met. This is because the apparent concept-
ual commitment from which Lindblom departs is that of non-commitment! The
culture of democracy is a culture of sharing among atoms; it is not an organic
whole.
Both Lindblom and Mannheim seem to be trying to acknowledge conceptual
commitment while at the same time giving ever more reality to the phenomenon
of conscious conceptual change. But Lindblom makes the effort in its reverse
image as it were. If one's conceptual framework interprets human action as
atomistic competition and thus, ironically, as something free of the conceptual
framework, then to make such competition more truly free is to make it a com-
petition over conceptual frameworks themselves, including the one which in-
terprets action in that way. The problem is, in form, something like the
so-called paradox of democracy. To be fully democratic is to be able to vote
away democracy.
The attempt I see in Lindblom to make his concept, of bargaining increas-
ingly real reaches its terminus, I suggest, in the attempt to show that bargain-
ing may take place over a "collective good, " where this collective good is not
merely an aggregate of lesser goods but is an overall vision of the public inter-
est. Lindblom comes close to saying this in 1965 in the Intelligence of Democ -
racy. In that work he acknowledges piecemeal collective goods, though not an
overall one. 23 But in 1972 he clearly suggests that there could be competition
"Z3See text, chap. Ill, p. 186.
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over total world views and hence over the broadest interpretations of the col-
lective good. ^
Lindblom does not specify, in much detail, what different kind of social
structure could be implied in a new world view. But he suggests that such a
social structure might not have the atomistic character of bargaining or market
exchange. Instead it would presumably involve more organic and communal
relationships. Hence the competition between world views would be ultimately
one between a competition view of society and a non -competition view. If, in
this process, the organic view prevailed then liberalism, in attempting to re-
solve the planning dilemma, would seem to have destroyed itself.
Liberal Planning -- Lindblom 's position is one expression of the theoret-
ical foundation for what I call liberal planning. (In saying this I don't acknowl-
edge any significantly real distinction between theory and practice --but there
is an analytical distinction and it is that to which I refer. )
The distinctive response of liberalism to the dilemma of conceptual
change or conceptual commitment is its decision to embrace the former and,
by its means, to try to achieve the latter. Of course it must not finally suc-
ceed or further change would be impossible. Put more concretely, the liberal
approach in planning is the continuous attempt to achieve community through
individual competition. The irony in this approach is that the community
achieved is always a community of competitors, not of organic relationships
24See text, chap. Ill, p. 149 and footnote 25.
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and cooperation.
Many professional planners would deny that liberal planning, as I de-
scribe it, represents a form of planning. For them, planning means the
conventional theory of rational policy-making. 25 Writers like Lindblom or,
on another side, John Friedmann are considered to be anti-planners. The
advocates of the rationality model admit that it poorly accords with practice
but they claim, nonetheless, that it is the proper normative theory. 1 disagree.
The rationality model points to an important something which, for me, is
missing in liberal planning- -an awareness of the reality of individual decisions
25This statement can be misleading. Until the decade of the 1960s,
American urban planners were relatively little aware of planning as a general
process. Before that time, a course in planning theory was most likely to
focus on goals and, specifically, on the ideal city literature. Such discussion
of process as there was tended to be hortatory or to refer to techniques, al-
though there were some classic works, like those of Patrick Geddes, which
might be mentioned.
An important sign of change was the discussion of the conceptual scheme
in Meyerson's and Banfield's case study of Chicago public housing policy. This
study articulated that rationality model previously implicit in American urban
planning and, at the same time, it cast doubt on the realism of the model. See
Martin Meyerson and E. C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955).
Despite the practical difficulties of the rationality model, Meyerson and
Banfield still considered it a worthwhile ideal. In 1%2 it received a more
extended discussion in the pages of the planning profession's own journal. The
article also emphasized the value of planning for widening the range of choice,
and thus it brought together the earlier Utopian interests and the new rational
process interests of planning. See Paul Davidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, "A
Choice Theory of Planning, " Journal of the American Institute of Planners ,
XXVIII (May, 1962), 103-15."
Impressed by the apparent rigor attainable in the transportation planning
of the 1960s, much of urban planning has tried to adopt the same systems
analytic approach to its own concerns. The rationality model now tends to
appear in the guise of such an approach. The goa] of the rational process may
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and of zero-sum conditions. But the model cannot be very helpful for action.
The insights it provides will need to be incorporated into some other model.
What is basically wrong with the rationality model is its dependence on
the theory -practice gap. In my view there is no such gap. Planning is a human
action, and we cannot have a cognition of such action without simultaneously
making a practical judgment on it. When we describe how policies are made
we are not providing a neutral observation. We are simultaneously describing
either how they should be made or perhaps how they should not.
Some writers on social policy-making would allow something to be called
a social policy even if it was purely capricious from the standpoint of the
society as a whole, being the outcome merely of the competing deliberations
of individuals and groups. Other writers would insist that there is no policy-
making, properly so-called, except where someone acting for the society as a
whole has based the policy on deliberations over alternatives and their con-
sequences. Lindblom is one of the first group. Advocates of the rationality
model belong to the second. It is apparent that the principal dispute between
these two groups concerns how to identify policy making. The goodness of such
policy is not at issue here since it is implicit in the identification.
be one outside the system or it may be the equilibrium of the system itself. In
any case, there has been much confidence in our ability to gain detailed quanti-
fiable knowledge about the urban system, and hence to approach the kind of
comprehensive calculation possible according to the rationality model. For an
example of this confidence, see J. Brian McLaughlin, Urban and Regional
Planning: A Systems Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).
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My point is that if a human action is possible in practice we must be able
to fully conceptualize it in theory. The rationality model is defective not simp-
ly because it has not been fully accepted. It has not been accepted because we
don't know what we are supposed to accept! Lindblom asks how we can identi-
fy general goals apart from all the relevant trade-offs and how we can know all
these trade-offs (which keep changing) in advance of choice. This is a con-
ceptual problem. When theorists mostly leave this problem for the practition-
ers they are not adopting a feasible division of labor. They are evading their
own responsibilities since the problem cannot be solved in practice unless it
is simultaneously solved in theory. Until it is solved, rational planning is not
a very legitimate theory.
The theory of liberal planning is a more legitimate theory. It is so not
because it better describes what actually happens. It better describes what
happens because it is a more legitimate theory. In distinguishing between
theory and practice, advocates of rationality are, of course, assuming an
empiricist epistemology according to which there is a neutral social reality.
But if there is none, if social concepts and social reality mesh, then there can
be more than one planning theory that appears to be "merely descriptive,
"
provided there are competing world views.
Although there is still a substantial allegiance to the rationality model,
among American urban planners, 26 allegiance is shifting toward the theories
~26see, for example ; Donald N. Rothblatt, "Rational Planning Reexamined,
"
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of liberal and radical planning. Like Molicre's gentleman who discovered he
had been speaking prose all his life, many practitioners, and even more
theorists, have realized that in "applying" their theory (i.e. in completing it)
they have really adopted the liberal model. They have functioned as brokers
among city agencies, business interests, etc. or have lobbied for a planning
interest among many other interests. ^
These newly realized liberals may still eschew Lindblom's work (de-
spite his explicit claim to be propounding another kind of planning rather than
opposing planning). But they are increasingly influenced by others who say
similar things. Altshuler's case studies of planning practice are required
reading for the American Institute of Planners membership examination. In
these studies, Altshuler echoes the Lindblom point by claiming that general
goals provide no basis for evaluating concrete alternatives. According to
Altshuler people prefer to work at lower levels of generality even if this means
fragmenting policy choices. And at these lower levels no one point of view is
obviously superior to another. The planner is a specialist among other
Journal of the American Institute of Planners , XXXVII (January, 1971), 26-37.
The rationality model has probably had more application in Western and
Eastern Europe, where legislatures are less fractionated, than in the United
States. This writer's discussion principally concerns American planning.
270ne sign of this new realization comes from statements of candidates
for office in the American Institute of Planners and in the American Society of
Planning Officials. Another is the more or less frankly acknowledged national
lobbying efforts in which the Institute is now engaged.
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specialists. ^
In an influential 1967 review of planning approaches, Bolan acknowledges
the difficulties of the rationality model but holds out hope that it need not be
9 Qlargely abandoned. By 1969, however, he has developed a supposedly value-
free description of the planning process from which he concludes the import-
ance of incremental decision-making and negotiated conflict resolution. 30 He
intimates that the planner must become a sort of broker Ons own terms are
motivator, coordinator, and consensus builder). The brokerage role is ad-
vocated explicitly by Rabinovitz who suggests that the planners will have to
assume such a role, if long-run urban problems are to be resolved. The
politicians, she says, have not successfully applied the role to that end. 31
Within the profession, the most influential and explicit of the liberal
planners is probably Davidoff. Yet, though he claims to be a pluralist, his
liberalism is perhaps more classic than that of others. He, too denies that
there is a single interpretation of the public interest, and he concludes that
2$A.lan Altshuler, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (Ithaca
New York: Cornell University Press, 1965). [Hereinafter referred to as The
City Planning Process . ]
2
^Richard S. Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning, " Journal of the Amer -
ican Institute of Planners , XXXIII (Juty, 1967), 233-45.
^Richard S. Bolan, "Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of
Planning, " Journal of the American Institute of Planners , XXXV (September
1969), 301-10.
31 Francine F. Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning (New York: Ather-
ton Press, 1969).
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planners should be advocates for interest groups. But his image of this adver-
sary planning process is the discovery of truth, as in the criminal proceedings
of a court, rather than the striking of a bargain. 32 The latter image would not
have been as hopeful for the advancement of minorities and it is that specific
purpose with which Davidoff is particularly concerned. Despite the explicit -
ness of its pluralism, Davidoff's views are perhaps the closest, among liberal
planners, to those of the radicals in planning.
Though from within the rationality model planners have clearly and con-
structively noted the defects in liberalism, they have not yet done so as they
moved within the embrace of the liberal model itself. The problem looks
easier from the outside than the inside. The new response seems often to be
one of disillusion and cynicism, as in Catanese's book on Planners and Local
33
Politics
.
Planners are just not convinced that an interest group competition
really can constitute a form of community.
In the end, American urban planners seem little happier with the liberal
model than with that of technical rationality. The frontier of planning thought
09
^Davidoff presents two different directions in his writing. His essay on
a choice theory of planning (see footnote 25) incorporates the model of rational
decision, but his essay on advocacy planning could lead away from that model.
See Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, " Journal of the Amer -
ican Institute of Planners, XXXI (November, 1965), 331-38.
^Anthony James Catancse, Planners and Local Politics: Impossible
Dreams, Sage Library of Social Research, Vol. VII (Beverly Hills, California:
Sage Publications, Inc.
,
1974).
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seems already to have moved on to radical planning. The deepest theoretical
foundations of radical planning are traceable, in part at least, to Karl Mannheim.
Mannheim, Radical Planning, and Community
Mannheim's Position -- Mannheim expresses the dialectic of conceptual
commitment and conceptual change more directly than does Lindblom. It
appears that Lindblom *s problem, in theory, is how there can be real conflict
within a democratic culture so consensual that negotiations are usually con-
sidered to be satisfactory just in being made. But I suggest that the problem,
in practice, is the reverse one of determining how a competition of atomic
individuals and groups can make a community which is more than just that
competition itself.
Unlike Lindblom, Mannheim begins his thought with a certain emphasis
on full conceptual commitment. It is commitment which does not contain within
it the idea of non-commitment as the conceptual model of the market system
would do. Mannheim's position yields a radical approach to planning. The
challenge is to achieve conscious conceptual change despite conceptual commit-
ment. Again unlike Lindblom, Mannheim sees in our conceptual spectacles not
merely a set of shared preferences but a definition of the very social structure
which would color those preferences. This becomes clearer in works sub-
sequent to his dissertation. 34 But I suggest that it is present there, also, in
some passages --for example in the claim that one may see cultural manifesta-
34See text, chap. IV, pp. 225, 237.
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tions historically, without thereby falling into relativism. 35
What generates an inner debate within much of Mannheim's thought is
his continually more elaborated attempt to realize conceptual freedom-
-to
establish that there can be people who achieve some escape from their per-
spectives
--while he yet maintains that the perspective has the character of a
total world view. This effort might be said to reach its goal in 1943 when he
suggests that individuals are so free that they can plan for religious experi-
ence. He sees religious experience in the way that earlier he saw more
purely intellectual "perspectives. " It is that which ultimately integrates and
gives meaning. If man can freely plan his conceptual commitment, by planning
for religious experience, then he would have become truly free of that commit-
ment. But in thus trying to resolve the planning dilemma, if one can interpret
Mannheim's effort in this way, his distinctive approach—the emphasis on the
priority of the conceptual commitment- -seems to have been destroyed.
Radical Planning -- The intent in radical planning is the reverse of that
in liberal planning, as regards the planning dilemma. Here one embraces
conceptual commitment to become free of it. Specifically, one wants to provide
for opportunity, for self realization, within the bounds of community. And by
community is usually meant a small community. Radical Planning, like liberal
planning, is a sophisticated concept. It is not blindly anti -system nor funda-
35See text, chap. IV, footnote 63.
36See text, chap. IV, p. 240.
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mentally violent (although for some people it may mean that).
One can develop a supposedly "merely descriptive" theory of planning
from the radical perspective as well as from the liberal one. Lindblom is
mistaken in supposing that the description of existing policy processes will
necessarily favor his own view. Consider the following contrast. Bolan
develops a descriptive theory of the planning process on the foundation of the
rationality model as modified for group decision-making. He builds the bar-
gaining model into key steps of this process and concludes, not surprisingly,
that if planners adopt this bargaining approach they are more apt to affect
action. Grand efforts to change institutions or reallocate resources are less
likely to be effective than efforts at incremental change, in his view. 37
Friedmann proposes a different descriptive theory of planning. It is organized
around a basic distinction between allocative planning, which distributes exist-
ing resources within an existing institutional framework, and innovative plan-
ning, which builds new institutions and fundamentally reallocates resources.
^
The conceptual division which Friedmann makes would be almost useless for
Bolan since the latter denies that there can be any significant amount of inno-
vative planning anyway. But it leads Friedmann to look at instances of national
planning in a country like Chile where the model seems to apply better than
37Bolan, "Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of Planning, "
p. 306.
38John Friedmann, "A Conceptual Model for the Analysis of Planning
Behavior," in A Reader in Planning Theory , ed. by Andreas Faludi (Oxford:
Pergamon Press, 197377 pp. 345-70. See especially p. 349.
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does Bolan's. (It must be admitted, however, that Friedmann's "descriptive
model" does not seem to reflect his fully developed theory of radical planning.
The more developed theory is less applicable. )
Grabow and Heskin, building in particular on the insights of Roszak, 39
have set forth some of the main features in a radical concept of planning:
We presently live under a world view consisting of the maintenance of a
mass technocratic society governed by the myth of an objective conscious-
ness, through the demands of the rational-comprehensive model, with
emphasis on an accommodating economic growth. The paradigm rising to
challenge this present concept of reality is based on systems change and the
realization of a decentralized communal society which facilitates human
development by fostering an appreciation of an ecological ethic based on the
evolutionary process: spontaneity and experimentation. 4ir
~
The authors do not mean, by the above passage, that the evolutionary
process continues only until a decentralized communal society is realized. The
realization of this society is a perpetual effort, a sort of permanent revolution,
which the radical planner helps facilitate but which he does not, in the tradi-
tional sense, "plan.
The process of evolutionary experimentation is, I think, the central
feature of radical planning. It is a process that somehow synthesizes rational
action and spontaneity so that the person engaged in social learning does not set
39xheodore Roszak, The Making of a Counterculture: Reflections on the
Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition , Anchor Books (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. , 1969).
40Stephen Grabow and Allan Heskin, "Foundations for a Radical Concept
of Planning, " Journal of the American Institute of Planners , XXXIX (March,
1973), 109.
~~
41
Ibid.
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himself apart from what is learned. 42 Friedmann develops this process into
what he calls transactive planning. Transactive planning involves subject
matter communication together with the more personal "life of dialogue. " The
transaction occurs between the abstract processed knowledge of the planner and
the more personal less generalizable knowledge of a client. 43
While the process of radical planning is learning, rather than bargaining,
the context of such planning is the small community, rather than a large society
of competing interests. The Goodmans, whose classic work describes the goals
of radical planning, though not the process, see these communities as relative
-
44
ly fixed. Recent works see them more as task forces which group and re-
group. 4 ^ What matters in any case is that the relationships among those
people within them are fully personal.
The promise of radical planning is the achievement of a society in which
people are known as wholes, as they would be in a small community, but which
does not have the provinciality or rigidity of the usual small community since
it is not a fixed community. Put another way, the learning activity which con-
tributes to human development does not alienate the person, as abstract thought
42Ibid.
43John Friedmann, Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Flan -
ning, Anchor Books (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press /Doubleday, 1973),
chap. 7. [Hereinafter referred to as Retracking America . ]
44Goodman and Goodman, Communitas , chap. 6.
45Friedmann, Retracking America, p. 196.
322
would do, because the activity is not merely abstract. It is an evolving merger
of the rational and the spontaneous, the abstract and the personal,
At the present time, the theory of radical planning is probably much more
influential among academicians than among practitioners. In its supporters
there is a sense of optimism which allows little room for second droughts or
self-criticism. The posture is in marked contrast to that of the liberal plan-
ners who, though they also are often optimistic, show a recognition of diffi-
culty, even dilemma, in their views.
What makes the optimism of radical planning so particularly frustrating
to critics is that the language of the theory tends to preclude its knowing appli-
cation, and so it is an illusive target for criticism. If the learning process is
an unspecifiable combination of the abstract and the personal, how can one
know when one is engaged in it? The theory seems impossible to apply and
hence complete, and it seems thus to produce as serious a gap between theory
and practice as does the rationality model.
Promised Resolutions of the Planning Dilemma . At the level of planning
practice neither liberal nor radical planning obviously resolves the planning
dilemma --the problem how to have both conceptual commitment and conscious
change of that commitment, or how to have both community and opportunity.
There is disillusion with the results of planning interpreted as liberalism. And
there perhaps ought to be equal disillusion with radical planning if it was ex-
amined carefully. At the level of abstract theory, however, it is possible to
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Promise a solution without being held immediately to account. I suggest that
such promised solutions are provided by both Lindblom and Mannheim.
Lindblom maintains that there is a consensual democratic culture which
is nevertheless a culture of bargaining and exchange, and is hence, by impli-
cation, one consisting of beings atomistically related to each other. To show
that the beings are so related he must show that they can question the very
exchange culture which defines them as atoms. This he seems to do in 1972
by himself arguing the case for such questioning. But he does not then abandon
his earlier support of bargaining. A. reader is left with the impression that
somehow the values of a competitive society and those of a more cooperative
organic one are compatible.
Mannheim argues for the existence of a culture which goes beyond atom-
ism in that it structures the very identity of individuals and groups, as well as
their relationships to each other. Despite the pervasive influence of this
culture, at least some individuals can loosen its influence, he maintains. To
show that individuals can become truly free, however, Mannheim must show
that they can form the culture which forms them. He appears to do this in
1943 in arguing the possibility that one can plan for religious experience. But
neither then nor later does he explicitly abandon his claim for a culture -bound
consciousness.
Perhaps the immediate reason why neither writer acknowledges a pers ist-
ent dilemma is because each assumes the prior achievement of one side and
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thus has only to focus on establishing the other. In that case, what each
assumes is that for which the other argues. Lindblom does indeed appear to
assume the reality of that atomistic individualism which, seen from Mannheim's
viewpoint as conceptual freedom, it is the tetter's purpose to establish. And
Mannheim in Large part assumes the reality of conceptual wholeness which,
seen from Lindblom 's viewpoint as social coordination, it is the latter's plan
to reveal.
But this kind of logical interdependence should cause embarrassment to
the two sides. If, say, Lindblom leaves it to someone like Mannheim to estab-
lish that social reality really is a matter of competing atomic individuals, and
Mannheim succeeds in doing so, then the latter has said that social reality is
not a matter of organic wholeness. Yet Lindblom wants to say that it is and
now his assumption seems to preclude him from saying so.
Whatever may be the immediate reason why Mannheim and Lindblom are
willing to hold apparently contradictory positions, the ultimate reason is, I
suggest, because both accept some kind of theory-practice gap. At the end of
The Intelligence of Democracy Lindblom observes that his attempt at a formal
evaluation of partisan mutual adjustment must be inconclusive, both generally
and in particular situations . In choosing among policy making methods, one
must use the incremental method, a method which cannot set forth standards in
advance. ^
46Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making
through Mutual Adjustment (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 296-300.
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Although Mannheim, in "The Sociology of Knowledge, " sets up what
appear to be fixed absolute principles
--such as the principle of situational
determinism-
-he suggested that it is not by absolutes but in what he elsewhere
calls the flux of life that a person reaches some freedom from partial per-
spectives. And even were this not so, - -even if some formulae for moving
among perspectives were attainable
--this fact, too, would be something only
discoverable as one works with the empirical data. 47
Thus Lindblom and Mannheim both say of their respective problems that
while in theory these seem likely to be resolvable, only in practice can we know
for sure and know how.
Dilemma Avoidance as Class Exploitation?
If my views are correct, as regards the status of social concepts in
general and of human alienation in particular, then planning theoreticians must
be wrong in supposing that the planning dilemma is avoidable. On the one hand,
the durability of alienation would imply the durability of a dilemma expressive
of it. And, on the other hand, there would be no theory-practice distinction to
allow for a promise of solution, at the theoretical level, which was not immed-
iately called to account by practice.
Given the above conclusions, I trace out, in this section, the expected
47j<arl Mannheim, "The Sociology of Knowledge, " chap. V appended to
Ideology and Utopia : An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge , trans, by
Edward Wirth and Edward Shils, Harvest Books (New York: Harcourt, Brace
& World, Inc.
,
1936). See pp. 300-05.
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social consequences of continuing to assume away dilemma. The analysis has
enough rough parallels to Marxist thought so that a preview in its terms might
be useful.
1. It is hypothesized that there is a contradiction in human thought. By
abstraction a person splits himself into subject and object and thus becomes
self-alienated. Once in existence this subject-object split --this self contra-
diction-
-impels the person to increasingly higher abstraction and self aware-
ness—the object pole—but also to increasing efforts at reunification of subject
and object. The development of civilization, and of cities, may be seen as the
material expression of this mental struggle.
2. There is a fundamental class division. It is based upon relative
facility at abstract thought, since abstraction is the principal control mechan-
ism in the society. Planners and planning theoreticians belong to the upper
class, or "meritocracy. "
3. There is a process of exploitation. It results from the attempts of
the meritocracy to avoid the contradiction in thought, by obscuring its existence,
and hence to delay its development. Liberal and radical planning are instances
of this attempt.
4. In these attempts at avoidance, however, the contradiction really
continues to do its work. It generates a process of increasing material control
and affluence which at first obscures the contradiction. But the growth process
is self-limiting and as it slows the contradiction becomes increasingly painful
to the lower classes without their being able to articulate the cause. This
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growth process is manifest in the physical environment as the development of
the low density urban region. The limits to that growth are also increasingly
evident in the form of intolerable congestion and pollution.
5. The contradiction reaches a kind of fruition in the natural tendency of
a meritocratic society to overproduce the number of persons needed for the
most abstract functions. The tendency is expressed by widespread higher
education. There is a three-fold result. Firstly, increasing numbers of
people become self-conscious about their world views. Secondly, upper levels
of the meritocracy, in order to justify their positions to this increasingly artic-
ulate audience, must give more attention to the applications of their abstractions.
Thirdly, this growing merger of theory and practice reveals more clearly the
basic dilemma in thought. For as these inherently contradictory abstractions
become more relevant, those who apply them become more stressed; the stress
can no longer be concentrated on others.
I have already discussed the first of the above five points --the alienating
character of thought. In this section I briefly describe the hypothesized process
of class exploitation, as it is outlined in points two through four. Point five is
elaborated in the following section.
The Meritocracy. There does exist a class division corresponding to the
theory-practice distinction and it seems to be the most fundamental division in
society. Tocqueville observes how the administrative class persisted in France
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through the Monarchy, the Republic and the Empire. 48 It continues to do
49 rv-iso. Djilas identifies a new administrative class in the self
-proclaimed
classless society of the Soviet Union. 50 But in its meritocratic attributes
this class looks like the old Czarist bureaucracy which Lenin confidently
assumed to be eliminable but quickly found was not. 51 Galbraith finds that
the American industrial economy is no longer controlled by entrepreneurs but
by highly trained experts and managers whom he calls, collectively, the
techno
-structure. The presence of a technical elite is not really new for
America, however. The old entrepreneurs may have often combined product
expertise with their other skills.
Prabably the fundamental attribute of this administrative class is the
ability of its members to think in abstractions and to organize knowledge by
48Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution,
trans, by Stuart Gilbert, Doubleday Anchor Books (Garden Gity, New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc.
,
1955). The persistence of the administrative
class is not the chief point of Tocqueville's work but it is an important one.
49
See, for evidence, Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon,
Phoenix Books (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 308.
^Milovan Djilas, "The New Class, " in Essential Works of Marxism,
ed. by Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), pp. 319-46.
^Vladimir Lenin, "State and Revolution, " in Essential Works of Marx-
ism, ed. by Arthur P. Mendel (New York: Bantam Books, 1961). See
especially pp. 131-35.
52John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Signet Books (New
York: The New American Library, 1967). See especially chaps. VI, VIII
and XXV.
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means of these abstractions. The justification for the British administrative
class is particularly explicit on this point. For the British it is not the partic-
ular subject knowledge that defines an administrative class member. In the
past what defined such a member was a certain family background combined
with a liberal education. But in recent times the membership criterion has
been, increasingly, one of mental capacity. 53
With the rapid obsolescence of technical knowledge, other countries may,
like Britain, begin to see in their administrative class less a subject matter
expertise than a capacity for rapid learning through freely abstract thought.
I shall follow Michael Young, Richard Herrnstein, and others in calling such a
class the "meritocracy.
Perhaps it is possible for a person to rise through the meritocratic class
divisions. 55 But even if it is the division itself seems highly durable. Our
53For a concise discussion, see Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain
Today
,
Harper Colophon Books (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 257-66.
54
It is not suggested that the new administrative class includes no special-
ists but that the specialist/generalist distinction is no longer the decisive one
for determining membership in the higher British administration.
On social class division as intelligence -based, see Michael Young, The
Rise of the Meritocracy : 1870-2033; An Essay on Education and Equality
(Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1958); and R. J. Herrnstein, I. Q. in the
Meritocracy, Atlantic Monthly Press Book (Boston, Massachusetts: Little,
Brown and Company, 1973).
^5See Herrnstein, I. Q. in the Meritoc racy , for the argument that intel-
ligence is largely hereditary and that a class division based on intelligence
consequently would allow little mobility.
Herrnstein has been vigorously criticized. The specific issue of the her-
itability of I. Q. is highly, even passionately, controversial. Hence, although
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admissions criteria for professional level work and for higher education con-
stantly reaffirm it.
The Unequal Burden of Alienation
. The defining attribute of the meri-
tocracy is the facility of its members at abstract thought. If alienation is a
product of abstract thought, then as abstraction becomes more pervasive
alienation will become more intense. In my view of alienation this means that
an individual will find conceptual commitment (community) must be purchased
at a higher cost in conceptual change (opportunity) and vice versa.
Conventional wisdom identifies typical examples of this conflict. There
is the ambitious business executive who sacrifices family, community life,
and geographic roots for self advancement. Conversely there is the individual
--often visualized in the United States as a second generation immigrant—who
1. Q. scores have been widely used in education and although the assumption
of native differences in intellectual capacity seems to pervade industrial
society, when the assumption itself is commented upon it is often hotly denied.
Yet it persists. Runciman, in arguing that all people should receive equal
respect but not equal praise, speaks about the different activities which chil-
dren are "good at," the fact that one person may be more "gifted" than another,
differences in "talents" some of which are more admired than others and so on.
W. G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Altitudes
to Social Inequality in Twentieth Century England (Berkeley, California: Uni-
versity 'of California Press, 1966), pp. 274-84, passim.
Lukes, after questioning the conclusiveness of the hereditarian findings
on I. Q. , admits that perhaps, after all, these findings may hold and concludes
that our objective, in any case, should be to organize society so that the
powers of its members, whether great or small, will be fully realized. Steven
Lukes, "Socialism and Equality," in The Socialist Idea, ed. by Leszek Kolakow-
ski and Stuart Hampshire (New York: Basic Books, Inc. , 1974).
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sacrifices goals of individual development in order to remain in the old home
neighborhood or town and concentrate on family nurture.
I believe that because of the meritocratic class division the burden of
increased alienation is not spread so uniformly as conventional wisdom pro-
claims. The emphasis may well shift in the direction of opportunity as regards
the upper class but overall that class benefits both in terms of opportunity and
community while, conversely, the lower class is deprived in both respects.
This inequity is not primarily attributable to any self-interested exercise of
overt power by the meritocracy. It is merely the consequence of applying
abstract thought in society. Furthermore this inequity does not seem unique
to any one political system. Its effects are apparent both in capitalist systems
and in communist ones. Whether it is eliminable in the "third world" is un-
certain.
Abstract thought appears both as analysis and synthesis. Through
analysis such thought increases the apparent complexity of reality. Through
synthesis a similarly abstract thought is utilized to control that complexity.
Hence, those who deal in abstractions find more opportunities open to them
because they can see more richness in their environment. And they find com-
munity more easily because in their power of high synthesis they necessarily
represent smaller groups than do those for whom the synthesis is provided.
For example, that ambitious business executive is one of a class of
professional and managerial people. The class, considered as a whole, is a
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relatively comfortable one, regardless of whether it is an American or a
Russian class. The work of its members is usually challenging and stimu-
lating and their opportunities for social and political participation, on a high
level, are also greater than are those of the lower class. Clearly they have
opportunities for conceptual change and growth.
But the class seems not to fully pay for these opportunities by a loss in
community. It does not encounter as much loss of personal ties or as much
traumatic change to long held beliefs as one might expect. The world of the
professional is often cosmopolitan and personal at the same time --the best of
both worlds. The few doctors, lawyers, or planners in a region can easily
know one another, often be able to be together and, through the operation of
professional ethics, have seldom in the past had to come in severe conflict.
And the professional will be treated more personally- -more flexibility, for
example, to cope with family problems and more collegial concern for them.
Of greater importance, however, is the professional's ability to maintain
his belief system. Because the system is more abstract than that of others it
can appear less subject to change. When the professional or executive ad-
vocates a change of principles it is not he who is likely to pay most dearly.
The cost is imposed largely on those who must put the principles into practice
and thus it rests more heavily on them than it would if uniformly distributed.
Consider the alienation of the industrial laborer from his work as a
result of a major conceptual change --the extreme rationalizing of the work
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process. The intensity of that alienation results, I suggest, because manage-
ment supposes that the logical analysis of work details does not imply any
substantial change in the more general management principles. It is because
of that supposition that work is allowed to become highly fragmented and
boring. 56 If the burden of change is to be uniformly spread, then management's
supposition is wrong, however.
One might resynthesize complex industrial work into large components
rather than small ones. Workers would become specialists, say, in assembling
an entire product. And having now become more valuable, and hence more
independent-minded, their coordination by management, with respect to any
future organizational change, might well become more difficult and stressful
for that management. But at the same time it is probable that their own sense
of alienation would decrease. It would become less a Hobson's choice between
individual isolation or mass action and more a matter of group conflict. In other
words, when the burden of a change in social organization is fairly spread, the
change in basic principles, and hence the impact on their custodians, may be
57
as risky and unpleasant as the change in details.
5^For an extended examination of the effects of industrial organization on
personality, one valuable though older source is Chris Argyris, Personality and
Organ ization (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).
57in a review of efforts for industrial democracy, which she finds to be
limited so far, Hirszowicz suggests that the relationship between effective
leadership, on the one hand, and worker participation in management, on the
other, is inevitably contradictory. The two principles can only coexist by
means of constant clashes and readjustments. The movement toward socialism
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The only way to eat one's cake and have it too is to take someone else's.
That this is the relationship between the meritocracy and the lower classes is
a hypothesis compatible with what we know of the latter as well as of the former.
That second generation immigrant, mentioned earlier, is a member of a
lower class. Most of the class are, comparatively speaking, deficient in
opportunities for self realization. But they seldom find themselves in a meaning-
ful community either. Supposedly this individual gains in family closeness and
community ties part of what was lost in career success. Actually it is in his
class that the family is most seriously degenerating. 58 Divorce, deficiencies
of child care, even child abuse are indications. But though the family is in de-
cline it is not being replaced by some broader community relationships. In his
work life, for example, the lower class laborer does not find his personal needs
to be treated flexibly- -he works by the time clock. And he is more apt to have
to see his fellows as adversaries, competing for his job or setting an intolerable
work pace. ^
does not resolve this contradiction but only reveals it in a new form --the con-
flict of small groups (not just in production) against the power of large-scale
bureaucratic organization. See Maria Hirszowicz, "Industrial Democracy,
Self-Management and Social Control of Production, " in The Socialist Idea , ed.
by Leszek Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire (New York: Basic Books, Inc. ,
1974).
CO
^That the lower class has more incomplete families than do higher classes
is well known. As one item of documentation, among many, sec S. Kirson Wein-
berg, Social Problems in Modern Urban Society (2d ed. ; Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey" Prentice -Hall, Inc. , 1970), pp. 153-56.
59This entire discussion of the unequal burden of alienation is not heavily
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The lack of community is as evident in the matter of belief systems as in
that of personal relationships. The simplest part of a belief system is its
explanation of the immediately tangible—the physical environment. Unfortun-
ately the physical environment has grown beyond the appreciation of those not
comfortable with high abstractions.
We live today in great "urban regions" where the functions of industrial
society are coarsely scattered. 60 It is difficult to appreciate why and how
such a region can exist. By contrast, the purpose of a small agricultural
market town was apparent. It is difficult to move around in an urban region
and the major highways are dully abstract. The old market roads displayed a
varied scenery and what difficulties there were (such as mud) were easily
understood if not always correctible. The market town had, indeed was, an
identified center, but the urban region is so multinucleated that only according
to each one's interests can he identify any very clear focus.
To the meritocracy the nature of the urban region is understandable and
it may even be exciting. Melvin Webber, Raymond Vernon and others don't
f\ 1
merely describe. They even seem to celebrate these new megalopoles.
documented. It seems unnecessary that it should be. We all recognize that, in
general , the upper levels of society live a better life in all ways than do the lower.
60por one good overview of this phenomenon, see Jean Gottman, Megalo-
polis; The Urbanized Northeastern Seaboard of the United States (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).
61Melvin M. Webber, "The Urban Place and the Nonplace Urban Realm,
"
in Explorations into Urban Str ucture , ed. by Melvin M. Webber (Philadelphia:
336
But not even the meritocracy particularly much wants to live there. Indeed
nothing more concretely demonstrates the usefulness to the meritocracy of the
theory -practice gap as the fact that many of the managers of megalopolin
society themselves flee to the outer suburbs which they try to recreate as small
villages. ^
In closing this section I want to emphasize a previous point. The kind of
exploitation engaged in by the meritocracy does not necessarily involve overt
action. If self-alienation is intrinsic to thinking man, then thinking man is in
a severe zero-sum situation and so is the society of which he is a member. It
is easy to identify the exploiting class in a severe zero-sum situation. It is the
more comfortable class. Those members of the meritocracy who must take
overt action to protect their status will not be the most comfortable members.
Those will be who need not take such action but will get the important benefits
anyway.
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 79-153; Melvin M. Webber,
"Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility: Toward an A. I. P. Con-
sensus on the Profession's Roles and Purposes, " Journal of the American
Institute of Planners , XXIX (November, 1963); and Raymond Vernon, The Myth
and Reality of Our Urban Problems (2d ed. ; Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1966).
62A major theme among celebrants of the new urban regions is that these
provide the life style which the middle class—and the poor also—really want.
The point is misleading. The fact is that each suburban resident wants this
lifestyle mainly for himself. He would usually prefer to keep the others away.
His desire was to move to the country, not to a suburb. The physical signs of
urbanity, such as sidewalks, are anathema to him.
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The Growth Ethic
--Compensation and Exacerbation
. Associated with the
Western ideal of abstract thought is the ideal of thought's development. Since
the Renaissance this development has been understood in the sense of prog-
ress --particularly scientific progress and its consequence in material progress.
Through abstract thought is achieved, supposedly, an increasingly rich analysis
of experience and an increasingly broader synthesis and control of that exper-
ience.
It is usually assumed that there is a perpetual surplus of most of the
major elements associated with this development process. Firstly, there is a
surplus of mental capacity in the most gifted of society's members. This is
supplemented by a surplus of the mechanical energy and other physical re-
sources needed to provide adequate computers and to power and supply the
technology of a computerized science. ^ There is, thirdly, a surplus of
opportunities for total personal growth, despite the role specialization required
by the technical society. ^4 And there is, finally, a surplus of that nurturing
aptitude which is sensitive to the concrete wholeness of personality and is
critical to the growth of the child and the maintenance of community ; there is
this last surplus despite an environment which makes increasing demands for
^ 3For a particularly enthusiastic presentation of this "technological
optimism, " see the writings of R. Buckminster Fuller.
^4The Horatio Alger novels are a classic expression of the belief in
surplus opportunity. For a recent incarnation, see Richard Bach, Jonathan
Livingston Seagull (New York: Macmillan, 1971).
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an abstract, complex, and fragmented response to life situations. 65 The
belief in mental and material progress, together with the assumption of surplus,
may be called the "growth ethic. " This growth ethic seems to have varying
effects on the problem of class exploitation—effects which result, I suggest,
because certain of the assumptions about surplus are false.
The most immediate effect of the growth ethic is to compensate for an
increasing loss of opportunity and community. In a highly organized technolog-
ical society opportunities for total personal growth do not appear to be in sur-
plus. They appear scarce. The best opportunities go to the meritocracy and
this is true both with respect to mental and manual work. Regarding the latter,
for example, those whose work is still craftsmanship rather than physical
routine, are apt to be the college educated and to be working for a relatively
small clientele in museums, art shops, etc. The chances for development of
^Symbolic 0f this belief is the emphasis in the women's movement on
day-care facilities for pre -school children. Here, the argument is not that the
father and mother should share more equally in child rearing, but that perhaps
neither has to do so. This writer is not speaking about the justification of such
facilities for one -parent families where the parent has to work. Nor is he
talking about mother or father substitutes where one person cares for only two
or three children. What is meant is the use of day-care facilities where a few
adults care for many children and as a means to provide greater freedom from
child-care responsibilities for both the spouses of a complete family. Such
child-care authorities as Benjamin Spock have argued against this practice,
claiming that children of three years or younger need much more attention than
such facilities can provide and that any family which is capable of giving it
should do so. Spock is saying, in other words, that the nurturing aptitude is
relatively scarce because so much is needed. Some parts of the women's
movement are saying that it is in surplus because much less is needed.
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community also tend to appear scarce, for reasons given previously.
The resulting increase in alienation appears as a loss of self-identity.
For the middle class, material affluence becomes its surrogate. Wealth be-
comes the measure of self advancement. Gifts substitute for the community
of close personal relationships. And costly physical appearance (colonial
architecture, rural character, etc. ) becomes a partial replacement for the
66
wider community. But though the material side of the growth ethic compen-
sates for middle class alienation, it does so unobtrusively. The Alger myth of
surplus opportunity and the Jeffersonian myth of small scale agrarianism
persist.
The assumption of a surplus of energy and other resources may also be
a myth, however, and if it is then the ultimate effect of the growth ethic may
be to exacerbate the problem of class exploitation rather than to compensate
for it. When self identity is tied to something quantifiable, then it becomes
relative; one has a self to the extent that one is more affluent and more mater-
ially generous than another. Consequently, the desire for material prosperity
becomes insatiable. But if there are limits to resources then the result of such
material greed (understandable as it may be) is an increasingly inequitable
distribution of resources between those with more overt political-economic
power and those with less.
66This analysis of the psychological use of wealth is similar to that made
by such social critics as Paul Goodman and Herbert Marcuse but they identify
somewhat different reasons why such compensations are needed.
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Now the assumption of resources slack may indeed be false. Resources
are resources only because of an available technology to use them, and tech-
nology may be self-limiting. For one thing there is the increasing problem of
information overload involved in measuring the reciprocal effects of phenomena
upon each other. But, for another thing, there may be an increasing need to
measure these effects. 67 The technology employed to solve problems almost
always creates others --such as the pollution problem caused by industrial
technology, or the problem of job contraction caused by management technology.
Hence, on the above analysis we can expect to find a trickle -down
process of exploitation. The higher meritocracy will try to avoid the burden
of alienation by shifting it to the middle classes. The middle classes will try
less successfully to shift it further downward but in addition they will try to
compensate for alienation through material wealth. The final result will be
that the lower classes are placed in increasingly tight zero-sum situations
since the achievement either of opportunity or community does require some
resources (education, land, etc. ). These zero-sum situations have distinct
and characteristic descriptions: "cross pressure," the "double bind" or,
most simply, "stress. "
67For persuasive statements on both points, though not connecting the
points directly with each other, see Kenneth E. F. Watt, "Planning—So There
Will Be a Future," in Ecocide --and Thoughts toward Survival , ed. by Clifton
Fadiman and Jean White (Santa Barbara, California: Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions, 1971), pp. 109-39. On the first point, in particular,
see p. 137.
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Consider an example of this trickle-down process. An academic planner
writes a book in which he argues for a massive shift of economic resources to
public needs (translation = "a massive increase in taxes") on the ground that
planning problems are otherwise unsolvable. The book receives critical
acclaim giving its author a sense of self advancement, and he finds himself
welcomed into a community of scholars who recognize the articulateness of
his position though they may quarrel with its substance. But the book makes no
great change in public policy. If it had seriously threatened to do so, the
writer would probably have become an outcast and have gravely endangered
his career as the price of his creative ideas. He is saved by the theory-
practice gap. The price of his salvation however is that there is not that mas-
sive increase in public funds which might have occurred, had he been taken more
seriously.
On a lower level of mental activity is a freshly graduated planning student
who would like to get involved in minority group advocacy but discovers that
the financing for this has dried up- -partly because the arguments of that academ-
ic planner were not effective. Even if it hadn't, the budgets of local govern-
ments are so tight, partly for the same reason, that there is little likelihood
of prying out a greater share for the poor. So the fledgling planner lays aside
his new ideas and joins a suburban planning agency which he well knows is
oriented to traditional exclusionary practices. To make matters worse, not
only must he foresake his ambitions for creative self development but he cannot
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even be confident of a pleasant working environment-
-a community of peers.
The agency budget is so short that each member must see the others as com-
petitors. The effect of this is to damage not only his office community but his
own family as well.
Faced with these prospects, the new planner opts for money. Let his
life style display self advancement. Things like luncheons and gifts can help
make up for what is missing in the community of office and home. And he will
need a lot of money- -to compensate for the criticism he receives for "selling
out" from those who didn't have to.
Near the bottom of the social system is a member of the working class
poor. There is little public money available to help him--partly because that
fledgling planner cannot afford to share his wealth—since it constitutes his
very self identity. On this member of the working poor and those beneath him
rests in crushing form, on my interpretation, that excess of alienation which
results from its partial avoidance by higher social levels.
The alienation of a person from himself is a matter of stress and some
stress, I argue, is essential. But it is stress in its most extreme forms which
the poor are made to face. A boring poorly paid work life juxtaposed to an
over-dense and often dangerous residential environment is the general mani-
festation. But there are many specific dilemmas which relate directly to the
money focus of my particular illustration.
There is a necessity to work and rigid working hours but there are no
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affordable facilities for child care.
There is unemployment but there are very few public recreation facilities
or programs in the areas of greatest need.
There is more incentive to crime as an outlet for frustrations but there
is also a harsher response by authority to such crime.
Other illustrations could be given of the claim that, on balance, the
growth ethic merely exaggerates the inequality in the burden of alienation.
But enough has been said. Having looked generally at the exploitation inherent
in dilemma avoidance we must look specifically at current planning practice
in the United States. That practice seems to contribute to the exploiting
process. After all, the planners themselves occupy relatively high positions
in the meritocracy.
Failure of Liberal and Radical Planning
.
According to the theory of
liberal planning it is possible to have a decision process in which through the
incremental interaction of individual choices a unified social result is achieved.
If this theory is correct then the problem of self-alienation, as expressed
through a conflict of opportunity and community, should be resolved when we
act in terms of the theory. It should be resolved because each individual in
realizing his own opportunities will be contributing to community. But if the
theory is a false promise then action in terms of it will simply convert the
problem of alienation into new forms not previously recognized.
The major physical product of twentieth century liberal planning is
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middle class suburbia. As a product of liberalism, suburbia should provide
its residents with opportunities for conceptual growth-opportunities provided
by interaction with the numerous viewpoints present in a metropolitan center.
And the suburban phenomenon should itself be the product of individual inter-
action rather than an imposed order. Suburbia does indeed have these char-
acteristics.
But liberal planners promise that the suburban phenomenon will also
provide for community. It is supposed that the suburbanite will encounter the
stability, small scale, and closeness to unintellectualized experience of the
small town. Only superficially does this occur, however. A suburb is not,
socially or economically, a small town. And even this superficial community
which it is is purchased at great expense to society generally. It is costly in
terms of provision of urban facilities to low density areas and of transportation
to the center. Consequently, suburban residents resist efforts to also share the
costs of the central city, though they use its services and ultimately depend
upon its existence for their jobs.
The inadequacy of revenues, and the loss of middle class interest and
leadership, in the metropolitan cores has a truly disastrous effect, though,
on community and opportunity for the lower classes. Opportunity declines as
the financial support of public education is siphoned off to the suburbs and as
commerce and industry follow in the wake of the suburban residents. Commun-
ity declines with the neglect of most inner city housing, and with the expulsion
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of current residents and frequent disruption of community life which occurs in
those few areas of redevelopment. 68
Liberal planning does not seem to fulfill its promise to achieve community
just in allowing for opportunity. The lower classes find themselves deficient
in both respects in order that the middle classes can have the physical appear-
ance of community, though often without its substance.
If liberal planning holds forth a false promise that mainly serves to
perpetuate the inequity of alienation, radical planning scarcely does better.
According to the theory of radical planning it is possible to have a decision
process which is rooted in an ongoing social system but which yet can operate
somewhat free of that system. This theory, also, implies the possibility of
avoiding self-alienation if it is correct. But, again, it may be only a false
promise.
American radical planning, as part of its central belief in an evolving
collective consciousness, usually incorporates emphases on ecological aware-
ness, widespread citizen participation, and flexibility in decision. Because he
participates, and does so free of strict rules, the individual is not, theoretic-
ally, merely a captive of the prevailing socio-conceptual system; and yet
because his participation is part of a collective contribution, involving aware-
ness of his place in all nature, neither is he separated from system.
68For one concise statement of the problem, see the foreword by Senator
Charles H. Percy in Social Science and the Urban Crisis: Introductory Readings ,
ed. by Victor B. Ficker and Herbert S. Graves (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1971).
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Closeness to the natural environment has always been considered a
fundamental part of a person's community and a major constraint on his
possibilities of self development, since it poses constraints over environmental
control. Those in the environmental movement promise that this constraining
effect need not be too serious. But that promise only seems to obscure a
shifting of constraints to lower classes. The movement justifies, for example,
physical growth controls which inhibit lower class mobility to the suburbs. 69
It justifies pollution controls which, at least in the short run, reduce their job
opportunities.
The curious notion that change
-oriented citizen participation can be built
into an established political system is one that continues to be part of many
United States federal grant programs. But a system does not willingly fund its
opposition. In physical planning the most acceptable and successful forms of
citizen participation have been those of middle and upper class neighborhoods
which have much to protect and can do so via restrictive covenants or neighbor-
hood associations. When lower classes, with less to protect and more needs,
attempt to use participation devices for making major changes in public budget
-
70
ary priorities they usually fail.
6^For a perceptive environment-oriented view of the general issues, see
Charles E. Little, "The Environment of the Poor: "Who Gives a Damn?" Con-
servation Foundation Letter
,
July, 1973, entire issue.
^°For an overview of some of the federal programs for citizen partici-
pation--and their problems --see Donald G. Hagman, Public Planning and Con -
trol of Urban and Land Development: Cases and Materials (St. Paul, Minne-
sota: West Publishing Co.
,
1973), chap. VI.
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Perhaps the most important element of radical planning theory is the
notion of openness or flexibility. As expressed by the open mindedness of the
intellectuals this was a central feature in Mannheim's thought, and it contin-
ues to be central for Friedmann and others in the notion of experimental
learning. But there is a strain of elitism in this notion if, in fact, some people
are naturally quicker to learn than are others. What we find in urban planning
practice is not inconsistent with this view that radical planning is elitist.
There is increasing flexibility in American urban planning but it tends to be
associated with increasing administrative discretion in which the average
7
1
citizen has less voice rather than more.
From these instances it appears that radical approaches to planning
have not uniformly produced a society with both community and opportunity.
Instead, the possibility of opportunities for change and growth, without such
costs to the community as ecological degradation, seems to be provided
mainly to upper classes.
How to Live with Dilemma
At this point, some words of summary are appropriate. I have argued
that abstract thought is the essence of planning and that on one view of such
71 ln fact, planning flexibility is generally defined as an increase in ad-
ministrative discretion. For one revealing indication that citizens and other
planners will reject flexibility if it implies discretion for someone else, see
Anthony James Catanese, "Plan? or Process?" Planning; The ASPO Magazine ,
XXXX (June, 1974), 14-16.
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thought it necessarily leads to self-alienation. I conditionally accept that
view. I suggest that the avoidance of self -alienation poses a dilemma in that
it seems to require individuals and societies to be characterized both by con-
ceptual change and conceptual commitment.
In public planning the two sides of this dilemma are confronted respect-
ively by the liberal and radical approaches. Each is a promise, at the level
of theory, to show how it is possible to achieve the advantage of each side
while avoiding its disadvantage. But neither approach obviously succeeds
--and
given my view of self-alienation neither could.
It is possible, however, for those who are most adept at abstract thought
to most successfully avoid its alienating effects. The theories they contrive
are helpful in this respect by obscuring the irresolvability of the dilemma.
The consequence is to intensify the dilemma by concentrating its impact on
lower social levels. In trying to escape this impact some of these classes
increase further both its total severity and its concentration on social levels
still lower.
Whatever else may be said for this view of the human situation, it must
be admitted that in the mid 1970's dilemmas do seem increasingly common.
Within the industrialized nations the relation of inflation to unemployment, of
energy needs to environmental protection, of public expenditures to private
consumption—all of these appear not only as zero-sum (they have always been
that in the short run) but as harshly zero-sum. And the relations between the
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living standards of the industrialized nations and those of the third world also
appear to be in this condition.
That these situations are truly dilemmas, however, is in various ways
denied. Optimistic labelling is the crudest device. Declining productivity and
employment, in the midst of inflation, presumably poses a less severe dilem-
ma when the former condition is labelled a "recession" rather than a "de-
pression. " Optimistic promises are a more frightening device. They involve
the need to trust, say, that the widespread harnessing of the energy in wind,
waves, or sun would have no catastrophic effects.
That there is a specific dilemma of physical planning also is evident. In
defense of community one finds increasing need for effective governmental
decentralization both to the city or town level and beneath it to that of the
neighborhood. Some cities seem in danger of social collapse without such de-
centralization. Neighborhood school boards and neighborhood corporations are
two of the most dramatic recent responses to this need.
The need for community and for decentralization is the basic truth be-
hind the suburban movement. But the suburban movement has not really met
that need for the middle class and has posed a financial impediment to its
achievement in the central cities.
In defense of opportunity there is a pressure to accept and consolidate
the new scale of the urban region. While the urban region provides multiple
opportunities for work, education and social life, this new scale also creates
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severe problems of pollution, congestion, and energy demands. To deal with
these problems, strong regional and state planning seems essential.
We have already seen, though, that the theories of liberal and radical
planning operate to deny the dilemma of planning as other dilemmas are
denied.
Cynicism and Despair—A Destructive Response to Dilemma
. Not far
beneath the optimistic words and promises there seems a present mood of
pessimism which tacitly admits that there are severe dilemmas and that we
cannot avoid them. For some observers --the cynics --this mood is less
marked than for others.
About our cities there may be serious problems, says Banfield, but no
disaster impends and, anyway, we can do little about matters. Granted that
there are concentrations of the poor in our central cities, with accompanying
problems of crime and unemployment. These people are a minority however.
The majority live in comfortable suburbs and cannot be expected to accept
major changes in income distribution or' similar changes, nor is there any
reason they should since poverty is primarily a cultural phenomenon for which
the poor are themselves to blame. 72 Banfield's cynicism may be nicely
summarized in Daniel Moynihan's slogan of "benign neglect. 11
A more active and despairing brand of cynicism is often found among
those taking a broader view. The environmentalists Ehrlich and Meadows are
72Edward C. Banfield, Hie Unhea verily City Revisited (Boston, Massa-
chusetts: Little, Brown and Com piny, 1974).
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concerned about the dilemma of world population growth and resource limits,
but they have little confidence that governments, or perhaps even most people,
will respond to it. And so their writing is directed to the self interest of
individual families. The theme is what you individually can do to save your-
self from the coming crises of energy and food. 73 It is the cynicism of
"every man for himself. "
Finally, there are those who are optimistic neither about the general
human prospect nor about the ability of individuals to save themselves from it.
For them, cynicism gives way to despair. Robert Heilbroner is concerned
about the dilemma of population growth and dwindling resources, but he sees
the emphasis on individual self interest not as a constructive response, even
for the individual, but as an aggravating one. Only social-structural solutions
could respond to the dilemmas, in his view, but just because of self interest
these are unlikely to be forthcoming either from capitalism or from commun-
ism. The prospect is for great wars of redistribution and for "lesser" crises
such as critical crop failures or fatal urban temperature inversions. Instead
74
of our controlling events, the events will control us, and not in a benign way.
Small Scale Wholes --A Constructure Response to Dilemma: Part I . If
there are severe dilemmas which confront our cities and nations, and the
73See, for example, Paul R. Ehrlich, The End of Affluence (New York:
Ballantine Books, 1974).
74Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry into the Human Prospect (New York:
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. , 1974).
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current literature of cynicism and despair acknowledges that there are, then
perhaps that literature also represents the appropriate response. But perhaps
it does not. In my view it is self-alienation from which social dilemmas
ultimately spring, and if upper classes in alienated society could be persuaded
to bear more of its burden, these dilemmas would, while not vanishing, be-
75
come much less severe.
In this last part of the dissertation, I shall draw upon the Hegelian model
of conceptual relationships, and upon my applications of that model, to suggest
a constructive response to dilemma generally and to the dilemma of planning
in particular. While the response may represent a somewhat new direction in
planning thought it is less alien to trends in its practice. The response is in
three parts.
In part 1. I consider again the problem of achieving community in a
'^Consider this point. If we agree that the root of the world's ecological
dilemma is population growth, then a close connection can be drawn between
attempts to reduce self-alienation in advanced societies and the severity of the
ecological dilemma. This writer argues that the urban region is one import-
ant means for attempting to avoid alienation. But it is costly in money and in
its demands for the technical knowledge of civil servants and consultants.
These particular knowledge demands, added to the many other such demands
in industrialized nations, have been inadequately met within those nations
themselves. The result has been a brain drain from the poorer industrialized
nations to the richer and from the underdeveloped nations to both. Within the
underdeveloped nations an analogous brain drain occurs from country to city.
Assuming that the only really effective way to change family planning practice
is by face to face contacts throughout the rural areas, and by an increase in
their living standards, then the population problem is indeed one costly side
effect of the attempt in industrialized societies to avoid alienation.
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meritocratic society. If there are levels of competence in abstract thought,
if society is a social-conceptual whole, and if the totality of the society only
exists at the highest level then how can those below that level be part of a
community? I answer, with Hegel, that the social-conceptual whole is expressed
by its "smallest part" and that this part is the whole as truly as is any other. 76
The re-creation of complete small scale community would reduce the need in
the lower meritocracy for the compensations of material affluence and hence
would reduce the dilemma -intensifying effects produced by the growth ethic.
An emphasis on the small community is central to thinking of the new
left, to some environmentalism, and to some third world ideology. But there
does not seem to be an equal emphasis on opportunities for self development.
There is indeed emphasis --an emphasis on the simpler more understandable
opportunities associated with small scale enterprise. For some people this
kind of opportunity represents a widening of opportunity. But for Western
culture generally it is apt to be a narrowing. The frontiers of the arts and
sciences are always associated with relatively large scale societies. What is
very often omitted in such literature as that of the new left is any adequate
discussion of these larger scales. In part 2. of my discussion I shall briefly
argue for their importance and persistence in the field of urban planning.
I want to argue that there can be societies which are not only small scale
76For Hegel, only when the concept is fully developed--when Spirit is
fully realized—can we speak of the whole. But it is also true that the initial
concept of Being is already Spirit in potential.
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socially and economically but also conceptually. Yet I insist that these
societies must be part of larger wholes. How is this possible? How can there
be truly competing views of society when one is more inclusive than the other,
and how can the competition persist? It will be found that I have already given
the main part of the answer to this question in part 1. In part 3. 1 consider
that answer again as it is reflected in some very recent planning theory.
Having mapped the way ahead, I shall now start out by considering more
fully the idea of small scale conceptual syntheses. I look firstly at the need
for such syntheses, secondly at the problem in meeting that need, and finally
at some resolutions of the problem.
For many people, some would say for all, the scale of society is too
large and its composition is too homogeneous. I have already described this
condition as regards the physical environment and have alluded to it as re-
gards the working environment. On the latter point, the fact is that the aver-
age worker does not know, except in the most obvious way, how his work
contributes to the total product of his organization. And he knows still less
how that organization contributes to the total economy. The scale of the
cultural environment has also become too large. The local participatory cul-
ture of church, school, and civic associations is increasingly eclipsed by a
mass culture centered on television.
When the stated point of the aforementioned criticism is to reinstitute a
more humane society- -as it is for Mumford or the Goodmans
-
-the criticism
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is often considered merely visionary and perhaps even mistaken. 77 But if the
revival of the small community is defended less for its value in reducing human
alienation than for the more immediate purpose of defusing the thread of a mass
politics it is taken more seriously. 78 In serving this latter purpose, com-
munity revival usually appears as community control—especially control over
neighborhood schools or neighborhood police. Official acceptance of increases
in such control may often be a clear response to the danger of riot.
Without a strengthening of community perceptions
,
however, it is unlikely
that community control would stem mass movements. At least it is unlikely
that this would happen if assumptions about resource limits are accepted.
Those inner city residents fighting for better schools, in New York and else-
where, have apparently accepted the society as a largely unintelligible but still
a competitive affluent one. They ask only a better chance at their share of the
79
pay-off which the middle class gets. I mean the pay-off, in large scale
77For an articulate defense of anonymous technological urban society,
see Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theo -
logical Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 1966).
78For the argument that a mass politics grows out of the elimination of
social groupings, see Hanneh Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. , 1951).
79This is not wholly true. Some advocates of community control of
schools want to ground education on a less materialistic vision of society. The
main source of support probably comes, however, from those concerned with
the educational failure of their children as indicated by the standard measures
of reading levels, jobs attainable, class mobility and the like. See Maria
Fantini and Marilyn Gittell, Decentralization: Achieving Reform (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1973), pp. 41-44.
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society, for abandoning most claim to intellectual participation. If the pay-off
is no longer available (i. e. if the living standard declines) then the major
options remaining to these residents seem to be either to join a mass politics
of negativism or to claim back an intelligible community-
-one which, though
materially poorer, has an understandable economy and a participatory culture.
There is relatively little problem in the revival of small-scale conceptual
syntheses if the large scale ones are to be abandoned— if the technology, econom-
ics, and politics of nation-states are to disappear. For then the "small" is not
part of anything larger. But if it is part of something larger then any attempt
to assert the completeness of small perspectives confronts what Whitehead
called the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. ^
The Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness is the so-called fallacy of mis-
taking the abstract for the concrete; it is similar to what is called hypostati-
zation. Whether or not, and in what sense, it could be a fallacy, examples of
the process are ubiquitous. In physical planning a classic example is the
proposal of Vitruvius to orient streets so that unpleasant winds would always be
diverted. He mistook the abstract concept of prevailing wind direction for a
0 1
concrete phenomenon, supposing that the direction was wholly invariant. 01
80Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , Mentor Books
(New York: The New American Library, 1925), pp. 52, 59.
81The views of Vitruvius are noted in Kevin Lynch, Site Planning (1st ed. ;
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1962), p. 95.
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For Whitehead it was the nature of science that earlier abstractions
were less abstract than supposed. Scientific advance was a continuing process
of escape from the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. Toulmin's discussion
of motion nicely illustrates how a concept which is highly abstract can only
gradually be appreciated for what it is. Aristotle supposed that motion was the
result of a force overcoming a resistance and this idea of motion was close to
the concrete experience of a horse pulling a cart. Newton, in abstracting from
the abstractions of Aristotle and the later ones of Gallileo, developed a com-
pletely idealized view of motion as something not the product of force but com-
pletely free of any force including even that of its own weight. 82
The scientific base of urban politics and planning largely builds on this
Whiteheadian view. Consider an urban region within which there are numerous
local governments. An understanding of how this region operates presumably
will be relatively complete and relatively abstract. An understanding of a
smaller locality within the region can be less abstract but if so this under-
standing will be more narrow and hence less complete.
A frequent suburban self-image is of a small relatively self-sufficient
community which retains the virtues of neighborliness and civic participation.
This image plays the critical role in the attempt of suburbanites to overcome
82stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry into the
Aim s of Science
,
Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper & Row, 1961),
pp. 44-59.
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the alienating effects of city life. From the regional viewpoint, however, the
image is a prime example of misplaced concreteness. The image would have
been valid in pre
-industrial times. But today the suburb is merely one highly
interdependent part of a larger whole. The suburban self-image hypostatizes
the self sufficiency of an international, moneyed, large scale industrialized
economy as the self sufficiency of a farming village.
The belief in the relative intellectual superiority of higher abstractions
over lower ones is very persuasive. Some people would even argue that there
is a moral superiority. Regarding the present example, I myself have previ-
ously said that the small town pretensions of suburbanites are at the expense
of increased alienation downtown. Nevertheless I want to argue against the
view that hypostatization is either an intellectual or a moral mistake.
I want to take specific exception to those who patronizingly acknowledge
that the more abstract and the less abstract viewpoints both have their place
but then make quite clear that the place of the lesser is always merely within
the greater. A representative instance of this pervasive view is the following
passage in which Harris argues that a city plan cannot grow out of a neighbor-
hood plan but that the neighborhood plan should "carry out" the city plan.
".
. .
it is equally mistaken to assume that in principle or in practice a large
metropolitan or city plan can grow out of neighborhood planning, and to assume
that a broad comprehensive plan can be effective without steps to carry it to
n 83
the neighborhood level. . .
"
83
Britton Harris, "Plan or Projection: An Examination of the Use of
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In this dissertation I have assumed a contextualist epistemology--one
which asserts an intimate interdependence between "concepts" and "reality. "
Hence, for me, the abstractions to which Whitehead refers cannot simply
mirror the concrete. They must to some extent structure it. But I disagree
that the process of structuring is one in which concepts and reality together
evolve toward an increasingly closer fit. I suggest, following Hegel, that it is
instead one in which the two already fit exactly.
This reality which is identical to its concepts is a paradoxical one. It is
differentiated as the concepts act to negate and thus define each other. Thus,
only as we understand all other concepts can we truly understand the one with
which we begin, but the beginning concept contains in potential all the others
84
and without it the later ones could not exist. Consequently this initial syn-
thesis is not merely as important but also as complete as the later ones.
A synthesis is an abstraction, an effort of thought. One probably cannot
sustain an abstraction in one's mind unless one continuously either broadens or
deepens it. To broaden the synthesis is, I suggest, to destroy it and provide a
Models in Planning, " Journal of the American Institute of Planners , XXVI
(November, 1960), 266.
84
"In different senses absolute spirit is both prior and posterior to its
self-alienation and return. So far as geometrical expression is applicable
at all, the whole series and each triad within it , as Hegel himself suggests,
is better symbolized by a circle than by a straight line. If it were worth
while refining the symbol further, we might imagine the dialectic as a series
of spirals bent back on itself in a circle. . . " [G. R. G. Mure, The Philoso
-
phy of Hegel, p. 37.] [This writer's emphasis. ]
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replacement at a more abstract level- -a level capable of systematizing a wider
range of what passes for experience. It is to overcome the supposed Fallacy
of Misplaced Concreteness. But to deepen the synthesis is to do something
quite different. It is to make ever more connections between the present ab-
stractions and the apparent experience. It is to entrench the supposed fallacy.
As I mean it, the distinction between broadening a synthesis and deepen-
ing it is analogous, within some professional discipline, to that between
academic activity and practical experience. And within each of these two
enterprises it parallels the distinction between "young turks" and "old fogies. "
It is also related to the distinction between inner and outer debate which I
employ in analysis of Lindblom and Mannheim.
The reason why I claim that a deepened synthesis is as complete as a
broadened one is because it is the latter which enables us to summarize, and
planning requires summarization. As the essence of planning is to abstract,
so the purpose of abstraction is not merely to mentally capture reality but to
do so in a summary form.
We normally think that summarization means simply to abstract to a
sufficiently high level. Thus for example, we provide an "abstract" to a
journal article. And we describe our army leaders as "generals" because chey
are required to abstract the general principles from more concrete experience
and hence to understand in a brief form how the parts fit together. We usually
take for granted this summarizing ability but we should not do so, for it is a
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very odd phenomenon indeed. We suppose that we can brief a government
leader about the most highly complex and varied matters and that on the basis
of those briefings he can make informed deliberate decisions. Yet he might
logically be expected to know very little of the concrete meanings of most
abstractions with which he is presented.
Again, we suppose that we teach a student by first presenting him with
the fundamental principles of a discipline and then letting him subsequently fill
in increasing detail from his experience. Granted that some subjects are
withheld until the student is older or has more background but that does not
change my main point. The fact is that we expect both government leader and
student to somehow understand the import of highly abstract concepts without
first encountering all the aspects of the phenomena to which the abstractions
apply. That this summarizing process is actually possible is not so obvious
as it seems, as I have already indicated in attempting to apply the process to
Lindblom.
In any case, our first explanation of this curious ability is that it comes
from intelligence. But that explanation is useless, amounting merely to the
circular claim that those who can understand concepts can understand concepts.
More significant explanations come, respectively, from empiricist and
contextualist epistemology, but both of these explanations are incomplete. The
empiricist tells us how to establish the non-arbitrary meaning of a concept, if
only he could find a. stable concept. Unfortunately, the operational tests give
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us a new "concept" with every replication of the operation. In the end the
empiricist seems to conclude that some concepts are just forced on us by
experience.
The contextualist tells us that we already have a relatively stable con-
ceptual framework. Now if only we could find a touchstone of non-arbitrary
meaning. But, again unfortunately, the conceptual framework seems to pre-
clude any outside test. 85 In the end the contextualist tends to conclude that
our concepts have non-arbitrary meaning simply because we all share the same
ones.
Although Lindblom adopts contextualist views (in emphasizing that differ-
ent groups have different perspectives and sometimes in his notion of a demo-
cratic consensus) he also has empiricist leanings. He argues that individual
people don't deliberately summarize since they do not know what general con-
cepts mean. Instead, through the process of bargaining among individuals over
concrete policies the social system as a whole may be said to summarize. The
unity among concrete events or objects is forced upon us by a hidden hand.
Mannheim, who is a more straightforward contextualist, concludes that
people already find themselves within a kind of summary. The perspectives
(or conceptual frameworks, or world views) which they share may be called
such. Consequently they too do not summarize deliberately. Concepts are
8
^For a discussion of the virtues and difficulties in the empiricist and
contextualist positions, see text, chap. II, pp. 24-33.
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apparently more a matter of recollection.
Are we to be satisfied with such answers? Is summary to be either the
product of sense tyranny or of the tyranny of the community of concept users?
Of course neither Lindblom nor Mannheim is satisfied with his initial view but
what I find in their ultimate responses seems more like a swapping of views
than any third alternative.
How then is deliberate summarization possible? How is it ever possible
to "come to the point?" I suggest that it is just through the hypostatizing of
concepts. Pure abstractions could not bring us there. When the empiricist
Hume argued that sense 'experience was wholly discrete he was not speaking of
sense experience as the plain man knows it. He was really speaking of ab-
stractions. Bits of color or texture are not the quintessential concrete but the
quintessential abstract. Thus when Hume observed that he had no impressions
of objects or self he was talking about the result of abstraction. 86 The result
is that we confront only flux, not specific wholes.
To know about a phenomenon we must abstract, must broaden, but then
to summarize that knowledge it seems we must narrow the abstractions by
turning them into things. Empiricists and some contextualists say we under-
stand these things by sense experience or recollection, respectively, but their
answers do not allow us to play much deliberate part in that summarizing
86DavidHume, A Treatise of Human Nature
, pp. 15-17 [Bk. I, Pt. I,
sec. VI]; and pp. 251-63, [Bk. 1, Pt. IV, sec. VIJ.
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process.
I suggest that we understand the hypostatized concept just because it is
hypostatized. We understand it by contrast with that more freely abstract but
evasive knowledge which it solidifies. For an intellectual discipline to have a
point it must embrace its enemy, "oversimplification. " Although similarly,
the point of the discipline is only understood through that same broader view
which condemns it. This logical-conceptual relationship between smaller and
larger syntheses is analogous, I think, to the relationship between community
and opportunity.
Perhaps the most vivid example, in urban planning, of the interdependence
of broader and narrower syntheses is the debate over zoning. Zoning is the
central planning power in the United States. In its traditional or "Euclidian"
form, it can be easily described as a hypostatization of the abstraction of land
use. It recognizes only a very few major uses and recognizes only a few
standard relationships among these uses. There are the simple nuisance
relationships, as between residence and industry. And there are the simple
87positive relationships as between major highways and commercial use.
The value of a hypostatized concept of land use is in taking some given
scale of urban industrial pattern and making it sufficiently stable and simple,
8?For a description of a largely Euclidian approach to zoning, see Philip
P. Green, Jr. , "Zoning, " in Local Planning Administration , ed. by Mary
McLean (3d. ed. ; Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1959),
chap. 11.
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relative to one's common "experience, " that an individual can control a part
of it and be personally identified with that control.
It may seem curious to think of zoning, and of the private property
system on which it is based, as evidence of a concrete element in society.
According to a more common view, the concept of private property is abstract
and atomistic. But all things are relative. The concept of social property is
clearly more abstract than the version we owe to Locke.
The obvious disadvantage of Euclidian zoning is that in its pure form it
cannot allow for the complexities of a large scale society. Many present day
functions planned as large units, such as shopping centers., require subtle
decisions about location and internal design. These decisions are not speci-
ficable in advance. They require a richer knowledge of economics, for ex-
ample, than the traditional zoning relationships express. Like all hypostatiz-
ing, Euclidian zoning rigidifies and thus makes economic, social, and ultimate-
ly psychic opportunities more difficult.
One may increase opportunities in use of land by replacing fixed zoning
with a broader syntheses --specifically with one which sees the subtle, volatile
relationships in land usage and proposes to control these by a process of case
o o
by case development permission. 00 Alternatively, one may try to incorporate
greater opportunities within the Euclidian structure itself by making the latter
88The American Law Institute in its Model Land Development Code
proposes tins kind of approach. Also see John W. Reps, "Requiem for Zoning.
Planning, 1964, pp. 56-67.
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more flexible.
I argue that because both syntheses are necessary for each other that
this second alternative, which deepens the existing land use synthesis, con-
stitute as much completeness as the first, which broadens it. Euclidian zoning
is the completeness of the more concrete, while the approach of development
permission represents the completeness of the more abstract.
The broader view of land use associated with development permission is
a view lifted out of the matrix of individual property relations. Land use is now
an almost completely public and abstract concern. But pure abstractions do
not make a whole, as Hume showed. This highly abstract vision of the city
tends to lack unity and direction. In Britain, which employs a process of
development control, such control has been referred to as the mockery of
on
ad-hoc -cry. oy In the United States the more inclusive understandings of the
city developed through mathematical simulations and systems analysis often do
not. even claim to be anything more than Humian associations. ^
The process of zoning as development permission involves a constant
inner struggle to attain, within the bounds of abstraction and flexibility, the
89For the difficulties in both the Euclidian and flexible approaches to
zoning, see Richard F. Babcock, "Key Issues in Land Use Controls," Planning
,
1963, pp. 14-20.
^In a review of the large -scale models of urban phenomena undertaken
in the 1960s, Lee concludes, among other things, that the models were too
comprehensive, too complicated, and too abstract to be very helpful in deciding
what to do. Douglas B. Lee, Jr. , "Requiem for Large-Scale Models," Journal
of the American Institute of Planners, XXXIX (May, 1973), 163-78.
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guidance of something more concrete and fixed. A recent state court decision
has affirmed the need for this something. 9 * The broader syntheses , in zoning
as elsewhere, lias no point unless it incorporates a narrower synthesis as its
"form. "
Of course, no conception of one's situation could be purely concrete.
An approach, such as Euclidian zoning, which is relatively more concrete
faces a reverse problem. Unless it becomes self critical, by placing itself
within a broader framework, it ceases to be effective. Hence, it involves a
constant inner struggle to achieve, within the bounds of a relatively concrete
and stable mapped plan, a flexibility based on more abstract urban science.
In other words this narrower whole only becomes one as it fits within a broader
whole which is its "material . "
From an examination of the apparent logic of summarization, and from
an example of that logic, I conclude that small scale syntheses, the intellec-
tual perspectives of "less educated," "less intelligent" people are as important
and as fully complete as those of others. But they are no more so. Each needs
91 In Fasano vs. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County
(Oregon), (507 P2d 23, 1973), the Oregon Supreme Court declared that certain
zoning decisions will no longer be granted presumptive validity. In cases of
zoning flexibility where decisions are made on a case by case basis the
burden of proof shifts to the governing body. It must show that the zone change
is harmonious with the comprehensive plan. The court does not say that the
comprehensive plan must be a mapped plan but presumably it must be a fairly
rigid document or the problem of arbitrary discretion will simply reappear in
a new form.
the other. ^
Wholes Against Wholes--A Constructive Response to Dilemma: Part II.
The literature which argues for the small community usually does not claim,
as have I, that there can be equally complete conceptual wholes which are
nevertheless on different levels. Instead it tacitly suggests either that there
need be no larger wholes or that, if there must be, that these larger ones need
be no more than loose confederations.
The Goodmans propose an ideal community based on syndicalism, the
integration of physical and mental work, the integration of personal and work
life, and relative community autonomy. But on this last crucial point of
autonomy they say nothing more. ^
According to Alperovitz, the basic issue for radicals, and one they have
not clearly addressed, is whether society can ever be organized humanely
an influential essay, Alexander argued that the city did not have a
tree -like structure coming to a point but instead was of the nature of a "semi-
lattice" with much overlap. In saying so, Alexander argued against small-
scale syntheses --or any conventional syntheses --but he did so, ironically, in
a beautifully-organized paper which itself had the classic structure of a tree.
See Christopher Alexander, "A City Is Not a Tree, " Design
,
February, 1966,
pp. 46-55.
By contrast, Aitshuler, in a previously-cited work, has taken the view
that there can be small syntheses.
".
.
.every concrete object of planner attention is a miniature of the
whole. The important analytical problems that arise in planning for an
entire urban area arise also in planning any section of it" [Alan Aitshuler,
"The Goals of Comprehensive Planning, " Journal of the American Institute
of Planners, XXXI (August, 1965), 191].
'
'Goodman and Goodman, Communitas, pp. 153-60, 170-71.
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without generating a highly centralized authoritarian system. He suggests
that it can be --that the local communities can be the building blocks for larger
political
-economic units. But in the end he too is vague as to how this is done. 94
If society is sufficiently affluent then the deficiencies of coordination
which may arise from a confederate system need not be serious. The assump-
tion of material affluence seems the ultimate reason why neither the Goodmans
nor Alperovitz attempt a more specific discussion of larger scales. 95
I disagree with the literature just sampled but will not argue the matter
at length. In research what is obvious and what needs explanation depends on
one's point of view. For this dissertation it is considered obvious that ex-
tensive world, regional, and state planning is necessary. My concern is with
the conceptual logic of contrived social wholeness, not with its necessity. A
few arguments for this necessity will nevertheless be advanced.
The development of very large scale social units was made possible by
certain methods of organization such as capitalism. But the desirability of this
scale may result more from the artistic, scientific, and technological oppor-
tunities of which it is both product and process. People come to great cities
not only, and probably not even primarily, for a better physical existence.
They come because those cities represent the cultural frontier. Many advocates
94Gar Alperovitz, "Notes towards a Pluralist Commonwealth," The
Review of Radical Political Economics , IV (Summer, 1972), 28-48.
95See Goodman and Goodman, Communitas , pp. 11, 160; and Alperovitz,
"Notes toward a Pluralist Commonwealth," p. 43.
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of a smaller scale do not accept it for themselves. Paul Goodman lived most
of his life in New York City, as Lewis Mumford still does.
Of course the provision of cultural opportunity may not require institu-
tions of the current size. And there are obvious dysfunctions-
-responsiveness
to demand for example --in the current scale of business and government. But
decentralization primarily by local initiative seems unlikely. Would General
Motors break itself up mainly as a defensive response to small competitors?
Will New York City be broken up into neighborhoods mainly by the action of
those neighborhoods, and can most functions then be handled by them? If society
disintegrates into small armed camps, the answer to both questions may be
"yes. " But under less catastrophic circumstances that answer seems unlikely.
It seems that large societies are needed not only for their own cultural ad-
vantages but as the necessary means for producing decentralization.
Proposals for decentralization are made within the context of an existing
world population, much of which lacks basic necessities, and of an existing
technology. Where this technology directly contributes to the necessities it
probably will not be abandoned for less effective forms. Nor is it likely that
those other parts of technology and social organization, which support this
effort, will be abandoned. At present the relevant technology is associated
with large scale social organization. States and nations are pervasive and
exercise great power. There are many commentators who assume that this
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condition must remain and that assumption seems to be the safest one. 96
While I agree that decentralization is not only desirable but necessary
for social survival, I also agree with those commentators who believe in the
necessity for centralization.
Can there be a clear division of responsibilities between centralized and
decentralized social units? That there can is a common assumption. But it is
questioned, of course, by both liberal and radical planners. Lindblom argues
that this division of responsibilities ignores the extent of interdependencies
among decision centers. It also ignores the problem of agency bias. Because
an agency is likely to have a distinctive viewpoint on a given matter, it may neg-
lect other considerations important to the same matter that a different agency
97
would not. 7/ Friedmann presents another important reason. The rapidity of
change militates, he notes, against a clear division of responsibility. 98
9fS
In describing the decentralist- -participatory theme among emerging
nations, Worsley points out that these nations still see the need for a strong
state. See Peter Worsley, The Third World (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1967), p. 173.
Besides the arguments for the continuation of die nation state, there are
also numerous arguments for a new governmental entity larger than cities or
counties but less than the state.
97David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom. A Strategy of Decision :
Policy Evaluation As a Social Process (New York: The Free Press, 1970),
pp. 104-06.
"
98
"Where the 'activities to be managed' are themselves subject to fre-
quent redirection and reorganization (because of rapid changes in environ-
mental conditions and the quick response times of the system), [i.e. , guid-
ance system] work and guidance can no longer be conceptually distinguished"
[Friedmann, Kctracking America , pp. 208-09].
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Now there is substantial evidence (for example in federal-local relations)
for the subtle interdependency among social units and for the speed with which
99tney change. And Altshuler, for one, has demonstrated in his case studies
the value of multi-agency perspectives on the same topic. 100 It seems, there-
fore, that division of responsibility is not a way of avoiding the dilemma posed
by the need for both centralization and decentralization. This conclusion is not
the one which liberal or radical planners draw from the above arguments since
they reject, anyway, the concept of deliberate centralization. But it is the con-
clusion which is most significant to me.
Wholes Within and Against Wholes: A Constructive Response to Dilemma :
Part III
.
The literature of urban planning theory has given little previous
recognition to the concept of a simultaneously conscious and conflictual social
whole. The traditional theory of centralized planning and systems analysis --
theory almost totally divorced from practice 1 ^1 --always assumes that the con-
102
flict can be overcome. The more relevant theory of liberal and radical
^One important source of evidence is comprised by the publications of
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.
100Altshuler, The City Planning Process .
*^This writer is referring primarily to the United States when he says
that the theory of centralized planning is largely divorced from political practice.
^•^To overcome social conflict is to find an agreed public interest or a
social welfare, function. For evidence that planners believe they have found
one, see Altshuler, The City Planning Process. .
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planning does not acknowledge conscious central planning. Wholeness is a
pre-conscious part of the social fabric intrinsic to bargaining or to exper-
iential learning.
There is some recent literature, however, which acknowledges a planning
dilemma. While the literature is small, and focuses upon the struggle for con-
trol rather than a struggle over conceptual frameworks, it seems likely to
grow and broaden. For it touches upon some very current and sensitive issues.
In 1967 Bolan hypothesized a tension in the general domain of planning.
According to Bolan this tension existed not within planning itself, but between
planning and decision -making. Furthermore this was not a tension of concepts
or meanings but one of mechanical control. Bolan's comments are nonetheless
suggestive.
In any decision environment, as the number of independent decision-
makers increase, and as functional responsibilities become increasingly
fragmented and specialized among independent decision-makers, the
capacity of the system to utilize comprehensive forms of policy-making
decreases, while the needs of the system to utilize comprehensive forms
of policy-making increases. These counter requirements produce tension
between the decision system and the planning system; a tension directly
proportional to the degree of dispersal of decision -making. -^3
Bolan did not seem to accept the tension, however. At that time, and in
later literature, he proposed to reduce it by adopting incrementalism. ^4 But
if an incremental strategy will resolve this tension then the independent decision
-
lO^gQiaj-,^ "Emerging Views of Planning, " p. 244.
*^fbid. , and see this writer's footnote 30.
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makers of his hypothesis must not be deciding anything very important or
long range, and hence the hypothesis is less interesting than it appears.
Some recent literature accepts dilemma, if only grudgingly, and pro-
poses or describes response to it. Where this response is one of words, as
distinct from action, I shall call it "heuristic dialectics. " Where the response
is both, I call it the "dialectics of action. "
One proposal for heuristic dialectics is a 1974 essay by Hudson and
others. They ask how one could see the impact of regional public service
systems "from the concrete and unique viewpoint of neighborhoods. 1,1 05 For
them, the basic question is "whether it is possible to consider simultaneously
the neighborhood's and the larger city's perceptions of costs and bene-
fits.
. .
" 106 They suggest that it is and propose a method of "dialectical
scanning. "
Dialectical scanning is a device for analyzing points of disagreement.
It isolates the parts which are clearly differences in values so that those
differences can be juxtaposed. The emphasis is on presenting a debate more
than on resolving it.
Another approach to heuristic dialectics is Churchman's concept of
"Hegelian Inquiring Systems. " Here it is supposed that the confrontation of
* ^Barclay m. Hudson, Martin Wachs and Joseph L. Schofer, "Local
Impact Evaluation in the Design of Large -Scale Urban Systems, " Journal of
the American Institute of Planners, XXXX (July, 1974), 255.
106Ibid.
,
p. 256.
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one set of underlying assumptions with another set of counter assumptions
will result in a synthesis incorporating the best elements of both. Hence for
Churchman there is confidence in resolution of debate through dialectic. 107
And there is some evidence that this confidence is justified when applied to
corporate enterprise. 108 Its success in public planning has not been demon-
strated as yet.
Most approaches to heuristic dialectics do not claim to deal with dilem-
ma but with conflict, and conflict may be resolvable. Nevertheless, these
approaches would also be useful as responses to dilemma. And the fact that
they have been proposed is tacit recognition that conflict is at least more
durable and more large scale than is supposed in other approaches to policy
study. As responses to dilemma, however, they only tell how to display the
conflicts, not how to live with them. It is only a dialectics of action that could
do the latter.
We want to know how to live with conditions where community and societal
viewpoints both interlock and compete. As case studies we would look for
organizations which either have a centralized internal organization or them-
selves act as the central control for a larger organization. Among the internally
^C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts
of Systems and Organization (New York: Basic Books, 1971). chaps. 7 and 8.
1"°R. O. Mason, "A Dialectical Approach to Strategic Planning," Manage-
ment Science, XV (April, 1969), B-403-14.
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centralized organizations we would look for those which also allow substantial
internal decentralization. An example would consist of those major corpor-
ations which have developed successful programs of job expansion and some
worker control. Among those organizations which act as central controls we
look for that subgroup which designates some of its members as area repre-
sentatives.
In planning literature the best example is perhaps an interview study by
the Needlemans on the community planning experiment in several United States
109
cities. Community planning is the assignment of individual staff members
to specific areas within the city. Each community planner is supposed to work
closely with the district residents in developing a plan for their area. This
new approach to planning seems to have developed as a response to urban
unrest partly in lieu of money responses, the latter being unavailable. Com-
munity planners represent only one part of any agency staff, the remainder
consisting of those responsible for the city-wide plan or some of its functional
elements.
What the Needlemans found in those agencies which had adopted commun-
ity planning was evidence of intense dilemma and cross -pressure. It fell
•^Martin L. Needleman and Carolyn Emerson Needleman, Guerrillas in
the Bureaucracy: The Community Planning Experiment in the United States
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974). This work was originally Martin Needle-
man's doctoral dissertation prepared for the State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1972. As a dissertation, it appeared under the more revealing main
title of Plann ing against Itself.
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principally upon the community planners but to some extent on the entire staff.
This cross
-pressure resulted, in my terms, because the agency was attempting
to integrate different levels of wholes. The city-wide planners were committed
to a relatively abstract whole, this being the concept of physical land use. The
concept was broad, as abstractions can be broad, but was narrow in the sense
that other urban functions were handled elsewhere in government. The Needle
-
mans describe this traditional planning as "encapsulated. " It was organized
as an "elite council" in which decision
-making was limited to a small group of
insiders.
The community planners dealt with richer more concrete wholes. The
agencies had not intended this result but community residents, many of whose
problems were more social than physical, tended to insist upon it. Hence
community planning became expansionist and intruded into the domains of the
city operating agencies. This form of planning was organized as an "arena
council" in which decision making became an open forum.
A community planner was placed in a double -bind. On the one hand, he
was urged by his agency to develop rapport with the community. In order to do
this he had to demonstrate a primary allegiance to it. The most credible dem-
onstration was to effectively pressure the city government on the community's
behalf--it was to follow an expansionist, arena council view of planning.
On the other hand, his superiors expected the community planner to
provide simply a divisible part of the traditional comprehensive plan. He was
supposed to follow the encapsulated, elite council view.
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As the community planners were cross
-pressured, so the planning depart-
ment itself became polarized between them and the comprehensive planners.
Polarization expressed itself variously as disputes over basic planning theory
and failures in coordination.
One might expect that a planning approach so organizationally disruptive
could not last. But the Needlemans think otherwise. The organization of an
American planning agency already reflects, they suggest, the schizophrenic
nature of its functions. To maintain its pretensions to long range central plan-
ning, in a polity basically hostile to that approach, an American planning
agency must always be prepared to put aside other matters when asked for re-
search services to the city council and to operating agencies, and it must always
be ready to take advantage of the latest federal or state programs. This makes
for a crisis -oriented work process and a lack of clear organizational hierarchy.
Because the agency can offer little salary, relative to the abilities it requires,
it instead offers autonomy. This makes for a chronic lack of coordination.
Given the nature of plan agency organization, a director has few incentives at
his disposal to keep independent employees in line other than dismissal and the
termination of the community planning experiment.
It appears then, according to the Needlemans, that most professionals
involved in the community planning process have experienced an increase in
stress. This condition results from their attempt to live with dilemma --to
live with an agency which embraces two contradictory forms of planning or, in
my terms, two different levels of the whole.
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The principal significance of the study is that the less a community
planner was able to avoid being cross
-pressured the more effective he was in
his community. The initial intent of most community planners was to function
as "urban guerillas"
--to operate under cover. But really effective pressure
on operating agencies or city council was eventually certain to blow the cover
of a community planner and sharply increase the cross
-pressures upon him.
The community, having tasted success, now pressured for more action, while
the government establishment, stung by unaccustomed demands and by surpris-
ingly knowledgeable lobbying, pressured for less.
It seems clear that what the Needlemans document is a redistribution of
stress. Groups previously apathetic and deeply alienated now see the possi-
bility that someone in the socio-political system has their interests at heart.
And this is no foundation-sponsored consultant type advocate planner, nor is
it somebody dependent on highly capricious federal programs. It is someone
whose role is built into the system and whose commitment to the community is
supposed to be a permanent in-depth one. But to build opposition into a system
is necessarily to build stress into the adversary role.
In reflecting upon their study, the Needlemans do not see this redistri-
bution of stress as a long term condition. For them, the community planning
experiment, given the presently inadequate financing of our cities, is likely to
intensify the self-interest of different groups. In view of present financial
problems, however, they consider this result to be a "necessary step backward"
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from a more harmonious and rational planning process.
But how can the financial problem improve? Perhaps it can do so only as
the burden of social dilemma is dispersed across society and as the compen-
sations of material affluence therefore become less necessary. Perhaps only
as the suburbs are organized to fight for meaning and esteem in the way that
the inner city has been organized to fight for material goods will the zero-sum
game of the metropolis become less severe. If this is so, then what the
Needlemans describe is not perhaps so much a step backward from rational
planning as it is the shape of things to come, at least for a long time.
The natural pressures of a meritocratic society would further articulate
this struggle between community and society. Through a mass higher educa-
tion, now aggressively reaching out to the public, the opportunity to concept-
ualize and control his social environment again begins to seem a possibility to
the average person. And because a meritocracy is likely to overproduce the
skills needed for the highest positions, there will be increasing numbers of
people interested in intellectual synthesis who find that the only opportunities
for use of those skills are provided at lower levels of abstraction and among
lower level social institutions than would previously have been the case. The
result will probably be an increase in the number of people who are willing,
perhaps anxious, to play the role of community advocate. But it will not be a
comfortable role for them. Nor will those in higher positions find their roles
so stress free as they once were.
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A struggle of wholes within but against wholes may be a necessary human
burden but it is a burden nonetheless.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Mure has suggested that:
The reader who tackles a work of Hegel for the first time should, as a
preliminary exercise, take any process of development, the growth of an
organism, an historical movement, or the course of what strikes him as
a well constructed novel or play, and try to reflect on it at a level beyond
pictorial thinking. He should try.
. .to think what really is that movement
which he already calls development. Then, as he reads Hegel, he should
treat the triadic notation as an indespensable but rough sign-posting of the
route and watch to see whether there may not be triads (on any scale)
which not only reveal sublation in the very heart of things but suggest that
it cannot be something merely sporadic and accidental. i
Tli is is the method I have tried to follow in this essay but I have used it as
much to understand the processes I study as to understand Hegel.
I begin by assuming, with Hegel, that thinking man is necessarily a
division of objective and subjective self. I assume that human life is a cease-
less struggle to recombine these aspects into a whole, thus providing com-
munity and avoiding anomie, while at the same time it is a similarly ceaseless
struggle to ever more sharply distinguish them, thus providing opportunity
and avoiding alienation.
I apply the Hegelian approach primarily by tracing the development of
*G. R. G. Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel (London: Oxford University
Press, 1965), pp. 38-39.
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two people's thought about wholeness. I see this thought as the attempt to
reconcile without eliminating-
-to sublate in Hegel's words-two expressions
of the subject-object split. Charles Lindblom tries to allow for real human
conflict (the object side of human society) within a democratic society so con-
sensual (so clearly of the subject side) that the interaction among people is
presumed to constitute a kind of automatic agreement and harmony. Karl
Mannheim tries to allow for a freedom from the point of view involved in a
socio-conceptual order (again the object side) but to allow for ic precisely
within this socio-conceptual order (which is itself the subject side).
I see the Lindblom and Mannheim efforts not as producing a resolution
of their respective debates but as internalizing these debates. And I see the
pattern of this internalizing process as a roughly triadic one. There is firstly
an attempt to baldly identify the subject and object poles. But then there is
secondly an attempt to differentiate out the object pole so that it really means
something—so that "bargaining" is not, for Lindblom, just another name for
consensus and so that "relationism" is not, for Mannheim, just another ad-
mission of relativism. Following the attempt to give meaning to the object
pole there is thirdly the need to recombine subject and object, although the
result of the third step is to destroy those meanings provided in the second
step, if the argument is allowed to stop at this point.
1 see the pattern of debate as a series of circular arguments, contained
within each other. Each broader argument begins, however, by introducing a
new distinction which denies the totality of the preceding arguments. Con-
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sequently these arguments are not only circles within circles; they are circles
within and against circles.
Because Lindblom and Mannheim do not resolve their debates about
wholeness we cannot apply their arguments directly to the planning situation.
But we can examine the dialectical pattern of their continuing debates with
themselves to see if a similar pattern may be found in ordered or planned
society. I suggest that it may. I suggest that planned society is perhaps best
understood as a dialectical pattern of conceptual frameworks in which the ones
smaller and nearer to what we usually call the concrete provide the point and
purpose to the ones larger and more abstract, while these larger ones provide
the specialized concepts which serve as the material for the purposes of the
smaller. 1 suggest that our acknowledged ability to summarize and come to
a point, in an intellectual effort, is itself an acknowledgement that these smalle:
conceptual wholes are valid. If they were not, it seems that we could not teach
principles without first teaching their extensive application.
I have argued that the subject-object conflict is expressed, in a bureau-
cratized society, through a necessary competition of larger and smaller con-
ceptual frameworks but that the custodians of the broader views --the bureau-
crats and professionals --have largely avoided this competition by denying the
legitimacy of the smaller views.
But I have also advanced the claim that the natural tendency of a society
based on thought (and thought creates all the problems I am speaking of) is to
educate everyone to the maximum ability and hence to overproduce the number
of persons needed in the highest parts of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The
result, I believe, is a self correction of the tendency for the administrative
class to avoid the human struggle. Some members of that class must find
their best opportunities for intellectual synthesis at lower steps. In a planning
agency they may become advocates of neighborhood perceptions against those
of the city or advocates of city perceptions against those of the state. In a
school system they may be advocates and agents of a neighborhood school
board. In industry they may be spokesmen for functional work groupings which
result from a process of job expansion.
The result of these new demands on administrators is to increase the
stress of life for them while probably reducing it for those in lower positions
of the bureaucratic society. Previously, those lower classes endured sparse
opportunities for self realization and a disintegrated communal life because the
scale of a highly rationalized society had grown beyond them. But if the nature
of men and society is not rational but dialectical- -not a logical order of one
great whole but a paradoxical order of large and small wholes --then the recog-
nition of that fact will help distribute the necessary pain of being human across
the entire spectrum of society. By insisting on the integrity of those smaller
wholes over against the necessary integrity, also, of the larger, one will im-
pose greater stress on those who by virtue of their control positions must
straddle both sides.
From the standpoint of the meritocratic class itself my speculation may
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present a gloomy prospect. Faced with this prospect one cannot help but look
once again at the alternate promises of liberal and radical planning-
-promises
that the dilemma of planning and of planned society is avoidable and that no one,
either "great" or "small, " need anticipate a permanent self -alienation.
Let us look at those promises in the context of the community planning
situation, since that situation seems to typify the sort of challenges I envision.
Why isn't community planning just another expression of partisan mutual ad-
justment? It seems so with its emphasis on a plurality of groups in competition
with each other. Is there not a good possibility that this process could result
in a mutually satisfactory accommodation?
My answer is simple. There is surely such a possibility if we make
certain assumptions about our concepts. Of course we cannot assume that
planning concepts are just "out there" in the physical world. We know very
well that they are social products, and the concept of wholeness most obviously
so. But if they are social products then on one view they must involve a pre-
conscious consensus. If it was not pre -conscious we could disagree but if it
was not consensual we could not be communicating.
Now when these concepts, which are social products, are also about
society, they are not merely theoretical. They define action as they simul-
taneously describe it. And since mutual accommodation is obviously a value
concept, then if the concept is consensual- -if we can agree on what it means --
we have agreed as to when it exists. Hence we have agreed on our values. If
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a community planner and a comprehensive planner can agree on what consti-
tutes a "mutual accommodation" between the locating of a highway and the
protection of neighborhood housing then they have of course already agreed on
what to do.
If we accept the above logic of concepts
--which is what I have called a
degree of truth logic --then the theory of liberal planning may well convince us
that we do not face dilemma, though it is less the substance of the theory which
is convincing and more the sheer fact that we can understand it.
But I do not accept a degree of truth logic, for purposes of this essay.
I agree that concepts are social products and that we can communicate them to
each other. But I don't agree that communication implies a basic and pre -con-
scious consensus. For me it implies fundamental disagreement because for me
it is wholly conscious. Consciousness is what divides us, within ourselves,
into subject and object. The resulting division is projected onto the social
world in the form of debates, such as that between conservatives and liberals.
We can communicate with those of opposing views because we have the core
of that opposition within ourselves.
The concepts envisioned by a degree of reality logic also are social
products. When they, too, are about social reality, they, too, define action
in process of describing it. But here they do so by conflict. Let me return
now to my illustration.
If the community planner does not reach agreement with the comprehensive
planner on the highway-neighborhood tradeoff, they both must somehow con-
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ceptualize this failure. If both planners have accepted the theory of liberal
planning they will of course describe the failure as a failure in bargaining. But
they obviously cannot point to an agreed operational definition of bargaining.
For if they could do so then by theory the bargaining should have issued in
agreement. Hence each must define his concept in opposition to die others and
will understand the others as some form of hierarchy. Each will say that the
other really isn't willing to bargain but wants to impose his own views instead.
The community planner will probably call the comprehensive planner a
tool of the local elite while the latter will reply that the former is one of those
radical elitists. But each will know that he himself is necessarily caught in a
contradiction
.
Each wants to say both that if his wishes were to prevail then
that would be coordination and that if anyone's wishes prevail over the objections
of another then that is not coordination. His liberal planning confronts him with
dilemma.
From such analysis I conclude that liberal planning is not an alternative
to the struggle of wholes against wholes which the Needlemans describe. It is
not, that is, if we deny the assumption of a basic conceptual consensus. In-
stead the self-styled liberal planners are themselves engaged in this dialectical
struggle though they interpret it in another way.
In one sense my view of planning is indeed pluralistic. I emphasize the
struggle of groups with each other. But in another sense it is not. If the
struggle is only an outward struggle then I say that it will become intolerable in
its intensity, since on my supposition there is no pervasive consensus to mod-
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erate this struggle. It is through the internalizing of the pluralist struggle
within each individual person, so that each becomes aware of the great truth
in his opponent's views as well as that in his own, that the outer struggle be-
comes moderate and endurable.
If liberal planning is not a way out of the somewhat unpleasant prospects
I describe then why not radical planning? Couldn't community planning be con-
sidered the prime expression of a learning society? Isn't it possible to recon-
cile the needs of large and small social units if each person remains flexible
and experimental in his attitudes?
Again let us consider my illustration. If we assume in advance that the
community planner and the comprehensive planner will agree, then of course
we have assumed that something like liberal or radical planning will work. I
did not make such an assumption before and will not do so now. It would con-
tradict the basic assumption I have made about the inherently conflictual nature
of social reality.
What happens then if we assume, again, that our two planners do not
agree but if we now suppose that they consider themselves radical planners
rather than liberals. In that case, failure to agree will be described as a
failure in learning. And, again, it will signal a failure to agree on the oper-
ational definition of the concept.
Each will define himself as learning, in contrast to the other who will be
said to be caught in a rigid conceptual system. The community planner may
say that the comprehensive planner is a captive of obsolete abstractions and
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does not appreciate the personal small scale realities of the city. The com-
prehensive planner may accuse the other of an equally abstract pluralism which
does not recognize that social problems can only be resolved by large scale
system change.
But it is true, again, that each will be caught in a contradiction. Each
wants to say that if his views were accepted then that would represent conceptual
advance but yet if anyone's views are accepted by someone who nevertheless
disagrees with them then that is not conceptual advance since it does not reflect
understanding.
So 1 conclude that the radical approach is no more an answer to the prob-
lem revealed in community planning than is the liberal one. These planners
too are engaged in a dialectical struggle which they describe otherwise.
But as in one sense my view of planning is pluralistic so it is also radical.
1 emphasize the need for a new consciousness among planners --one which better
accords with their real situation. The enemy which I believe this new conscious-
ness will reveal, however, is not someone external. It is the planners them -
selves in their efforts to avoid inevitable dilemmas.
In these last chapters I have developed a frankly speculative hypothesis
about the nature of planned social wholeness. The hypothesis arises out of that
pessimistic vision of the human prospect which is common at the time of writing.
I feel instinctively that this vision is accurate. And if it is, then we ought to
consider every plausible explanation for our situation, and every plausible
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response. Desperate conditions may require desperate remedies.
I have hypothesized that our problems result from that attribute which
we usually take as their salvation-human thought. It is in our attempts to
avoid the inherently alienating effects of thought, so I argue, that we have made
the problems so severe. If this is so, our true salvation is to accept this
burden of alienation and to fully share it. It is to participate in that very
stressful process of integrating conceptual wholes
--world views
--of widely
different scope.
My purpose in presenting this hypothesis is not to start some new trends.
There is already much happening in higher organization that parallels the kind
of pressure system which has been descried. My purpose is to argue for the
possible virtue in those trends—and hence, perhaps, to make them more en-
durable. Perhaps. I personally believe that my hypothesis is correct. But
I do not like it.
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